

***DISSENSIONES INTER VIAM ANTIQUAM ET VIAM MODERNAM:*  
AN EDITION OF THE *WROCLAW, BU, 6130, MILICH., II, 78, F. 1-5*  
MANUSCRIPT**

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**Abstract** The article discusses an anonymous, late medieval philosophical text, followed by its first critical edition that sets the main differences between *via antiqua* and *via moderna*, the two major philosophical parties of the second half of the 14<sup>th</sup>, and the 15<sup>th</sup> century. The phenomenon of the two ways originated in the quarrels between the Parisian realist and nominalist philosophers, and moved away to Central Europe through the departure of the German nation masters and students from Paris towards the newly founded Central European universities. Thus, due to its reference apparatus, discussed problems, and academic and historic context, the text appears to be included in the *via moderna* tradition, as an apologetical endeavour to sustain the modern cause.

**Keywords** *via antiqua*, *via moderna*, 15<sup>th</sup> century philosophy, Central European universities

The text *Dissensiones inter viam antiquam et viam modernam* opens the Wrocław, BU, 6130, Milich., II, 78 manuscript, consists of five *folio* with two columns writing, and preserves the scholastic exhibition of the differences distinguishing the main philosophical factions of the 15<sup>th</sup> century, the *via antiqua* and the *via moderna*. The textual structure is simple and it is characterised by orality right from the prologue, testifying to its intention to present the main differences between the two ways through six small questions, *quaestiuncula*. Also, the debate is presented by way of

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small arguments suggesting a good philosophical knowledge, aimed to argue in favour of one of the positions, rather than to impartially present the two opposing doctrines. The prologue, where the author states his intentions, does not suggest the author's affiliation to any of the two traditions, but solely presents the chief members of the two schools: Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas for the *via antiqua*, and Johannes Buridanus, Marsilius of Inghen and William Ockham for the *via moderna*. Nevertheless, as I shall argue, the distribution of the arguments throughout the six *quaestiones*, favouring the *via moderna*, suggests the author's affiliation to the modern cause.

The *Wegestreit* phenomenon is one of the main characteristics of Central European universities, preserving in an institutionalised form the Parisian quarrel between the realists and nominalists, as the universities were inscribing in their curricula the doctrinaire orientation as following *via antiqua* or *via moderna*. The prevalence of modern arguments, the orality, and the reference in the third *quaestio* to *Erfordia* as an example of proximity suggest that the text is a scholastic apology for the *via moderna* and that Erfurt, one of the main late medieval *via moderna* universities, was its place of composition. In the following pages, I shall argue for the scholastic character of the text, for its links with the *via moderna* and with the university of Erfurt.

## I. Distinctive features of the text

The manuscript preserved at the National Library of Wrocław opens with the debate over the main differences between the philosophical traditions of the 15<sup>th</sup> century, followed by a number of Thomas Aquinas's treatises, such as *De principio individuationis* and *De natura accidentis*, some anonymous commentaries on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, *De generatione et corruptione* and *De caelo*, commentaries on Thomas Aquinas's *De ente et essentia*, a commentary on the pseudo Aristotelian *Liber de causis*, Thomas Sutton's *De productione formae substantialis*, and also the sentences condemned in 1241, 1277 and 1387. Henrik Wels<sup>1</sup> emphasises that the thematic unity of the manuscript resides in its interest in the problem of universals, in the difference between being and essence, and in the Parisian censored propositions respectively. As he argues, the thematic unity is based on the fact that the manuscript is the work of a sole copyist, whose name can be read in some of the colophons as– Mauricius of Dresden. The colophon of the commentary on *De causis* marks the year of the production, 1455, but none of the colophons preserve the copying place. As the prologue announces, the text is structured as six short questions that aim to exhibit the main differences between the *via antiqua*, as

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<sup>1</sup> Henrik Wels, *Aristotelisches Wissen und Glauben im 15. Jahrhundert. Ein anonymer Kommentar zum Pariser Verurteilungsdekret von 1277 aus dem Umfeld des Johannes de Maisonneuve. Studie und Text*, Bohumer Studien zur Philosophie 41 (Bohum: B.R. Grüner Publishing Co., 2004), 28–34.

inherited from Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas, and the *via moderna*, as inherited from the nominalists William Ockham, Johannes Buridanus or Marsilius of Inghen.<sup>2</sup>

The six questions are:

1. *Utrum sit ponendum ex natura universale praeter intellectus operationem, sicut ponenda universalia realia ab individuis separata.*
2. *Utrum essentia differt ab esse.*
3. *Utrum distincte praedicamenta inter se differunt formaliter <et> realiter.*
4. *Utrum potentiae animae distinguantur ab anima realiter et inter se realiter et formaliter.*
5. *Utrum suppositio sit distincta realiter <et> formaliter a termino supponente.*
6. *Utrum propria passio distinguitur a suo subiecto.*

The main areas of debate are the problem of universals, the difference between being and essence, Aristotle's theory of the soul and the problem of predicaments. Although the goals presented in the prologue do not imply an apology for one of the traditions, the author offers a quantitative prevalence to the arguments sustaining the *via moderna*. Thus, measuring the number of lines granted to each position (see the following table), we shall find a prevalence of the modern arguments. This occurs even in the first two questions, where, though the ancients are granted with a wider arguing space, their positions are described in a detrimental way by the means of their own arguments. In the case of questions three through six, the author merely resorts to a succinct presentation of the ancient positions, emphasising the ability of the modern way to produce a plurality of arguments, and even confines the *via antiqua* position to *quod sic*, as a sanction to the problem set forth in the *quaestio*.

<i>Quaestio</i>	<i>Antiqui</i>	<i>Moderni</i>
1	30	13
2	51	44
3	8	109

<sup>2</sup> [1ra] Notandum quod doctores antiqui Albertus et beatus Thomas ex una parte, Johannes Biridani, Marsilius et praesertim magister Wilhelmus Occami, quem moderni Occam vocant "viae modernae reformatore singularis", parte ex altera, in multis punctis materialibus naturalibus <et> logicalibus discordant, diversimode sentientes seu scolastice dogmatizantes, de quibus punctis sex modo quaestiuncularis recitabuntur, quarum prima est:

4	6	22
5	7	87
6	<i>Quod sic</i>	35

The name of Mauricius of Dresden, as Wels indicates, is also present in a manuscript preserved in Munich,<sup>3</sup> dated between 1452 and 1453, which once again makes no mention of the place where it was copied. The sole lieu where the copyist marked the place of production is within the colophon of Thomas Sutton's *De productione formae substantialis*, under the form *sczerbist*,<sup>4</sup> identified by Wells as the German city of Zerbst. The toponym is also present in the Munich manuscript. In the third question regarding the issue of the distance between two individuals, the author mentions *Erfordia* as an example of proximity, and *Babylonia*<sup>5</sup> as an example of distance. This note may suggest that the writing place of the text was the University of Erfurt, founded in 1392, which, according to *Manuale scholarium*,<sup>6</sup> had the reputation of being a nominalist university. Indeed, as Astrik L. Gabriel writes,<sup>7</sup> no realist student came to Erfurt through the student exchanges between Erfurt and Paris. Moreover, the short distance of only 150 kilometres separating Erfurt and Zerbst may suggest the University of Erfurt as the place where the text was written. Even though the name of Mauricius is not present in the student lists of the university of Erfurt, he may have become acquainted with the text in Zerbst, where the monastery of Saint John functioned since 1235. The monastery was abolished by the Reformation, Martin Luther himself preaching in its church, but it survived as a library and a gymnasium. It is easy to presume that a school text written at the University of Erfurt could have easily been brought to Zerbst, where it could have been copied by Mauricius of Dresden, maybe a monk of the Franciscum, or, as Astrik L. Gabriel presents the 15<sup>th</sup> century intellectuals, a humanist wandering from university to university, ignoring the theological titles, who halted at Zerbst and became interested in the referred texts. Thus, we can observe how, through its structure and its possible location, the text is placed within the *via moderna* milieu,

<sup>3</sup> München, UB, 2<sup>o</sup>, Cod. ms. 49.

<sup>4</sup> *Et sic est finis tractatus de forme substantialis productione in vigilia penthecostes anno Mo cccco Ivo in sczerbist Mauricius de Dresden .*

<sup>5</sup> *...quod Socrates sit albus in Erfordia et Plato sit niger residens in Babilonia...*

<sup>6</sup> *The Manuale scholarium, An original account of life in the medieval university*, transl. Robert Francis Seybolt (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1921), 41.

<sup>7</sup> Astrik L. Gabriel, "'Via antiqua' and 'Via moderna' and the Migration of Paris Students and Masters to the German Universities in the Fifteenth Century", in *Antiqui und Moderni, Traditionsbewusstsein im späten Mittelalter*, ed. Alfred Zimmerman (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1975), 450.

as the modern argumentation is more extensively discussed and it was probably written at the University of Erfurt.<sup>8</sup>

Beyond the information provided by the Erfurt and Munich manuscripts, we lack any other information and sources concerning the studies and activity of Mauricius of Dresden; there is no indication of whether he was close to any of the two ways, of which his alma mater was or which university where he may have taught was. Not even the Wrocław manuscript's table of contents offers any relevant information concerning his activity or philosophical affiliation. Thus, if the majority of texts comprised in the manuscript<sup>9</sup> are *via antiqua* treatises, such as the large variety

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<sup>8</sup> I am thankful to Ioana Curuț for showing me the commentary of Nicholas of Amsterdam on *logica vetus*, as a possible source for our text, or even as a possibility that our text rests under the authorship of Nicholas of Amsterdam. He was a prominent *via moderna* master of the university of Rostock, who studied at the universities of Cologne and Erfurt, at the latter developing his interest for the *via moderna* problematics and methodology. Therefore, the academic context in which the *magister Erfordiensis* professed corresponds both to the possible time interval in which the composition of our text might be situated and to the place where our text might have been written. Moreover, the commentary on *logica vetus*, the only entirely edited and published work of Nicholas (Nicholas of Amsterdam, *Commentary on the Old Logic*, ed. Egbert P. Bos, Bochumer Studien zur Philosophie 58 [Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2016]) meets with our text in the discussion on the problem of predicaments, where similar expressions are used, but for different purposes. Therefore, the presence of common formulas might suggest the link between the two texts and, also, the text of Nicholas as a source for the text that we introduced. However, the problem might be explained by the fact that they share the same academic milieu and the modern way. Thus, the expressions shared by the two authors might be the usual expressions in the discussion on the problem of predicaments and, therefore, they do not suggest a real filiation between the two texts. We shall offer a careful observation of the studies on the work of Nicholas of Amsterdam and to the future editions of his works, in order to argue for, or against the possible link between our text and his work.

<sup>9</sup> 1. *Dissensiones inter viam antiquam et modernam*.

2. S. Thomas, *De principio individuationis*.

3. S. Thomas, *De natura accidentis*.

4. Thomas Sutton, *De productione formae substantialis*.

5. S. Thomas, *De mixtione elementorum*.

6. S. Thomas, *De iudiciis astrorum*.

7. Mauricius de Dresden, *Auctoritates ex diversis libris Aristotelis, Senecae, Boetii*.

8. Anon., *In I-XII Metaphysicae*.

9. *Index quaestionum operis praecedentis*.

10. *Tractatus formalitatum*.

11. *Exercitium super De generatione*.

12. *Commentum super De caelo et mundo*.

13. Franciscus Mayronis, *De esse et essentia*.

14. Anon., *In De causis*.

15. Armandus de Bellovisu, *De esse et essentia*.

of Thomist treatises, Thomas Sutton's *De productione formae substantialis* or Jean Versor's commentary on Aquinas's *De ente et essentia*, the text that opens the manuscript presents itself from the very beginning as an apology for the *via moderna*. We have to remark the copyist's interest in the commentaries on *De ente et essentia* linking in the same manuscript the commentary of Jean Versor with the ones of Franciscus Mayronis and Armandus de Bellovisu. Through its content, the manuscript can be characterised as scholastic, containing well known treatises within the late medieval academic life, written by *via antiqua* authors and studied within the universities of those days. Nevertheless, the choice to open the manuscript with a text pertaining to the *via moderna* tradition is peculiar. In the following pages, we shall continue to argue that the text connects to the *via moderna* tradition and philosophy. In this regard, we shall firstly present a short history of the schism between ancients and moderns and, secondly, we shall outline the philosophical structure of the text and its web of references.

