THE GENEALOGY OF NIETZSCHE – FROM A PHENOMENOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

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Abstract According to Foucault, the purpose of the Nietzschean genealogy is not to "restore an unbroken continuity", on the contrary, it is to show dispersion, error, accident, "to follow the complex course of descent". Contrary to this view, the present study emphasises that Nietzsche's genealogy, cannot be seen as reconstructions of fragmented little stories, but a large-scale experiment that tells *the transcendental history of European humanity*, while employing a pluralistic diversity of approaches, primarily the *naturalist-psychologist* and the *metaphysical-historico-philosophical* perspective. Nietzsche gave a *psychologist* explanation of how man became a *metaphysical* being.
Keywords Genealogy, Nietzsche, Foucault, phenomenology, transcendental history, morality.

Introduction

The present paper interprets *On the Genealogy of Morality* as a unified whole through such phenomenological concepts as transcendental history, original foundation, and destruction. The phenomenological perspective allows a unified treatment of the work, despite the fact that it employs psychological, sociological, and metaphysical-historico-philosophical approaches. The psychological and sociological approaches have a primarily critical, revealing function, while the metaphysical-historico-philosophical approach is action and future-oriented. From a phenomenological perspective, the stories described in the *Genealogy* tell us about the interdependent original foundations of human self-relation: i.e., Nietzsche provides a psychological explanation to how man became a metaphysical being. According to Nietzsche, we have reached a historical turning point because the ultimate ascetic intellects have been

undermined, and if man as a metaphysical being is incapable of a further original self-relational foundation, i.e., cannot transcend himself as overman (Übermensch), then the history of humanity will become an intellect- and transcendenceless desert.

Given the diversity of approaches employed by Nietzsche, his philosophy can be interpreted from very different perspectives, as Keith Ansell-Pearson says: "naturalism, existentialism, phenomenology, and poststructuralism can all, with a degree of plausibility, claim themselves heirs to his thinking."[1] In contrast to interpretations that are sometimes to some extent one-sided, such as the naturalistic, psychologistic interpretations of Nietzsche,[2] or which see the *Genealogy* as a critique,[3] as emancipation,[4] or as Foucault did,[5] as a precursor to his own philosophy,[6] the present paper attempts to take Nietzsche's

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[1] Keith Ansell-Pearson "The Philosophy of the Morning: Philosophy and Phenomenology in Nietzsche's *Dawn,*" in *Nietzsche and Phenomenology. Power, Life, Subjectivity*, ed. Élodie Boublil, Christine Daigle (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2013), 217.

[2] "The *Genealogy*, in turn, is Nietzsche's most systematic attempt to give a *naturalized* account of the phenomenon of morality." (Brian Leiter, *Nietzsche on Morality*, (London: Routledge, 2002), 3. For a critical exposition of Leiter's interpretation, see Christopher Janaway, *Beyond Selflessness. Reading Nietzsche's Genealogy*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 35-39. Janaway's conclusion is remarkable. "Nietzsche cannot simply assume scientific practice as a fixed and unproblematic paradigm for his enquiry into values, since he regards scientific practice as imbued with the very values he spends most of his time calling into question." Janaway, *Beyond Selflessness*, 53.

[3] See, e.g., Martin Saar, *Genealogie als Kritik. Geschichte und Theorie des Subjekts nach Nietzsche und Foucault* (Frankfurt am Main/New York: Campus Verlag, 2007, see also David Couzens Hoy, "Nietzsche, Hume, and the Genealogical Method," in *Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality: Essays on Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morals,* ed. Richard Schacht (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 264-265). It is noteworthy in Saar's analysis that he interprets genealogical critique as "opening up spaces of possibility" for "other relations, actions and identities" (Saar, *Genealogie als Kritik*, 294).

[4] When elucidating Foucault's interpretation of Nietzsche, David Owen concludes: "[i]t is in this way that genealogy performs its inherent aim to be the self-consciousness of a process of enlightenment and emancipation" (David Owen, *Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morality* (Stocksfield: Acumen, 2007), 149).

[5] Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," in *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews,* ed. Donald F. Bouchard, tr. Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), 139-164.

[6] "Foucault's interest in Nietzsche is motivated solely by the methodological premises of his own thinking," Alfons Reckerman, *Lesarten der Philosophie Nietzsches* (Berlin, New York: de Gruyter, 2003), 29.

psychological, sociological and metaphysical approaches into account in an integrated way through a phenomenological approach.[7]

Reading the first and last paragraphs of *On the Genealogy of Morality* in relation to each other reveals a connection that points beyond the apparent moral philosophical perspective.[8] The initial and final perspectives formulate and connect two philosophical questions of fundamental significance which though fall outside the scope of moral philosophy in the narrower sense but linking and answering these questions require moral philosophical considerations.

The opening of the book addresses the limitations of the self-knowledge of cognitive man: "We are unknown to ourselves [...]. We have never looked for ourselves - so how are we ever supposed to find ourselves?"[9] "sometimes, we, too *afterwards* [...] (are) astonished, taken aback: [...] 'Who are we in fact?'" (Ibid.). Nietzsche here is not merely preoccupied with our self-knowledge, but instead with the deficit of our existence, more precisely, he argues that by not seeking and, of course, not knowing ourselves, we are not even ourselves.

Then Nietzsche begins his last paragraph as follows: "Except for the aescetic ideals: man, the animal man, had no meaning up to now. His existence on earth had no purpose; 'What is man for actually?' was a question without answer; there was no *will* for man and earth; behind every great human destiny sounded the even louder refrain 'in vain!'" (*KSA* 5, 411, in English: 120). Nietzsche makes remarkable statements here: 1.) He connects the question of meaning (Sinn) with moral ideals: human existence receives a meaning if and to the extent, there is a valid moral order. 2.) He defines man as an animal, that is, he breaks with the notion that man is a "citizen of two worlds," an intelligent living being who acquires his

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[7] Stuart Elden explores parallels in the philosophies of Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Foucault in relation to the concept of "historical a priori" (Stuart Elden "Reading Genealogy as Historical Ontology," in *Foucault and Heidegger: Critical Encounters*, ed. Alan Milchman and Alan Rosenberg (Minneapolis, London: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), 187–205). According to him, Foucault's concept "bears definite comparison with the understanding as history found in Nietzsche and Heidegger" (ibid. 197, see also 199).

[8] Annemarie Pieper, for instance, considers the Genealogy Nietzsche's version of the "Critique of the Practical Reason" (see Annamarie Pieper, "Vorrede," in *Friedrich Nietzsche Zur Genealogie der Moral*, ed. Otfried Höffe (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2004) 15.

[9] Friedrich Nietzsche *Jenseits von Gut und Böse, Zur Genealogie der Moral*, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (München: de Gruyter, 1999), hereinafter referred to as *KSA* 5, 247, in English: *Beyond Good and Evil. Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future,* ed. Rolf-Peter Horstmann and Judith Norman, tr. Judith Norman (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), *On the Genealogy of Morality,* ed. Keith Ansell-Pearson, tr. Carol Diethe, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 3.

true identity through being part of the intelligible world. 3.) Will is the key momentum by which the lack of meaning can be remedied.

The question of the ultimate meaning of self-identity and human existence thus provides the external framework for the genealogical study of morality. If we attempt to answer why the philosopher chose this framework, it is worth starting from the idea - which defines Nietzsche's whole work - that our moral presuppositions contain such false premises that affect our *whole* program of cognition and severely damage its truth content. Consequently, Nietzsche, even in his very early writings, attempts to rethink the problem of cognition and truth from a position outside morality (außermoralisch). The title of his short piece written in 1872/73 already connects the position outside morality and the question concerning truth: "Ueber Wahrheit und Lüge im aussermoralischen Sinne." Nietzsche, in this fascinating text, states that cognition "invented" by man and the human intellect are in fact "tools" (Mittel) developed in the interest of survival - which are: "deception, flattery, lying and cheating, speaking behind the backs of others, keeping up appearances, living in borrowed finery, wearing masks, the drapery of convention, play-acting for the benefit of others and oneself"[10]; the original purpose of human cognition was not discovering the truth, far from it. The morality that defines humanity supports this self-deceptive or at least indifferent attitude to truth.[11]

In one of his most mature and well-thought-out works, *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche approaches the relationship between morality and cognition from a similar perspective: "The power of moral prejudice has deeply affected the most spiritual world, which seems like the coldest world, the one most likely to be devoid of any presupposition (voraussetzungsloseste) – and the effect has been manifestly harmful, hindering, dazzling and distorting" (*KSA* 5, 38, in English: 23). For this reason, it seems essential for Nietzsche to take a position beyond the prevailing morality: "we are sailing straight *over and away from* morality;

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[10] Friedrich Nietzsche *Die Geburt der Tragödie. Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen*, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (München: de Gruyter, 1999), hereinafter referred to as *KSA* 1, 876, in English: *The Birth of the Tragedy and other Writings,* ed. Raymond Geuss and Ronald Speirs, tr. Ronald Speirs (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 142, *Untimely Meditations,* ed. Daniel Breazeale, tr. R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

[11] "What, then, is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonymies, anthropomorphisms, in short a sum of human relations which have been subjected to poetic and rhetorical intensification, […] truths are illusions of which we have forgotten that they are illusions, […] to put it in moral terms, the obligation to lie in accordance with firmly established convention, to lie *en masse* and in a style that is binding for all" (*KSA* 1, 880-881, in English: 146).

we are crushing and perhaps destroying the remnants of our own morality by daring to travel there […]" (*KSA* 5, 38-39, in English: 23).

