Voluntas as *Liberum Arbitrium* at Saint Augustine And Three Meanings of the *Servum Arbitrium* at Martin Luther*

Radu BANDOL
„Alexandru Ioan Cuza" University of Iaşi,
Faculty of Philosophy and Political-Social Sciences

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Abstract: The present study aims at analyzing several aspects of the concept of will from the perspective of Saint Augustine and Martin Luther. The authors are "classical" sources of the free will issue, the former in asserting it, the latter in coming to doubt it with regard to the "superior" choices. The actuality of the theme resides not only in the fact that it is profoundly transdisciplinary and that it continuously pursues a balance between *what depends on the deliberating agent* and what influences it in action from the outside, but also in that the authors we are dealing with were frequently investigated, resorted to and quoted in their age about the matter of the assertion and negation of free will. In the case of Augustine we take into consideration the relationship between *arbitrium* and *voluntas*, the former as a faculty of judgement and free consent, the latter as a complex of inclinations or dispositions. In the case of Luther three hypostases are identified in which *arbitrium* is slave (*servum*): an enslavement due to its impossibility of removing the aversion to God, an enslavement due to its impossibility of responding to God's grace and the last one towards the sovereignty of God's governing of the universe. The theological theory of will has the "advantage" of relating to a superior, perfect, modelling Will. Our attempt is to notice the essential anthropological aspect in which Luther distances himself from Augustine and the effect it has on understanding the *arbitrium*.

E-mail: radubandol@gmail.com

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1. *General* considerations on the study of *will*

The actuality of the theme is given not only by the fact that in the contemporary disputes on free will of the philosophy of religion, philosophy of mind, action theory, metaphysics, philosophy or theology the solution[1] is not definitively settled, but also by the implications of the theme in the most various fields: physics, ethics, social sciences, philosophy, law, arts, military conflicts, neurophysiology, music, psychiatry. The topic

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[1] Namely, what the congruity (harmony) is between free (freedom of the) will (choice) and determinism.

of free will is truly transdisciplinary.[1] It is also of interest to find a balance between the personal perspective of the free will, namely that man as a free agent can influence the world through reasoning, evaluation and deliberation, i.e. by means of *what is up to him/what lies in his power*, and the impersonal or objective perspective, which takes into account external reasons and psychological origins of which man is not aware when he must choose. Moreover, the differences in understanding and constituting the concept of will are reflected in fields of reality such as the ethical-moral attitudes, the engagement in action, the perception of the self, the place and role of man in the universe. The issue of the free will is recurrent in the history of thinking in that it approaches one of those definitive, fundamental, true themes of the mystery of the being, and a certain *auctoritas* is attributed to the two authors, Augustine and Luther, in the issue of the free will, to the former in affirming/asserting, and to the latter in doubting the "superior" choices.

What has come to be understood as *will* in contemporary language differs from that of previous eras, and it seems that the theme of will is problematic, while the fine demarcation of this concept tends to lead to complications. In his systematic approach, Charles Kahn[2] proposes four different perspectives (families of philosophical theories) on the concept of will. Each of these suggests a different account of the history of this concept.

The first family of theories, called by Khan "the theological concept of will", starts with Augustine and concludes with Thomas Aquinas and the medieval "voluntarists" (e.g. John Duns Scotus). This states that the "theory of the will of God precedes and guides the analysis of the human will", in the sense that "the human will is thought of as modeled on, or responding to, the will of God". The post- Cartesian theory puts the emphasis on volition "as an inner, mental event or act of consciousness which is the cause, accompaniment, or necessary condition for any outer action, that is, for any voluntary movement of the body". The tradition starting from Kant produced a change in the paradigm, for the concept of will came to be understood as autonomous, through the fact that it is a law unto itself. It is a dimension within which "we become aware of ourselves as noumenal, non-empirical entities". The final family of theories, the discussion of which enters into the arena of the libertarianism/determinism controversy, tries pretentiously to incorporate all the interpretations of "will" right back historically as far as Epicurus and Aristotle. The theory has many ramifications and it extends across a broad spectrum of scientific disciplines, but it is particularly debated within areas such as philosophy of religion, philosophy of the mind, and philosophy of action.

