Chiastic Modernism: Rational Uncanniness and Uncanny Reason

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Abstract: This paper seeks to offer a continuity thesis by showing that modernism is in many ways a continuation – both from a theoretical and a literary historical point of view – of well-established cultural contradictions and rhetorical strategies. I argue that a focus on the uncanny in modernist literature illuminates the complex chiastic interdependence of the apparently simple opposition between the rational and the irrational: the former constantly discovers in the latter not only its antagonist, but also its most important motivation. Thus, reason folds back onto itself in a chiastic fashion: rationalizing the uncanny generates further instances of the uncanniness of reason. This paradoxical operation is not simply a marginal device that modernist writers sporadically deploy, but, as I reveal in my brief analyses of D. H. Lawrence, Aldous Huxley, and Joseph Conrad, it can rather be regarded as one of the central organizing principles of modernist literature and culture. The last part of the essay shows that Woolf's genius lies in the fact that she relocates the modernist chiasmus at the level of the opposition between ethics and aesthetics. The uncanny in Woolf's *Mrs. Dalloway* upsets the distinction between the two categories, suggesting a new modernist aesthetics of the trivial.

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In Loose from Loos: A Law Permitting Individual Building Alterations or Architecture Boycott Manifesto (1968) Friedrich Stowasser – popularly known as Friedensreich Hundertwasser and a host of other puckishly self-created names – rails against the architectural rationality initiated, in his view, by Adolf Loos's influential manifesto "Ornament and Crime" (1908). In contrast to Loos's functional forms and at the same time surpassing the stylistics of "sterile ornament" the latter was reacting against, Hundertwasser praises "living growth" and declares: "The straight line is the only uncreative line. . . . The straight line is the true tool of the devil. Whosever uses it is aiding the downfall of mankind".[1] He adds: "the damage caused by rational building methods exceeds several times over any apparent savings made".[2] Hundertwasser's architectural designs seek to displace the rational monotony of carefully calculated rectangular shapes, while his paintings take inspiration from the works of such precursors as Gustav Klimt (1862-1918) and especially Egon Schiele (1890-1918). He

[1] Friedrich Stowasser, "Loose from Loos: A Law Permitting Individual Building Alterations or Architecture Boycott Manifesto" In: Harry Rand, *Hundertwasser* (London: Taschen,1993),118.
[2] Ibid., 119.

confesses: "For me the houses of Schiele were living beings. For the first time I felt that the outside walls were skins. . . . It is the third skin which really demonstrated something that cries, that lives . . . When you look at these houses you feel that they are humans".[1] To view houses and thus essentially works of art as living, breathing beings is to reverse the order of priority establishing the classical distinction between *physis* (nature) and *techné* (culture). The inversion is in fact the enactment of a chiastic operation: nature informs culture just as culture, in turn, informs nature and everyday life.

The general operation of the chiasmus is essential for the understanding of modernist art and culture. Schiele's living houses are not simply innocent examples of personifying the inanimate, but they can also be viewed as stretching the boundaries of reason by suggesting that cultural artifacts and aesthetic objects could easily come alive, threatening to displace the rational coherence of the natural world. As such, Schiele's art is symptomatic of the process by which modernism relocates analogically the initial distinction between nature and culture at the level of the opposition between the rational and the irrational. It is by no means accidental that Schiele's artistic experiments – which invoke and at the same time upset the relationship between the nature/culture division on the one hand and the rational/irrational distinction on the other – occur precisely at the beginning of twentieth-century modernism. Notably, modernism bears witness to key historical and social transformations that mark both the apotheosis and in certain ways the crisis of the Enlightenment project of modernity. Spanning back to René Descartes's philosophy of the *cogito* and developed through the aesthetics of Immanuel Kant, the pursuit of modernity has been defined as the establishment of the autonomous domains of nature and culture, or what Bruno Latour calls the "purification" of separate spheres.[2] The constitution of the separate domains of nature and culture within modernity is underwritten by the distinction between the rational and the irrational, or, using Jürgen Habermas's terms, the insistence upon "the cognitive potentials" and "the rational organization of everyday social life".[3] The warning implicit in Schiele's art regarding the threat of the irrational against Enlightenment rationality comes precisely at the point in history when the separations between culture and nature, art and everyday life, the irrational and the rational seem to be the most intense but also the most brittle. The precarious, two-way relationship between these terms, involving constant repetitive reversals, defines the generic logic of chiastic modernism.

Of course, the animate houses Hundertwasser encounters in Schiele's works are by no means uncommon or unrepresentative instances of the ways in which the irrationality and the supernatural dimensions of art inform the rational constitution of everyday life. Several modernist authors are intensely preoccupied with the various ways in which lifeless objects come alive to upset the rational distinction between the animate and the inanimate. One of the major modes of animating the inanimate in modernist literature is by way of the uncanny, which is itself the product of an ontological chiasmus: the intermittent resurrection into life and passing into death—in

[1] Ibid., 13.

[2] Bruno Latour, *We Have Never Been Modern*, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 10.

[3] Habermas, Jürgen. "Modernity—An Incomplete Project" In: *The Anti-Aesthetic*, ed. Hal Foster (Port Townsend, WA: Bay Press, 1983), 9.

other words, life in death and death in life. In E. M. Forster's *Howards End* (1910), for example, not only does Margaret Schlegel assert, in a fashion that recalls Schiele's influence on Hundertwasser, that "Houses are alive",[1] but it is the aura of the mansion itself, Howards End, carrying the late Mrs. Wilcox's ghostly presence, that makes Margaret conclude to his sister, Helen: "I feel that you and I and Henry are only fragments of that woman's [Mrs. Wilcox's] mind. . . . She is everything. She is the house, and the tree that leans over it".[2] A similar, almost telepathic communication takes place in Katherine Mansfield's short story "Bliss" between Bertha Young and Miss Fulton through the medium of the animated pear tree, while the two stand "side by side looking at the slender, flowering tree . . . understanding each other perfectly, creatures of another world".[3] The unhomely (*Unheimliche*) yet familiar experience of another world is also one of Clarissa's major concerns in Virginia Woolf's *Mrs. Dalloway* (1925), who experiences "odd affinities . . . with people she had never spoken to, some woman on the street, some man behind the counter—even barns or trees".[4] The impossibility of the death of the soul, which inevitably lives on through the medium of worldly objects and persons, is at the center of Clarissa's "transcendental theory" that proclaims: "our apparitions . . . are so momentary compared with the other, the unseen part of us, which spreads wide, the unseen might survive, be recovered somehow attached to this person or that, or even haunting certain places after death".[5]