To acquire true self-knowledge, self-understanding, we must put an end to our moral prejudices and our blind trust in the value of morality without analysis, without thinking; in the *Genealogy*-book, he says: "we need a critique of moral values, *the value of these values should itself, for once, be examined*" (*KSA* 5, 253, in English: 6). The prevailing morality, and belief in the value of morality in general, is a tenacious obstacle to our self-knowledge, to become clear about ourselves, how we exist and, of course, how we could exist if we got rid of our self-deceiving, lying innervations. The mission statement of the *Genealogy*-book seems clear in this respect: the question of the origin of morality, in the words of a later thinker, destroys[12] prevailing prejudices in order for us to confront the original nature of man and to open up the intellectual paths that serve as the precondition for us to exist as ourselves.

Nietzsche, however, warns us in the last paragraph of the book, that so far in history only morality has given meaning to man. Thus, the breakdown of morality is, at least at first glance, a very dubious undertaking, since overcoming morality or even questioning morality threatens to eradicate the meaning of human existence. To that extent, a genealogical examination of morality is a leap into the void, an acrobatic stunt where the acrobat ignites the rope on which he should cross to the other side. Perhaps that is why Nietzsche calls this book "the most uncanny thing[s] written so far."[13]

This means that Nietzsche must attempt, in the context of a genealogical reinterpretation of morality, to develop an alternative that provides an answer to the problem of *meaning*. The genealogy of morality must be linked to a thought-approach that seeks to define the meaning of human existence from an alternative basis to morality in general, or at least Christian morality. It goes without saying that finding a basis for an alternative definition

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[12] The question of the extent to which the duality of dismantling (Abbau) and appropriation (Aneignung) inherent in Heideggerian destruction (see, e.g., Martin Heidegger, *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*, ed. F.-W. von Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1975), 31, 36) can be found in Nietzsche's genealogical experiment would require a separate study. At first glance, it may seem that the "philosopher of the hammer" is more interested in demolition than in re-appropriation, but let us keep in mind that Nietzsche is trying to answer the question related to the origin, that is, he attempts to penetrate an area from which the tradition he questioned receives new meaning.

[13] Friedrich Nietzsche *Der Fall Wagner, Götzen-Dämmerung, Der Antichrist, Ecce homo, Dionysos-Dithyramben, Nietzsche contra Wagner*, eds. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (München: de Gruyter, 1999), hereinafter referred to as *KSA* 6, 352., in English: *The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and other Writings,* ed. Aaron Ridley and Judith Norman, tr. Judith Norman, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 135.

of meaning for the future cannot be imagined independently from the definition of man himself. As we have already quoted the end of the *Genealogy*-book, Nietzsche believed that regardless of moral ideals, "man, the animal man, had no meaning" (KSA 5, 411, in English: 120), that is, the perceived danger of meaninglessness is closely linked to the definition of man as an animal. However, if we look at Nietzsche's image of man from a broader perspective, we may rightly doubt that the philosopher would identify man in a positivist-naturalist way with animal existence. Instead, Nietzsche relies heavily on naturalistic elements, especially in his destruction of traditional Christian morality, but there is also an alternative conceptualism and vision in his argumentation that should be called metaphysical and historico-philosophical.

The question of the (re)definition of man is such a cornerstone of the genealogy of morality, which in itself contains opposing tendencies and tensions that leave their mark on the whole Nietzschean endeavour. If we interpret man as an animal made ill by morality, then obviously the biological-psychological conceptualisation prevails. However, if we consider Christian morality as one of the manifestations of the will to power, we approach the problem from a metaphysical, historico-philosophical perspective. We must add here that, in addition to the biological and metaphysical-historico-philosophical perspectives, there is also a third point of view between the two, which could be defined as the sociology of knowledge with retrospect from the history of twentieth-century thought. When Nietzsche connects the different modes of moral evaluation to the interests, visions, and innervations of individual social groups, he typically uses a sociological approach.

These three approaches (biological-psychological, sociological, metaphysical-historico-philosophical) are applied alternately in the *Genealogy*-book. However, if we consider Nietzsche's development as a thinker, it can be said that the metaphysical perspective becomes increasingly important in his late writings, and this is also true of the *Genealogy*-book under examination. Even though biological, psychological, and sociological aspects play their vital roles in certain argumentations, *the book as a whole* and *the problem of meaning* highlighted at the very beginning of this study can be interpreted primarily in *the light of the metaphysical-historico-philosophical perspective*.

The interpretive attitude that understands the stories described in the *Genealogy*-book - despite the pluralistic approaches - as a large-scale, cohesive concept, is in stark contrast to interpretations that doubt that Nietzsche's works have an internal organising consistency that would make it a unified theory, and put the emphasis clearly on fragmentation. Foucault's interpretation of Nietzsche's genealogy put forth by the French thinker primarily in his work entitled "Nietzsche, Genealogy, and History,"[14] is a good example

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[14] Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History."

of this approach. According to Foucault, the purpose of the Nietzschean genealogy is not to "restore an unbroken continuity" or to "demonstrate that the past actively exists in the present, that it continues secretly to animate" it, on the contrary, it is to show dispersions, errors, accidents, "to follow the complex course of descent."[15] According to Nietzsche in Foucault's interpretation, "'Effective' history differs from traditional history in being without constants. Nothing in man - not even his body - is sufficiently stable to serve as the basis for self-recognition or for understanding other men" (ibid., 153). Accordingly, "the historical sense […] corresponds to the acuity of a glance that distinguishes, separates, and disperses; that is capable of liberating divergence […] This is because knowledge is not made for understanding; it is made for cutting" (ibid., 152-53). "The purpose of history, guided by genealogy, is not to discover the roots of our identity, but to commit itself to its dissipation. It does not seek to define our unique threshold of emergence, the homeland to which metaphysicians promise a return; it seeks to make visible all of those discontinuities that cross us" (ibid., 162). Thus, according to Foucault's Nietzsche, a genealogical approach to history "confirms our existence among countless lost events, without a landmark or a point of reference" (ibid., 155).

Contrary to this view, the present study emphasises that Nietzsche's pluralistic approach is in a tense relationship with the metaphysical-historico-philosophical theory which increasingly gained ground in the thinking of the philosopher, and sharply defined his work entitled *On the Genealogy of Morality* and his genealogical thinking in general. Thus, Nietzsche's genealogy, cannot be seen as reconstructions of fragmented little stories, but a large-scale experiment that tells *the transcendental history of European humanity*[16], while employing a pluralistic diversity of approaches

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[15] Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," 146.

[16] The "transzendentale Geschichte" (Edmund Husserl, *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität III.*, ed. Iso Kern, (Haag: Nijhoff, 1973), 392, Edmund Husserl, *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie Ergänzungsband Texte aus dem Nachlaß 1934-1937*, ed. R. K. Smid, (Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer, 1993), 87), and the "transzendentale Historizität" (Husserl, *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie Ergänzungsband Texte aus dem Nachlaß 1934-1937,* 80) terms belong to the conceptualism of the late Husserl. When I use these terms in this context, by transcendental history, I mean the chain of primal institutions (Urstiftung) that played a decisive role in the formation of a tradition. It is clear that the primal institutions described by Nietzsche are quite different in nature from those that Husserl talks about, but, and we shall come back to this later, the primal institutions are also transcendental in Nietzsche's case, i.e. they are events that have become condition-possibilities for continued existence.

Since this metaphysical-historico-philosophical approach already played a crucial role in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, written a few years earlier, I shall begin my analysis with a brief examination of this work and its two key concepts, the 'overman' and the 'will to power'. Then, in the second part of the study, I will examine the two key stories in the *Genealogy*-book from the perspective opened up by the above two concepts. Finally, in the last part, I will draw conclusions.

The overman and the will to power

At the beginning of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Nietzsche vividly presents the type of man who *has lost* his ability to overcome himself, and thus to have the opportunity to relate to the prevailing morality, to become the starting point of alternative modes of evaluation. Nietzsche calls this type of man the last man, a name that obviously has a historico-philosophical meaning: this type of man is the last, because if the type triumphs, in principle, there is no other type that can come after it. Because the last man is the specimen of an age, "when human beings no longer launch the arrow of their longing beyond the human, and the string of their bow will have forgotten how to whir! […] when human beings are no longer able to give birth to a dancing star."[17] If the desire of the people on earth does not extend beyond themselves, they are no longer able to give life to a dancing star, that is, to vigorous, new values, so no one will ever surpass that type of man: they will be the last and end human history in this negative utopia.[18]

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[17] Friedrich Nietzsche *Also sprach Zarathustra*, eds. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (München: de Gruyter, 1999), hereinafter referred to as *KSA* 4, 19., in English: *Thus Spoke Zarathustra. A Book for All and None,* eds. Adrian Del Caro and Robert B. Pippin, tr. Adrian Del Caro, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 9.

