ON THE MEANING OF *DELIBERATIO* IN SAINT GERARD OF CENAD

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Abstract The word *deliberatio* in the title of the work *Deliberatio supra Hymnum Trium Puerorum ad Isingrimum Liberalem* by Gerard of Cenad bears several meanings and its principal use is still to be discussed. We shall investigate the contexts and the possible sources in order to attempt a final conclusion regarding the multiple uses of the term and of the *deliberatio* as a practice.

Keywords Gerard of Cenad, deliberatio, virtues, medieval philosophy, medieval theology, Isidore of Seville, medieval hermeneutics, Central European philosophy

Besides having been, chronologically speaking, the first Christian bishop resident in what we today know as the Banat region of Romania, Gerard of Cenad authored an impressive book called *Deliberatio supra Hymnum Trium Puerorum ad Isingrimum Liberalem,* written some time between 1030 and 1046, the exact time of writing is still subject to conjectures. The Caroline minuscule manuscript dated to the second half of the eleventh century survived in one single copy in the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Munich (Clm. 6211)[1]. It was edited for the first time in 1790 by Bishop Ignatius Batthyány of Alba Iulia[2]; then, in the twentieth century, a contemporary edition was released under the authorship of Gabriel Silagi,[3] followed

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[1] Előd Nemerkényi, *Latin Classics in Medieval Hungary 11th Century* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2004), 81. Also, "The Deliberatio of Bishop Saint Gerard of Csanád", in *Filosofia Sfântului Gerard de Cenad în context cultural şi biographic* (The philosophy of Saint Gerard of Cenad in cultural and biographic context), ed. Claudiu Mesaroş (Szeged: Jate Press, 2013), 48.

[2] Ignatius Batthyány, *Sancti Gerardi episcopi Chanadiensis scripta et acta hactenus inedita cum serie episcoporum Chanadiensium*. (Albae-Carolinae [Alba Iulia], 1790).

[3] Gabriel Silagi, ed. *Gerardi Moresenae Aecclesiae seu Csanadiensis Episcopi Deliberatio supra hymnum trium puerorum* (Turnhout: Brepols, 1978), XVII, 217 p.

by the third, printed in 1999 by Karácsonyi & Szegfű.[4] A Romanian partial translation was published in 1984 but it did more damage than it helped the reception of the text due to the ideologised selection.[5] The text lacks an optimal reception even in Hungary due to its poor circulation and due to the fact that a modern translation has been made only in 1999. It is still to be discovered by the future generations. The knowledge on the biography of Gerard relies on two anonymous medieval sources, both originated in the same narration called *Legenda Sancti Gerardi*. The earlier version, *Legenda Minor*, is a shorter biography that may have been part of an *Hours Liturgy* and has known multiple editions and translations.[6] The second source, *Legenda Maior,* is larger and more hagiographical in style, considered by historians to be unreliable.[7]

The *Deliberatio supra hymnum trium puerorum ad Isingrimum liberalem,* is considered to be the oldest theological text of the Hungarian Middle Ages and was meant to be a lengthy commentary on the biblical *Song of the Three Young Boys* in the Book of Daniel.[8] Information concerning Gerard's textual sources is scarce; he must have possessed a minimal stock of documents in Cenad, since his text, if written there, contains abundant Biblical, Patristic, Areopagytical and Isidorian fragments and phrases, besides mentioning a large amount of Ancient philosophers' names.[9] Judging by the quantity of the borrowed phrases, Gerard was certainly educated at least in part with the help of Isidore's *Etymologies.* Still, since no solid evidence of schools in Veneto existed in Gerard's time,[10] except some stylistic practice found in various compositions, it is only the supposed realism of some

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[4] Béla Karácsonyi, Szegfű László, eds., *Deliberatio Gerardi Moresanae aecclesiae episcope supra hymnum trium puerorum* (Szeged: Scriptum, 1999).

[5] Gerard of Cenad, *Armonia lumii sau tălmăcire a cântării celor trei coconi către Isingrim Dascălul* (World Harmony or Interpretation of the Hymn of the Three Dolphins dedicated to Isingrim the Teacher), trans. Radu Constantinescu, ed. Răzvan Theodorescu (Bucharest: Meridiane, 1984).

[6] Ross, Martin, "Izvoare istorice cu privire la Vita Gerardi", in *Filosofia Sfântului Gerard de Cenad …,* 23–28.