## II. *Antiqui et moderni*

The distinction between *via antiqua* and *via moderna* was specific to the 15<sup>th</sup> century and lost its importance in the 16<sup>th</sup> century. The schism must be linked with two major phenomena of the 15<sup>th</sup> century: the founding of the central European universities, in whose structure it is reflected, and the migration of the masters and students from Paris towards the newly founded universities. In the beginning, the universities made a choice between the two ways, but in time they came to accept both of them, so the distinction disappeared by the end of the century. Moreover, the academic curricula of the central European universities, following the *via antiqua* or the *via moderna* respectively, reflected the doctrinal and institutional quarrels between the Parisian realists and nominalists.

The doctrinal dissensions started in Paris, in the 1330s, with the introduction of the English terminist logics comprised in treatises, such as William Ockham's *Summa Logicae*, which were trying to restructure the Aristotelian logics following a principle that offers a more efficient academic initiation. The conflict concerned problems of teaching and interpretation of the Aristotelian corpus:

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16. *Regestrum alphabeticum operis praecedentis*.
  17. S. Thomas, *De ente et essentia*.
  18. Johannes Versor, *In de ente et essentia*.
  19. Fragmentum anon, *comenti in Metaphysicam*.
  20. *Fragment tekstu filozoficznego*.
  21. *Quaestiones disputatae variae*.
  22. *Sophismata*.
  23. *Aliae quaestiones disputatae*.
  24. *Errores a Stephano Tempier damnati cum notis explicatoriis*.
  25. Aegidius Romanus, *De erroribus philosophorum* (fragmentum).
  26. *Formalitates* (sine fine).

whether logics should be studied following the traditional way, namely commenting each of Aristotle's known works, or following a rational structure, as the one used by the academic manuals, such as Ockham's *Summa Logicae* or Buridan's *Summulae de Dialectica*. At the University of Paris, the 14<sup>th</sup> century was marked by the scission between the followers of these two methods, the works of Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas being the leading ones for the traditionalist party. Thus, the main schools of the century were the Thomist, the Albertist and the terminist. The end of the 14<sup>th</sup> century saw a predominance of the nominalists in Paris and an increased activity of what the author of the manuscript called *scola Biridani*, comprising philosophers like Marsilius of Inghen, Albert of Saxony, Nicolas Oresme etc.

Classic researches concerning the distinction between *via antiqua* and *via moderna* and its Parisian origins are the articles of Gilles Meersseman,<sup>10</sup> presenting the Parisian origins of the Albertism of Cologne, and of Astrik L. Gabriel,<sup>11</sup> that broadens Meersseman's interpretation to the whole German cultural space of the 15<sup>th</sup> century. In the following pages, I shall refer to the two studies.<sup>12</sup> In the second

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<sup>10</sup> Gilles Meersseman, "Les Origines Parisiennes de l'Albertisme Colonnais", in *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age*, Vol. 7 (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1933).

<sup>11</sup> Astrik L. Gabriel, "'Via antiqua' and 'Via moderna'".

<sup>12</sup> I shall focus only on the articles of the two scholars, both for their reputation, the articles being cited in the great part of scholarly literature that approaches this issue, and their historical, and not polemical endeavour to identify the source of the *Wegestreit*. Beyond them, we are dealing with a vast literature treating the causes of the schism between the two ways. Some works place the birth of the schism within the 14<sup>th</sup> century Parisian conflicts, caused by the introduction of the ockhamist logic in Paris, like those of Carl Prantl, *Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande*, IV, (Leipzig, 1870), Heinrich Denifle, *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, II, (Paris, 1891), Gerhard Ritter, *Via Antiqua und Via Moderna auf den deutschen Universitäten des XV Jahrhunderts*, Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, phil.-hist. Klasse, (Heidelberg, 1922) or the well-known work of Franz Ehrle on Peter of Candia's commentary on Peter Lombard's Book of Sentences: Franz Ehrle, *Der Sentenzenkommentar Peters von Candia, des Pisaner Papstes Alexander V*, Franziskanische Studien 9 (Münster im Westf., 1925), N.W. Gilbert, "Ockham, Wyclif, And the 'Via moderna'", in *Antiqui und Moderni, Traditionsbewusstsein im späten Mittelalter*, 85–125, refutes the above interpretation and places the origins of the *Wegestreit* within the 15<sup>th</sup> century events of John Wycliff's attacks against the terminist logics and the separation between the realism of Wycliff and Jan Huss and the terminism of Pierre d'Ailly and Jean Gerson. Moreover, Zénon Kaluza, "La crise des années 1474–1482: L'interdiction du Nominalisme par Louis XI", in, *Philosophy and Learning, Universities in the Middle Ages*, eds. Maarten J.F.M. Hoenen, J.H. Josef Schneider and Georg Wieland (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 293–327, critically approaches both exegetical versions. The scholar presents the Prague quarrel as a nationalist matter, and not a philosophical one, revolving around the departure of the german nation masters and students from Prague, and, at the same time, he presents the origins of the *Wegestreit* belonging to the quarrel between the Parisian realists and nominalists, but he emphasizes the political

half of the 15<sup>th</sup> century, the University of Paris weakened its independence in the face of the royal authority. In that context, King Louis XI censored the study of nominalist doctrines,<sup>13</sup> because, as it is argued by Gabriel, a realist protégé of the Roman Curia lost a *disputatio* at Leuven in the face of a nominalist Parisian doctor. Thus, by condemning the nominalists, the king was offering a favour to the pope. The nominalists produced a memoir<sup>14</sup> exposing their complaints and a history of the four western persecutions against the nominalism. The first was against Ockham, the second was against the Bohemian nominalists, adversaries of the Hussite realism, the third occurred in Paris at the beginning of the 15<sup>th</sup> century and the last one is presented as the cause of the memoir. Both Meersseman and Gabriel identified the source of the distinction between *antiqui et moderni* in the third persecution, but, as they argued, it had not been a persecution per se, but a chain of historical contexts that compelled the German masters and students to depart from Paris towards the newly founded Central European universities and caused the establishment of a group of Albertists in Paris in 1407. Thus, in 1407, in the context of the conflict between the house of Burgundy and the house of Armagnac, Louis, Duke of Orleans,

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character of the quarrel, the significance of the argument of heresy, used by the 1474 condemnation, and the low significance of the philosophical implications of the quarrel. A reconciliatory exegesis is offered by William J. Courtenay, "Antiqui and Moderni in Late Medieval Thought", *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 48/1 (1987): 3–10. He demonstrates the Hussite schism as only the peak of a process started by the introduction of terminist logics in Paris, and presents the large use of the term *modernus* throughout the Parisian 14<sup>th</sup> century, from its signification as contemporary, like Ockham was using it, to labelling the terminist group, as it functioned throughout the entire 15<sup>th</sup> century. A remarkable exegetical endeavour is comprised in the ninth volume of *Miscellanea Mediaevalia* (1974), entirely dedicated to the distinction between ancients and moderns, not only as a late medieval academic phenomenon, but also as a conceptual couple functioning throughout the Middle Ages.

<sup>13</sup> Franz Ehrle, *Der Sentenzenkommentar...*, 310–321.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid, 322–326; Zénon Kaluza, *La crise...*, 321–324 recognizes the 1474 condemnation text as the source for the fallacious exegetical identification of the origins of the *Wegestreit* as being the condemnation of the ockhamism or the Hussite refutation of nominalism. Suggesting the political character of the quarrel in both Prague and Paris, Kaluza comments the stages of the nominalist persecution, as they are presented by the nominalist memoir, and exposes them as a nominalist endeavour to create a history that exposes the persecution from a doctrinal perspective. Thus, the nominalist memoir historically justifies the existence of nominalism and its right of presence within the university as a survivor of multiple persecutions: the condemnation of Ockham and ockhamism, the Kutná-Hora decree, presented by the memoir as an anti-nominalist action by ignoring its nationalist implications, the 1407 condemnation, one of the causes being presented by the decree as the alliance between the albertists and the English in the Hundred Years' War, and the 1474 condemnation, presented by the memoir by ignoring its political implications. Hence, by applying a negative hermeneutic, Kaluza recognized the necessity to historically study the epochs of the quarrel between ancients and moderns, by transcending the narratives fabricated in order to sustain the parties.



was assassinated by Jean sans Peur, Duke of Burgundy. Because of this destabilising event for the Parisian university, but also because of the Hundred Years' War crisis and the precarious financial situation in Paris, compared with the freshly founded European universities, the members of the German nation, masters and students, left the city, the university's leadership being transferred to a group of Albertists who censored nominalism. The leader of the Albertist group was Johannes de Nova Domo, the master of Heymericus de Campo, who became chief of the Albertist party and the founder of *Bursa Laurentiana*, the Albertist headquarters at the University of Cologne. The Albertist domination at the University of Paris lasted until 1437, when the nominalists regained their hegemony. Therefore, the main Parisian schools of philosophy were the Albertists and the nominalists, along the Thomists and the Scotists, who were also of realist orientation, but with a lower influence. By leaving Paris for the Central European universities, the scholars preserved the Parisian pattern. However, their labels changed from the representative philosopher to *antiqui* and *moderni*. Most of the universities elected a single way, but some universities allowed the students to choose the way in which they should be educated. The University of Cologne, where Heymericus de Campo had taught, was one of the leading universities in the Albertist *via antiqua*. One of the main *via moderna* universities was the University of Erfurt, where Bartholomaeus Usingen taught and Martin Luther had been one of his students. In Krakow, the two ways alternated: in the first half of the 15<sup>th</sup> century the *via moderna* was followed, and in the second half the *via antiqua* was followed. In Basel and Tübingen, both of the ways were simultaneously accepted. Adopting one *via* or another implied the curricular orientation, but did not exclude the presence of philosophical opponents at the university, as it is confirmed by Servatius Fanckel, student at the University of Cologne. In his recordings of the usual academic disputes, he recorded the presence of a nominalist at a *disputatio* concerning the real distinction between the persons of the trinity. The academic disputes played a major role in the medieval university, and there was a whole range of them, like the *disputationes nocturnae*, held every night at various colleges, or the *bursae*, *disputationes vacantiales*, held every week during the summer break, and other disputes held upon the bestowal of different academic distinctions. As Maarten Hoenen<sup>15</sup> argues, commenting Servatius Fanckel's record of the disputes in Cologne, the *disputatio* played a major didactical role, providing the students and the auditorium the possibility to hear both the arguments favouring their own academic orientation and those favouring the opponents. Thus, there are numerous documents that record the *disputationes* with an emphasis on the arguments used, because students recorded those arguments that could be used in their future disputes. The text in question is not the recording of a dispute, but a

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<sup>15</sup> Maarten Hoenen, "Nominalism in Cologne: The Student Notebook of the Dominican Servatius Fanckel with an Edition of a Disputatio Vacantialis Held on July 14, 1480", in *Crossing Boundaries at Medieval Universities*, ed. Spencer Young (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 86.

university speech or, probably, a lesson, which took the form of a dispute between ancients and moderns. The parts of the dispute are announced in the prologue in a chronological order and through particular speech formulas: *Ad quod respondent platonici...Sed hoc reclamant moderni istomodo; Ad hoc respondit beatus Thomas...Dicit tamen Albertus...Sed Buridanus et scola moderna respondent...; or Ad hoc antiqui respondent, ut thomistae, albertistae...Ad hoc antiqui respondent; or Ad hoc respondet Albertus quod...Sed ista positio non placet modernis...et cetera.*

In the prologue, the author presents the representatives of the two *viae*, the ancients Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas and the moderns Johannes Buridanus, Marsilius of Inghen and William Ockham, the main reformer of the modern way. Despite the fact that Ockham is emphasised as the main figure within the modern way, throughout the text, the most invoked modern philosopher is Buridanus, often as a spokesman of the moderns: *Sed Buridanus et scola moderna respondent....* The emphasis on Ockham's special role within the modern way is specific to the literature of the 15<sup>th</sup> century. For instance, Bartholomaeus Usingen's text also contains a dispute between ancients and moderns, held at Erfurt, in 1497, where Ockham is introduced with the title *venerabilis inceptor viae modernae*. The most cited philosopher is Buridanus, because his works were well known, having been used as academic textbooks together with the ones of Marsilius of Inghen. As Zénon Kaluza<sup>16</sup> argues, a characteristic of the impact of buridanism originates in the fact that in 1339 and 1340 nominalism was not generally censored in Paris, but only the doctrine of Ockham and the okhamism, this allowing the buridanism to expand at the central European universities. Also, as Heiko A. Oberman<sup>17</sup> argues, another feature of the influence of buridanism in Central Europe consists in its reverence towards Ockham. Because *via moderna* did not associate itself with the thought of a sole philosopher, as was the habit within the *via antiqua*, but with a sum of school leaders, Ockham is remembered as a historical representative for the birth of *via moderna*, rather than a school authority.