[18] "'We invented happiness' – say the last human beings, blinking. […] One still loves one's neighbour and rubs up against him: for one needs warmth. […] One has one's little pleasure for the day and one's little pleasure for the night: but one honours health" (*KSA* 4, 19-20, in English: 10). The last man invented happiness: that is, he learned to organise life in such a way that the real events and tragedies of life could not touch him, instead of friends and companions, he rubbed up against his neighbours for human warmth, portioned pleasures instead of passions color his life, the point is it should not be harmful: not to jeopardise the safe way of life. The word blinzeln (winking) – unfortunately the English translation gives blinking does not give back the intersubjective nature of the original term - is a real hit: the last people sneakily reinforce each other, winking at each other that this degraded life without true goals and passions is real and down with those who want more. In his parable "On the Flies of the Market Place," Nietzsche goes on to describe the last people and shows how they treat those who cannot fit into this

The main characteristic feature of the last man is that he *completely lacks the capacity for self-overcoming* — in the figurative speech of Nietzsche, he lacks chaos because "one must still have chaos in oneself in order to give birth to a dancing star" (*KSA* 4, 19, in English: 9). It is evident in this context, too, that what is on the line here for Nietzsche's philosophy is the question of the *future*. He sees man as a being endangered by his own morals and traditions, who may even lose the meaning that Christian morality once contained[19]. Involvement of chaos seemed essential to him because the *creation* of a new method of evaluation should not, in principle, be regulated by norms and values. If humanity needs new norms and values, then the pre-norm, amoral, chaotic dimension must be revived and made the engine of norm-creation.

In the Prologue to *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, the possibility of the rule of the last man arises as a historico-philosophical alternative. The other possibility with which Zarathustra begins his lecture in the marketplace is the historico-philosophical option expressed in the tenet of the overman, which determines the philosophical background of Nietzsche's genealogical experiment decisively. If we consider the tenet of the overman in relation to the idea of the last man, which appears as a kind of pair to it, the vision of the last man appears as the ultimate closure of Western history, against which the tenet of the overman, *promises a new beginning*. The difficulty of interpretation lies in what this new beginning means and, of course, what the term overman means.

If the last man is characterised by his inability to overcome himself, then the overman, as already indicated by the word "über" in his name, is the very type of this self-overcoming (Selbstüberwindung). "Human being is something that must be overcome" (*KSA* 4, 14, in English: 5). "The overman is the meaning of the earth. Let your will say: the overman *shall be* the meaning of the earth!" (*KSA* 4, 14, in English: 6).

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invented happiness: "They punish you for all your virtues. What they forgive you thoroughly are only – your mistakes" (*KSA* 4, 67, in English: 38). In *Beyond Good and Evil,* Nietzsche says: "*Our* pity is a higher, more far-sighted pity: – we see how humanity is becoming smaller, how *you* are making it smaller! […] Well-being as you understand it – that is no goal; it looks to us like an *end*! – a condition that immediately renders people ridiculous and despicable – that makes their decline into something *desirable*!" (*KSA* 5, 160-161, in English: 116).

[19] "For the matter stands like so: the stunting and levelling of European man conceal *our* greatest danger, because the sight of this makes us tired […] Today we see nothing that wants to expand, we suspect that things will just continue to decline, getting thinner, better-natured, cleverer, more comfortable, more mediocre, more indifferent, more Chinese, more Christian – no doubt about it, man is getting 'better' all the time […] Right here is where the destiny of Europe lies […]" (*KSA* 5, 278, in English: 25).

In Karl Jaspers' interpretation, the concept of the Übermensch, which "- as an image - remains indefinite,"[20] is applied to the future. "Nietzsche does not adhere to the visible or the hidden features of man, but to the future that transcends man through man" (ibid.). Jaspers thus sees the type of man indicated in the concept of the overman as an indefinite task to be accomplished in the future, but a relatively early remark by Nietzsche, formulated in his second Untimely Meditation, may nuance this picture. There, Nietzsche writes: "the goal of humanity cannot lie in its end but only in its highest exemplars" (*KSA* 1, 317, in English: 111). Thus, the history of humankind should not be perceived as approaching some kind of fulfilment, but rather that we should judge the current state of history on the extent to which the currently operating humanity allows for the creation of extraordinary human specimens.[21]

Nietzsche takes this idea further in *The Antichrist,* by already using the concept of the overman: "Humanity does not represent a development for the better, does not represent something stronger or higher the way people these days think it does. […] In another sense, there is a continuous series of individual successes in the most varied places on earth and from the most varied cultures; here, a *higher type* does in fact present itself, a type of overman in relation to humanity in general."[22] The overman is thus the result of the coincidence of fortunate circumstances, and, as Nietzsche continues, "whole generations, families, or peoples can sometimes constitute this sort of bull's eye, right on the mark" (ibid.). This picture may be supplemented by a note found in his legacy, written at the turn of 1887/88, in which Nietzsche discusses the role of the church in this regard: "the church sends all 'great men' to hell - it fights against every 'greatness of man'..."[23] One of the fortunate/unfortunate circumstances is the presence of the church, which, by its practice and ideology, can be classified as one of those forces, that grind up the levelling, outstanding types of people, according to Nietzsche.

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[20] Karl Jaspers, *Nietzsche,* (Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 1981), 168.

[21] "[...] society *cannot* exist for the sake of society, but only as the substructure and framework for raising an exceptional type of being up to its higher duty and to a higher state of *being*" (*KSA* 5, 206-207, in English: 152).

[22] Friedrich Nietzsche *Der Fall Wagner, Götzen-Dämmerung, Der Antichrist, Ecce homo,Dionysos-Dithyramben, Nietzsche contra Wagner*, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (München: de Gruyter, 1999), hereinafter referred to as *KSA* 6, 171, in English: *The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and other Writings,* ed. Aaron Ridley and Judith Norman, tr. Judith Norman, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 5.

[23] Friedrich Nietzsche *Nachlaß 1887 – 1889*, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (München: de Gruyter, 1999), hereinafter referred to as *KSA* 13, 73., in English: *Writings from the late Notebooks,* ed. Rüdiger Bittner, tr. Kate Strurge, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 231.

I believe, however, that our interpretation of the tenet of the overman would be one-sided or even faulty if we attributed the mere fact that history is a random process in which extraordinary human specimens, "Übermensch," are created as a result of lucky coincidences to this concept. Nietzsche considers his own age a special one, where the real danger is the spread of the dominion of the last man, and - as a correlative side of this, to prevent this negative scenario - there is an urgent *need to proclaim the tenet of the overman*. Nietzsche considered his contemporary world - in terms of the chances of the emergence of extraordinary people - to be in a much worse position than ancient Greece or the Renaissance were because in his world even the elimination of the *possibility* of the overman's emergence is a threat. The program of the late Nietzsche, characterised by the ideas of the revaluation of all values, the will to power, the overman,[24] (also) sees itself as the opening of a new era that can offer new opportunities to humanity.[25]

In order to move forward in the interpretation of the tenet of the overman, it seems necessary to analyse Nietzsche's other metaphysical-historico-philosophical key concept, the will to power.

The will to power,[26] according to Nietzsche, is the innermost aspiration of man, and all living beings, to increase, enrich, strengthen his powers, possibilities, skills. "The triumphant concept of 'force', with which our physicists have created God and the world, needs supplementing: it must be ascribed an inner world which I call 'will to power', i.e., an insatiable craving to manifest power; or to employ, exercise power, as a creative drive, etc. The physicists cannot eliminate 'action at a distance' from their principles, nor a force of repulsion (or attraction). There is no help for it: one must understand all motion, all 'appearances', all 'laws' as mere symptoms of inner events, and use the human analogy consistently to the end. In the

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[24] Of course, we must not forget the idea of the eternal return of the same, although the question of whether this doctrine can be made compatible with history-philosophical ideas to be reconstructed below, cannot be examined here.

[25] In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* the historical situation is indicated as follows: "A thousand goals there have been until now, for there have been a thousand peoples. Only the fetters for the thousand necks are still missing, the one goal is missing. Humanity still has no goal" (*KSA* 4, 76, in English: 44).

[26] On this key concept, see: Jaspers, *Nietzsche,* 299-309, Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, tr. Hugh Tomlinson, (London, New York: Continuum; 2002), 49-52, Volker Gerhardt "Wille zur Macht," in *Nietzsche-Handbuch. Leben – Werk – Wirkung,* ed. Henning Ottmann, (Stuttgart/Weimar: Metzler, 2000), 351-355, Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche I-II.*, (Pfullingen: Neske, 1961), II, 263-272, Walter Kaufmann, *Nietzsche. Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist*, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1974), 178-207.

case of an animal, all its drives can be traced back to the will to power: likewise all the functions of organic life to this one source" (*KSA* 11, 563, in English: 26-27).

The will to power, according to the above, is an addition to the force discovered by physicists and applied in their theories,[27] namely, a relationship that relates to the *expression, employment, and exercise* of force. Nietzsche admits to having stretched man's analogy to the extreme, and since the primary goal of this analysis is Nietzsche's interpretation of man, the focus will be on how this relationship to force can be considered in the case of humans and living beings.[28] It is a relationship aimed at the expression and realisation of the forces that can be activated by man (living beings) driven by the pursuit of self-fulfilment and self-overcoming. For when we relate to our own forces and potentials,[29] the manifestation of these forces takes place as self-manifestation and self-overcoming.

By expressing these forces, by weaving them into the force context of the world, we express ourselves and practice ourselves, however, this practice is never an utterly blind manifestation of force, but an interpreted, directed, disciplined, in a word, transcendental manifestation of force. "We are still on our knees before *strength* – after the ancient custom of slaves – and yet when the degree of worthiness to be revered is fixed, only the *degree of rationality in strength* is decisive: we must assess to what extent precisely strength has been

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[27] "The world seen from inside, the world determined and described with respect to its 'intelligible character' – would be just this 'will to power' and nothing else" (*KSA* 5, 55, in English: 36).