In all these examples, the uncanny reveals its chiastic constitution because it turns out to both elevate and jeopardize the characters' experience and overall existence: death is irrational communication, and irrational communication is, in turn, the death of the rational. Each of the above-mentioned characters is bound to realize that the irrationality of epiphany is inevitably coupled with a much more intense struggle to maintain the rational coherence of everyday life. For Margaret Schlegel, it is the continuous fight with patriarchy in the person of the unscrupulous businessman, Mr. Wilcox; for Bertha Young, the greatest experience of bliss means at the same time the potential disintegration of her family and the ruination of her marriage; and finally, Clarissa Dalloway's transcendental theory involves the contradictory aesthetics of the trivial, according to which the growing of roses turns out to be more important than people's lives and the issue of war in general. In fact, the focus upon the uncanny in modernist literature illuminates the complex chiastic interdependence of the apparently simple opposition between the rational and the irrational: the former constantly discovers in the latter not only its antagonist, but also its most important motivation. Thus, reason folds back onto itself in a chiastic fashion: rationalizing the uncanny generates further instances of the uncanniness of reason. This paradoxical operation is not simply a marginal device that modernist writers sporadically deploy, but, as I show in my brief analyses of D. H. Lawrence, Aldous Huxley, and Joseph Conrad, it can rather be regarded as one of the central organizing principles of modernist literature and culture. Woolf's genius lies in the fact that she relocates the modernist

[1] Edward Morgan Forster, *Howards End* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1998), 113.
[2] Ibid., 222.
[3] Katherine Mansfield, "Bliss" In: *The Short Stories of Katherine Mansfield* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1937), 347.
[4] Virginia Woolf, *Mrs. Dalloway* (New York: Harcourt, 1981), 153.
[5] Ibid., 153.

chiasmus at the level of the opposition between ethics and aesthetics. The uncanny in *Mrs. Dalloway* upsets the distinction between the two categories, suggesting a new modernist aesthetics of the trivial.

Modernism and Chiasmus

In "Dover Beach" (1867) Matthew Arnold depicts a young couple, who are ready to profess their love for each other, hoping that that their sincerity, like the windowpane in front of them, will protect them against the sorrows and the chaotic uncertainties of a constantly changing modern world. The poem ends with the soothing prospect:

> Ah, love, let us be true
> To one another! for the world, which seems
> To lie before us like a land of dreams,
> So various, so beautiful, so new,
> Hath really neither joy, nor love, nor light,
> Nor certitude, nor peace, nor help for pain;
>
> And we are here as on a darkling plain
> Swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight,
> Where ignorant armies clash by night.[1]

Aleksandra Chaushova, *Aunts/Unconditional Surrender*, 2011,
pencil on paper, 46,4 x 32,6 cm

[1] Matthew Arnold, "Dover Beach" In: *The Poems of Matthew Arnold*, ed. Kenneth Allott and Miriam Allott. (New York: Longman, 1979), 29-37.

This closing passage of the poem vividly shows the dual effect of the growing tension between nature and culture that reaches its apotheosis in early-twentieth-century modernism. The fragile windowpane separating the lovers from the outside world can be viewed as a symbol of the precarious, two-way relationship between progress and regression. Viewed through the windowpane, itself a sign of artificiality and separation but also of communication, the promising world of technological development, seemingly "so various, so beautiful, so new," turns out to be pregnant with its opposite: a desolate, joyless world of fear and confusion. A similar setback to novelty is also one of the major concerns of Charles Baudelaire, who finishes *The Flowers of Evil* (1857) with the image of plunging into "the abyssal depth of Hell or Heaven—what matter where?— / the abyssal depth of the Unknown, to find the new!"[1] For Baudelaire, just as for Arnold, the achievements of the modern world are at the mercy of chthonic powers, which, far from being conquered once and for all, threaten to destroy the very aspirations of modernity.

Baudelaire's prose poem "The Eyes of the Poor", written only five years before "Dover Beach", is also focused upon a pair of lovers, sitting this time "at a brand-new café on the corner of a new boulevard",[2] separated, again, from the outside world by the thin glass pane that allows them to contemplate the Parisian streets. While enjoying the splendors of the coffee shop, the lovers suddenly find themselves exposed to the stupefied and sorrowful gaze of a poor family: "The father's eyes were saying, 'How beautiful! How beautiful! All the poor world's gold seems to have fallen upon those walls.' —The little boy's eyes, 'How beautiful! How beautiful! But only people not like us can enter this house'".[3] The separation between the dazzling café and the family in rags, the inside and the outside, "to look" and "to be looked at" seems to be complete. And yet, just like in Arnold's poem, the thin windowpane acts as mediator and allows these two worlds to interpenetrate, exposing the falsity of a simple, clear-cut opposition between advancement and regression, suggesting instead that the latter in fact thoroughly informs the former. This is true perhaps even more so in the case of Baudelaire. Unlike the lovers in "Dover Beach," Baudelaire's couple is unable to praise mutual affection as the ultimate protection against the contradictions of the modern world. The poem concludes with the skeptical warning, "how incommunicable thought is, even among people who love each other!"[4] Early modernism, for both Arnold and Baudelaire, means the birth of an ambiguous world in which progress and destruction interact in a chiastic fashion. To innovate is to penetrate with Baudelaire "the abyssal depth of Hell or Heaven," and thus to heed Friedrich Nietzsche's admonition in *Beyond Good and Evil*: "Whoever fights monsters should see to it that in the process he does not become a monster. And when you look long into an abyss, the abyss also looks into you."[5]

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[1] Charles Baudelaire, "Travel" In: *Baudelaire's Flowers of Evil and Other Poems*, trans. Francis Duke (New York: Vantage, 1982), 213.