[7] Gaşpar, Cristian. 2012. "An intellectual on the Margin and His Hagiobiographers: For a New Edition of the Vitae of St. Gerard" (paper presented at the *International workshop on the Historiography of Philosophy: Representations and Cultural Constructions*, West University of Timisoara, Romania, September 22–23).

[8] Nemerkényi, *Latin Classics in Medieval Hungary 11th Century*, 80.

[9] Ibid, 178–179. After a massive discussion, Nemerkényi concludes that the direct access is rather improbable.

[10] His early studies in Venice have been polemically disputed especially after Gabriel Silagi's edition of the *Deliberatio* (Silagi, 1978). On these grounds, Ronald G. Witt, in *The Two Latin Cultures and the Foundation of Renaissance Humanism in Medieval Italy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 134–135, argues that no solid evidence of schools in Veneto existed in Gerard's time, although some suppositions might be made since serious stylistic practice can be found in different compositions of the time.

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passages in *Deliberatio* (like 41 "*In Platone quippe disputationes quondam apud Galliam constitutus quasdam de Deo Hebraeorum confidenter fateor me legisse et de caelestibus animis*"[11]) that can shed some light on the issue of literary sources. According to Silagi and Witt,[12] Gerard may have read Greek philosophy or lectures like Chalcidius's translation of Plato's *Timaeus,* and probably other texts as well while visiting *Francia,* and also accessed the Latin translation of the *Corpus Areopagiticum,*[13] since the cult of Saint Denis was popular before the eleventh century.[14]

Gerard uses the term *Deliberatio* as a title for his biblical interpretation, meaning that the word bears some special significance for him. Although it is difficult to guesswhat the main meaning of the term was for Gerard, it is a sound hypothesis that there was such a principal use. There are several different contexts where the term bears a semantic weight and we shall discuss each of them in order to reach a final conclusion.

1. *Deliberatio* as rational discourse on the divine matters.

First, the term is used in Book I as a noun ("*Invenies autem non solum istos in dictis concordes, quin potius omnes divina sapientissime deliberantes*") to express that not only the theologians but all those who wisely *deliberate* on the divine things agree with each other. The meaning in this context seems to be similar to the one in the title of Gerard's book, rather general or at least having no special meaning: *deliberatio* is a rational discourse, since it is not only the theologians in particular but any other person ("*omnes ... deliberantes"*) who counts as an agent of a deliberative act.

Even in the absence of inspiration, any man is able to meditate and *deliberate* on the existence of a Creator just by thinking of the things above; therefore, nobody can be excused for not knowing about the existence of a Creator because the creation is a construction of signs ("*ad signum fabrica*"). And if someone is unable to measure these signs with his mind ("*et si eadem metiri non potest ulius ingenii suffragatione*"), then the *deliberatio* can be possible as an act of meditation

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[11] We shall be referring to Gerard's text by the number of the Liber from now on (Book I to Book VIII), in the text. The text is that of Gabriel Silagi, corroborated with the edition: Ignatius Batthyány, *Sancti Gerardi episcopi Chanadiensis scripta et acta hactenus inedita cum serie episcoporum Chanadiensium.*

[12] Ronald G. Witt, *The Two Latin Cultures and the Foundation of Renaissance Humanism in Medieval Italy,* 135.

[13] More on this in Előd Nemerkényi, *Latin Classics in Medieval Hungary 11th Century*, 73–156.

[14] The cult of Denis had spread as far as England before the eleventh century: Luscombe, "The reception of the writings of Denis the pseudo-Areopagite", in, *Tradition and Change: Essays in Honour of Marjorie Chibnall*, eds. Greenway, D., Holdsworth, Ch., Sayers, J. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 115–144, especially 125–126.

on the immensity of creation ("*tum deliberet horum inaestimabilis factoris immensitatem*").

Human autonomous deliberation does not necessarily appear to be evil but it is clearly inferior and only useful as a weaker contemplation in the absence of a higher understanding. An instance of such a meaning can be found in Book VIII, where Gerard, after mentioning that another brother was waiting for him to write a book, stands up for the task but still asserts his minimal *ingenium* and does not dare to deliberate against such a clever and subtle debater as Isingrimus: "nimis *vereri prudentissimo deliberare tractatori et subtilissimo arbitri, praecipue cum dictorum pulchra me minime possideant ingenia*". Again, close to the end of Book VIII, Gerard names his own interpretation a *Deliberatio:* "*Supra autem in ceteris deliberationibus*".