[28] Obviously, Nietzsche wishes to go further, and he sees the general principle of being in the will to power. The following note – preserved in his legacy and dated to the summer of 1885 – illustrates this view beautifully: "And do you know what 'the world' is to me? Shall I show you it in my mirror? This world: a monster of force, without beginning, without end, a fixed, iron quantity of force which grows neither larger nor smaller, which doesn't exhaust but only transforms itself, […] an ocean of forces storming and flooding within themselves, eternally changing, eternally rushing back, with tremendous years of recurrence, with an ebb and flood of its forms, shooting out from the simplest into the most multifarious, from the stillest, coldest, most rigid into the most ferry, wild, self-contradictory, and then coming home from abundance to simplicity, from the play of contradiction back to the pleasure of harmony, […] as a becoming that knows no satiety, no surfeit, no fatigue - this, my *Dionysian* world of eternal self-creating, of eternal self-destroying, this mystery world of dual delights, this my beyond good and evil, without goal, […] - *This world is the will to power - and nothing besides!* And you yourselves too are this will to power - and nothing besides!" (Friedrich Nietzsche *Nachlaß 1884 – 1885*, eds. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (München: de Gruyter, 1999), hereinafter referred to as *KSA* 11, 610-611, in English: *Writings from the late Notebooks,* ed. Rüdiger Bittner, tr. Kate Strurge, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 38-39.

[29] "Nietzsche as a classical philologist, probably had in mind the conceptions of dynamis and potentia." (Kaufmann, *Nietzsche. Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist*, 186.)

overcome by something higher, in the service of which it now stands as means and instrument!" (*KSA* 3, 318, in English: 214). According to this relatively early text, the degree of rationality in strength (der Grad der Vernunft in der Kraft) is also the degree of self-overcoming, in which the will to power can be interpreted as the expression and unfolding of power disciplined by reason. To this extent, the will to power is also a manifestation of man's entanglement in nature: the shaping, sublimation,[30] transformation into creative power[31] of his raw instincts are all manifestations of the will to power.

In the Zarathustra lecture entitled "On the thousand and one goals" Nietzsche touches upon a significant aspect of the will to power, which is also particularly crucial for his moral genealogy to be written later; namely, he examines its connection with the *emergence of moral modes of evaluation*: "A tablet of the good hangs over every people. Observe, it is the tablet of their overcomings; observe, it is the voice of their will to power" (*KSA* 4, 74, in English: 42). It is noteworthy that Nietzsche directly links the values of people engraved in stone to the question of overcoming, and we may add, to self-overcoming. People overcome themselves and others[32] when formulating their values, and though these values may be different for individual people, they are guided by *a single* principle - the principle of the will to power. "Esteeming is creating (Schätzen ist Schaffen)" – wrote Nietzsche (*KSA* 4, 75, in English: 43), *the principle of the will to power includes the possibility of creating new patterns of interpretation, lifestyles, and traditions*. The juxtaposition of the thousand and one goals indicates that *the will to power is a formal principle,* i.e. it can guide the emergence of a variety of moral modes of evaluation. However, Nietzsche makes a distinction between individual people spontaneously accepting of a set of values and the possibility of a unique, historical turn, when the *will to power* in Zarathustra's (Nietzsche's) philosophy *becomes self-conscious*: "Only the fetters for the thousand necks are still missing, the one goal is missing" (*KSA* 4, 76, in English: 44).[33] On reflection, what we have here is the *application of the will to power to itself, the re-application*

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[30] See Kaufmann, *Nietzsche. Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist*, 218-227.

[31] "Overcoming the affects? - No, not if it means weakening and annihilating them. Instead, drawing them into service, which may include exercising a long tyranny over them […] In the end they are trustingly given back some freedom: they love us like good servants and voluntarily go where our best interests want to go." (Friedrich Nietzsche *Nachlaß 1885 – 1887*, eds. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (München: de Gruyter, 1999), hereinafter referred to as *KSA* 12, 39, in English: *Writings from the late Notebooks,* ed. Rüdiger Bittner, tr. Kate Strurge, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 64.

[32] "Truly, my brother, once you discover a people's need and land and sky and neighbour, you guess as well the law of their overcomings […]." (KSA 4: 74., in English: 42.)

[33] The juxtaposition of the thousand and one goals formulated here is also of great importance for the interpretation of the concept of the overman, to be considered below.

of the principle of self-overcoming: the will to power manifested in the thousand goals may acquire a new quality by disciplining and deepening itself.[34]

Plurality and monism form a peculiar connection in the Nietzschean concept of the will to power. It is *a* principle that ultimately encompasses *the whole universe* and *the totality* of human instincts and aspirations,[35] however, *it acquires specific content* and *represents a specific perspective* for each force centre*:* "[…] each centre of force *for all the rest has its very specific perspective*, i.e. *its valuing*, his kind of action, its resistance type" (*KSA* 13, 371, in English: 100).[36]

The will to power can, on the one hand, be interpreted as the shaping, sublimation, transformation of our raw instincts into creative power, as the rationally disciplined expression and unfolding of force centres. We have also seen that, according to Nietzsche, the will to

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[34] Philosophy itself is a manifestation of the will to power, even the philosophy that discovers and applies the principle of the will to power. Nietzsche does not speak of himself in *Beyond Good and Evil*, but he states the connection that, in my opinion, lies within the whole Nietzschean concept. "But this is an old, eternal story: what happened back then with the Stoics still happens today, just as soon as a philosophy begins believing in itself. It always creates the world in its own image, it cannot do otherwise; philosophy is this tyrannical drive itself, the most spiritual will to power, to the 'creation of the world', to the *causa prima*" (*KSA* 5, 22, in English: 11).

[35] "Assuming, finally, that we succeeded in explaining our entire life of drives as the organization and outgrowth of one basic form of will (namely, of the will to power, which is *my* claim)" (*KSA* 5, 55, in English: 36).

[36] Perspectivism is not only the central core of Nietzsche's epistemology, but the philosopher also explains how all living things work with the help of perspectivism; in the preface to *Beyond Good and Evil,* e.g. he calls "*perspectivism*, which is the fundamental condition of all life" (*KSA* 5, 12., in English: 9, see also *KSA* 5, 26, in English: 13). For Nietzsche, the concept of a world in itself makes no sense: "does not exist as a world 'in-itself it is essentially a world of relationships: it […] is essentially different at every point" (*KSA* 1, 271, in English: 250). Consequently, according to Nietzsche, there is no 'truth'. "There are many different eyes. The sphinx too has eyes: and consequently there are many different 'truths', and consequently there is no truth" (*KSA* 11, 498, in English: 14). Each force centre represents its own perspective and creates its own truth; there is no exception to this; this is the nature of philosophical 'truths' as well. Formally speaking, however, there is, of course, *only one consistent perspectivism* that delegates all truth to finite and relative positions. This paradoxical connection is formulated by Nietzsche towards the end of his *Genealogy*-book: "There is *only* a perspectival seeing, *only* a perspectival 'knowing'; the *more* affects we are able to put into words about a thing, the *more* eyes, various eyes we are able to use for the same thing, the more complete will be our 'concept' of the thing, our 'objectivity'. But to eliminate the will completely and turn off all the emotions without exception, assuming we could: well? would that not mean to *castrate* the intellect?" (*KSA* 5, 365, in English: 87).

power is expressed in all kinds of evaluations and interpretations, especially concerning the *emergence of moral modes of evaluation* as a pure form of the realisation of the will to power. Up to this point, I believe that a naturalist-psychologist interpretation still has a raison d 'être, since we can say that according to the above, human evaluations and decisions are primarily determined by profound instincts, raw forces, which man can only refine and sublimate. However, if we also consider that the *decisive element of the principle of the will to power is the self-reference and self-overcoming of the forces*, it becomes clear that there are serious limitations to a naturalist interpretation. We can only speak of the will to power if a centre of force is assigned, an "inner world", which can be interpreted as a dimension enabling self-reference. This inner world, which allows for the refining, interpretation, and transformation into new concrete possibilities of the raw forces, must, in my opinion, be interpreted as a dimension *not* derived from biology or nature.

Self-reference and self-overcoming realised as the will to power can reach many levels. The difference between these levels cannot be considered simply as differences in degree, but, at least as some texts of Nietzsche suggest, there may be abrupt changes. When interpreting the Zarathustra lecture entitled "On the thousand and one goals," it was already noted that in the juxtaposition of the thousand and one goals, the will to power works in two different ways: the thousand goals refer to individual people spontaneously accepting a value system. In contrast, the one goal refers to the possibility of the *will to power* philosophically becoming *self-conscious and understanding itself as a principle*. The acceptance of a value system in itself presupposes an inner world, self-overcoming; the stone tablets of values of a given people are considered by Nietzsche "the law of their overcomings" (das Gesetz seiner Überwindungen, cf. *KSA* 4, 74, in English: 42). Compared to the thousand goals of the peoples, the designation of one goal, in my opinion, is of a higher level, it means the self-overcoming of referenced self-referencing. I believe Nietzsche speaks in Zarathustra's lecture on "Self-overcoming," about this second level self-referenced self-overcoming: "But a stronger force grows out of your values and a new overcoming; upon it egg and eggshell break" (*KSA* 4, 149, in English: 90). The expression "eine neue Überwindung"[37] in my opinion, suggests that it is possible to go beyond current evaluation methods in a new way, so the aim is not to create a

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[37] It seems symptomatic how at the time of his writing *Zarathustra* Nietzsche spoke in his notes in many respects of the need for something "new" to come – "new nobility" (Friedrich Nietzsche *Nachlaß 1880 – 1882*, eds. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (München: de Gruyter, 1999), hereinafter referred to as *KSA* 9, 486., "new glance" (ibid., 463), "new beings" (ibid., 466), "new weights" (ibid., 494), "new education" (ibid., 497), "new life" (ibid., 519), "new instinct" (ibid., 642), "new enlightenment" (*KSA* 11, 294) expressions appear in the various notes.

new evaluation method *in addition to* the existing ones, but to establish an evaluation that brackets and surpasses *all previous ones*.[38]

In summary, the principle of the will to power includes two different organisational logics that are in heightened tension with each other. The naturalistic logic, delegates the will to power to the instinctive level of living beings and the human world can be understood as the sublimation of these instincts.[39] While according to the other logic, the will to power is a metaphysical principle that exists independently and can reach heights of self-referencing that open up a *new historico-philosophical perspective in human history and even include the possibility of the self-overcoming of human existence itself*. At this point, we can return to the interpretive dilemmas we encountered in examining the concept of "Übermensch".