In research, there are tendencies, as far as the study of Augustine is concerned, of attributing to him a scholastic or psychological vocabulary on the topic of volition, or of understanding him through the lens of the contemporary philosophy of religion. Was

[1] See, for instance, Robert Kane, ed., *The Oxford Handbook of Free Will* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), to which twenty-six researchers have brought their contribution, all from various fields.

[2] Charles H. Kahn, "Discovering the Will: From Aristotle to Augustine" in John M. Dillon and Anthony A. Long, eds., *The Question of Eclecticism: Studies in Later Greek Philosophy,* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 235–236.

Augustine a libertarian,[1] a determinist,[2] or was he a compatibilist?[3] As Eleonore Stump remarked, "historians of philosophy read Augustine on free will so variously that it is sometimes difficult to believe they are reading the same texts".[4] In research, it is crucial that we should not intend to categorise him but rather respect and give greater attention to the philosophical and theological complexity involved.

Martin Luther is usually associated with theistic determinism.[5] But we must also take into account the historical context of this reformer, differentiating between the sources of his thinking, and encapsulating his pronouncements on free will within these primary concepts: *iustitia Dei, theologia crucis, praedestinatio, sola gratia.* The understanding of Luther's anthropology will determine the rectitude of his perception of free will.

The task of developing a study on free will, for Augustine and Martin Luther, is a very complex one. Both of them, each one in their own historical context, are major landmarks in the development of the understanding and the positioning of free will in the theologico-philosophical context of the man–God rapport. Free will, according to these two thinkers, is directly linked to a plethora of issues, such as: man's autonomy, the historical moment of Adam's fall, evil, the understanding of grace, predestination. In this study we do not set out to analyze the collateral concepts of free will as they belong to a broader study.

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[1] *Libertarianism* is used in Political Philosophy, Ethics and Metaphysics. "In metaphysical sense, it is opposed to determinism and holds that the past does not determine a single future. We can act, on the basis of rationality or the self we possess, independent of necessitating causal laws, no matter what happened in the past. This theory is now often supported by appealing to quantum mechanics, which asserts that there are uncaused events in the universe, but it is not clear that quantum indeterminism is the right way to allow for rationality and choice." Nicholas Bunnin and Jiyuan Yu, s.v. "Libertarianism," *The Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2004), 386.

[2] *Determinism* is used in Metaphysics. "The theory that every event has a cause, and that all things in the universe, including human beings, are governed by causal laws and operate in accordance with them. […]. Theological determinism, which can be found in Augustine, Spinoza, and Leibniz, infers from God's will that the existing world is the only possible world, so we have to accept it and find our own places in it. It also infers from God's omniscience and omnipotence that everything that happens is inevitable." Ibid*.,* s.v. "Determinism," 177.

[3] *Compatibilism* is used in Metaphysics and Philosophy of Action. "Also called soft determinism, a position that holds that determinism and free will are compatible. Hence human actions can be caused, but still be free. Free actions are not uncaused actions, but are actions that are closely linked with an agent's inner causation through one's own beliefs and desires." Ibid*.,* s.v. "Compatibilism," 123.

[4] Eleonore Stump, "Augustine on free will," in Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzman, eds., *The Cambridge Companion to Augustine* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 124.

[5] See Derek Pereboom, "Free Will, Evil, and Divine Providence," 77, in Andrew Chignell and Andrew Dole, eds., *God and the Ethics of Belief: New Essays in Philosophy of Religion*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); for a broader discussion about relation between Free Will and Determinism see ch. 13, "Free Will and Determinism," 267-284 in James P. Moreland and William Lane Craig, *Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview,* (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2003); see also John Martin Fischer, Robert Kane, Derek Pereboom and Manuel Vargas, *Four views on free will*, (Malden, MA; Oxford; Carlton, Victoria: Blackwell Pub., 2007).

Şerban Savu, ***Enlightenment*****, 2010, 35 x 50 cm, oil on canvas**

The aim of this study is to analyze the relation *arbitrium–voluntas* in Augustine and the conceptions of *servum arbitrium* from Martin Luther's work, *De Servo arbitrio*.