The same meaning is employed when we are told that the most learned men have deliberated on the four uncontaminated virtues ("*incontaminatae ... virtutes*"), namely the cardinal virtues ("*doctissimorum deliberatio perfectissima virorum quattuor, nimirum prudentiam, fortitudinem, temperantiam et iustitiam*"); Gerard uses Isidore's *Etymologies* and says that Socrates was the first to institute the cardinal virtues in his search for the good life (*bene vivendi*).[15] In his turn, Gerard will consider the cardinal and theological virtues as one single edifice: "*in unum efficiuntur septem virtutum spiritualium arcem continentes*" (Book VIII).[16]

2. *Deliberatio* as inspired discourse.

The prologue of Book II offers two more similar uses in an intricate text that goes like this: "*Iterum in manativis theoricis circa dictum ducenda est contemplatio, et iuxta fortitudinem caelestis **deliberanda** denuntiatio*". The writer makes a reiterated effort to shift his attention towards some objects of contemplation that are in some way active against the subject, inspiring, on the one hand, in order to *deliberate* on the celestial revelation. This celestial *denuntiatio* is the very object of the deliberation, the revealed Divine names; on the other hand, the deliberation itself is possible to the very extent that the object of discourse is in its turn inspiring (*denuntiatio*) the author of the deliberation. This hermeneutical exercise is "*iuxta voluntatem ad voluntatem et circa aliam formationem et regulam*": according to the will, for the will and according to different forms and rules, aiming at explaining the high Divine mysteries that can be evaluated by the mystics (*potentes*) without using a model

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[15] See a more developed study on this subject: Claudiu Mesaroș, "Socrates and theory of virtues in the *Deliberatio supra hymnum trium puerorum* by Gerard of Cenad", in *Saint Gerard of Cenad: Tradition and Innovation* (Budapest: Trivent Publishing, Philosophy, Communication, Media Sciences Series, 2015), Available online at http://trivent-publishing.eu/e-book/1saintgerardofcenad.html (accessed 15.05.2017).
[16] See also István P. Bejczy, *The Cardinal Virtues in the Middle Ages: A Study in Moral Thought from the Fourth to the Fourteenth Century* (Leiden: Brill, 2011).

(*sine typo*), as the *potentes* have arrived at a direct understanding of the Divine, so any method or model is empty to them.

The second paragraph of Book II explicitly states that the sacred text or the Scripture had not been written to offer direct access to its meaning ("*Nil itaque aestimes nuditati commendatum in sanctissimis vociferationibus*"), therefore a true philosopher will assume St. Peter's model in exploring the Divine knowledge, unlike humans who deliberate like beasts ("*non cum hominibus, qui iumentis iunguntur*"), if we are to access the unthinkable and to discover the greatest mysteries ("*si meditari desideramus immeditabile et maxima denuntiare*").

It is obvious that the human rational deliberative discourse will have to adapt to God's inspiration: "*ex aliis cetera divinae aptanda animi virtute, non humani ingenii deliberatione*" (Book VI), and again, in Book VIII, where we see that nobody can *deliberate* without the teachings of Christ: "*Si advertere, ut deliberas, (...) nil vadationis sine periculo quis invenire potest, nisi ad omnia respiciat, et toto corde sequatur, quod Christi doctrina hortatur*"; similarly, on the next few pages below, we read that Judas has bruised all human *deliberatio* ("*Legat librum divini Iudae, in quo omnis humana deliberatio sugillata redditur*").

3. *Deliberatio* as hermeneutics.

The inspired discourse of the *potentes* is at the same time a hermeneutic act. The inner experience of the mystic precedes and offers the source for what may seem to the uneducated as mere autonomous intellectual efforts of explaining a text, whereas the *potentes* are the legitimate authorities able to interpret and their act is an educated (not trivial) one. In the same fragment at the beginning of Book II Gerard announces that we should expect to read an "educated deliberation" (*eruditam deliberationem*), a judgment that should not be trivially criticised either by unexamined arguments (*et discurse non potest, quemadmodum nec oportet, examinari inexaminatis taxationibus praecipue ad eruditam deliberationem*...) or by the flaming opposition (*ignitum iudicium contra iudicium*).