### III. Philosophical aspects

As I have already stated, the difference between *esse* and *essentia* plays a major role in the manuscript's table of contents. The fragment we discuss also deals with the aforementioned issue. That is why we shall confine our commentaries to the second question and how the problem of *esse et essentia* appears throughout it, and to the third and fifth questions, both dealing with the problem of the predicaments. During this entire exercise, we shall continue our endeavour to prove the text's inclusion within the modern way and we shall support this statement by way of the text's philosophical aspects and references.

<sup>16</sup> Zénon Kaluza, *La crise...*, 294, note 2.

<sup>17</sup> Heiko A. Oberman, "Via antiqua and Via moderna: Late Medieval Prolegomena to Early Reformation Thought", *Journal of the History of Ideas* 48/1 (1987): 35.

### 1. *Esse et essentia*

The second question investigates the difference between *esse* and *essentia*, implying three philosophical arguments – two ancient ones, of Thomas Aquinas and Albertus Magnus, and one nominalist argument, of Johannes Buridanus and the *modern school*. The realist arguments are contextualised within the Neoplatonist problem of emanation from One to multiplicity, but set forth in its Christian creationist form. The implied arguments are linked with the ones used by Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas in their commentaries on the pseudo-Aristotelian *Liber de causis*.

Approaching Saint Thomas's view on being and essence, despite the fact that it is discussed at length in *De ente et essentia*, the author presented only the arguments of the fourth book of the named treatise, in which Saint Thomas discussed the separate substances, and limited the Thomist arguments only to those treating the first levels of the world's hierarchy: God and the angels. Thus, the Thomist argument is twofold. Firstly, the author presented the identity of being and essence in the case of the first Intelligence or God, arguing through the authority of Aristotle's theory of the first and incorruptible substance.<sup>18</sup> Secondly, the author presented the Thomist argument concerning the angels, or the second intelligences, emphasising a real and necessary difference between being and essence. If neither God, nor the angels are composed of matter and species or other integrating parts, another form of contrast has to save the first Intelligence's supreme simplicity and that is what must be the real difference between being and essence within the second intelligences. We have to remark how the two arguments are closely presented with to the Thomist conception of the synonymy between the first Intelligence and God, and the multiple intelligences and the angels, avoiding the confusion with the Albertist philosophical vocabulary, where, following the theory of *Liber de causis*, the concept of intelligence represents an intermediary between being and multiplicity. At the end of the paragraph dedicated to Saint Thomas, admitting the validity of the first argument, the author succinctly refutes the second argument regarding the second substances. He argues that, despite its intentions of creating a contrast between God's simplicity and the composed nature of the angels are valid, the contrast could be more properly argued through the argument of the angel's composition of potency and intelligible species or of potency and the acts of comprehension.

The author's critical endeavour must be understood on the grounds of the necessity to refute the realist philosophers and to favour the nominalist philosophers. However, its validity is open to question, because it tends to ignore major details of the theory of Saint Thomas. Thus, in the fourth book of *De ente et essentia*, Saint Thomas certainly refutes the endeavours to theorise the composition of matter and form in the intelligences and in the soul, endeavour inherent to

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<sup>18</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, XII, 6, 1072a.

Avicenna's *Fons vitae*. Saint Thomas theorises a hierarchy of the intelligences using the authority of *Liber de causis*, IX, distinguishing between being and essence in the case of angels and emphasising God as pure essence. However, he does not ignore the inherent potentiality of the inferior intelligences and their specificity of comprehensible beings, as the anonymous author objects. Saint Thomas used the argument presenting the second intelligences as intelligible from the beginning of the fourth book, with the purpose of refuting the theory of Avicenna, because the composition with any type of matter would compromise their intelligibility. Moreover, Saint Thomas does not end his research with God and the second intelligences, but he vastly describes the Neoplatonist hierarchy, down to the lowest position of the human soul. Potentiality is the principle used to pass from One to multiple. Because God is a pure, simple essence, and creation receives its essence and being from him, and because anything received from something rests in a potential state relative to the offeror, the creation rests in a potential state relative to God. The quiddity of the intelligences rests in a potential state relative to the being received from God and the received being always acts as actuality. Because God is the sole pure essence, the distinction from him takes place through an admixture of potentiality.<sup>19</sup> As much as the scale bends on the potentiality's part, the substances occupy a lower level on the hierarchy and their multiplicity increases. Hence, the objection made by the author is partially valid, because potentiality is not excluded from the Thomist hierarchical scheme, and neither is the admixture with comprehension acts, specific to the separate intelligences.<sup>20</sup>

In the second step, the author described the position of Albertus Magnus, emphasising his distinctness compared to his predecessor in the order of the text and succinctly argued the invalidity of his major arguments. As we also remarked while discussing the argument of Saint Thomas, Saint Albert's argument is folded in a multiplicity of theoretical covers and, right from its beginning, it is linked to Albert's commentary on *Liber de causis*. Thus, the first step in order to distinguish Albert from Thomas, presents the second intelligences not composed of *esse* and *essentia*, as Thomas argued, but of act and potency, as a receptacle of the divine revelations, their union being named *materia spiritualis*. Saint Albert's works contain two concepts that, although they may seem to be synonyms, they are enunciated in a real distinction. Thus, the concept of spiritual matter, used by the manuscript's author, can only be found in three different works of Albert.<sup>21</sup> The concept of *hylatin*

<sup>19</sup> Saint Thomas also refutes Avicenna's theory in *Summa Theologica*, Ia, q.50, art.2.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid. Ia, q.50, art.2, ad 3m.

<sup>21</sup> Albertus Magnus, *Super I Sententiarum*, II, 18,8, in *B. Alberti Magni Opera Omnia*, XXV, ed. A. Borgnet (Paris, 1893–1894), 324b; idem, "*De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa*", I, 1, 5, in *Alberti Magni Opera Omnia*, XVII, Pars II, ed. Winfridus Fauser (Aschendorf: Monasterii Westfalorum, 1993), 10–13; idem, "*De intellectu et intelligibili*", I, 1, 7, in *B. Alberti Magni Opera Omnia*, IX, ed. Borgnet (Paris, 1890), 532.

is theorised throughout an entire chapter in Albert's commentary on *Liber de causis*<sup>22</sup>. In the aforementioned fragments, and mainly in the one of *De causis...*, the spiritual matter is postulated as an intermediary between the first cause, lacking matter, and the multiplicity of particular objects, bearers of corporeal matter. The necessity of an intermediary form of matter emerges from the Albertist hierarchical succession of the causes, as exposed in the commentary on *De causis*: the influence of the first cause does not reach the particular objects directly, but gradually, through the mediation of several other causes. The spiritual matter is one of the mediating causes. The chapter in Albert's commentary on *Liber de causis*, treating the problem of *hylatin*, is of great importance, because it is one of the major sources in the research of the theory of being and essence in Saint Albert's view. As the scholarship remarked,<sup>23</sup> the use of *hylatin* has a double source in this commentary. Firstly, it originates in a philological error: offering the sense of an admixture of matter and being, due to a euphony with the Greek word for matter, ὕλη, to the lieu where the pseudo Aristotelian treatise discusses the admixture of species and being within the derivate entities.<sup>24</sup> Secondly, the use of *hylatin* corresponds to the distinction of Boethius between *id quod est* and *quo est*. Thus, *hylatin* acts as a principle of individuation, because only something concrete is passible of acting and suffering and, because matter is the Aristotelian principle of individuation, *hylatin* is the material principle of individuation for the intelligences able to receive the divine revelations. However, Albert recognised the absence of a third form of matter within the non-corporeal entities and, in so doing, he postulated a third degree of pure receptivity, correctly interpreting the receptive structure of the intelligences, as described in *Liber de causis*. *Hylatin* is not a type of matter adequate to non-corporeal entities, but a principle of their individuation, a supposition (*suppositum*), that occupies the place of *id quod est* in Boethius's theory, a receptacle of the being, *quo est*, received from the first cause.

By comparing the use of the two concepts, we can remark how the theory read as *materia spiritualis* by our anonymous author is linked to Saint Albert's understanding of *hylatin*. Even though both theories describe the material character of the intermediary intelligences, compared to the first Intelligence and the multiplicity of corporal objects, the theory of the spiritual matter does not imply its

<sup>22</sup> Albertus Magnus, *De causis*, II, 2, 18, 110–111.

<sup>23</sup> Alexander Baumgarten, *Intermediaritate și Ev Mediu* (Intermediarity and the Middle Ages) (Cluj-Napoca: Editura Viața Creștină, 2002), 25–54; Idem, "Liber de causis: teoria inteligenței intermediare între aristotelism și neoplatonism" (*Liber de causis: the theory of intermediary intelligence between Aristotelianism and Neo-Platonism*), in *Pseudo-Aristotel, Liber de causis*, bilingual edition, trans. Alexander Baumgarten (Bucharest: Univers Enciclopedic, 2002), 107–174; Therese Bonin, *Creation as Emanation* (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001), 15–34.

<sup>24</sup> Pseudo-Aristotle, *Liber de causis*, 90.

receptivity and its correspondence with the essence understood as *id quod est* or *suppositum*. Moreover, the synonymy of *materia spiritualis* and *hylia* is only apparent, because within the non-corporeals Saint Albert only recognised the apparent material character of the second concept, while he presented the spiritual matter as a simple intermediary between the first, active cause and the passive, corporeal objects.<sup>25</sup>

In the second step, the author discusses the validity of the argument concerning the eternity of the essences of objects, refuting it through Anaxagoras's theory of *homoimeries*. The albertist position is succinctly invoked, completed by the authority fragment of Aristotle's *Physics*, I, 189a, 5-8. The text implicitly refers to Saint Albert's commentary on *Liber de causis*. In the second book, Albert introduces the following argument: *Propter quod formae in intelligentia acceptae, aeternae sunt et universales: acceptae autem in materia, temporales sunt et particulare: hoc est quod dicunt et Aristoteles et Boetius, quod "universale est dum intelligitur, particulare dum sentitur."*<sup>26</sup> EDDIG

Thus, if the Thomist argument and the first step of the Albertist argument discussed the difference between being and essence concerning the first Intelligence and the second intelligences, the second step of the Albertist argument discusses the essence of corporeal, multiple objects. The presentation is only partial, because, as we can read in the fragment above, Albert introduces a double significance of the essences of particulars. Thus, Albert theorises the eternity of objects only from the intelligible perspective, grounding his theory on Aristotle's theory of the principle of material objects,<sup>27</sup> and on Boethius's *Consolation of Philosophy*, a view also grounded on Aristotle. The eternity and universality of the material objects is not acceptable from the sensible perspective. Henceforth, we can infirm the refutation based on the ontology of Anaxagoras, because the eternity of the essences of objects can be sustained only on an intellectual ground.