[2] Charles Baudelaire, "The Eyes of the Poor" In: *The Parisian Prowler: Le Spleen de Paris. Petits Poèmes en prose,* 2nd ed., trans. Edward K. Kaplan (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1997), 60.

[3] Ibid., 61.

[4] Ibid., 61.

[5] Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1966), 89.

A different way to put this idea is to claim, along with Marshall Behrman, that being modern at the beginning of the twentieth century is to be suddenly thrown into "the maelstrom of modern life" in which people become at once "subjects as well as objects of modernization"[1] Significantly, Berman takes the phrase for the title of his book ("all that is solid melts into air") from Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels's *The Communist Manifesto*, which illuminates the circular – indeed, chiastic – relation between subjects and objects of modernization. In *The Communist Manifesto* Marx and Engels argue that "the bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the means of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society".[2] The result is overproduction, which the authors describe in the famously vivid passage: "Modern bourgeois society . . . that has conjured up such gigantic means of production and exchange is like the sorcerer, who is no longer able to control the powers of the nether world whom he has called up by his spells"[3] One way to view the flip side of progress – also expressed by Arnold's "darkling plain", Baudelaire's "abyssal depth of the unknown", and Nietzsche's slippery monster – is to relate it to the changes in the capitalist mode of production and exchange that occur with full intensity approximately half a century after Marx's diagnosis, during the second Industrial Revolution.

The social, historical, and economic conditions at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries make it possible to define modernism as the expression of a chiastic relationship between subject and object: the emergence of a world of temporal simultaneity, which blurs the distinction between cause and effect—in other words, a world in which to create something new means to be created by the very objects of production. It is such a temporal simultaneity that Perry Anderson refers to in "Modernity and Revolution", where he proposes a "conjunctural" analysis of modernism based on "the intersection of different historical temporalities" determined by three key coordinates: (1) "a highly formalized academicism," (2) the emergence of "key technologies or inventions of the second industrial revolution; that is telephone, radio, automobile, aircraft, and so on," and (3) "the imaginative proximity of social revolution".[4] As a consequence, Anderson concludes, modernism "arose at the intersection between a semi-aristocratic ruling order, a semi-industrialized capitalist economy, and a semi-emergent, or semi-insurgent, labor movement"[5] The technological innovations Anderson mentions are crucial characteristics of modernist society and culture, viewed as the crisis of abundance.[6]

One of the most significant implications of the modernist culture of abundance, implicit also in Anderson's conjunctural analysis, is that it signals at once the

[1] Marshall Berman, *All That is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982), 16.
[2] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto* (New York: Bantam, 1992), 21.
[3] Ibid., 24.
[4] Perry Anderson, "Modernity and Revolution" In: *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*, ed. Caryl Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988), 324-325.
[5] Ibid., 326.
[6] On this idea, see Stephen Kern, *The Culture of Time and Space 1880-1918* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), 9. See also Ronald Schleifer, *Modernism and Time: The Logic of Abundance in Literature, Science, and Culture*, 1880-1930 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 35-66.

intensification and the crisis of the Enlightenment ideals of progress.[1]Thus, modernist abundance invites a Freudian reading, which also reveals in its own distinctive way the ambiguous double-relation between gain and loss. As Freud explains in *Civilization and Its Discontents,* "it is impossible to overlook the extent to which civilization is built up upon the renunciation of instinct, how much it presupposes precisely the non-satisfaction . . . of powerful instincts".[2] Cultural and technological abundance are symptoms that are meant to compensate for a much more important primal loss, entailed by repressed instincts and desires. Freud uses in his analysis the metaphor of organ-extension: "Man has, as it were, become a kind of prosthetic God. When he puts on all his auxiliary organs he is truly magnificent; but those organs have not grown on to him and they still give him much trouble at times".[3]

Registering the circular relation between gain and loss in Freud's analysis, between subject and object in Berman's modernist maelstrom, and between the gigantic modes of production and the powers of the underworld in Marx, is to look from different perspectives into the Nietzschean abyss, which inevitable gazes back into the beholder. It is, therefore, to reveal the analogy between the general constitution of modernism and the operation of the rhetorical figure of chiasmus. Chiasmus derives from the Greek letter "χ" (chi), which illustrates by its shape the "ABBA" pattern of repetition and inversion.[4] Nietzsche's phrase, for instance, "when you look long into an abyss, the abyss also looks into you," is a perfect illustration of chiasmus, suggesting the "Greek verb meaning to mark with cross lines":[5]



The same chiastic structure characterizes Behrman's insight that modernism signals the process by which people become at the same time subjects and objects of modernization. In both cases, chiasmus involves not simply the simple mirrored repetition of parallel terms, but it also emphasizes the relation of inversion by which to act is always also to be acted upon, not despite but precisely *because of* the insurmountable opposition between subject and object, nature and culture. Thus, "the powers of the nether world" are summoned in Marx's imagery not from some malicious underworld sealed off from capitalist development, but precisely in the name of the

[1] In this regard, the project of modernism resembles what Tim Armstrong calls the general logic of "prosthetic modernism" and organ-extension. See Armstrong, *Modernism, Technology, and the Body: A Cultural Study* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 77-105.

[2] Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents*, trans. James Strachey (New York: W. W. Norton & Co, 1961), 52.

[3] Ibid., 44.

[4] See Richard A. Lanham, *A Handlist of Rhetorical Terms*, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 33.

[5] David Weir, "Chiastic Narrative" In: *James Joyce and the Art of Mediation* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 89.

exclusionary oppositions generated by capitalism itself. Similarly, the image of the human as "prosthetic God" in the Freud's analysis discloses the troubles of "auxiliary organs" not simply as inhuman artifices independent of the realm of the human, but rather in the very name of the thoroughly humanized progress of civilization. Chiastic modernism illuminates the inherent dynamics of such oppositions that function as reciprocally generating, rather than simply exclusionary, mechanisms.