The inspired forerunners like Apostles and the *potentes* are the models to be followed in interpreting the text; at the end of Book VIII, Gerard says that he had followed them precisely as a *deliberatio*: "*ut potentes volunt, et nos deliberamus*".

4. *Deliberatio* as mystical experience.

Therefore, the act of *deliberatio* turns out to signify something more than a simple rational or even inspired discourse made up by a philosopher or a theologian: it is an act of someone who has a mystical relation with the very object of discourse. Gerard's status as a bishop is consistent with the claim of a hermeneutical endeavour made from the position of authority addressing his believers. Thus, the status of a bishop turns the *deliberatio* as a hermeneutical act into a learned translation of the revealed truth made from a position of authority and endorsed by an ascetical life. The interpretation is therefore not a mere semantic conversion of

terms but rather an internal experience that the interpreter lives in relation with the text to be explained: the act of interpreting is first of all a complex experience of entering the reality of the text and this experience precedes the interpretation as literary act, so the interpreter is rather making a testimony of a personal experience and the resulting interpretation of the sacred text becomes a mystical or soteriologic act of the interpreter himself.

The ascetical life implies that the interpreter of the text assumes a personal experience similar to that of the three young boys. The *Liber primus* begins with an obscure exordium that announces high *contemplationibus* and the need to be patient and not give up the effort however difficult it may be (*nec vero declinandum, quamlibet circulorum*). In Book IV expressions such as "excessive heat" (*cauma improbita*) suggest the conditions of the furnace in the Biblical text: the *cauma improbita* does not allow any relaxation. The term *cauma* is rare and highly stylistical,[17] so it is plausible that, in this case, it does not have a material meaning, but it stands for the furnace's extreme heat that the mystical interpreter assumes. Gerard uses the word in several instances, like in Book VII where the term characterises the Divine Verb: ("*Ros suum non deficit caumate, non artatur frigore, non congelatur algore, licet surgat aquilo*").

Again, in Book IV Gerard addresses Isingrimus through a terrible confession: "*Hoc autem dictum, ut scires divini et terribilis dicti nos esse concordes*", just to announce that when we try to *deliberate* that the visible sun is actually an angel as it is said in the Bible, we stumble ("*in eodem angelum stare deliberamus, suffocabitur*"). Further on, in Book VIII, Gerard mentions an aforementioned distinction between Spirits of God and Spirits opposed to God, as a *deliberatio* ("*ut deliberandum sit, quod sint spiritus non Dei*").

5. Bestial *deliberation.*

The term *deliberatio* is yet ironically associated with the term *luxuriosissima* (dissolute, profligate, debauched, prodigal, seductive, likerish) to build an antithesis between Christian and anti-Christian philosophy. There are philosophers called *humams* that search for God and have strength in discovering truth ("*Homines autem hic potentes in theophaniis dictorum*"), and there are weak philosophers, called "„beasts", who can only dig into the thrash of pagan inventions, due to their dissolute way of thinking ("*Iumenta in sterquilinio gentilium promulgationum figentes gressum luxoriosissima deliberatione*"). The antithesis is very strong: the negative *deliberatio* refuses Christian revelation and assumes an inverted path, still not necessarily irreversible, since bestial philosophers may be saved by God's mercy,

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[17] Nemerkényi, *Latin Classics in Medieval Hungary,* 139: "The Greek noun cauma occurs in medieval Latin but its use, instead of the more common aestus, ardor or calor, implies a stylistic input in the works of other authors as well as in the Deliberatio".

yet never by their own merits (*secundum multiplicationem totius deitatis misericordiae*).

In Book VIII, these "*maligni spiritus*" are described as "*spiritus procellarum*" that raise wars against the virtues and "*non faciunt verbum quia non sunt per verbum, peccata enim sunt, quae a Deo non sunt*"; they are "*inquieti et ad malum anxii*", and, according to the Psalm, "*Talium autem pars ignis, sulphur et spiritus procellarum calicis est*", where *ignis* signifies their evil spirit according to their *evil deliberatio* ("*Ignis cupiditatem significat omnium malorum iuxta deliberationem malorum*").