The third step of the Albertist argument, following the being and not the essence, discusses the problem of generation and corruption. We have to emphasise that the confusing use of the terms *being* and *essence* within the arguments originates in the works of Albert.<sup>28</sup> A proper understanding would be provided by changing them with Boethius's concepts of *quo est* and *id quod est*. Thus, as we observed when we discussed the spiritual matter, the second intelligences are composed of being (*quo est*) and essence (*suppositum, id quod est*). The essence acts as a principle of individuation, similar to matter. The author's conclusion, that being and essence are distinct, like the eternal and the corruptible, is valid, because the

<sup>25</sup> Albertus Magnus, *De causis...*, II, 2, 18, 110–111.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid, II, 1, 19, 83–84.

<sup>27</sup> Aristotle, *Physics*, I, 189a, 5–8.

<sup>28</sup> Therese Bonin, *Creation as Emanation*, 24–25.

individuation principle of the corporal substances is the corporal matter. However, their being emanates from the first cause.

The third argument, of Buridan, is based on his commentary on the *Metaphysics*.<sup>29</sup> In the eighth question, the medieval master investigates the identity of being and essence within the object and, in the ninth question, he investigates the distinction between being and essence regarding the act of rationalising. For both questions, Buridan's answer is affirmative. Thus, in its first step, the text follows Buridan's position assuming the identity of being and essence within the object and their distinction implied in the act of rationalising. For explanatory purposes, the author uses the example of the identity of light and the act of lighting, an example that does not belong to Buridan, but to Saint Albert. However, the example was not used by Albert in order to assert the identity of being and essence, but in order to support his theory of the diffusion of Being as *actus essentiae*.<sup>30</sup> Therefore, the conceptual definition is transferred from ontological grounds to logical grounds. The author argues how the two concepts in question refer to the same object, but from different perspectives. Essence is an absolute concept, expressed through absolute and un-composed terms, like human or animal. Being is a verbal concept, expressed through a discourse composed of accidents and the expression of the essence, like *the human is*. The core authority for Buridan's eighth question is the fragment of *Metaphysics*,<sup>31</sup> where Aristotle sets the identity of essence, even though it refers to a real human or the notion of human. Due to a better fitting of the Aristotelian theory through the emphasis of the predicative function of essence, Buridan uses, in the eighth question, the example of *the rose* and *being a rose*, and not Albert's example of light and the act of lighting. The master admits their real identity, but he postulates their logical distinction. Thus, the being is what is predicated relative to the particular being to whom the act of existence is inherent. The predication of the rose as essence does not concern the existence or the inexistence of an actual rose. The essence is identical to the noumenon, relative to whom the being is contingent. This is the object of knowledge and it ignores the being or the un-being of the object. Thus, being is not inherent to the object in an essential way, the object having the possibility of being or un-being. However, as Buridan emphasises in the same question, being is not something added to the essence. If not, the task to identify the origin of being would be an infinite one. In order to offer a possible solution for the problem, the author of the manuscript invokes Boethius's argument of being, interpreted as *quo est* and not as *id quod est*, but in the same paragraph he refutes the argument's validity through the argument of the limited terms and the

<sup>29</sup> Johannes Buridanus, *Lectura Erfordiensis in Aristotelis I–VI Metaphysicam, together with the 15<sup>th</sup>-century Abbreviatio Caminensis*, VIII–IX, ed. L.M. de Rijk (Turnhout: Brepols, 2008), 75–82.

<sup>30</sup> Albertus Magnus, *Super Sententiarum*, I, 8, 5, 227–228.

<sup>31</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, IV, 2, 1003b.

transcendental terms. As William Ockham<sup>32</sup> puts it, a transcendental term is common to every object, like *genre, one, good* etc. A limited term is common only to a part of the objects. Therefore, the author argues that Boethius's argument is valid only for the limited terms and not for the transcendental ones and that the error of the ancients originates in ignoring this distinction.

## 2. *The problem of predicaments*

The third question of the manuscript forms a philosophical couple with the fifth, both discussing the problem of the real or nominal distinction between the predicaments and, in the latter, the difference between the predicaments of passion and substance. The distinction between predicaments is of great importance within the late medieval philosophy, being discussed throughout all its aspects: ontological, epistemological or theological. On 7 March 1277, Etienne Tempier, Bishop of Paris, released a list of 219 articles, containing phrases from the philosophical literature of that time, and condemned their use in the academic practices. The aim of the decree was to stop the advance of the Aristotelian philosophy and of its Averroist interpretations, which could interfere with the Christian theology. The main endangered issue was the divine omnipotence, which, even though it was formulated by Petrus Damianus and by Peter Lombard's *Book of Sentences*, it had to be strengthened by confronting menacing theses, like the Aristotelian thesis of the inexistence of the void. Despite the fact that the jurisdiction of Tempier was restricted to the Parisian diocese, the decree of censorship was undertaken by the Franciscans and, later, by the universities, like the ones of Bologna, Vienna, Cologne or Erfurt. The main effect of the condemnation was to cause the establishment of a new intellectual class that questioned the Aristotelian principles, like the ones threatening the validity of the divine omnipotence.<sup>33</sup> Therefore, the problem of the divine omnipotence was transferred to the core of late medieval philosophy, because, if the philosophical thinking previous to the Parisian condemnation limited the divine omnipotence to the logical contradiction, God being thus unable to act in contradiction with the laws of creation, the philosophical thinking that followed the condemnation, like Buridan's, transcended the Aristotelian dogmatism and restored the plenitude of the divine omnipotence, by operating the distinction between *potentia Dei absoluta* and *potentia Dei ordinata*. *Potentia Dei absoluta* concerns the infinity of possibilities available to God in the anteriority of creation, which remain mere potentialities in the posteriority of creation. *Potentia Dei ordinata* concerns the actual plan of creation, i.e. the sum of potencies actualised by the choice of God

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<sup>32</sup> Pseudo-Ockham, *Elementarium logicae*, 7, 13, ed. Eligius M. Buytaert, revised by Gedeon Gal and Joachim Giermek, in William of Ockham, *Opera philosophica VII (opera dubia et spuria)* (St. Bonaventure N.Y: St. Bonaventure University, 1988).

<sup>33</sup> Edward Grant, *The Nature of Natural Philosophy in the Late Middle Ages* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2010), 53.



within the act of creation. Despite the fact that God has the ability to actualise the potencies excluded from the creation's plan, he does not actualise them, in order not to disturb the natural order.<sup>34</sup> By postulating this distinction, philosophy enables itself to research the problems by transcending the Aristotelian physics, issues like the existence of void, God's ability to create other worlds, distinct of our own, whether God is able to move our world rectilinearly or whether God has the ability to separate the accidents from substance.

The argument of the ancients is attributed to the Albertists and the Thomists, which argue the real distinction between predicaments. We must remark that, despite their admission of a real distinction between predicaments, that does not imply their severability from substance, which will be discussed in the fifth question. The ancient position is presented through the argument of logical transitivity: the predicament of quality is distinct from substance and the predicament of relation is also distinct from substance; therefore, the two predicaments have to be distinct from one another. The ancient position is presented as being based on the authority of Themistius. However, because the author vaguely names the ancients as Albertists and Thomists and because the fragment and its answer, found in the following paragraph, correspond to the place of *Lectura erfordiensis*,<sup>35</sup> where Buridan treats the same problem and where the name of Themistius is not mentioned, the source of the argument must be the Buridanist commentary on the *Metaphysics*.

The modern argument opens with a response to the ancient authority: because the principle *essentiae predicamentorum sunt impermixtae* must be understood not ontologically, as a real existence of the predicaments and their reciprocal real essential distinction, but as an act of predication, their essential difference consists in their specific role within the process of predication, one predicament not being able to essentially predicate in relation to another predicament, but only accidentally. However, if the argument of the ancients concerned the reciprocal distinction between predicaments, the modern argument transfers the discussion to the distinction between accidents and substance, as it can be noticed in the following arguments that discuss the difference between relationship and substance. Hence, through the fragment attributed to Themistius, the author argues for the accidental predication of the predicaments in relation with substance, exemplified through the propositions *Socrates is white* and *Socrates is a father*.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> Ibid, 54.

<sup>35</sup> Johannes Buridanus, *Lectura erfordiensis*, XI, 393, 33, 92.

<sup>36</sup> The modern arguing originates in Buridan's commentary on the *Metaphysics*:

For the ancient argument:

*"Confirmatur per istam auctoritatem famosam quod essentie sive quiditates <diversorum> predicamentorum sunt impermixte sive diverse. Hoc enim accipitur ab Aristotile primo*

The modern position is sustained through the example of relationship, and the author uses six arguments in this regard. However not all of them are faithful to the doctrine of Buridan, even though they follow the modern tradition. Despite the fact that Buridan is one of the scholars who argue that the divine power separates the accidents from substance, in this case the identity between substance and accidents must be understood in the perspective of *potentia Dei ordinata*, i.e. the natural logic which can be defied by God through miracles. As Femke J. Kok argues,<sup>37</sup> Buridan asserts the miraculous severability of accidents from substance. However, that does not offer the statute of substances to the accidents, because their separate existence does not happen naturally. Hence, the discussion has to be kept within the limits of the natural, but the severability of the accidents from substances must be accepted in the exceptionality of the divine intervention, like the case of the Eucharist. In this context, the master argues for the identity between substance and the predicament of relation. In his first argument, he emphasises the non-object character of relationship: if the relationship were really distinct, we would have to admit a plurality of real potencies, because it is able to enter in an infinity of relations. The second argument refutes the ontological transitivity of relationship. The third argument transcends the Buridanist position, arguing that, if the relationship were really distinct from substance, it would also be a substance implying the property of divisibility and, therefore, the property of quantity, from here resulting a factual contradiction: *quod in maiore homine esset maior paternitas et in minore homine minor paternitas, quod est falsum*. Even though he refutes the real distinction between accidents and substance, Buridan offers a special statute to the predicament of quantity, by using the example of condensation and dilution. He accepts a real distinction between substance and quantity, because, in the named phenomenon, what changes is not the substance, but its quantity.<sup>38</sup> Thus, if the

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*Posteriorum et a Commentatore duodecimo Methaphisice. Modo figura et cera que est figurata sunt diversorum predicamentorum.*" Johannes Buridanus, *Lectura Erfordiensis*, XI, 393, 33, 92.

For the modern argument:

*"Similiter ad ultimam auctoritatem potest dici quod essentie predicamentorum sunt impermixte ad istum sensum quod termini de uno predicamento non ponantur modo essentiali de termino alterius predicamenti et quiditative, sed modo denominative."* Buridanus, *Lectura erfordiensis*, XI, solutio, 409, 14, 95.

<sup>37</sup> Femke J. Kok, *John Buridan's Commentary on the Metaphysics*, in *A Companion to the Latin Medieval Commentaries on Aristotle's Metaphysics*, eds. Fabrizio Amerini and Gabriele Galluzzo (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 495–550.

<sup>38</sup> *"Ad istam quaestionem respondeo secundum viam antiquam quod nulla substantia est magnitudo sive quod materia non est magnitudo. Et ad hoc adduco primo unam rationem naturalem: ponentes enim quod omnis res extensa sit magnitudo concedunt rarefactionem et condensationem fieri per motum localem secundum quem partes substantiae elongantur ab invicem vel approximantur ab invicem ad obtinendum minorem locum absque hoc quod*

author followed the Buridanist view, it would not imply the identity of quantity and substance and the fact that a larger man would imply a larger amount of paternity, because the phenomenon of quantity change demonstrates that what is transformed is not the substance, but its quantity. That is why Buridan defined the predicament of quantity by following the *via antiqua* and accepting its real distinction from substance.

The fourth modern argument sustains, through the example of causality, the invalidity of the real existence of relationship, because, if the relationship were a predicament truly anchored in substance, the implication would be that a certain agent would be able to produce infinite potencies existing in a real way and acting through an infinite distance. The relationship is based on causality, through the fact that one member of the relationship gains a note of likeness with another member of the relationship, ignoring the distance separating them. The author tries to emphasise the absurdity of the realist thesis and, to this purpose, he formulates an example: the white man named Socrates living in Erfordia and the black man named Plato living in Babilonia are separated by an infinite distance; through the fact that Plato whitens himself, the likeness is produced, and, therefore, the relation is created through an infinite distance and has to be acknowledged as existent. However, the example does more than prove that the realist thesis is absurd; it is truly important in the endeavour to geographically localise the place where the manuscript was produced. The text uses Erfordia as an example of the closest proximity and Babilonia as an example of the most remote farness, therefore offering reasons to consider the *via moderna* University of Erfurt as the place where the text was written.