The method used is the diachronic one, sequential but not very rigorous, doubled by the comparative one. While in the continental and North American territory the two thinkers are often juxtaposed in aspects that refer to the predestination, grace and free will, in Romania however the situation is almost inexistent. The working perspective assumed in the study is at the crossroads of philosophy and theology, or maybe even sooner it is one of the philosophy of religion. Our attempt is to notice the essential anthropological aspect in which Luther distances himself from Augustine, and its effects for the understanding of the *arbitrium*.

We shall accept the presupposition that Saint Augustine and Martin Luther belong to the first family of theories on free will (i.e. the theological concept of will) proposed by Kahn.

2. Discontinuity and continuity in Augustine

There is currently a controversy among researchers, who have raised the question whether or not Augustine's thought in the latter stage of his life is consonant with that of his early stage. In other words, the question addresses the aspects of continuity and discontinuity. But what are the implications in this case, in terms of studying free will?

Not long ago, and in agreement with some distinguished researchers (Drecoll[1], Hombert[2], and Cipriani[3]), Carol Harrison[4] meticulously argued against Peter Brown's theses[5] in which he maintains that Augustine's views suffered dramatic changes around 396, at the time or writing *Ad Simplicianum*. Brown contends that in the period of 386–396, Augustine would have had a Platonic, optimistic theory and that he believed in man's natural capacity of doing good by his free will. Hence the stress on free will and responsibility in *De Libero Arbitrio*. After 396, the year considered the landmark of separation between his early philosophy and his later theology, he came across the Pauline writings, which caused him to experience "a true" conversion and a new perception of man's total dependence on God.

The researcher from Durham proves that the main concepts of Augustine's later theology are to be found in a nutshell in his initial writings. Indeed, his early works rely on Neo-platonic resources, but they build the argument towards a Christian theology and not the other way around. *Creatio ex nihilo* is a concept that implies the foresight of the human tendency towards sin and the intrinsic need of divine help, as well as the need of a solution for the problem of evil. *Fides* and *electio* understood as *gratia* are other key concepts in pre–396 Augustinian theology. For Harrison, *Ad Simplicianum* would not represent a sharp separation but rather a reconnection, in conformity with "The Fundamental Exceptions" as spelled out in *Commentary on Statements in the Epistle to the Romans* and *Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians* (394/395), where he asserts the postlapsarian freedom of the will, based on his former thinking, but using a more accessible terminology, where *initium fidei* is referred to as grace.

This discontinuity is rediscovered by James Wetzel[6] in the area of free will, who agrees with Brown's theory, for example, in *De libero arbitrio*. Thus, his treatise could well encompass "the two Augustines": the first, from book I, optimistic and reliant on the self determination of free will and on the possibility of achieving happiness, the second, from book II and III, the cleric Augustine, who has become aware of ignorance and the difficulty of the interaction between free will and the life of the church. Harrison[7] argues for the unity and continuity of the treatise: Augustine had in mind from the beginning a consistent structure throughout all three books – the first is prelapsarian,

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[1] Volker Henning Drecoll, *Die Entstehung der Gnadenlehre Augustins*, Beiträge zur historischen Theologie 109 (Tübingen, 1999).

[2] Pierre-Marie Hombert, *Gloria Gratiae. Se glorifier en Dieu, principe et fin de la théologie augustinienne de la grâce*, Collection des études augustiniennes: Série Antiquité, vol. 148 (Paris: Institut d'études augustiniennes, 1996).

[3] Nello Cipriani, "L'altro Agostino di G. Lettieri," *Revue des études augustiniennes* 48 (2002), 249–265.

[4] Carol Harrison, *Rethinking Augustine's Early Theology: An Argument for Continuity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 14.

[5] Peter Brown, *Augustine of Hippo: A Biography, Revised Edition with a New Epilogue* (Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000), especially the chapter "The Lost Future," 139–150.

[6] James Wetzel, "Snares of Truth. Augustine on Free Will and Predestination," in Robert Dodaro and George Lawless, eds., *Augustine and his Critics. Essays in Honour of Gerald Bonner* (London/New York: Routledge, 2000), 124–141.