6. Divine *Deliberatio*.

The existence of a divine *deliberatio* may be confirmed by Gerard's use of the term in a difficult context of Book III when commenting on the meaning of the waters in the Song, namely the heavenly waters ("*Aquae supra caelos fundatos*"). As this is difficult to understand, Gerard appeals to an analogue demonstrandum borrowed from Isidore of Seville:[18] the Apostles have been named "waters" in the Bible because the water is equal to itself at the surface ("*Aqua siquidem dicta, quod in superficie aequalis sit*"), and so we should be perceiving these heavenly waters not in a human manner ("*non mortalium more*") but according to the sacred *deliberatio* ("*sed sacra deliberatione*"). This fragment is very important for at least two reasons. First, it suggests that the *deliberatio* shall also be a process of reaching a decision: the fact that there is a sacred deliberatio is *per se* an argument that there is a final and correct *deliberatio* concerning a given textual problem, and that correct deliberatio is Divine. Second, this adds another meaning to the multiplicity of uses discovered so far, probably the primary meaning of a possible hierarchy.

The divine *deliberatio* is firstly accessible to the Apostles and then to all other sacerdots (called by Gerard *Hyeromistas* or *Divini Perfectores*) through mystical life. In Book IV there is an occurrence of *deliberatio* where the apostles are named by Gerard *piscatores quam litteratos* that have been filled with sacred vision ("*postquam Spiritus Sanctus eructavit in illis*") so that they depassed all the *deliberationem* of the mortal philosophers ("*omnem deliberationem mortalium philosophorum transcenderunt*").

Again, in Book V, we find that Origene was above all others in what concerns the *ingenium* and divine *deliberatio,* as the sunt would have shown into his virtue ("*omnes divinos superavit tractatores ingenio pollens omnique divina deliberatione ac si sol in virtute sua resplendens*"). Just to confirm this, in Book VI he will say that according to the philosophy of the Evangels, plebeians and peasants are

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[18] Isidore of Seville, *Etymologies*, 20, 3, 1, in Stephen A. Barney, W. J. Lewis, J. A. Beach, Oliver Berghof, *The Etymologies of Isidore of Seville* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). From now on we shall be referring to the Etymologies in the text, giving only the annotations from this edition and abbreviated as *Etym*.

turned into rhetoricians ("*Talis siquidem evangelii philosophia est, ut plebeios et rusticos concite faciat oratores*"). The same passage says that Stephen the Deacon crushed all human persuasions with the Saint Spirit's *pistillo*, although he had not been educated in the mundane deliberation ("*mortalibus deliberativis*").

The works of God are impenetrable and protected by the Divine *voluntatum* and *permissionum,* therefore no man can autonomously comprehend them through a *deliberatione* (Book VIII: "*Thesauri Dei inaestimabilitas sive operum, sive voluntatum, sive permissionum, de quibus nemo humana deliberatione quid digne valet comprehendere*"). Ioannes Scotus Eriugena seems to be addressed in the following line: "*Ergo illi, qui mendacissimo stilo de divisione rerum superiorum scripserunt, falsi sunt divinas operationes vanissimis aestimationibus circumstantiantes*".

7. *Deliberatio* as correct decision.

Book II offers an interesting viewpoint. When commenting on the issue of the multiplicity of the Heavens, Gerard quotes from Isaia and says: "In Isaia vero legitur, quod *septem mulieres virum unum apprehende*rint dicentes: Panem nostrum manducabimus, vestimentis nostris operiemur, tantummodo invocetur nomen tuum super nos. Septem, quas audistis, mulieres septem praedictas ecclesias indubitanter sume. Virum, quem audisti, unum illum delibera, de quo Spiritus Sanctus: Ecce vir – ait –, oriens nomen eius". It is possible that *delibera,* "decide, think, be sure", stands, in this context, for the most proper meaning, that of a *decision* regarding the significance of a text or symbol. In this case, the *deliberatio* is rather more than a commentary or an interpretation; it also implies making the correct decision regarding the meaning of a term or text, and that decision is only possible on the basis of *legitimate criteria*. This is in accordance with the previous contexts where Gerard stated the need for a mystical experience in order for one to be able to access the mysteries of the Scripture, but it is still consistent with the logical use of the term in the *Etymologies* of Isidore of Seville, whereby Gerard could have learned of the *deliberatio* as a logical consistent discourse named *epichereme.*

8. *Deliberatio* as *epichereme.*

Isidore of Seville's *Etymologies* is the main source for Gerard's information concerning Ancient wisdom, and it is essential to see that his discourse on rhetoric, dialectic, theory of virtues, physics and many others are borrowed from them. Gerard's quotations are so close to Isidore's text that it is reasonable to assume that the *Etymologies* had been under his eyes when composing the *Deliberatio.* Just a few examples will suffice.