The fifth argument once again discusses the problem of the second argument, emphasising that a relationship does not imply a real transformation, and it defines the relationship following the modern way: the relation and its fundament are not really distinct, except in a modal way, i.e. a relative term that predicates an accidental mode, relative to the subject or the fundament. The last argument presents the function of the relationship in the Buridanist view, it augments the position of Buridan, it operates the distinction through different types of relationships and it concludes the rationalization. Therefore, in Buridan's view,<sup>39</sup> the relationship is caused relative to the act through which the soul compares objects. In other words, the relationship has a comparative functionality. However, the author operates a distinction. Thus, when the relationship is based on substance, it is caused concerning a concretely existing object, like paternity, based unmediated on father's substance, because the paternity is founded between a concrete

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*quantitas corrumpatur.*" Johannes Buridanus, *Physica*, XXI, 1, in Benoit Patar, *La physique de Bruges de Buridan et le traite du ciel d'Albert de Saxe*, vol. II (Longueuil: Les Presses Philosophiques, 2001), 75–82.

<sup>39</sup> Johannes Buridanus, *Lectura erfordiensis*, XXVII, solutio, 682, 160.

individuality, gaining the fatherhood quality, and something predicated in an absolute way, like human or animal. The relationship is mediated when it is founded on quantity and the mediation is operated, through quantity, in substance, as it is exemplified by the author through the relation of likeness between two white men. The author thus draws the conclusion. Firstly, he affirms the simultaneity of the predicament of relation, which, even though it is split between logical and ontological, when the soul compares the objects, the two parts are engaged simultaneously, as the likeness and the objects being alike. Secondly, the mediation allows to postulate a difference between the relationship and substance. Because the relationship concerns a concrete object, it is predicated about substance, like the fact of being alike. The relationship that concerns an abstraction is predicated about quantity that mediates its foundation in substance. Thus, the author exhibits the identity of substance and relationship as valid only on the level of the unmediated relationship, like the paternity; but, due to the quantitative mediation, he admits a logical difference between substance and relationship, when the relationship is predicated about absolute terms.

The fifth question treats the difference between substance and accidents by applying the general debate of the third question to the difference between the predicament of passion and its subject. Therefore, without naming the philosopher who authored the argument, the author exhibits the ancient position in accepting the real distinction between passion and its subject, through the fact that, according to the *Metaphysics*,<sup>40</sup> where passion is placed through its definition under the genre of quality, the passion is an accident and the subject is a substance. As it was argued in the third question, the ancients assert a real distinction between accidents and substance. Henceforth, they admit a real difference between passion and the subject of passion.

The modern position is again presented through Buridan, whose theory implies the modal distinction between passion and its subjects. In his commentary on the *Metaphysics*, Buridan discusses the subject of the science of metaphysics and says that it is different from the subject that is distinct from passion. Through this, Buridan postulates the purely nominal distinction between passion and subject: both refer to the same *suppositum*, but passion adds an additional connotation to substance. The author uses the method of *reductio ad absurdum* in order to argue for the modern position. Therefore, the main premise of the second argument consists of a fragment of Buridan,<sup>41</sup> based on the Aristotelian theory of the

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<sup>40</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1022b, 15.

<sup>41</sup> Johannes Buridanus, "Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima (de tertia lectura)", I, 5; II, 2, in Jack Zupko, *John Buridan's Philosophy of Mind: An Edition and Translation of Book III of His "Questions on Aristotle's "de Anima", with Commentary and Critical and Interpretative Essays*, Dissertation, Cornell University, 1989, 201, 234.

anteriority of substance relative to accidents, by time, definition and nature.<sup>42</sup> As it can be observed, in Buridan's commentary on *De anima*, the philosopher accepts the Aristotelian principle, but only in form, because the matter of the object is acknowledged only through accidents. The master argues that, if we admit the real difference between substance and passion, we have to admit the possibility that they exist separately from one another, i.e. laughter exists separately from the human subject and the human subject independently from his passions. The conclusion exposes the absurdity of the ancient position.

The third argument, through a *reductio ad absurdum*, presents once more the position of the ancients from a nominalist perspective. By demonstrating that the ancient theories are inconsistent, the author theorises the passion as an essential aptitude, distinct from the subject only within the act of reason. The author offers the example of laughter and of the ability to laugh, an example which had also been offered by Buridan. Thus, the passion is an aptitude for an act, and, in order to distinguish the aptitude from the act, the author uses two notions of medieval logic, *materia naturali* and *materia contingenti*. The two notions represent types of modal propositions, which, by adding the notion of *materia remota*, circumscribe the areas of essential and accidental predication. *Materia naturali* represents the necessity: what is attributed to an object must be attributed to all of the objects. *Materia remota* represents the impossibility: what is retracted from an object must be retracted from all objects. The two notions constitute the essential predication. *Materia contingenti* concerns an accidental link between subject and predicate, postulating a third genre of modal propositions, that is neither necessary, nor impossible, but contingent, and it forms the accidental predication.<sup>43</sup> According to this logic, the proposition *The human is laughable* is a necessary proposition, while the proposition *A human laughs* is an accidental one. The difference between subject and passion is accepted only under these conditions. The essential aptitude, i.e. the soul operating through its various faculties, distinguishing each other only through the variety of functions, is not different from the subject, but it is the very subject able of an act. However, as it is argued in the fourth argument, the essential aptitude is not a distinct part of the subject, but it is the very subject in the state of the possibility for a certain act. The last part of the modern argument reiterates the modal argument, demonstrating that the difference between passion and subject should not be accepted as both having different essences, but through the fact that passion constitutes an accidental predication, because it implies the *actus vivendi*. In other words, the proposition predicating the passion pertains to the contingency

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<sup>42</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, VII, 1028a.

<sup>43</sup> Gino Roncaglia, "Modal Logic in Germany at the Beginning of the Seventeenth Century: Christoph Scheibler's *Opus Logicum*", in *The Medieval Heritage in Early Modern Metaphysics and Modal Theory*, eds. Russel L. Friedman, Lauge O. Nielsen (Dordrecht: Springer-Science&Business Media, 2003), 259.

described above, because its reference implies the accidental note of the activation of an aptitude.

A frequently used argument throughout the text, labelled at the end of the fifth question as a Parisian article, is: *quaecumque sunt distincta realiter possunt separari et separatim conservari*. The expression *possunt separari et separatim conservari* is frequently present within the medieval philosophical literature, as in the works of Duns Scotus or in the glosses of *De consolatione philosophiae in usum Delphini*, the last presences being attested to Descartes and Leibniz. The author uses the argument to sustain the modern position when the problem of the predicaments is discussed. The argument was frequently used by Buridan regarding the same problem. We claim the author took the argument directly from Buridan's work, who, as Edward Grant indicates in his commentary on the 1277 condemnation, used the formula in a direct link to three of the articles of that condemnation.<sup>44</sup> Because the 139, 140 and the 141 articles were condemned, as they implied the problem of the Eucharist,<sup>45</sup> despite Buridan not being a theologian, but a mere magister of the Parisian arts faculty, he discussed the problem of divine omnipotence and the problem of the Eucharistic transubstantiation. Thus, in the commentary on Aristotle's *Physics*, Buridan uses the divine omnipotence to argue the real difference between substance and accidents and does so in order to argue the possible existence of the void: God can create an accident without subject and he can separate the accidents from their subject and, being separated, to conserve them in that state (*potest accidentia separare a subjectis suis et separatim conservare*). In the same manner, God can create a third dimension, different from any type of substance or accident. Moreover, God can facilitate the interpenetration of these dimensions by creating a three-dimensional void space, capable of containing natural objects. We must emphasise the fact that the position of the author, who introduces the Parisian article to support the modern position, and the position of Buridan are not in contradiction; the two positions complete each other, if seen through the distinction between *potentia Dei absoluta* and *potentia Dei ordinata*. Buridan accepts the real distinction between accidents and substance only as a possibility inherent to the divine, absolute omnipotence. Nevertheless, he excludes it from the sum of possibilities introduced in the world by God in the act of creation. Otherwise, the position of Buridan would imply the real presence of

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<sup>44</sup> "139. *Quod accidens existens sine subiecto non est accidens, nisi equivoce; et quod impossibile est quantitatem sive dimensionem esse per se: hoc enim esset ipsam substantiam.*  
140. *Quod facere accidens esse sine subiecto habet rationem impossibilis implicantis contradictionem.*

141. *Quod deus non potest facere accidens esse sine subiecto, nec plures dimensiones simul esse.*" David Piché, *La condamnation parisienne de 1277* (Paris: Vrin, 1999), 120–122.

<sup>45</sup> Roland Hissette, *Enquête sur les 219 articles condamnés à Paris le 7 mars 1277* (Louvain: Publications universitaires; Paris: Vander-Oyez, 1977), 287–291.

accidents separated from their substance and actually existing on their own as substances, which is an absurdity refutable at the exam of nature, where the quantity, quality or relation exist only in the predication of a substance. The formula appears again in Buridan's commentary on *Metaphysics*, IV. By invoking the same theological argument and the example of the Eucharist, while discussing the difference between *esse* and *essentia*, the philosopher accepts the real separation of accidents from substance.<sup>46</sup>

#### IV. Conclusions

The aim of the present study was to argue that the text *Dissensiones inter viam antiquam et viam modernam* is included in the *via moderna* tradition. We examined each of the hypotheses by exposing the peculiar character of the text within the table of contents of the manuscript, the possible composition place, the possible transcription place as the 15<sup>th</sup>-century University of Erfurt, the particular character of the *antiqui et moderni* phenomenon in Central European universities and the philosophical changes that came with it, and, mostly, by presenting its philosophical characteristics and Jean Buridan as its main authority. The purpose and function of the text are not explicit, but its participation to an eminently academic dispute, the naming of Erfurt, home of one of the main *via moderna* universities, and the naming of Buridan, whose works functioned as academic textbooks within the *via moderna* universities, suggest the academic character of the text. Nevertheless, the function of the text within the university is uncertain. It could be a regular lesson, held by a master, hypothesis sustained by the rhetoric of the prologue, where the theme, the parts of the dispute and the structure of the presentation are announced. However, the 15<sup>th</sup> century academic practices implied different didactical institutions, the *disputatio* being one of the most important. The text has the structure of a dispute, which could have been written by a student or master, as a scholastic exercise aimed to gather a sum of arguments useful in a dispute on diverse problems. The widespread use of paper, starting with the 15<sup>th</sup> century, allowed the students to take notes of the arguments used within the disputes. Therefore, the text could be a made-up dispute, for exercise, in which the arguments of both traditions are briefly exposed.

Another possible academic functionality of the text may be that of an occasional academic discourse, held by a master or student when obtaining an academic degree. Nevertheless, the lack of addressing formulas toward the

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<sup>46</sup> "Dico ergo quod nos tenemus ex fide quod per potentiam Dei accidentia possunt separari a substantiis et separatim conservari sine substantia sic subjecta, unde dicitur quod sic, sine subjecto, subsistent in sacramento altaris." Johannes Buridanus, *Subtilissimae Quaestiones super octo Physicorum libros Aristotelis* (Paris, 1509), fol. 74r, bk. 4, 9.8. Reprinted as *Kommentar zur Aristotelischen Physik* (Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1964).

academic authorities, which had to be present at such an occasion, and the lack of solemnity indicate the questionable possibility of this functionality.