[7] Carol Harrison, *Rethinking Augustine's Early Theology,* 198–237.

the second and the third are postlapsarian. Moreover, he maintains the same opinions on the pre- and postlapsarian free will, in all three books, and in all his writings on the subject (for example, *De beata vita*, *Contra Fortunatum*) produced in the period of time between the start of the Book I, *De libero arbitrio* (388) and the completion of the treatise (394/395).

From the two perspectives argued by these researchers, we shall agree with the median solution, as proposed by Anthony Dupont[1], which has to do with "evolution", "development", and a "continuous?? discontinuity". How could the conversion of Augustine – asks Dupont – be considered an event, a product or a process? Although 386 is considered the year of the grace of his conversion, Augustine did not change from being a non-Christian to being a Christian, but rather turned from (neo)Platonism to Catholicism, with the Apostle Paul as the catalyst of his conversion, as well as major Christian roots, since before his conversion. Certainly, as for Augustine's thinking, it is a case of maturing, deepening, and refining, following an intense process of pastoral experience and theological controversies in which he engaged.

Particularly, with regards to grace and freedom of will, Augustine's reflections have been shaped by his inner wrestling, firstly with Manichaeism and Neo-platonism, and secondly with Donatism, and Pelagianism. Consequently, this wrestling led to new perspectives and approaches, a constant adaptation of his theological vocabulary and use of grammar.[2]

3. The Relation between *voluntas* and *arbitrium* in Augustine

3.1. The association of *voluntas* with the stoic *o`ρμη*

Before we begin analyzing this relation, it is important to note some of the meanings of the term *voluntas* before Augustine. Sarah Byers[3] is very convinced that *voluntas*, for Augustine, is nothing else but the dispositional[4] and occurrent (i.e. relating to some observable feature of its bearer) form of o`ρμη, the rational being from stoic philosophy o`ρμη, signified by *impulse*, *appetite* towards an action. In fact, Byers follows an older path, opened by Brad Inwood, in his *Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism,* from 1987. Gerard O'Daly[5] avoids identifying *voluntas* with o`ρμη, (the psychic promptitude towards action) but he is very close to the concept in that he

[1] Anthony Dupont, "Is There an 'Early Augustine' and What is his View of Grace?," (Review of *Rethinking Augustine's Early Theology: An Argument for Continuity*, by Carol Harrison, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006; xii + 302 pp., ISBN: 978–0–19–928166–4/978–0–19–954364–9), *Ars Disputandi, The Online Journal for Philosophy of Religion,* 8 (2008), 75–76, accessed April 28, 2011, http://www.arsdisputandi.org/publish/articles/000304/article.pdf

[2] See Henri Irénée Marrou, *Saint Augustin et la fin de la culture antique* (Paris: Editions de Boccard, 1958).

[3] Sarah Byers, The meaning of 'voluntas' in Augustine," *Augustinian studies* 37 (2006): 171–189.

[4] "To possess a dispositional property is not to be in a particular state, or to undergo a particular change; it is to be bound or liable to be in a particular state, or to undergo a particular change, when a particular condition is realised. The same is true about specifically human dispositions such as qualities of character." Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind* (London: Hutchinson, 1949), 43.

[5] Gerard O'Daly, *Augustine's Philosophy of Mind* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1987), 25–26, 53, 144.

equates will with "impulse" (in infants), "impulsive tendencies", "engine of the impulses". In other instances, *voluntas* is a faculty of consent that generates impulse, or a capacity of the impulse which is activated as a consequence of the consenting. Gilbert Ward[1] analyzed *voluntas* in Aristotle, Chryssipus, Cicero, and Seneca, that is, in ancient secular philosophy before Augustine, and observed that it generally means "appetite or (rational) reasonable desire", "intention", "impulse". In the Roman context of day to day jurisprudence, *voluntas* was not employed primarily to denote the inclination of the will, but rather describing the sense of volition[2] in order to determine if the will becomes evident when set in action.