In Book IV, when Gerard states that we must praise *(laudare)* pagan philosophers for their spirit *(ingenium)* and merit *(iure),* as every human person was gifted by God, the entire list of Greek philosophers is taken from Isidore's *Etymologies,* 2. Another example is the integral quotes Gerard borrows from the

Etymologies when he discusses logic. He quotes two different passages from Isidore: first, the *Etymologies* 2.23.1-2, when he asserts that Varro defined rhetoric and dialectic: "*et Varro, qui nobiles geminas disciplinas definiendo sic distinguere dignatus est dicens, quod altera ab altera in manu hominis pugnus adstrictus et palma distensa. Una verba contrahens, alia distendens. Una ad disserendum acutior, altera ad ea, quae nititur instruenda, facundior. Una ad coessentes, alia ad forenses procedit. Quarum una studiosos requirit rarissimos, altera facundissimos populous*", and then, a few lines below, he takes text from *Etymologies* 2.24.7 to illustrate that dialectic and rhetoric were added to Socrates' ethics: "*subiungens logicam, quae rationalis vocatur, per quam discursis rerum morumque causis uim earum rationabiliter perscrutatus dividens eam in supra praedictas geminas disciplinas, dialecticam utique et rhetoricam*". Thus, merits for logic are shared between Plato and Varro, whereas Thales and Socrates have priority in the natural sciences and ethics, as Gerard learned from the *Etymologies,* in passages that he neither comments or nor criticises but simply takes them for granted. There are numerous other passages like these two.

It is quite clear that Gerard used the *Etymologies* and we may assume that other important knowledge from it was also well known to him. For instance, it is peculiar to note that Isidore's definition of *deliberatio* was, in *Etymologies* (2.9.6;16-1)[19], a sort of *epichereme.* Here is what Isidore says:

"Inference (*ratiocinatio*) is a discourse by which what is in question is put to the test. 7. There are two types of inference. First is the *enthymeme* (*enthymema*), which is an incomplete syllogism, and used in rhetoric. The second is the *epichireme* (*epichirema*), a non-rhetorical, broader syllogism. (...) 16. ... *epichireme*, deriving from inference as broader and more developed than rhetorical syllogisms, distinct in breadth and in length of utterance from logical syllogisms, for which reason it is given to the rhetoricians. This consists of three types: the first, of three parts; the second, of four parts; the third, of five parts. 17. The three-part epichirematic syllogism consists of three members: the major premise (*propositio*), minor premise (*assumptio*), and conclusion (*conclusio*). The four-part type consists of four members: first the major premise, second the minor premise joined to the major premise or a minor premise, third the proof (*probatio*), and the conclusion. 18. The five-part type accordingly has five members: first the major premise, second its proof, third the minor premise, fourth its proof, fifth the conclusion. Cicero puts it thus in his art of rhetoric (*On Invention* 1.9): «If deliberation (*deliberatio*) and demonstration (*demonstratio*) are kinds of arguments (*causa*), they cannot rightly be considered parts of any one kind of argument – for the same thing can be a kind of one thing and part of another, but not a kind and a part of the same thing,» and so forth, up to the point where the constituents of this syllogism are concluded".

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[19] Stephen Barney, W. J. Lewis, J. A. Beach, Oliver Berghof, *The Etymologies of Isidore of Seville*, 72.

If Gerardus had this in mind, than his book called *Deliberatio...* should have been planned as a non-rhetorical inferential discourse (*epichireme*), broader than the logical syllogism due to the fact that each proposition has a proof, therefore a syllogism with five parts. In this case, *Deliberatio* could mean, as in Cicero's definition borrowed by Isidore, an inference, consisting of five parts: major premise, proof, minor premise, proof, conclusion. Therefore, Gerard would most probably have tried to follow a Ciceronian structure in his *Deliberatio,* more precisely an intentional rhetorical structure ("*it is give to the rhetoricians*") of syllogistic composition with each premise tested or given a proof; the conclusion in its turn must have a proof apart from the syllogistic inference, which consist either in the abundant Biblical quotations or in philosophical illustrations such as the information taken from the *Etymlogies.*