The inclusion of the text in the *via moderna* tradition is indicated right from the prologue, where the author names William Ockham as *viae modernae reformator singularis*. Not only is the author full of reverence towards the authority of Ockham, participating in a Central European medieval practice, presented above, but he also endeavours to justify the modern cause. Thus, Ockham's reformatory character must be understood as a limit within the logical and epistemological interpretation of Aristotle, the author placing Ockham as a demarcation point between the ancient realist interpretation and the nominalist modern interpretation. If Porfir's *Isagoge* constitutes the debut for the quarrel of the universals, the author establishes Ockham as a turning point in solving the problem, awarding him great respect, appropriate to the one who inaugurated the new way of interpreting the Aristotelian corpus. Ockham's presence is historically justified; however, the real textual authority is Jean Buridan. Hence, the tradition of the text is historically circumscribed by naming its initiator, Ockham, and its Parisian moment of development. Even though the modern exegesis questions the actual existence of a Buridanist school in Paris,<sup>47</sup> the manuscript circumscribes the history of the modern tradition not from an institutional view, but a doctrinaire one, presenting the main members of the disputes concerning the nature of the universals, the difference between *esse* and *essentia* or the distinction between predicaments.

The most cited work is Buridan's *Lectura Erfordiensis in Aristotelis Metaphysicam I-VI*,<sup>48</sup> preserved in only one copy at the Allgemeinbibliothek zu Erfurt.<sup>49</sup> This is a didactical purposed version of Buridan's commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, presenting significant differences from *Lectura ultima*, the text considered the final version of the Buridanist commentary, but, in fact, a distinct version. The commentary's editor, L. M. De Rijk, emphasises its importance for the research of the academic philosophical practices in the late Central European Middle Ages. The manuscript of the Buridanist commentary is attested in the first half of the 15<sup>th</sup> century, thus close to the temporal interval of the discussed manuscript. Commenting the third question, we indicated how the Buridanist argument on the difference between predicaments provided the source for the arguments of the manuscript, the author appropriating the entire modern argument from the fourth

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<sup>47</sup> William J. Courtenay, "The university of Paris at the time of Jean Buridan and Nicole Oresme", *Vivarium: Journal for Mediaeval Philosophy and the Intellectual Life of the Middle Ages* 42 (2004): 3–17; J. M. M. H. Thijssen, "The Buridan school reassessed. John Buridan and Albert of Saxony," *Vivarium: Journal for Mediaeval Philosophy and the Intellectual Life of the Middle Ages* 42 (2004), 18–42.

<sup>48</sup> Johannes Buridanus, *Lectura erfordiensis*.

<sup>49</sup> Mss Erfurt, Amplon, f. 322.



question of *Lectura erfordiensis*.<sup>50</sup> Moreover, Buridan provides argumentative fragments for the first *quaestio*, where, citing *De anima*, 430b, the author cites Aristotle through the paraphrase of Buridan from his commentary on the Aristotelian work.<sup>51</sup>

The particularity of the late medieval intellectual life consists in a mixture between great authoritarian texts and small individual intellectual progresses, all within the university, where, through academic practices, new ways of discussing nature, God or logics were developed. The text under scrutiny attests this type of intellectual context, since it is an anonymous work composed within a Central European university and a text with references to the works of Jean Buridan, one of the major medieval philosophical authorities. Thus, we may find here a pattern that anticipates the birth of modernity, the university having been the place where a critical reading of Aristotle was developed, attested through the works of masters, like Buridan. Moreover, the university was the medium where a critical attitude towards the authoritarian scholastic philosophy was developed through disputes and lessons questioning the ancient methodologies, through new answers offered to the philosophical questions, through the development of new questions concerning the nature and the practice of a philosophy that anticipates the modern experimentalism. The text that we introduced is integrated in the second part of our exposed pattern, through its dialectical particularity presenting the *via moderna* revolution parallel to the answers given to the same questions by the *via antiqua* philosophers. Thus, the text, like a large number of other such texts, *disputationes*, *reportationes*, academic discourses, still available only in manuscripts, is a major instrument for the study of the late medieval academic establishment. If the early modern philosophy is generally characterised by the refutation of Aristotelianism and scholasticism and by the experimental methodology, even though the contemporary scholarship exhibited the scholastic particularities present in the modern works, e.g. Etienne Gilson's reading of Descartes, the roots of this revolution must be searched for in the late medieval academic transformations. Our text attests this kind of change in the practice of philosophy, citing texts that respond critically to the Aristotelian problem of the severability of the accidents from substance through the example of an experiment: blowing up a pig's bladder to assert the real difference between quantity and substance. Also, the text is included in the great discussion on God's omnipotence, by tackling the problem of the difference between accidents and substance and by its references to Buridan's interrogation on the same problem. Therefore, the text outlines an image of the late medieval philosophical practices. Even though it is short, its importance is great and its greatness grows if the text is placed within the large amount of similar, yet unstudied texts. If we are correct, and the late medieval philosophical practices and

<sup>50</sup> Johannes Buridanus, *Lectura erfordiensis*, IV, 64–81.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid, *De anima*, q.12, 130–140.

the roots of modernity are twofolded, as an academic schism between philosophical authorities and a plurality of individual endeavours, the importance of this text consists in its contribution to the study of the late medieval academic revolution.

## Appendix

### Dissensiones inter viam antiquam et viam modernam

[1ra] Notandum quod doctores antiqui Albertus et beatus Thomas ex una parte, Johannes Biridani, Marsilius et praesertim magister Wilhelmus Occami, quem moderni Occam vocant "viae modernae reformatore singularis", parte ex altera, in multis punctis materialibus naturalibus <et> logicalibus discordant, diversimode sentientes seu scolastice dogmatizantes, de quibus punctis sex modo quaestiuncularis recitabuntur, quarum prima est:

Q. 1. Utrum sit ponendum ex natura universale praeter intellectus operationem, sicut ponenda universalia realia ab individuis separata

Ad quod respondent platonici, quod universalia praeter intellectus operationem ponenda, sicut<sup>1</sup> praeter intellectus operationem sunt ponenda realia ab individuis separata, moti ex hac ratione quia "oportet omnem intellectionem simplicem esse veram", ex III<sup>o</sup> *De anima*<sup>2</sup>. Sed multae sunt intellectiones simplices universales. Ergo etiam multa sunt universalia realia. Consequentia tenet ex hoc quia "singulare non potest esse obiectum intellectionis universalis"<sup>3</sup>, ex quo sint diversarum rationum. Haec positio est falsa et reprobata per Aristotelem VII<sup>o</sup> *Metaphysicae*<sup>4</sup>, I<sup>o</sup> *Posteriorum*<sup>5</sup>, I<sup>o</sup> *De Anima*<sup>6</sup> et I<sup>o</sup> *Ethicorum*<sup>7</sup>. Sed ad rationem respondetur quod duplex est circumstantia, una est materialis, alia formalis<sup>8</sup>. Magis ad hoc quod omnis intellectio simplex sit vera, non requiritur circumstantia formalis, sed sufficit circumstantia materialis. Sed sic est de re singulari sive individuali, quod ipsa <est> obiectum materiale universalis cognitionis, licet res singularis secundum suam individualitatem non sit obiectum formale universalis intellectionis concepta

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<sup>1</sup> ponenda sicut] *inv. W.*

<sup>2</sup> oportet ... veram] *cf.* ARIST. LAT., *De an.*, III, 6, 430b 26, *sed verba sunt Buridani, cf.* IOH. BURID., *De an.*, III, 1, 3, p.144

<sup>3</sup> singulare ... universalis] *cf.* ARIST. LAT., *Metaph.*, VII, 15, 1039b 27 -1040a 5

<sup>4</sup> Aristotelem...*Metaphysicae*] *cf.* ARIST. LAT., *Metaph.*, VII, 15-16, 1040a 6-1041a 5

<sup>5</sup> I<sup>o</sup> *Posteriorum*] *cf.* ARIST. LAT., *Anal. Post.*, I, 24, 85a

<sup>6</sup> I<sup>o</sup> *De anima*] *cf.* ARIST. LAT., *De an.*, I, 1, 402b 5-10

<sup>7</sup> I<sup>o</sup> *Ethicorum*] *cf.* ARIST. LAT., *Ethica*, I, 4, 1095a 14-1095b 13

<sup>8</sup> duplex...formalis] *cf.* ARIST. LAT., *Metaph.*, VII, 3, 1029a 1-1029a 30

terminandi speciem intelligibilem universalem. Sed quidam alii antiqui, ut albertistae, thomistae, ponunt universalia praeter intellectus operationem realia, non separata a singularibus, sed coniuncta, probantes hoc sic: una est communitas<sup>9</sup> essentialis omnium individuorum speciei humanae, sed illa essentia non est essentia singularis Socratis, Platonis etc., nec etiam est ficta.

Sed hoc re-[1rb]clamant moderni isto modo. Nam si essent ponenda universalia realia coniuncta, ut ipsi asserunt, talia essent priora suis singularibus ut per se concedunt, sed omne prius potest absolvi a suo posteriori. Hoc stante fierent platonica argumenta, quia, quaecumque sunt distincta, possunt separari et separatim conservari. Et confirmatio modernorum patet ex intentione Commentatoris super III<sup>um</sup> *De anima*<sup>10</sup> dicente: si aliqua<sup>11</sup> universalis poni deberet illa a specie intelligibili ortum haberet; si ergo modus universalis aliquis in rebus reperiatur, verior in intentionibus reservatur.

## Q. 2. Utrum essentia differt ab esse

Ad hoc respondit beatus Thomas ponens duo per ordinem. Primum quod in prima intelligentia sive in Deo idem sint esse et essentia<sup>12</sup>. Probatur, quia in prima essentia nulla est compositio, sed mera simplicitas, ut patet XII<sup>o</sup> *Metaphysicae*<sup>13</sup>. Secundum quod ponit est quod in omnibus aliis intelligentiis sive angelis esse et essentia differunt realiter<sup>14</sup>. Quod sic probat, quia nisi in angelis esset praedicta compositio, non videtur modus per quem potest salvari maior simplicitas in prima intelligentia sive in Deo quam in secundis vel angelis ex eo quod, sicut in intelligentia prima non est compositio ex materia et forma, nec ex partibus integralibus, sic etiam in secundis intelligentiis, necessarium est ponere differentiam inter esse et essentiam in angelis sive in secundis intelligentiis<sup>15</sup>. Sed motivum huius opinionis non valet. Nam sufficienter salvatur maior simplicitas in prima intelligentia quam in secundis per hoc quod in intelligentiis est compositio ex potentia et speciebus intelligibilibus, secundum unam opinionem, vel ex potentia et actibus intelligendi, secundum aliam opinionem. Nullam autem compositio reperitur in Deo seu in intelligentia prima, igitur motivum opinionis dictae non valet.

Dicit tamen Albertus quod intelligentiae secundae sunt compositae ex actu et potentia<sup>16</sup>, quae actus et potentia est potestas recipiendi revelationes divinas et

<sup>9</sup> communitas] communia W.

<sup>10</sup> Commentatoris...De anima] cf. AVERR., *In De an.*, III, 39, 20, p.505

<sup>11</sup> si aliqua] iter. W.

<sup>12</sup> Primum...essentia] cf. THOMAS DE AQ., *De ente*, V, p.378

<sup>13</sup> Probatur...*Metaphysicae*] cf. ARIST. LAT., *Metaph.*, XII, 7, 1072a 32-34

<sup>14</sup> intelligentiis...realiter] cf. THOMAS DE AQ., *De ente*, V, 378.

<sup>15</sup> necessarium ... intelligentiis] iter. W.

<sup>16</sup> intelligentiae...potentia] cf. ALB. MAG., *De praed.*, I, 3, p.156

hanc potentiam vocat 'materiam spiritualement'<sup>17</sup>. Sed Albertus dicit et ponit duo per ordinem. Primum sciendum **[1va]** quod essentiae rerum sunt aeternae<sup>18</sup>, quod satis manifeste deducit super I<sup>um</sup> *Physicorum*<sup>19</sup>. Sed simpliciter haec minus opinioni praetactae valent. Nam secundum istam opinionem rediret opinio Anaxagorae, qui dixit quod licet esse in quolibet pro tanto, quia secundum positionem suam tunc ex certa portione materiae primae possunt infinite esse formae generales preexistentes generaliter secundum essentiam, et per consequens opinio Anaxagorae rediret. Sed secundum dictum suum est quod res accipit generationem et corruptionem secundum esse et non secundum essentiam. Sed ista positio iterum non valet, quia essentiale non potest poni substantia, ut ipse per se concedit. Si ergo poneretur accidens, tunc periret omnis generatio et corruptio simpliciter dicta. Ex istis duabus propositionibus secundum Albertum infertur id certum quod esse et essentia differunt realiter sicut aeternum et corruptibile.