One possible interpretation is that fortunate historical circumstances can result in extraordinary, overman beings anywhere, anytime. In this case, history is considered a rather chaotic, aimless process, in which fortunate and unfortunate combinations can occur, and of course, we can rejoice when real, "great" people are thrown out of this large-scale slot-machine. By all means, the naturalistic approach is valid here.

However, if we turn our attention to the historico-philosophical nature of Nietzsche's (Zarathustra's) teachings, we are confronted with a completely different conception that can no longer be interpreted in a naturalistic way. In this context, Nietzsche speaks of the need to create a new ruling class that *will change the course of history, and as an unprecedented type, will make its mark on future ages*. The principle of self-overcoming becomes independent,

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[38] The seemingly mysterious combined breaking of the egg and the eggshell also suggests, in my opinion, that here we can speak of a novelty, an overcoming, which concerns both the framework and the essence. If the eggshell were to remain unbroken, it would suggest that something new is created under the same conditions, but if only the shell of something were to be replaced, its essential nature would remain constant; however, if both are broken, not only are new values created, but also the way these new values come about changes. As Nietzsche put it in a fragment: "My philosophy brings the triumphant idea of which all other modes of thought will ultimately perish" (*KSA* 11, 250).

[39] Nietzsche, for example, writes about man in his already mentioned early work entitled "On Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense" as follows: "Does nature not remain silent about almost everything, even about our bodies, banishing and enclosing us within a proud, illusory consciousness, far away from the twists and turns of the bowels, the rapid flow of the blood stream and the complicated tremblings of the nerve-fibres? Nature has thrown away the key, and woe betide fateful curiosity should it ever succeed in peering through a crack in the chamber of consciousness, out and down into the depths, and thus gain an intimation of the fact that humanity, in the indifference of its ignorance, rests on the pitiless, the greedy, the insatiable, the murderous - clinging in dreams, as it were, to the back of a tiger." (*KSA* 1, 877, in English: 142-143).

organised into a new type whose opinion of man is: "a laughing stock or a painful embarrassment" (*KSA* 4, 14, in English: 6).

The late works of Nietzsche, including the *Genealogy*-book, are also characterised by the above-described duality inherent in the concepts of the will to power and the overman. Nietzsche wants to realise a new level of self-referencing in the philosophy of the future and in the historical practice that unfolds in parallel, a level that would transcend the pluralistic and perspectivist world of the wills to power in a monistic way - in the spirit of creating a future, ambitious humanity that overcomes the state of current humanity.

Two Stories in the *Genealogy*-book

The *Genealogy*-book is dominated by a great struggle[40] initiated by Nietzsche himself: he challenged ascetic virtues and attempted to prepare the development of an alternative method of evaluation in this book. In the first two large sections of the book, he elaborated on his genealogical ideas that sought to break the monopoly of ascetic morality and explore the terrain that could also be the scene of the creation of new values. As mentioned earlier, according to Foucault, the purpose of the genealogical program is the archaeological exploration of minor differences, those coincidences and fractures that led to the creation of our moral world. Contrary to this interpretation, I believe, Nietzsche's "Polemic" [41] presents a *uniformly discussed history* of Christian morality and ascetic ideals, all the more so since he seeks to explore the system of conditions that presupposes the emergence of morality. By no means does the genealogical methodology dismantle human identity, instead it tries to uncover the *hidden unity* of the plurality of moralities, in order to assert *another unity and meaning* in contrast to the unity and meaning manifested in ascetic ideals.[42]

Nietzsche's *Genealogy*-book does not fragment but instead joins together, *inserts* the plurality he uncovered in other works of his *into a unified story*, and he does so in the context

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[40] "The idea we are fighting over here is the valuation of our life by the ascetic priests: they relate this […] to a quite different kind of existence that it opposes and excludes […]" (*KSA* 5, 362, in English: 85).

[41] The subtitle of *On the Genealogy of Morality* is: "A Polemic" (Eine Streitschrift).

[42] At the end of his book, Nietzsche clearly articulates the central questions guiding his writing: "What does the *power* of that ideal mean, the *monstrosity* of its power? […] The ascetic ideal expresses a will: *where* is the opposing will, in which an *opposing ideal* might express itself? The ascetic ideal has a *goal*, – this being so general that all the interests of human existence appear petty and narrow when measured against it; it inexorably interprets epochs, peoples, man, all with reference to this one goal, […]. Where is the counterpart to this closed system of will, goal and interpretation? Why is the *counterpart* lacking?.... Where is the *other* 'one goal'?" (*KSA* 5, 395-396, in English: 109).

of a more extensive program which is about the fate and values of future humanity. It is about presenting a new "one goal", but in order to be able to articulate this goal at all and, of course, to arouse the will for it, it is necessary to move away from the morality dominated by ascetic ideals and to cleanse the terrain for the new leap - as Nietzsche formulated his genealogy strategy in *Beyond Good and Evil*: "He is going backwards like someone who wants to take a great leap" (*KSA* 5, 229, in English: 169). The 'going backwards' is the storytelling; however, this story does not serve – as Foucault thought –, to "confirm[s] our existence among countless lost events, without a landmark or a point of reference" (Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," 155), but to describe a coherent origin-story of the moral dominating the present.

Of course, as already mentioned, Nietzsche's aspects of analysis are multifaceted and plural in nature. *The issue concerning the origin of morality has sociological, psychological, historical, metaphysical, transcendental aspects*. From a methodological point of view, we can by no means say that these aspects have been brought together in a unified whole. Nietzsche's imaginative analyses are not so much held in unison by the unified methodology, but rather by the subject matter examined, and the story told.

Nietzsche first connects the moral evaluation methods he examines not to individuals, but social groups, castes, and strata. The *two social protagonists* of his first essay are the caste of priests and the so-called warriors. In Nietzsche's portrayal, the struggle of these two social strata for hegemony is crucial to the formation of current Western moral value judgments. "You will have already guessed how easy it was for the priestly method of valuation to split off from the chivalric-aristocratic method and then to develop further into the opposite of the latter; this receives a special impetus when the priestly caste and warrior caste confront one another in jealousy […]" (*KSA* 5, 266, in English: 116-17).

Nietzsche, however, supports the modes of evaluation related to the two castes primarily psychologically. The noble, aristocratic warrior is characterised by not making a distinction between his desires, aspirations, and deeds, he simply takes what he needs in a straight forward manner, and butchers his enemies honestly, without any resentment.[43] The moral evaluation system he developed corresponds to this behaviour. The positive features of this evaluation are generosity, courage, valour, honesty, while on the flip side are vulgarity, failure, mundaneness, unworthiness. This mode of evaluation is an expression of positive self-affirmation; the evaluator quite simply sets himself as the benchmark. Two characteristics

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[43] Typically, Nietzsche brings his example from the animal kingdom: "the birds of prey will view it somewhat derisively, and will perhaps say: 'We don't bear any grudge at all towards these good lambs, in fact, we love them, nothing is tastier than a tender lamb'" (*KSA* 5, 279, in English: 26).

deserve attention besides the depiction of the brave warrior: bestiality and immediateness. It is as if Nietzsche is saying that the noble warrior is closer to animal nature than his opponent, the ascetic priest, and this closeness is also manifested in the fact that instinctive immediateness becomes the driving force of action without any intermediaries.

The ascetic priest, on the other hand, organises the desire for revenge and the discomfort arising from the helplessness caused by the self-righteous cruelty of the blonde beast. The vile and coward is incapable of directly confronting the strong, but their cowering and resignation does not pass without a mark: their helplessness as a worm gnaws their inside, creating a sense of 'ressentiment'.[44] The ascetic priest organises the feeling of helplessness and desire for revenge into a new mode of evaluation. One of the primary purposes of this mode of evaluation is to undermine the warrior from within, while the other is to exalt the cowardly and the helpless. Accordingly, the positive values here are humility, forgiveness, self-denial, and the negative ones are evilness, sensuality, violence.

However, the emergence of an ascetic system of evaluation means more - according to Nietzsche - than a simple exchange of values; on the one hand, it means the deepening of human existence, its enrichment with new dimensions, but on the other hand, it also brings with itself a fatal disease for man. Deepening is partly related to the emergence of intermediaries. The warrior type, as we have seen, makes *no* distinction between desire and action. "It is just as absurd to ask strength *not* to express itself as strength. […] popular morality separates strength from the manifestations of strength, as though there were an indifferent substratum behind the strong person which had the *freedom* to manifest strength or not" (*KSA* 5, 279, in English: 26).