Augustine combines the significance of the virtue of mental attitude, a practical inclination (disposition), well rooted desire, with that of volition, and thus, in his works, *voluntas* usually has a philosophical meaning, but sometimes it has a practical meaning which is associated with *liberum arbitrium*.

3.2. *Arbitrium – voluntas*. The nature of the will

In his analysis on the relation between *liberium arbitrium* and *(libera) voluntas*, Nico den Bok highlights a distinction which is extremely neglected by many specialists, particularly in Augustine's four later works, in order to examine the supposition that the freedom of will in Augustine was forsaken by the Hipponite in the latter stage of his life. His critique is negative, although he found that the role of grace is also predominant. The distinction between the terms highlighted above can be referred to as *the faculty of judgment* or *the faculty of free consent,* namely, *a complex of inclinations and dispositions*. In the study of the relation between the two terms we shall attempt to use and adopt his systematic clarifications on the dynamics between *arbitrium* and *voluntas*[3].

Man, in his original state, was endowed with *arbitrium*, the capacity of accepting, or rejecting, grace. But alongside *arbitrium*, God had also put in man *voluntas* as *bona voluntas*. Thus man was designed with a 'platform' of good inclinations, which he could extend or reduce.

> Tunc ergo dederat homini Deus *bonam voluntatem* (subl. aut.): in illa quippe eum fecerat qui fecerat *rectum*; dederat adiutorium, sine quo in ea non posset permanere si vellet; ut autem vellet, in eius libero reliquit arbitrio. Posset ergo permanere si vellet: quia non deerat adiutorium per quod posset, et sine quo non posset perseveranter bonum tenere quod vellet.[4]

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[1] Neal Ward Gilbert, "The Concept of Will in Early Latin Philosophy," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 1 (1963): 17–35.

[2] Albrecht Dihle, *The Theory of Will in Classical Antiquity,* Sather Classical Lectures 48 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), 132–144.

[3] Nico W. Den Bok, "Freedom of the will: a systematic and biographical sounding of Augustine's thoughts on human willing," *Augustiniana* 44 (1994): 250–254.

[4] Augustinus, *De correptione et gratia,* XI, 32, col. [0931] in *Patrologia cursus completus series Latina,* Tomus XLIV, ed. by J.P. Migne, Paris, 1845; hereafter *Patrologia Latina*=PL; "At that time, therefore, God had given to man a good will, because in that will He had made him, since He had made him upright. He had given help without which he could not continue therein if he would; but that he should will, He left in his free will. He could therefore continue if he would, because the help was not wanting whereby he could, and without which he could not, perseveringly hold fast the

> Istam gratiam non habuit homo primus, qua numquam vellet esse malus; sed sane habuit, in qua si permanere vellet, numquam malus esset, et sine qua etiam cum libero arbitrio bonus esse non posset, sed eam tamen per liberum arbitrium deserere posset.[1]

On the basis of these considerations, it can rightly be asserted that it is mainly due to the presence of *bona voluntas* that *arbitrium* was capable of accepting the primary gift of God. Structurally, and therefore naturally, the free consent of the will depends on *voluntas*, to certain extent, and is conditioned by *voluntas*, in terms of its manifestation. Endowed with *bona voluntas*, man will depend on *liberum arbitrium* if he is to remain *rectum*, as it had been intended to, or, as it had already happened, will become *concurvatus*. Dumitru Stăniloaie's remarks, as circumscribed in the eastern theology paradigm *image-likeness*, are very profound:

> Hence, the human person was pure, free from evil propensities, and endowed with a tendency toward the good of communion with God and his fellow human beings; yet he was not confirmed in this purity and in this good. The Human person was conscious and free, and both in his conscience and in his freedom, he tended toward good. He had not achieved, however, an advanced consciousness of the good and the true, nor an assured freedom in the face of possible enslavement by certain passions. The human person was not sinful, but neither was he adorned with acquired virtues and consolidated and purified thoughts. His innocence was that of one who had not tasted sin; it was the innocence acquired by one who has repelled temptations. The human person was a being whose spirit had not been wounded or weakened by the passions, but neither had it yet been strengthened through exercise in the tasks of bringing both body and world into subjection and of causing the contingent elasticity of the world to become actual. The world did not weigh down the human body and spirit with entangling chains of its own processes, but neither had it been brought under the sway of the spirit that asserts its own power over the world.[2]

It must be pointed out that the idea of man's merit cannot find its place here, as the primordial *voluntas* is not the result of a deliberate act of man's will. Rather, an aspect of merit could be the matter of *accepting* the grace, a fact which occurs only through the consent of free will. And if so many things depend on it (e.g. acceptance), it means that it has a very important role in the economy of eternal life.