The rhetorical operation of the chiasmus, which bears important affinities with the modernist culture of abundance, can also be seen in the form of a linguistic excess that seemingly exhausts, by virtue of its circularity, the range of argumentative possibilities. In conclusion, the relationship between modernist progress and destruction in the aesthetic worlds of Arnold and Baudelaire, as well as in the theoretical inquiries of Marx and Freud, reveals the chiastic logic by which destruction, instead of being hermetically isolated from the hopeful perspectives of progress, turns out to be the latter's very motivation and condition of existence. Thus, modernism bears witness to both the intensification and the crisis of the Enlightenment ideal of progress, an idea that, as I show in a moment, seeks to justify the distinction between nature and culture by referring it to the oppositional framework between the rational and the irrational. It is precisely the internal limitations of the Enlightenment ideal of progress, in many ways strengthened through new technologies during the early twentieth century that are exposed in literary modernism through the idea of uncanny, which reveals the chiastic interdependence between the rational and the irrational realms of existence.

"Primeval darkness falsified to a social mechanism": Reason and the Uncanny

In his seminal essay "The 'Uncanny'" (1919), Freud offers extensive discussion of the semantic features of the word "unheimlich" (literally, "unhomely"), which actually he shows to be synonymous with its opposite: "heimlich", he argues, can signify at once "what is familiar and agreeable" and "what is concealed or kept out of sight."[1] In his detailed examination of E. T. A. Hoffman's short story "The Sandman" (1816), Freud uses the idea of the shared meaning of *heimlich* and *unheimlich* as a starting point for his definition of the uncanny as "that class of the frightening which leads back to what is known of old and long familiar."[2] By grounding the notion of the uncanny in the familiar, Freud seeks to rectify Ernst Jentsch's earlier interpretation of Hoffman's story and his subsequent definition of the uncanny involving intellectual uncertainty about the distinction between the animate and the inanimate. The central concern of Hoffman's story is, indeed, the precarious opposition between nature and artifice: the young protagonist Nathaniel falls in love with the beautiful wooden doll, Olympia, neglecting his real-life lover, Clara. Moreover, Nathaniel confuses the natural and the artificial in another crucial way as well: not only does he confuse Coppola, the optician who manufactured Olympia's eyes, with Coppelius, whom he considers responsible for his father's death, but the latter also gets conflated in his mind with the folk-story character of the Sandman, believed to pour sand in little children's eyes who refuse to go to sleep.

[1] Sigmund Freud, "The Uncanny" *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, trans. James Starchey. Vol. XVII (1917-19) (London: The Hogarth Press, 1947), 224-225.
[2] Ibid., 220.

The reason why Hoffman's piece illustrates for Freud the operation of the uncanny is not so much because of the confusion between the natural and the artificial, but rather because Freud discovers in the story instances of the uncanny related to his notions of the "Oedipus complex" and that of the "repetition compulsion", both introduced in the simultaneously-conceived *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*. He argues that "the feeling of something uncanny is directly attached to the figure of the Sand-Man, that is, to the idea of being robbed of one's eyes, and . . . Jentsch's point of an intellectual uncertainty [between the animate and the inanimate] has nothing to do with the effect".[1] Clearly, Freud's attempt to discredit Jentsch's argument, while offering the more or less final conclusion that "whatever reminds us of . . . [the] inner 'compulsion to repeat' is perceived as uncanny",[2] represents the desire to overcome the irrational uncertainty of the uncanny through the "scientific" method of psychoanalysis.

However, as David Ellis acutely observes, the story of the Sandman "undermines Freud's claims to analytic mastery and control, both in his temporary function as reader of Hoffman, and in his larger role as clarifier of the uncanny".[3] In fact, Freud was also aware of the fact that by approaching the uncanny he was entering the slippery category of aesthetics, which could easily threaten the coherence of his "talking cure". Towards the end of his essay he writes, "We have drifted into this field of research [i.e. aesthetics] half involuntarily, through the temptation to explain certain instances which contradicted our theory of the causes of the uncanny".[4] Freud's failure to completely contain the uncanny within the realm of his psychoanalytic theory is highly significant, because it illustrates the aporia involved in controlling the irrational not as an unruly construction standing in itself, outside of, or in opposition to, the rational realm, but more importantly, as a haunting presence that stretches the boundaries of reason from within. The irrational dimensions of aesthetics are in full agreement with this idea. Instead of solving the issue of the uncanny, Freud actually brings about its proliferation, because, as it turns out, his experience with aesthetics via Hoffman's story is after all not very different from Nathaniel's encounter with the folklore-version of the tale of the sandman he used to hear as a child from the servant. In both cases, the irrationality of aesthetics troubles the rational structures of reality. The stakes for Freud involve facing potential inconsistencies of his psychoanalytic theory in the form of exceptional cases taken from the realm of art.

The tension between the irrational and the rational, underwritten by the distinction between art and everyday life, is also one of the central issues of modernist literature and culture. In "Art and Morality" D. H. Lawrence discusses this matter in relation to Paul Cézanne's post-impressionist still lifes, which he sees as examples *par excellence* of the way in which art separates itself from everyday life. The apples on Cézanne's paintings, notoriously defying the universal law of gravity, epitomize for Lawrence the problem Freud is also compelled to encounter in his analysis of the

[1] Ibid., 230.
[2] Ibid., 238.
[3] David Richard Ellison, *Ethics and Aesthetics in European Modernist Literature: From the Sublime to the Uncanny* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 58.
[4] Freud, "The Uncanny", 251–252.

uncanny; namely, the irrationality of art as opposed to the "Kodak-vision" of "the All-seeing Eye of humanity".[1] Lawrence concludes:

> Let Cézanne's apples go rolling off the table for ever. They live by their own laws, in their own ambiente, and not by the law of the kodak—or of man. They are *casually* related to man. But to those apples, man is by no means the absolute.[2]

Lawrence's observations summarize the general operation of the uncanny as the "revenge" of the artistic world over the reality of everyday life, enacted through the letting loose of irrational energies directed to overwhelm human rationality. Furthermore, it is by no means accidental that Lawrence chooses to illustrate the abstract notion of reason with photographic technology, which was in the process of development during the 1880s and would come to fully inform modernist society by the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. Implicit in Lawrence's conclusion is the idea that the evolution of human rationality, like the technological conception of reality through photography, inevitably folds back onto itself and leaves behind an irrational residue through art.