In contrast, adherents of the ascetic system of values, who are coward and weak to act, say, let us be good and distinguish between our desires and our actions. "This type of man *needs* to believe in an unbiased 'subject' with freedom of choice because he has an instinct of self-preservation and self-affirmation in which every lie is sanctified. The reason the subject […] has been, until now, the best doctrine on earth, is perhaps because it facilitated that sublime self-deception whereby the majority of the dying […] could construe weakness itself as freedom […]" (*KSA* 5, 280-281, in English: 27).

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[44] "[…] the man of *ressentiment* is neither upright nor naïve, nor honest and straight with himself. His soul *squints*; his mind loves dark corners, secret paths and back-doors, everything secretive appeals to him as being *his* world, *his* security, *his* comfort […]" (*KSA* 5, 280-281, in English: 21).

The sociological and psychological aspects of the two modes of evaluation are thus supplemented by a system of criteria which might be called transcendental.[45] The warrior type is a rather simple formula in an existential sense; the warrior is a centre of strength which gives, without any particular feedback, its essence: affirms itself, and shows strength. The ascetic priest performs mediation in several ways, on the one hand, because he organises the resentment of *others* into force, and on the other hand, because his activity is based on an existential formula that is itself indirect in nature. The lack of direct response and the consequent feeling of helplessness open a new dimension in human existence, a new, inner world of relationships appears, which is a condition of possibility for an indirect response.

Nietzsche presents us here with the history of the evolution of the human soul, more precisely he tries to reconstruct critical events that become a condition of possibility for further development. The warrior type is also a level, i.e. in terms of the complexity of the soul, a *lower* level than that of the man of 'ressentiment'. From a moral point of view, however, the noble, aristocratic warrior type is also characterised by self-affirmation, honesty, openness, which are positive qualities to which Nietzsche wants to relate when working out the philosophy of the future.[46]

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[45] Generally speaking, Nietzsche does not use the language of transcendental philosophy and is a sharp critic of Kant, but this should not mean that the historical-existential version of the transcendental approach cannot appear as a constituent element in the philosopher's thinking.

[46] Think of the virtue of intellectual honesty (Redlichkeit, and intellektuelles Gewissen), which is one of the key elements of the new method of evaluation for Nietzsche. He emphasised the importance of intellectual honesty in one of the paragraphs of *Daybreak* – already here *in relation to the future*; the title of the paragraph says a lot in this respect.: "*A Virtue in a process of Becoming* (*Eine werdende Tugend*)" (Friedrich Nietzsche *Morgenröte, Die fröhliche Wissenschaft*, eds. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (München: de Gruyter, 1999), hereinafter referred to as *KSA* 3, 275, in English: *Daybreak. Thoughts on the prejudices of morality,* ed. by Maudemarie Clark and Brian Leiter, tr. by R. J. Hollingdale, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 191., *Untimely Meditations,* ed. Bernard Williams, tr. Josefine Nauckhoff, poems tr. by Adrian Del Caro, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). Intellectual honesty "is the youngest virtue", which "is among neither the Socratic nor the Christian virtues" (ibid.). An important feature of intellectual conscience is that it goes beyond our traditional conscience connected to morality; in fact, it helps us penetrate the sphere of amorality, where it provides a degree of orientation. As Nietzsche put it in his *Gay Science*: "Do you know nothing of an intellectual conscience (intellektuelles Gewissen)? A conscience behind your 'conscience'?" (*KSA* 3, 561, in English: 187). Intellectual conscience is behind moral conscience, that is, it moves on a more fundamental level that provides a platform for the latter.: *"that* you feel something to be right may have its cause in your never having thought much about yourself and in your blindly having accepted what has been labelled *right* since your childhood; […] and you consider it right because it appears to you as *your own* 'condition of

Obviously, there is a massive difference between the self-affirmation and straightforwardness of the warrior and the thinker, but in my opinion, it must be acknowledged that their virtues are in harmony. In both cases, there is courage, accepting possible self-destruction, self-affirmation, honesty. Nietzsche chose for himself a philosophical virtue that *fits*, mutatis mutandis, the virtues of the warrior. The virtue of intellectual conscience, is, of course, not a naive, unmediated virtue, like the straightforwardness and courage of warriors, but reflects on the indirectness, depth, and intimacy of priestly modes of evaluation. Nietzsche attempts to transcend Christian morality by reconnecting with the warrior, noble morality that preceded it, but not with its naivety, rather its toughness, honesty, riskiness[47] – still, he wants to fight the battle on the very battlefield created by 'ressentiment' and priestly evaluation: in the world of intimacy.

The morality of the warrior can be related not only to the realm of values of intellectual honesty but also to the idea of the overman. Of course, we cannot put an equation mark between these two systems of values, but the warrior's virtues return at a higher level in the representation of the overman. In this case, too, there is courage, accepting possible self-destruction, self-affirmations, honesty, which are expressed directly and spontaneously in the case of the warrior, but in the case of the overman there is no naivety, as Zarathustra says in his first lecture: "I love the one who lives in order to know, and who wants to know so that one day the overman may live" (*KSA* 4, 17, in English: 8). The cognition that Nietzsche/Zarathustra speaks of here is the cognition referring to life, namely the self-cognition of a life led boldly, by taking risks, so the key element is the deepening of the relationship with oneself, and thereby preparing for radical self-overcoming. The warrior's existential disposition is complemented by intellectual honesty, courageous, self-referenced thinking.

Intellectual honesty, just like the overman, is characterised by a depth of thought in addition to the virtues of the warrior. Nietzsche's genealogy seeks to explore precisely those moments of human spiritual life that can become the starting points of the new history[48] that

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existence' (Existenz-Bedingung)" (ibid., 188). The term "Existenz-Bedingung" is especially noteworthy for us: there are such existential decisions and preconditions behind our morality, the confrontation with which puts our intellectual conscience to the ultimate test.

[47] "From the long experience […], I learned everything that has been philosophized who look different: - the hidden history of philosophy […] "How much truth can endure, how much truth dares a ghost?" - this was for me the real measure of value. The error is cowardice... every achievement of knowledge follows from courage, from hardness against them, from the cleanliness to be..." (*KSA* 13, 492., in English: 169).

[48] In one of the sections of the *Gay Science* entitled "*The 'humanity' of the future*", he writes: "We present-day humans are just beginning to form the chain of a very powerful future feeling, link by link -

is defined by the overman. In this respect, Nietzsche's interpretation of the figure of the ascetic priest must also be considered entirely ambivalent, since the philosopher is exceptionally critical of priestly morality, yet, he considers the spiritual depth induced by this morality key to man's self-overcoming. Equally important is the story that Nietzsche tells in the second part of the *Genealogy*-book, which as we shall see, not only precedes the story of the ascetic priest but provides the condition of possibility for it.

This other story of the evolution of intimacy and freedom dates back much further than the previous one: Nietzsche goes back to prehistoric (*vorhistorisch*) times here. This story is the story of responsibility, the ability to promise, and sovereignty on the one hand, and the formation of the bad conscience on the other. This large-scale enterprise has several fundamental goals,[49] of which the outstanding ones are that Nietzsche attempts to 1.) reposition and answer the question "What is man?", 2.) work out the *condition of possibilities* of human sovereignty in a historical sense, 3.) uncover the *conditions of human freedom* by genealogically analysing bad conscience.[50] The working out of these three problem areas is an essential part of the future philosophy,[51] and is an essential part of the activist program outlined so far: humanity reached a turning point where the intervention of philosophy is required to form a new nobility and put humanity on a new path in general.

1.) *The repositioning of the question "What is man?".* In the first words of the second essay: "To breed an animal with the prerogative to *promise* (Ein Thier heranzüchten, das *versprechen darf*)" not only a "paradoxical task" (*KSA* 5, 291, in English: 35) is formulated, but the basic dimensions of answering the question "What is man?" are also created.[52] Every word

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we hardly know what we are doing. […] Indeed, that is *one* colour of this new feeling: he who is able to feel the history of man altogether *as his own history* feels […] as the dutiful heir to all the nobility of past spirit, as the most aristocratic of old nobles and at the same time the first of a new nobility the likes of which no age has ever seen or dreamt […]" (*KSA* 3, 564-565, in English: 190).

[49] See Otfried Höffe, "'Ein Thier heranzüchten, das verspechen darf' (II 1-3)," in *Friedrich Nietzsche Zur Genealogie der Moral*, ed. Otfried Höffe (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2004), 65-67.

[50] It needs to be reemphasised that Nietzsche does not use the language of transcendental philosophy, yet what he does is to elaborate the historical, genealogical perspective in a transcendental manner, that is, to explore a level that Foucault later called historical a priori. (see Michel Foucault, *The Archeology of Konowledge*, tr. A. M. Sheriden Smith, (New York Pantheon Books, 1972), 127-128).

[51] "The *Genealogy* is more than a 'Prelude to the philosophy of the future': it is meant to be part of such a philosophy" (Richard Schacht, „Moral und Mensch (II 16-25)," in *Friedrich Nietzsche Zur Genealogie der Moral*, ed. Otfried Höffe (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2004, 130).