Sed Biridanus et scola moderna respondent ad dubium, quod esse et essentia idem sunt realiter, sed differunt solum secundum actum rationis, sicut lux et lucere idem sunt in re, differentia tamen secundum rationis actum. Unde dicit quod essentiae correspondet conceptus absolutus, esse correspondet conceptus verbalis, connotativus terminus principale temporalis, id est connotat quod illa res principaliter coexistit tempori. Item essentia est res designata per terminum absolutum incomplexum, scilicet 'homo' vel 'animal', sed esse designatur per orationem compositam ex accidente et infinito, ut hominem esse. Et probat Biridanus positionem suam auctoritate Aristotelis IV<sup>o</sup> *Metaphysicae*, ubi dicit quod "idem est homo et ens homo et unus homo"<sup>20</sup>. Et idem confirmat Aristoteles processu textuali in II<sup>o</sup> *Posteriorum* ubi dicit: "Quaestio quaerens videlicet centaurus"<sup>21,22</sup>. Sed non est questio ponens in numerum, id est non est differentia realis numeralis inter centaurum<sup>23</sup>. Et eadem sententiam vult Averroes super V<sup>o</sup> *Metaphysicae*, ubi dicit quod quaestio quaerens utrum homo est animal, vel animal est homo non est quaestio ponens in numerum. Et probat Biridanus amplius intensionem suam, tali ratione essentia secundum se est aliquid. Ergo, secundum se habebit esse, eo quod esse est proprium entis, nihil ergo habet esse per se et essentialiter, et sic habetur propositum, quod esse non est quid supradditum essentiae, cum nihil **[1vb]** habet esse per esse superadditum, cum illud iterum quaeratur de illo cui sit per se vel per aliquid, et sic in infinitum procedendo. Sed id

<sup>17</sup> materiam spiritualement] cf. ALB. MAG., *De int. et intel.*, I, 1, 7, p.488a; *In Sent.*, II, 18, 8, p.324b; *De causis*, I, 1, 5, p. 12a

<sup>18</sup> essentiae...aeternae] cf. ALB. MAG., *De praed.*, 7, 12, p.295b; *De causis*, II, 1, 19, p.84b

<sup>19</sup> I<sup>um</sup> Physicorum] cf. ARIST. LAT., *Phys.*, I, 7, 189b 5-8.

<sup>20</sup> idem ... homo] cf. ARIST. LAT., *Metaph.*, IV, 2, 1003b 16.

<sup>21</sup> centenarius] centaurus W.

<sup>22</sup> quaestio ... centaurus] cf. ARIST. LAT., *Anal. Post.*, II, 1, 89b 10

<sup>23</sup> centenarium] centaurum W.

argumentum convenienter solvunt antiqui, quod id esse est esse quo et non quod. Sed haec solutio non valet, quia licet habeat medium in terminis limitatis, tamen non habet locum in terminis transcendentibus, unde mutatio quod est in quo est, licet causare potest fallaciam figurae dictionis in terminis limitatis, non tamen habet id locum in transcendentibus, cum albedo non suscipit denominationem concretam, quia ut ille idem ponit unum simpliciter dictum convertitur cum ente, cum igitur non superadditum esset, ens necessario esset unum, et sic ipsa solutio peccat ex illorum terminorum ignorantia.

Q. 3. Utrum distincte praedicamenta inter se differunt formaliter <et> realiter

Ad hoc antiqui respondent, ut thomistae, albertistae, quod sic, probantes ex eo quia qualitas differt a substantia essentialiter et relatio a substantia essentialiter, ergo etiam differunt realiter. Antecedens patet ex *Praedicamentis*<sup>24</sup> et probant hoc auctoritate Themistii dicentis essentiae praedicamentorum sunt impermixtae<sup>25</sup>.

Ad hoc respondent moderni, quod dictum Themistii et aliorum idem profitentium non debet sic intelligi quod pro quaelibet praedicamento oporteret poni unam essentiam obiectualiter realiter distinctam a qualibet alia. Sed sic differunt essentialiter, quod terminus unius praedicamenti non potest vere et essentialiter praedicari de alio termino aliquae praedicamenti, licet bene accidentaliter<sup>26</sup>, ut haec non est essentialis 'Socrates est albus' vel 'Socrates est pater'. Et probatur, ut specialiter, de relatione quae principaliter fundatur in substantiam immediate, et relatio est praedicamentum speciale, et ii non differunt realiter a substantia. Probatur: relatio paternitatis non differt realiter a Socrate patre suo <et> a suo fundamento. Probatur, quia sic tunc in causa rei essent ponenda infinita accidentia eadem actu, quia eadem res ad infinita potest referi. Sunt enim in eadem relationes<sup>27</sup> ostendi ut in Socrate est essentia (?) et identitas, habitudo et diversitas, [2ra] relatio et aequalitas essentiis.

Secundo probatur eadem opinio: id quod inexistit rei sive est in ipsa re na<tura> facta transmutatione, haec non debet poni ens reale, sed sic est de relatione. Nam si Socrates sit album ut quatuor et Plato efficiatur albus ut quatuor, Socrates refertur ad Platonem nulla stante transmutatione in Socrate.

Tertio probatur sic: si relatio esset realiter et formaliter distincta a substantia vel a fundamento, sequeretur quod esset accidens reale, sed hoc est falsum, quia nihil esset accidens divisibile vel indivisibile, sed nullum illorum probatur

<sup>24</sup> Antecedens...Praedicamentis] cf. ARIST. LAT., *Anal. Post.*, I, 5, 74b 5 sqq.

<sup>25</sup> Antecedens...impermixtae] cf. IOH. BURID., *Metaphysica I – VI*, q. 11, quaestio, par. 393, p.92

<sup>26</sup> non...accidentaliter] cf. IOH. BURID., *Metaphysica I – VI*, q. 11, sol., par. 409, p.95

<sup>27</sup> relationes] *iter. W.*

quod non indivisibile, quia nullum accidens indivisibile est ponendum<sup>28</sup> in aliquo subiecto divisibili. Etiam implicat aliquod accidens esse reale indivisibile, quia omne tale fortiter naturam convertibili esset divisibile. Probatur, quia tunc esset extensum et magnum et tunc sequeretur ulterius quod in maiore homine esset maior paternitas et in minore homine minor paternitas, quod est falsum.

Quarto idem sic probatur: si relatio esset accidens realiter inhaerens substantiae vel suae fundamento, tunc sequeretur quod aliquod accidens reale posset generari per aliquod agens infinite potentiae per infinitam distantiam. Id patet posito quod Socrates sit albus in Erfordia et Plato sit niger residens in Babilonia vel alias per infinitam distantiam distans, et dealbetur Plato per certam causam agentem, tunc Socrates qui prius fuit dissimilis Platoni erit Platoni similis, et illam similitudinem non causat aliud agens nisi albedinem producens in Platone, qui<sup>29</sup> per infinitam distantiam distat a Socrate.

Quinto sic: si relatio esset distincta sive esset<sup>30</sup> accidens reale, sequeretur quod subiectum mutaretur realiter per eum<sup>31</sup> accessum et recessum. Sed hoc est falsum, quia paternitas adveniens Socrati nullam causat in eo alterationem realem, ut etiam duxit ratio secunda. Ex isto patet conclusive quod relatio et suum fundamentum non differunt realiter, sed solum modaliter, hoc est, terminus relativus exprimit quemdam modum accidentalem circa subiectum sive fundamentum.

Uterius sciendum quod secundum intentionem Biridani **[2rb]** relatio uno modo causatur pro actu animae quo anima comparat res admodum<sup>32</sup>, sed alio modo relatio causatur pro illo pro quo concretum, scilicet pater, supponit. Pater enim supposuit pro re quae significatur per terminum absolutum 'Socrates' homo vel animal, et tale est verum fundamentum dummodo relatio fundatur in substantiam. Sed quando fundatur in quantitate, ut similitudo quae habetur de duobus albis, immediate fundatur in qualitate mediante, aut scilicet mediante qualitate in substantiam, quoniam etiam immediate fundatur in quantitate mediante quantitate in substantiam, ut patet de qualitate cuius subiectum immediatum est quantitatis. Quibus stantibus aliqua ponuntur conclusive per ordinem. Primum: relatio et suum fundamentum non distinguuntur causando relationem pro illo pro quo suppositus abstractum, ut paternitas et fundamentum<sup>33</sup> pro illo pro quo supponit<sup>34</sup> concretum, ut pater semper enim supponit pro eadem re nisi ubi connotatio concreti superaddit aliquid reale ut simile et similitudo eaedem causando relationem active, scilicet pro

<sup>28</sup> est ponendum] *iter. W.*

<sup>29</sup> qui] quod *W.*

<sup>30</sup> esset] essent *W.*

<sup>31</sup> eum] eam *W.*

<sup>32</sup> anima...admodum] *cf. IOH. BURID., Metaphysica I – VI, q. 27, sol., par. 682, p.160*

<sup>33</sup> fundamentum] *scr. ill. sed corr. sup. lin. W.*

<sup>34</sup> supponit] abstractum *add. sed del. W.*

actu quo mediante anima comparat sive refert rerum admodum. Relatio distinguitur a suo fundamento, quia sic relatio est accidens et fundamentum substantia. Item causando relationem pro illo pro quo supponit concretum, aliqua relatio distinguitur a fundamento saltem mediatione ut simul supponunt ut simile supponit pro substantia, scilicet Socrate, sed similitudo supponit pro quantitate. Similiter aequale supponit pro substantia et aequalitas pro quantitate, et sic patet quod aliqua relatio non est distincta a suo fundamento realiter, ut paternitas a Socrate patre, certa tamen relatio a suo fundamento distinguitur ut similitudo quae est qualis distinguitur a Socrate simili, quae est substantia universaliter, tamen haec est vera quod nulla relatio distinguitur a suo fundamento immediate. Nam fundamentum similitudinis immediatum est qualis aqua aqua realiter non distinguitur.

Q. 4. Utrum potentiae animae distinguantur ab anima realiter et inter se realiter et formaliter

Ad hoc respondet Albertus quod potentiae animae differunt secundum proprias essentias, id est realiter <et> formaliter, tamen non differunt secundum substantias sive subiective<sup>35</sup>. Et hoc sic probat, nam sicut [2va] differunt quod est et quo est, ita differunt quod potest et quo potest.

Sed ista positio non<sup>36</sup> placet modernis. Ponunt enim moderni, quod potentiae animae principales non sunt realiter ab ipsa distinctae, sed sunt ipsa anima met potens exercere diversas operationes vitales per diversa organa ad hoc deputata<sup>37</sup>, et nisi sic, sequeretur quod potentia intellectiva esset infinitae potentiae realiter ab intellectu distinctae, quod est valde absurdum dicere. Sequela probatur, quia secundum Philosophum III<sup>o</sup> *De anima*<sup>38</sup> intellectus “est quodammodo omnia”, et hoc specificans dicit intellectus agens est “omnia facere”, intellectus possibilis est “omnia fieri”. Patet etiam ibidem auctoritate Philosophi III<sup>o</sup> *De anima*<sup>39</sup>, capitulo 1<sup>o</sup>, ubi dicit: non ab altero absolutum appetitivae et intellectivae, sed secundum rationem solum, id est differunt solum secundum speciem intelligibilem. Quo non obstante positio Alberti probabilitatem habet sive probabilis est in via sua. In materia autem probabili non est inconsequens sapientem sapienti contradicere.