Aesthetics can function as a receptacle of the irrational, especially through the uncanny, because of its traditional role since the Enlightenment project of modernity as the realm against which, but also in the name of which, the rational coherence of human thought comes to be constructed. In Lawrence's "Art and Morality," the "Kodak-vision" suggests an improved version of the general ocularcentrism of the Enlightenment, which is emblematic of reason itself. At the same time, the sharp yet precarious distinction between aesthetics and ethics involved in this question is reminiscent of the ambitious undertaking of the Kantian aesthetics, which seeks to establish hermetically separated spheres of science, morality, and art. Set against this broad background of Enlightenment modernity, the uncanny in modernist literature reveals the chiasmus between the rational and the irrational: rationalizing the uncanny is inextricably caught up with the uncanniness of reason.

Different works show different aspects of this idea. In *The Rainbow* (1915), for instance, Lawrence's protagonist, Ursula Brangwen, fully experiences the "maelstrom of modern life" in the early twentieth century. She faces a predicament similar to the one Lawrence himself discussed in connection with Cézanne's still lifes: the recognition of the uncertainty of consciousness and of human existence, especially when compared to the unruly realm of the irrational residue of reason. Ursula imagines life as an "inner circle of light," which is at once illuminating through "the light of science and knowledge" and blinding, because it makes one incapable of perceiving the immense darkness lurking behind the spotlight of life, where she can feel "the eyes of wild beasts, gleaming, penetrating, vanishing".[3] For her, trains and factories – and thus, technology and economic progress in general – are all part of the "circle of light" that represents

[1] David Herbert Lawrence, *"Art and Morality" Study of Thomas Hardy and Other Essays*, ed. Bruce Steele (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 166.
[2] Ibid., 168.
[3] David Herbert Lawrence, *The Rainbow* (London: Penguin, 1981), 487-488.

everyday life, which generates terror but also offers "the security of the blinding light".[1] Realizing her position as both subject and object of modernization (to use Berman's description of modern life), Ursula confronts the uncanny because, just like Nathaniel in Hoffman's story, she finds it impossible not to live life aesthetically, by viewing worldly things as signifying systems that take away the natural dimensions of human existence. Not to take things for granted means for her, Unlike Viktor Skrebensky, her short-lived fiancé, who is willing "to screen himself from darkness, the challenge of his own soul" (535), Ursula chooses to face things as they come. The challenge, in this case, means to view people as "dummies exposed", who, like Nathaniel's manufactured Olympia, are nothing but artificial, "dressed-up creatures" sitting in the tram with "their pale, wooden pretense of composure and civic purposefulness".[2]

Early-twentieth-century English authors use the figure of the uncanny to disclose the chiastic constitution of modernism. Modern society and mutual love, just as Arnold and Baudelaire's aesthetics suggested, are, in Ursula's perspective, too, cover-ups within the realm of reason for chthonic powers, instances of "primeval darkness falsified to a social mechanism".[3] In its various manifestations in the literature of the period, the uncanny validates Freud's experience with the slippery realm of the aesthetic, emerging as the irruption of irrational energies (especially through art) in the form of internal contradictions embedded deep within human reason. Summoned from England to the United States to help Dr. Obispo's investigations into the lengthening of human life (by reading the legendary Hauberk papers, which contain the Fifth Earl's eighteenth-century diary-entry summaries of his own experimentations with the issue), Jeremy Pordage's story in Aldous Huxley's *After Many a Summers Dies the Swan* (1939) is no exception in this regard. The novel presents the classical instance of the uncanny as that which is resurrected to haunt the rational coherence of the human world. After discovering from the manuscript that the Fifth Earl staged his own death, Obispo and Jeremy, along with Stoyte, the millionaire contender to immortality, actually find the two-hundred-and-one-year-old Earl in the hidden labyrinth of the Hauberk family's cellar in England. In this strikingly gothic passage, the irrationality of aesthetics (in this case, the Fifth Earl's personal diary, long believed to be an anachronistic thing of the past) comes alive not simply to destabilize or attack rational thinking, but on the contrary, to prove that reason is thoroughly infused with irrational energies. At the sight of the senile, animal-like creature that was once the Fifth Earl, Dr. Obispo's belief in scientific progress amounts to "the finest joke ha had ever known",[4] while Stoyte's proof that lengthening indefinitely human life actually works can only be taken as the ultimate irony of reason, the uncanny mischief of irrational, evil spirits conjured up be reason itself.

The operation of the uncanny in Huxley's novel and Stoyte's paradoxical predicament can also be placed within the context of the rise of supernatural fiction at the turn of the eighteenth century, which, as E. J. Clery argues, is strongly related to the pervasive "consumer revolution" of the time, bringing about the "fundamental chiasmus" of "the growing commercialization of spirits . . . [and the] spiritualization of

[1] Ibid., 488.
[2] Ibid., 498.
[3] Ibid., 499.
[4] Aldous Huxley, *After Many a Summer Dies the Swan* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1939), 355.

commerce".[1] Huxley's novel also registers the chiasmus between the rational and the irrational within the context of the intense culture of abundance and the increasing consumer culture characteristic of the first half of the twentieth century. Living in a huge palace full of randomly selected valuables so that "every item is perfectly irrelevant to every other item",[2] Stoyte is clearly the generic figure of the consumer, whose world is restricted to what money can buy, and who is afraid only of what seems to be outside the economy of monetary exchange. Hence his excessive fear of death and his obsessive repetition of the self-reassuring phrases: "God is love. There is no death".[3] Significantly, one of Stoyte's main companies is the Beverly Pantheon, a cemetery that is built according to the "policy of injecting sex appeal into death"[4] and is thus thoroughly preoccupied with the aestheticization of death, or what Clery calls the "commercialization of spirits". It is precisely the logic of his own slogan, that is, the denial of death and its banishment into the realm of art that turns back against Stoyte as a chiastic fold through the "spiritualization of commerce" or the uncanniness of reason.