[52] This interpretation is confirmed by how the given sentence ends: "is it not the real problem *of* humankind?" (ibid., see Höffe Ein Thier heranzüchten, das verspechen darf' (II 1-3)," 67-68).

is significant in this case. The "to breed an animal" phrase suggests that the starting point is the animal existence of man, or if you prefer, man is, in fact, an animal, and it is not his rationale which is primarily appealed to, but, as it will become clear later, violence will be the dominant breeding tool. The breeding process is executed with an iron fist, as a result of which man is *free* to make a promise. He, who is qualified to keep it and whose right to this *is recognised* by others, is *free* to make a promise.[53] A human being becomes a man by entering a network of recognitions where mutual commitments are made possible. Man, thus, is essentially a social being who exists in a world of mutual recognitions, but this sociality is created through excessive violence.

According to Nietzsche, the most important step an animal must take to engage in sociality is to learn to exist in time. According to the philosopher forgetfulness (Vergesslichkeit) is such an "active ability to suppress" (*KSA* 5, 291, in English: 35), which plays a vitally important role in keeping up the *ability to act*.[54] Forgetfulness, however, also means that the forgetful animal is not part of temporal processes; it always lives in the present. He who always lives in the present, cannot make a promise, because a promise is by definition made about the future, we accept responsibility here and now for what we will do in the future. We need to let our promise enter our memory and get into a state where it is believable that we will remember our promise, and we will keep it. Man must be put in a state "so that he, as someone making a promise is, is answerable for his own *future*!" (KSA 5, 292, in English: 36).

The first act of the story lasted for thousands of years, during which man was taught to remember by way of the horrific mnemonic education. Nietzsche vividly lists the diversity of torture methods of the time, seeing in them "the most powerful aid to mnemonics" (KSA 5, 295, in English: 38). Yet, he derives the main principle of punishment from the creditor-debtor relationship, according to which in this early period "punishment has *not* been meted out *because* the miscreant was held responsible for his act" but based on the principle that "every injury has its *equivalent* which can be paid in compensation, if only through the *pain* of the person who injures" (*KSA* 5, 298, in English: 40).

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[53] E.g., in the case of taking out a credit, the bank examines whether the customer is in a position to make a promise to repay the amount to be borrowed with interest and on time.

[54] "He who cannot sink down on the threshold of the moment and forget all the past, […] will never know what happiness is - worse, he will never do anything to make others happy. […] Forgetting is essential to action of any kind, just as not only light but darkness too is essential for the life of everything organic." – says Nietzsche in his second *Untimely Meditation* (*KSA* 1, 250, in English: 62). For the Nietzschean concept of forgetting see the comments by Heidegger: *Zur Auslegung von Nietzsches II. Unzeitgemässer Betrachtung*, ed. Hans-Joachim Friedrich (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 2003), 27-52.

However, punishment achieved its most significant impact not on those who suffered it, but on those who feared it, and as a result suppressed in themselves any aspirations[55] that might have led to punishment. "All instincts which are not discharged outwardly *turn inwards* – this is what I call the *internalisation* (Verinnerlichung) of man [...]. The whole inner world, originally stretched thinly as though between two layers of skin, was expanded, and extended itself and gained depth, breadth, and height in proportion to the degree that the external discharge of man's instincts was *obstructed*" (KSA 5, 322, in English: 57). Nietzsche describes in a powerful way how human existence becomes multidimensional,[56] in its depth, and how this layered structure becomes a *presupposition* for man.

2.) *Historical elaboration of the condition of possibilities of human sovereignty*. At the end of the argumentation in the previous section, we have reached the point where we can discuss the level of the condition of possibilities of human subjectivity. Nietzsche's metaphorical use of words should not deceive us, as a result of the *historical process* he describes, new dimensions of the inner world of man have been created or expanded. Instincts repressed by violence and mnemonic practices have dug new depths in the human soul, and these newly emerged subjectivity-dimensions are *the condition of possibility for new realms of self-referencing*. Man is thus able to reference himself as one existing in time, and as a result, a *new way of self-identity can emerge*. Would it be conceivable to talk about self-identity in the case of a being who lives in the moment? This new self-referencing and temporal expanse also allow us to see ourselves as the *subject* of our actions. The impact of our actions points to the distant future, in order to take *on the consequences*, it is necessary to operate our existence in time in an adequate way.

At the end of the process, with the words of Nietzsche, "we then find the *sovereign individual* as the ripest fruit on its tree" (*KSA* 5: 293, in English: 37). According to Nietzsche, the

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[55] "The *second* essay gives the psychology of the *conscience*: conscience is not, as is believed, 'the voice of God in man', - it is the instinct of cruelty that is turned inwards after it cannot discharge itself outwards anymore..." – writes Nietzsche in *Ecce Homo* (*KSA* 6, 352, in English: 136).

[56] It is worth mentioning, that Husserl describes transcendentality as a "new dimension" that, for lack of application of the appropriate methodology, has "remained hidden through the ages" (see Edmund Husserl, *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie*, ed. Walter Biemel, (Haag: Nijhoff, 1954), 121-122, in English: *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, tr. David Carr, (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), 119). Nietzsche's conceptions and presuppositions are, of course, different from Husserl's transcendental phenomenology in many respects. One crucial difference is that Nietzsche is not talking about the *discovery of a new dimension, but about its formation*, and of course, Nietzsche's conceptualisation is highly psychological in nature.

sovereign individual is "like only to itself, having freed itself from the morality of custom, an autonomous, […] with his own, independent, enduring will" (ibid.). Nietzsche's subject – creating laws for itself - is outside morality in some respects, but at least occupies a borderline position concerning morality, as he puts it in the *Gay Science*: "Better to remain in debt (schuldig) than to pay with a coin that does not bear our image' says our sovereignty" (*KSA* 3, 516, in English: 149). Sovereignty not only means that we can make promises to other members of society, but also that the individual *creates his own law*, has his own image on his coins, *even if* doing so he violates the laws of the community and remains in debt according to the laws of the community.

The ambiguous role the question of debt plays in the thought processes concerning sovereignty is noteworthy. The *Genealogy*-book shows that the centuries-old method of punishment, modelled on debt collection, was crucial in the evolution of sovereignty.[57] He who does not pay back his debt deserves a punishment equivalent to his debt, just as he who commits a crime, and thus violates the rules of the community, is forced to endure suffering commensurate with the magnitude of the damage. "The ripest fruit" of the application of this centuries-old punishment is sovereignty. However, the quote from *Gay Science* actually says that we may even become indebted (guilty), but we must abide by our sovereignty, *our sovereignty is our law, and this law surpasses the law of the community*.

The sovereignty of the individual is the result of the terror of the community, but - when established - it becomes a power questioning the laws of the community, and it corresponds to its actual nature when it is literally a law on to itself and overwrites the norms and laws adopted by the community. Viewed from this perspective, it is clear that the concept of sovereignty belongs to the conceptual sphere of self-overcoming and the overman, and Nietzsche sees the formation of sovereignty as the historical antecedent of the overman.

3.) *The emergence of the bad conscience, and the deepening of human freedom, the emergence of values*. Nietzsche sees the emergence of the bad conscience as a manifestation of one of the most important turning points in human history: "I look on bad conscience as a serious illness to which man was forced to succumb by the pressure of the most fundamental of all changes which he experienced – that change whereby he finally found himself

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[57] "Throughout most of human history, punishment has *not* been meted out *because* the miscreant was held responsible for his act […] – but rather, as parents still punish their children, it was out of anger over some wrong that had been suffered, directed at the perpetrator, – but this anger was held in check and modified by the idea that every injury has its *equivalent* […]. And where did this primeval, deeply rooted and perhaps now ineradicable idea gain its power? […] I have already let it out: in the contractual relationship between *creditor* and *debtor*.." (*KSA* 5, 298, in English: 40).

imprisoned within the confines of society and peace" (*KSA* 5, 321-322, in English: 56).[58] The evolution of bad conscience is related to the consolidation of societal socialisation, social peace, that is, the suppression of violence as a result of violence. As a consequence of the cruel mnemonic practices described above, the violent impulses inherent in man cannot find an external object, and they turn inwards, in the form of torturous remorse.[59]

The inwardly turned instincts, as we have already seen, carve out and deepen man's inner world, and thus open up space for self-referencing. Nietzsche states in a remarkable line of reasoning that what happens in this process is that external freedom transforms into internal freedom, i.e. through the self-referencing of the inward-looking freedom. Let us look at the excerpt first: "This *instinct of freedom*, forcibly made latent – we have already seen how – this instinct of freedom forced back, repressed, incarcerated within itself and finally able to discharge and unleash itself only against itself (an sich selbst noch sich entladende und auslassende Instinkt der Freiheit): that, and that alone, is *bad conscience* in its beginnings" (*KSA* 5, 325, in English: 59). The instinct of freedom forced inward thus turns against itself, connects to itself, conducts the tension inherent in it as bad conscience, by turning on itself. For us, however, what is of particular importance is that this creates a new sphere of self-referencing, new spaces of freedom appear when the instinct of freedom becomes internalised.

It is of utmost importance that a *new formula is created*: inner aspirations begin to refer to themselves, *self-referenced relationships develop in the inner world of man*, the refinement, enrichment, and sublimation of instincts can begin. This explains why Nietzsche finds the origin of artistic imagination in bad conscience as well. "This secret self-violation, this artist's cruelty […], this uncanny, terrible but joyous labour of a soul voluntarily split within itself, which makes itself suffer out of the pleasure of making suffer, this whole *active* 'bad conscience' has finally – we have already guessed – as true womb of ideal and imaginative events, brought a wealth of novel, disconcerting beauty

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[58] This quote also demonstrates how problematic Foucault's interpretation is when he believes that the primary purpose of Nietzsche's genealogy is to "make visible all of those discontinuities that cross us" (Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History", 162) and to show that, "the true historical sense confirms our existence among countless lost events, without a landmark or a point of reference" (ibid. 155). In contrast, Nietzsche attempts to draw our attention to critical events in the history of European humanity, which are crucial for both the present and the future.