Q. 5. Utrum propria passio realiter distinguitur a suo subiecto

Ad quod respondent antiqui, quod propria passio et suum subiectum habent se ut essentialiter et realiter differentia, eo quod passio essentialiter est

<sup>35</sup> potentiae...subiective] cf. ALB. MAG., *De an.*, II, 1, 11, p.80a

<sup>36</sup> non] differunt *add. sed. del. W.*

<sup>37</sup> potentiae...deputata] cf. IOH. BURID., *De an.*, q. 17, pp.189-196

<sup>38</sup> III<sup>o</sup> *De Anima*] cf. ARIST. LAT., *De an.*, III, 4, 430a 15-17

<sup>39</sup> III<sup>o</sup> *De Anima*] cf. ARIST. LAT., *De an.*, III, 1, 429a 10-13

qualitas<sup>40</sup>, eo quod essentialiter tenetur sub qualitate, sed subiectum est substantia, modo implicat unum et idem esse realiter subiectum et accidens. Sed Biridanus cum certis modernis dicit quod propria passio non distinguitur realiter a subiecto, sed tantum modaliter<sup>41</sup>. Cuius ratio, quia antiqui dicunt propriam passionem progredi et fluere a principiis essentialibus speciei, quod falsum ostenditur ex I<sup>o</sup> Metaphisicae, quia actus sunt suppositorum, sed principia essentialia speciei sub esse specificè considerata non habet rationem veri suppositi, quare nec ipsis attribui potest active et per consequens non sunt causa fluxus, ut ipsi dicunt. Ex falsitate igitur opinionum antiquorum trahitur positionis veritas modernorum.

Secundo, ideo non dicuntur differre realiter, quia "substantia praecedit accidens tempore, natura et deffinitione"<sup>42</sup>. Si ergo pro- [2vb]pria passio sit distincta realiter a subiecto tamquam accidens stabit in instanti prioritatis humanis sine ridere aut subiectum sine propria passione, quod est impossibile.

Tertio, ideo moderni non ponunt distinctionem realem, quia ponentes distinctionem realem inter subiectum et propriam passionem incidunt in multa contra proprias opiniones, quia sic ponentes non habent ponere potentias distinctas quas tamen distinctas asserunt. Et quod hoc sequeretur patet, quia sic opinantes habent ponere quod propria passio immediate progrediatur ab essentialibus principiis speciei. Sed etiam potentiae sunt de genere qualitatis; sequeretur quod erit causatio ante praedictas potentias, et per consequens non oportet poni potentias, nam superflue ponerentur, si causatio et operatio possunt sine eis salvari. Et ideo dicendum est quod propria passio, ut ridere, supponit pro homine connotativo aptitudinem essentialem in ordine ad actum ridendi. Sed actus ridendi est extrinsecus speciei et ideo haec propositio 'homo ridet' est in materia contingenti, sed illa 'homo est risibilis' est in materia naturali. Et dixit connotando aptitudinem essentialem<sup>43</sup>, unde haec aptitudo essentialis est met res apta et aptitudo totum conceptum aptum, igitur subiectum et eius propria passio realiter non distiguuntur, sed solum secundum rationem, et licet idem sint in re, tamen proprium importat idem quod subiectum sub modo extrinseco induunt (?).

Quidam tamen ponunt aptitudinem essentialem dictam esse solam formam et tunc connotatum sive passio et subiectum distinguuntur sicut pars et totum, et haec via etiam apparet probabilis ex eo quod forma humana omnibus existentibus accidentibus secluset maiorem<sup>44</sup> habet habitudinem essentialem ad risibilitatem. Sed via ponens realem distinctionem proprius a subiecto sicut accidentis realis et materialis a suo subiecto omnino est abiicienda.

<sup>40</sup> passio...qualitas] cf. ARIST. LAT., *Metaph.*, V, 21, 1022b 15

<sup>41</sup> sed ... modaliter] cf. IOH. BURID., *Metaphysica I – VI*, q. 4, sol., par. 234, p.58

<sup>42</sup> substantia...deffinitione] cf. ARIST. LAT., *Metaph.*, VII, 1028a 32-35, p. 125; IOH. BURID., *De an.*, I, q. 5, p. 201; II, q. 2, p.234

<sup>43</sup> aptitudinem essentialem] cf. PORPH., *Isag.*, p.20

<sup>44</sup> maiorem] *sup. lin. W.*



Et ad illorum dicta dicitur quod propria passio et subiectum differunt essentialiter. Non debet sic intelligi quod propria passio poneret essentiam distinctam ab essentia subiecti, sed sic quod propria passio numquam potest praedicari essentialiter de sua specie sive **[3ra]** de suo subiecto, sed semper constituit praedicationem accidentalem<sup>45</sup> ex quo in suo connotato includit actum videndi, qui est extrinsecus et accidentalis speciei.

Item positio modernorum alia ratione confirmatur sic, si propria passio distingueretur realiter a sua specie vel a suo subiecto, vel ergo illam realitatem haberet eius supposito vel in connotato, non in supposito, quia tunc proprium non potest vere praedicari de sua specie dicendo 'homo est risibilis', quia isti termini 'homo' et 'ridere' non supponerent pro eadem re nec in connotato, quia vel illud connotatum est ens rectum vel absolutum non rectum, quia tunc ly 'ridere' non esset de predicamento qualitatis, sed relationis, quod enim est falsum non absolutum, quia quodlibet tale potest separari a significato suae speciei, et sic staret quod aliquis esset homo qui non esset risibilis. Et assumptum primum probatur per articulum parisiensem "quaecumque sunt distincte realiter possunt separari et separatim conservari"<sup>46</sup>.

Q. 6. Utrum suppositio sit distincta realiter <et>formaliter a termino supponente

Et sicut dicitur de suppositione, ita pariformiter determinandum est de ampliatione, appellatione et ultra de omnibus accidentibus praedicatorum, ut sunt accidentia partium orationis. Ad hoc respondent antiqui quod sic, sed Biridanus et ceteri moderni respondent negative, dicentes quod suppositio non est res a termino supponente distincta. Probatur sic, quia si esset res distincta a termino supponente, tunc possunt separari et separatim conservari, ut patet per articulum praeallegatum. Tunc illo stante sequeretur, quod si esset aliqua conclusio demonstrata eadem conclusione manente possit fieri<sup>47</sup> falsa, quod enim est contra Philosophum l<sup>o</sup> *Posteriorum*, ubi dicit quod scientia est necessariorum et perpetuorum<sup>48</sup>, idest conclusionum perpetuae veritatis. Sed sequela patet, et volo quod Deus auferat illud accidens supposito a termino supponente; tunc ablata suppositione conclusio est falsa. Ipsa manente demonstrata falsitas patet, quia est una affirmativa cuius subiectum et praedicatum non supponunt absque eius mutatione pro eodem, igitur propositum verum. Etiam sic ostenditur veritas propositi quidquid advenit **[3rb]**alicui absque eius mutatione reali vel penitus nulla facta mutatione in re. Hoc non est

<sup>45</sup> praedicationem accidentalem] cf. OCKHAM, *In Sent.*, q. 10, l. 15, p.317

<sup>46</sup> quaecumque...conservari] cf. IOH. BURID., *In Phys.*, fol. 74r, bk. 4, 9.8; *In Metaph.*, IV, q. 6, fol. XVII ra-rb, p. 21, 1.75-82

<sup>47</sup> fieri] demonstrata *add. sed. del. W.*

<sup>48</sup> Scientia...perpetuorum] cf. ARIST. LAT., *Anal. Post.*, I, 32, 88b 31-32

accidens reale, sed huiusmodi est suppositio, igitur etc. Assumptum pro secunda parte probatur sic: scribatur illa propositio ad parietem sic 'homo est animal'. Notum est quod ly 'homo' habet suppositionem. Et si in in quadruplum dixerint antiqui de suppositione aut quolibet alio accidente consimili sic arguendo quaecumque sic se habet quod verum corumpitur relinquo manente, illa habet realem distinctionem. Dicendum est quod omnia illa argumenta peccant in ignorantia appellationis formae simplicis et varie, unde corumpitur suppositio etenim suppositio non manet suppositio dum utique suppositio manet.

Tituli integri librorum qui abbreviationibus allegantur

- ARIST. LAT., *Anal. Post.* = Aristoteles Latinus, *Analytica Posteriora* (Guillelmus de Morbeka revisor translationis Iacobi Venetici), ed. L. Minio-Paluello et B.G. Dod, 1968, pp. 285-343.
- ARIST. LAT., *De an.* = Aristoteles Latinus, *De anima* (translatio 'nova' - Iacobi Venetici translationis recensio), textus sec.: S. Thomae de Aquino *Opera omnia*, XLV, 1, *Sentencia libri de anima* - ed. Commissio Leonina, Roma, 1984, pp. 3-258.
- ARIST. LAT., *Metaph.* = Aristoteles Latinus, *Metaphysica* (translatio 'media'), ed. G. Vuillemin-Diem, Aristoteles Latinus, Brill, Leiden, 1976.
- ARIST. LAT., *Phys.* = Aristoteles Latinus, *Physica* (translatio 'vetus'), ed. Fernand Bossier et Jozef Brams, Brill, Leiden-New York, 1990.
- ALB. MAG., *De an.* = Albertus Magnus, *De anima*, in *Alberti Magni Opera Omnia*, VII, Pars I ed. Clemens Stroick, 1968.
- ALB. MAG., *De causis* = Albertus Magnus, *De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa* in *Alberti Magni Opera Omnia*, XVII, Pars II, ed. Winfridus Fauser, 1993.
- ALB. MAG., *De int. et intel.* = Albertus Magnus, *De intellectu et intelligibili*, B. Alberti Magni Opera Omnia, IX, ed. Borgnet, 1890, pp. 527-584.
- ALB. MAG., *De praed.* = Albertus Magnus, *De praedicamentis*, B. Alberti Magni Opera Omnia, I, ed. Borgnet, pp. 150-242
- ALB. MAG., *Super Sent.* = Albertus Magnus, *Commentarium super libros Sententiarum*, in B. Alberti Magni Opera Omnia, XXV, ed. Borgnet, 1893-4
- AVERR., *In De an.* = Averrois Cordubensis *Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis 'De Anima' libros*, ed. F. Stuart Crawford, Medieval Academy Books, 1953.
- JOH. BURID., *Lectura ...* = Johannes Buridanus, *Lectura Erfordiensis in Aristotelis I –VI Metaphysicam, together with the 15<sup>th</sup>-century Abbreviatio Caminensis*, ed. L.M. de Rijk, Brepols, 2008.
- JOH. BURID., *In Metaph.* = Johannes Buridanus, *In Metaphysicem Aristoteles questiones argutissime Magistri Ioannis Buridani*, Paris, 1518.
- JOH. BURID., *In De an.* = Johannes Buridanus, *Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima (de tertia lectura)*, in Jack Zupko, *John Buridan's Philosophy of Mind: An Edition and Translation of Book III of His "Questions on Aristotle's "de Anima" , with*

*Commentary and Critical and Interpretative Essays*, Dissertation, Cornell University, 1989.

JOH. BURID., *In Phys.* = Johannes Buridanus, *Kommentar zur Aristotelischen Physik*, Frankfurt am Main, 1964, *apud* Benoît Patar, *La physique de Bruges de Buridan et le traite du ciel d'Albert de Saxe, II*, Longueuil, Quebec, 2001.

OCKHAM, *In Sent.* = William Ockham, *Quaestiones in librum tertium Sententiarum (reportatio)*, *Guillemi de Ockham Opera Philosophica et Theologica, Opera Theologica*, VI, ed. F.E. Kelley et Gi.I. Etzkorn, 1982.

PORPH., *Isag.* = Porphyrii *Isagoge, Translatio Boethii* in Aristoteles Latinus, *Categoriarum suplementa*, ed. Laurentius Minio-Paluello et Bernardo G. Dod, Brill, Leiden, 1966, pp.1-32

THOMAS DE AQ., *De ente* = Thomas de Aquino, *De ente et essentia*, în *S. Thomae de Aquino Opera Omnia*, XLIII, ed. Commissio Leonina, Roma, 1976, pp. 369-384.