Huxley shows that "every improvement . . . makes it more difficult for people to escape from their egos, more difficult to forget those horrible projections of themselves they call their ideals of patriotism, heroism, glory and all the rest".[5] Huxley does so in a way that recalls Ursula's setting up of the blinding spotlight as a metaphor for life that is surrounded by the immense darkness of the underworld; and he does so moreover in keeping with the prosthetic logic of modernism, which registers the circular dependence of gain and loss in Freud's theory. In the *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno refer to this folding back of reason onto itself as the internal contradiction of the Enlightenment project of modernity, which, instead of going through progressive stages of emancipation, turns out to be "the wholesale deception of the masses".[6] Their argument illustrates the logic of chiastic modernism. The chiastic fold between enlightenment demythologization, which "compounds the animate with the inanimate," and the practice of myth, which, on the contrary, "compounds the inanimate with the animate," bears witness to the "enlightenment return to mythology, which it never really knew how to elude".[7] Opposition is reinscribed as the essential chiastic relationship between reason and mythical fetishism, or, as Horkheimer and Adorno show, "Before, fetishes were subject to the law of equivalence. Now equivalence itself has become a fetish".[8] (17).

The grim consequences of this rational domination disguised as Enlightenment progress are also at the center of Kurtz's degeneration in Joseph Conrad's *Heart of Darkness* (1902). As Marlow discovers, "all Europe contributed to the making of Kurtz," the charismatic agent of British ivory expeditions, idolized by the African

[1] E. J Clery, *The Rise of Supernatural Fiction, 1762-1800* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 6-7.
[2] Huxley, *After Many a Summer Dies the Swan*, 174.
[3] Ibid., 42-43.
[4] Ibid., 230.
[5] Ibid., 126.
[6] Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, trans. John Cumming (New York: Continuum Publishing Co, 2001), 42.
[7] Ibid., 16-27.
[8] Ibid., 17.

natives as a supernatural creature, the very fetish of rational progress and emancipation, whose famous pamphlet written for "the International Society for the Suppression of Savage Customs" concludes with the slogan epitomizing the uncanny of reason: "'Exterminate all the brutes!'".[1] Conrad's "heart of darkness", Huxley's "horrible projections" of human progress and Lawrence's "primeval darkness" present different ways in which modernist literature illuminates through the uncanny the essential irrational component of social and cultural issues at the beginning of the twentieth century—issues such as colonial discourse for Conrad, consumerism for Huxley, and the institutionalized forms of intimacy for Lawrence.

"The roar on the other side of silence":
***Mrs. Dalloway* and the Aesthetics of the Trivial**

The uncanny in modernist literature is not simply the mere anticipation of the common argument of Frankfurt School theorists about the totalitarian rationality of Western society characterized by the dominating forces of the culture industry and of instrumental reason. Instead, the various manifestations of the uncanny in early-twentieth-century literature illustrate what Rita Felski describes as the modernity of "a multiplicity of voices and perspectives that cannot be easily synthesized into a single, unified ideology or world-view".[2] Unlike in the examples discussed so far, however, the uncanny in Woolf's *Mrs. Dalloway* leads to the proposal of an aesthetics of the trivial, which complicates the distinction between ethics and aesthetics, suggesting a very different approach from the "highly pessimistic philosophy of history which conceives of modernity as an inexorable spiral of ever greater repression".[3] Woolf's insistence upon the importance of the trivial in *Mrs. Dalloway* suggests affinities with but also the suspension of what Elaine Showalter calls the "saga of defeat" of "the female aesthetic" at this period in literary history.[4] (224). Self-destruction, Showalter argues, is "the hallmark of female aestheticism" during this period in literary history, due mainly to the "risk of self-destruction through psychic overload, ego death from the state of pure receptive sensibility"—the state which she describes, following George Eliot, as "the roar on the other side of silence".[5] In Eliot's *Middlemarch* (1871), it is indeed Dorothea's heightened sensibility which turns common everyday experience into "inward amazement," "preparing strange associations which remained through her after-years".[6] Eliot concludes: "If we had a keen vision and feeling of all ordinary life, it would be like hearing the grass grow and the squirrel's heart beat, and we should die of that roar which lies on the other side of silence".[7]

Following Eliot's heightened sense of vision, the aesthetics of the trivial in *Mrs. Dalloway* registers the elevated sensibility and ecstasy that are needed for turning ordinary life into Woolf's famous "moments of being," but also the implicit threat of

[1] Joseph Conrad, *Heart of Darkness* (London: Penguin, 1999), 91-92.
[2] Rita Felski, *The Gender of Modernity* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), 8.
[3] Ibid., 6.
[4] Elaine Showalter, *A Literature of Their Own: British Women Novelists from Brontë to Lessing,* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 224.
[5] Ibid., 251.
[6] George Eliot, *Middlemarch*; *Silas Marner*; *Amos Barton* (London: Chancellor Press, 2001), 150.
[7] Ibid., 151.

such epiphanies that involve, as it did for Eliot, the uncanny proximity of death, the "roar on the other side of silence". Woolf's novel animates the inanimate through the uncanny of an ontological chiasmus, the intermittent resurrection into life and passing into death: life in death and death in life. Narration in *Mrs. Dalloway*, as J. Hillis Miller argues, is "repetition as the raising of the dead"[1] not only because, as Miller acutely points out, Woolf buried in her novel the Richard Strauss song "Allerseelen", referring to the "collective resurrection of spirits" during All Soul's Day, but more importantly because the novel offers an alternative model of plot and knowledge. It does so by linking scattered, non-cumulative moments of existence through the telepathic – and, indeed, uncanny – communication between narrator and characters as well as among several fictional characters. Clarissa and his old friend, Peter Walsh, for instance, "went in and out of each other's minds without any effort",[2] just like the narrator glides in and out of the characters' minds through free indirect discourse. Miller's analysis reveals the novel's narrative logic based on the imperative "'They thought, therefore I am'",[3] which reveals the chiastic interdependence between narrator and character: in *Mrs. Dalloway* the characters are dependent upon the "all-knowing mind" of the narrator, while the narrator, in turn, is dependent upon characters' minds.[4]