[59] "Animosity, cruelty, the pleasure of pursuing, raiding, changing and destroying – all this was pitted against the person who had such instincts: *that* is the origin of 'bad conscience" (*KSA* 5, 322, in English: 57).

and affirmation to light, and perhaps for the first time, beauty *itself*" (*KSA* 5, 326, in English: 59-60). Bad conscience, is then the womb of the ideal and the imaginary — Nietzsche's claim is bold and telling; it means that the basis for the creation of culture and value was established by the self-referencing, inward-turning instincts, while freedom, obtained in higher quality, self-aware sovereignty, is also the product of this process.

Therapy or Utopia?

Nietzsche's genealogical experiment — whether we consider the methodology or the purpose of the study — can be characterised as being at the crossroads of various, difficult-to-reconcile approaches and aspirations. What seems to be important is the collision of two approaches, [60] which, incidentally, can also be considered very important for Nietzsche's whole philosophy. Earlier on, one was called the *naturalist-psychologist* approach and the other the *metaphysical-historico-philosophical* perspective. The significance and relationship of these two approaches within Nietzsche's oeuvre constantly change, with the main tendency that the metaphysical-historico-philosophical approach was slowly gaining ground over the other, however, biological, psychological and naturalistic ideas remained present throughout his work, even in the late *Genealogy*-book.

As it was mentioned at the beginning of the present study, the ultimate framework for the genealogical interpretation of morality is the question of self-knowledge and the ultimate meaning of human existence; in other words, through his historical examination of morality, Nietzsche attempts nothing less than the repositioning of the questions concerning the nature of man and the meaning of human existence. The main target of Nietzsche's critique is, of course, the Platonist-Christian interpretation that man is the citizen of two worlds, where these two worlds are hierarchically related, and the true nature of human existence is the purely psychic and spiritual dimension, in stark contrast with the bodily dimension responsible for the corruption of human existence.

If we highlight the naturalistic elements of Nietzsche's critique of Christianity, it can be summed up as follows: the Platonist-Christian interpretation of man slandered man in his instinctive-animal nature, falsified his true existence, and made him sick through this lie. However, when Nietzsche raises the question of the meaning of human existence, he is faced with what has already been quoted, – "Except for the ascetic ideal: man, the *animal* man, had no

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[60] I was unable to include the third, "sociology of knowledge" approach mentioned above in more detail in this study.

meaning" (*KSA* 5, 411, in English: 84). In other words: a consistent *naturalist* critique of Platonist-Christian morality and metaphysics finds itself in danger of rendering the world *without meaning*.

Nietzsche tries to find a way out – "there was no *will* for man and earth" (ibid.) - through the affirmation of the earth, that is, the reversal of Platonic metaphysics[61] and the emphasis on the will, that is, the *will to power*. Of course, it would undoubtedly be simplistic to say that the primary task of the naturalist-psychologist approach would be criticism, the destruction of Platonist metaphysics following which Nietzschean metaphysics linked to the will to power creates the new historico-philosophical meaning without which human existence would hopelessly wither away.[62] Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that Nietzsche's metaphysical-historico-philosophical approach prevails over the *specific material* produced by naturalist-psychological considerations.

The interplay and somewhat intertwining of naturalist and metaphysical languages and approaches are perhaps best exemplified by Nietzsche's description of the evolution of the sovereign individual. As we have seen, the psychological interpretation of punishment reveals that, as a result of cruel mnemonic training, human instincts turn inwards, creating a new inner world that forms unprecedented dimensions of self-reference, freedom, and sovereignty in human existence. Through these dimensions, man is not only able to relate to himself in a new way but is also able to *define and interpret* himself in a new way. A possible, psychologically based story thus *opened up entirely new avenues of human self-overcoming*, which from then on *became a condition of possibility* for later human history. Paradoxically, we could also say that Nietzsche gave a *psychologist* explanation of how man became a *metaphysical* being, how the condition was created for the existence or non-existence of the animal called man to be decided in relation to the metaphysical dimension.

Of course, this also means that *an alternative possibility of interpretation is necessarily embedded* in Nietzsche's philosophy: the will to power has always been an existing endeavour for all living beings, and the evolution of sovereignty must be interpreted as the self-realisation of the will to power. This line of interpretation is then confirmed in the concept of the Übermensch, insofar as we can interpret the overman as one who attains a higher level of himself and recognises in himself the possibility of self-overcoming, that is, the will to power.

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[61] See the Nietzsche interpretation of the late Heidegger (Heidegger, *Nietzsche I*, 469. sk., Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche Seminare 1937 und 1944*, ed. Peter von Ruckteschell, (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 2004), 6, 162-164).

[62] The hollowed-out Christian morality is, of course, according to Nietzsche, in danger of withering away without any psychologising criticism.

Neither of the two interpretations outlined above can be ruled out - but despite Nietzsche's shift towards the metaphysical-historico-philosophical interpretation in his last creative years - both the psychological-biological and the metaphysical-historico-philosophical approaches are present in his philosophy. Even his work entitled *On the Genealogy of Morality* should be perceived as an elaborate philosophical experiment, which cannot be thought of as unfractured in this respect either, but as a joint complex of these two versions.

One story — the *psychological-biological* — is thus about how the animal called man was afflicted with morality created in the interest of social coexistence, which is nothing more than a refined means of fighting to survive and defeat the other. The task of philosophy, in this case, is *to cure* man of the disease caused by morality. Man must acquire methods of evaluation which correspond to his life instincts, which are fundamentally self-affirmative in character. The overman could perhaps be perceived as a new species which treats man the same way man treats the ape.[63] There are two main tasks for philosophy in this case: *therapy and breeding*.[64]

According to the other - the *metaphysical-historico-philosophical* - story, everything that exists is driven by a basic principle, i.e. the will to power. This basic aspiration to multiply and fulfil possibilities permeates man, whose mind, methods of evaluation, interpretations of the world and himself all serve to fulfil the will to power. Nietzsche marked distinctive eras in human history when new forms of the will to power emerged. In his work *On the Genealogy of Morality*, he analysed the development of moral modes of evaluation as manifestations of the will to power. In this present interpretation, these turning points represent different levels of self-referencing of the will to power. Of particular importance to Nietzsche's own enterprise is that genealogy itself can be seen as a higher level of self-referencing and self-knowledge that can bring about a change in human history. The overman embodies the change in a transcendental sense: when man

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[63] "What is the ape to a human? A laughingstock or a painful embarrassment. And that is precisely what the human shall be to the overman: a laughingstock or a painful embarrassment" (*KSA* 4, 14, in English: 6).

[64] Some occurrences of the term "breeding" (Züchtung): *KSA* 5, 127, in English: 19, *KSA* 5, 195, in English: 143, *KSA* 6, 100-101, in English: 184-185, *KSA* 12, 339. However, it is disputed in the literature that breeding would be a biological concept, e.g. the excellent, though at times somewhat biased, Walter Kaufmann categorically denies that the concept of breeding in Nietzsche is biological in nature (cf. Kaufmann, *Nietzsche. Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist*, 306), and there is no doubt that in some places this term is used by Nietzsche in the sense of education, in a manuscript left behind, for example, where he lists the main principles and aspects of his planned masterpiece, and contemplates the formation of the "stronger gender" (Gattung)", and uses "Erziehung als *Züchtung*" as a headword. (*KSA* 12, 339).

understands himself as overcoming himself or as the will to power. The characterisation and interpretation of this new type of man are realised only very sketchily in Nietzsche's late philosophy.

Conclusion

For a brief thought, I would like to step outside the framework of Nietzsche interpretation in the strict sense. There appeared two thinkers in the first decades of the 20th century who fundamentally shook up European philosophical thinking and turned to "things themselves" with a new kind of strict methodological determination that even now, at the beginning of the 21st century, serves as a stimulus for philosophical thinking. The outstanding significance of the two thinkers, Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, I believe, is due in part to the fact that philosophy's self-reflexivity, "self-care," was developed in a sophisticated and confident way, giving way - in fact to this day - for philosophy to be able to relate to what it is doing - both historically and systematically. The methodological battles of the two phenomenologists were for similar stakes as Nietzsche's struggles a few decades earlier, and similar to the stakes thinkers today fight for: the interrelationship between naturalism and metaphysics, sociality and individuality, and freedom, issues of self-identity and historicity.

The above use of some of the key concepts of phenomenology and hermeneutics - such as destruction, transcendental history, and original foundation (Urstiftung) - in the interpretation of Nietzsche's philosophy, was under the assumption that Nietzsche did some pioneering work in a field, especially with his genealogical ideas, which bears a profound resemblance to the phenomenological hermeneutics developed by the young Heidegger and to the generative phenomenology of the late Husserl. The methodologically much more confident and elaborate conceptualisation of phenomenology and hermeneutics may be used to confront Nietzsche's witty ideas balancing between *naturalism and metaphysics* with his own presuppositions, and show how the different, difficult-to-reconcile presuppositions play a crucial role in shaping thought processes. *It seems worthwhile to retell Nietzsche's genealogical stories using the concepts of phenomenology and hermeneutics, not only to attempt to interpret Nietzsche' s ideas in a more methodologically coherent way but also to, perhaps, view Husserl and Heidegger's efforts to explore the structures of historical self – understanding through a different lens*.