Moreover, the momentary epiphanies in the novel are also underwritten by the logic of chiasmus: the intertwining of ecstasy and horror reveals the experience of the uncanny animation of the inanimate. In Clarissa's "transcendental theory," which describes her belief in the survival after death in the "everywhere" of life, "attached to this person or that, even haunting certain places after death",[5] the inanimate is brought to life to enhance but also to threaten through involuntary associations the characters' mental certainty. Just returned from India, Peter Walsh, for example, is standing in "exquisite delight" in Trafalgar Square, "as if inside his brain by another hand strings were pulled, shutters moved, and he, having nothing to do with it, yet stood at the opening of endless avenues".[6] The novel's closing passage also reveals Peter during one of these gothic moments, while glancing at Clarissa and contemplating, "What is this terror? What is this ecstasy?"[7] Throughout the novel, the coupling of terror and ecstasy suggests a complex relationship between ethics and aesthetics, manifested most significantly in the questioning of the distinctions between madness and normalcy in Septimus Warren Smith's story on the one hand, and between the important and the unimportant in Clarissa's aesthetics of the trivial. As Woolf confessed in her diary, the novel was meant to be "a study of insanity and suicide: the world seen by the sane and the insane side by side."[8] Septimus's story reflects Woolf's intentions but also complicates the very notions of human responsibility involved in attitudes toward sanity and insanity.

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[1] J. Hillis Miller, *Fiction and Repetition: Seven English Novels* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), 178.
[2] Woolf, *Mrs. Dalloway*, 63.
[3] Miller, *Fiction and Repetition*, 181.
[4] Ibid., 179
[5] Woolf, *Mrs. Dalloway*, 153.
[6] Ibid., 52.
[7] Ibid., 194.
[8] Virginia Woolf, *The Diary of Virginia Woolf*, Vol. II, ed. Anne Olivier Bell (New York: Harcourt, 1978), 207.

One of the most representative examples of the way in which ecstasy, elevated to quasi-religious experience, gets coupled with mental instability is illustrated by the shell-shocked war veteran Septimus's constant hallucinations, as he obsessively discovers in everything around him the haunting presence of his deceased friend, Evans. Septimus, who recognizes his transitory position between life and death by confessing to himself, "I have been dead, and yet am now alive",[1] cannot escape hearing Evans's messages through the medium of the elm trees, which he figures to be alive, containing the spirit of the dead, "the leaves being connected by millions of fibres to his own [Septimus's] body".[2] Septimus's excessive ethical responsibility for the dead verges upon madness, turning him into "the giant mourner", who is unable to contain the past by distancing and aestheticizing it as memory:

> "It is time," said Rezia.
> The word "time" split its husk; poured its riches over him [Septimus]; and from his lips fell like shells, like shavings from a plane, without his making them, hard, white, imperishable words, and flew to attach themselves to their places in an ode to Time; an immortal ode to Time. He sang. Evans answered from behind the tree.[3]

The inability to aestheticize the trauma of the past by referring it to closed temporal categories is figured here as a fissure in mental representation, leading to overwhelming guilt in the form of an ethics of madness. Thus, when Septimus instructs his wife, Rezia, to burn his papers, which are also described, significantly, as "odes to Time," he is in fact perpetuating a state of ecstasy that is outside the framework of traditional responsibility. Septimus's ecstasy is thoroughly amoral, stretching the very boundaries of sanity and madness. Rezia's rational response is to tie the papers up with a silk ribbon, simply because "some were very beautiful".[4] Aesthetics is thus complicit with a rationalized version of reality – in this context, the traumatic aftermath of the Great War – that seeks to relegate the irrational and the uncanny to the realm of art, precisely in the name of human sanity. In the light of Septimus's excessive responsibility, which resurrects the irrational of aesthetics to question the distinction between normalcy and madness, Rezia's aesthetic attitude is relocated not simply as the natural coherence of everyday life, but rather as a necessary limitation or even as an irresponsible act of insanity.

In a similar way, Clarissa's aesthetics of the trivial is also on the borderline between ethics and aesthetics, challenging the very distinction between the petty and the serious. In "Ethical Folds: Ethics, Aesthetics, Woolf", Jessica Berman shows the complex interconnection in Woolf's works between the reams of aesthetics and ethics, arguing that many of her novels bring "the epistemological and moral into conversation with each other, using aesthetics to make an ethical realm – or a fold – between the potentially universal and the personal".[5] (159). However, in *Mrs. Dalloway* Woolf also upsets the privilege given to the serious and the important, implicitly figured throughout

[1] Woolf, *Mrs. Dalloway*, 69.
[2] Ibid., 22.
[3] Ibid., 69-70.
[4] Ibid., 148.
[5] Jessica Berman, "Ethical Folds: Ethics, Aesthetics, Woolf" *Modern Fiction Studies* 50 (2004): 159.

the novel as masculine, by depicting the seemingly trivial feminine domestic realm of the upper-middle-class character, Clarissa, as the main source of a mystic sense of understanding, based on the uncanny feeling of immortal presence and the impossibility of death. Thus, on his return from India, Peter Walsh contemplates Clarissa's petty concerns: "Here she is mending her dress; mending her dress as usual, he thought; here she's been sitting all the time I've been in India; mending her dress; playing about; going to parties".[1] More generally, Clarissa's aesthetics of the trivial is described as the dispersed cluster of isolated events that do not lead up to conclusive syntheses and, just like Septimus's ecstatic moments, resist retrospective objectification. Her friendship with Sally Seton, especially their kiss on the lips, which Clarissa considers the most exquisite moment of her life, does not get fulfilled in any way, and in her recollections she cannot "even get an echo of her old emotion".[2] More than that, Clarissa also displaces the moral responsibility for war into mere detail by emphasizing the beauty of her roses over the fate of the Armenians. Aesthetics, in such contexts, seems thoroughly opposed to the realm of ethics.

However, although apparently rooted in the irresponsible attention given to common experience, the aesthetics of the trivial in *Mrs. Dalloway* is at the same time elevated to the irrational level of telepathic communication and the uncanny of metempsychosis exemplified by Clarissa's "transcendental theory." Unlike Rezia's aesthetic parceling-out of everyday life, Clarissa's aesthetics functions as a permeable membrane thoroughly connecting rather than decisively separating the lives of various characters. As such, it operates, following Berman, as a fold between aesthetics and ethics that interlaces personal life with the universal concerns.

Woolf's insistence on sounds and vibrations throughout the novel is one of the important ways in which this aesthetic is portrayed as a connecting membrane, surpassing the rational sphere of the visual. In "Virginia Woolf, Sound Technologies, and the New Aurality", Melba Cuddy-Keane shows that the concepts of "diffusion" and "auscultation" (the act of listening in its nonmedical sense) are crucial for the understanding of "the new aural sensitivity coincident with the emergence of the gramophone and the wireless".[3] The car "gliding across Piccadilly" impresses the characters not so much by its visual presence but by the "vibration" it generates as "strangers looked at each other and thought of the dead; of the flag; of Empire".[4] Similarly, the sound of the airplane can be heard by "all people in the Mall, in the Green Park, in Piccadilly, in Regent Street, in Regent's Park",[5] just as the sound of Big Ben and the song of the old woman on the street create a certain mutual awareness, connecting various characters who never get to meet in person.

The uncanny resurrection of the dead as well as the irrational aesthetic of the trivial are thus intimately related in the novel to the technological developments of the first decades of the twentieth century. Additionally, the issue of the supernatural and the

[1] Woolf, *Mrs. Dalloway*, 41.
[2] Ibid., 34.
[3] Melba Cuddy-Keane, "Virginia Woolf, Sound Technologies, and the New Aurality" In: *Virginia Woolf in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction*, ed. Pamela L. Caughie (New York: Garland, 2000), 71.
[4] Woolf, *Mrs. Dalloway*, 18.
[5] Ibid., 21.

uncanny for Woolf involves probing the boundaries of the human mind. In her essay, "Across the Border", Woolf writes that in order to achieve the true effects of the uncanny, exemplified, according to her, by the works of Sir Walter Scott and Henry James, the author "must seek to terrify us not by the ghosts of the dead, but by those ghosts which are living within ourselves".[1] *Mrs. Dalloway* vividly illustrates this idea. The moments of rapture Clarissa finds even in the most ordinary aspects of everyday life is a dramatic expression of the argument Woolf had made earlier in her review of Elinor Mordaunt's volume of short stories: "Nobody can deny that our life is largely at the mercy of dreams and visions which we cannot account for logically".[2] The irrationality of the aesthetic of the trivial in *Mrs. Dalloway* bears important affinities with Freudian psychoanalysis, or, as Woolf puts it in her review, with "the discovery of some of . . . [the] uncharted territories of the mind".[3] According to Woolf's confessions in her diary, one of the major literary techniques used in *Mrs. Dalloway* consists in a discovery that is by no means unrelated to the supernatural communication among various characters: "I dig out beautiful caves behind my characters. . . . The idea is that all caves shall connect, and each comes to daylight at the present moment".[4]

It is not surprising then that "to plunge at Bourton into the open air" is for Clarissa to plunge "into the very heart of the moment, . . . the moment of this July morning on which was the pressure of all other mornings".[5] It is precisely because the caves connect, that Clarissa can feel Septimus's suicide, also described as a fatal plunge into death, described not simply as the passing into nothingness but as the very source of irrational communication: "Death was an attempt to communicate; people feeling the impossibility of reaching the centre which, mystically, evaded them; closeness drew apart; rapture faded, one was alone. There was an embrace in death".[6] The connecting caves, which reveal the organizing principle of the novel, reinscribe existence as the operation of a basic ontological chiasmus: the turning of death into the uncanny continuation of life, and elevation of everyday trivia to the level of scattered events of ecstasy—the epiphany of orgasmic moments of multiple small deaths. Thus, feeling Septimus's death during her party, Clarissa contemplates:

> Fear no more the heat of the sun. . . . She felt somehow very like him—the young man who had killed himself. She felt glad that he had done it; throw it away. The clock was striking. The laden circles dissolved in the air. He made her feel the beauty; made her feel the fun.[7]

Like in Shakespeare's *Cymbeline*, where the line "fear no more the heat of the sun" refers to a state of quasi-death, for Clarissa, too, Septimus's suicide reflects the uncanny

[1] Virginia Woolf, "Across the Border" In *The Essays of Virginia Woolf*, Vol. II. (1912-1918), ed. Andrew McNeillie (New York: Harcourt, 1987), 218-219.
[2] Virginia Woolf, "'Before Midnight'" In *The Essays of Virginia Woolf*, Vol. II. (1912-1918), ed. Andrew McNeillie (New York: Harcourt, 1987), 87.
[3] Ibid., 87.
[4] Woolf, *The Diary of Virginia Woolf*, 263.
[5] Woolf, *Mrs. Dalloway*, 37.
[6] Ibid., 184.
[7] Ibid,, 186.

feeling of life-in-death, the irrationality of beauty, which does not put an end to life but merely signals its redefinition as moments of terrifying ecstasy. The uncanny registers the chiastic constitution of ecstasy, Woolf's "moments of being," as the desirable yet threatening human condition passing between the unruly realms of life and death.

Conclusion

Chiastic modernism can also offer a vantage point for the retrospective reevaluation of the Enlightenment. It suggests an alternative literary and cultural history, which complicates the usual conception of the Enlightenment as a period based on Cartesian clear and distinct ideas.[1] Instead, it shows that the very categories of reason that might appear to be secure universality and transparency are actually undergirded by irrational phenomena such as the ones the above-discussed authors incorporate into their works. Modernism is typically defined in terms of unprecedented scientific developments that are often linked to a sense of crisis and fragmentation in the arts. However, instead of the disruption of traditional continuities, this essay has sought to offer a continuity thesis by showing that modernism is in many ways a continuation – both from a theoretical and a literary historical point of view – of well-established cultural contradictions and rhetorical strategies. As a future project, it would be interesting to examine to what extent the irrational dimensions of modernist aesthetics are rooted in the Gothic tradition, which reaches the height of its popularity in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century.

[1] On this issue, see the argument that irrational beliefs and practices such as mesmerism are at the very center of the "radical" definition of the Enlightenment in Robert Darnton, *Mesmerism and the End of the Enlightenment in France* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968). See also the idea that "the repudiation of magic on the part of Enlightenment radicals occurred simultaneously with their adherence to a pantheistic naturalism that had once been the prevailing philosophy of Renaissance adepts and magi" in Margaret C. Jacob, *The Radical Enlightenment: Pantheists, Freemasons and Republicans* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981), 34 italics in the original.