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good which he would." Augustine, *On Rebuke and Grace,* XI, 32, in *St. Augustine Anti-Pelagian Writings*, trans. Peter Holmes and Robert Ernest Wallis, *The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers,* Series 1, volume 5, p. 484, Edited by Philip Schaff, 1886–1889, 14 vols., (Repr. Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 1994). Hereafter: (NPNF$^{1(series)}$ volume number: page number).

[1] Ibid., XI, 31: "The first man had not that grace by which he should never will to be evil; but assuredly he had that in which if he willed to abide he would never be evil, and without which, moreover, he could not by free will be good, but which, nevertheless, by free will he could forsake." Ibid.

[2] Dumitru Stăniloae, *The Experience of God: Orthodox Dogmatic Theology Volume Two: The World, Creation and Deification,* foreword by Bishop Kallistos of Diokleia, translated and edited by Ioan Ioniță and Robert Barringer (Brookline, MA: Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 2000), 103--104.

In *De correptione et gratia* (426/427),[1] Augustine establishes the famous distinctions between *posse non peccare* (man's original state) – *non posse non peccare* (man's state after the Fall) – *non posse peccare* (man's glorified state) and *adjutorium sine quo non* (the grace granted to man before the Fall) – *adjutorium quo* (the grace granted to man after the Fall). The Hipponite confirms the existence of free will in many of his theses[2]. For example, in *Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum* (420/421) he states:

> Liberum autem arbitrium defendendo praecipitant, ut de illo potius ad faciendam iustitiam quam de Domini adiutorio confidatur atque ut in se quisque, non in Domino glorietur. Quis autem nostrum dicat, quod primi hominis peccato perierit liberum arbitrium de genere humano? Libertas quidem periit per peccatum, sed illa, quae in paradiso fuit, habendi plenam cumimmortalitate iustitiam. Propter quod natura humana divina indiget gratia, dicente Domino: *Si vos Filius liberaverit, tunc vere liberi eritis*; utique liberi ad bene iusteque vivendum. Nam liberum arbitrium usque adeo in peccatore non periit, ut per illud peccent maxime omnes, qui cum delectatione peccant et amore peccati et hoc eis placet quod eos libet.[3]

If we accept that *arbitrium* still remains after the Fall, then – argues Bok[4] – neither the second, nor the third *non posse* can be understood in a strict sense, but must be understood in a dispositional sense. From a logical, or ontological, formal, but not material, point of view, this is not impossible. Similarly, the same possibility applies in the case of *adjutorium sine quo non.* The approach from a pastoral and practical

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[1] See PL 44, *De correptione et gratia,* XII, 33-XII, 34, colls. [0936]–[0937].

[2] Professor Bok researched within the CETEDOC programme, *Library of Christian Latin text on CD-Rom,* Brepols publisher, 1991, all the statements of Augustine on *liberum arbitrium* and *voluntas* and concluded that the only place the researchers use in order to show that Augustine denies the existence of the *arbitrium* after the Fall is *Enchiridion ad Laurentium de fide spe et caritate,* IX, 30: "For as a man who kills himself is still alive when he kills himself, but having killed himself is then no longer alive and cannot resuscitate himself after he has destroyed his own life so also sin which arises from the action of the free will turns out to be victor over the will and the free will is destroyed." Augustine, "Enchiridion," 356, in LCC 7, *Confessions and Enchiridion,* Ed. and trans. by Albert Cook Outler (Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster John Knox Press, 2006). However, Augustine's intention here was not to assert that *arbitrium* is lost or does not exist, since the quotation is followed by the description of a state of enslavement, in which *arbitrium* exists precisely because it can only be subjected to practicing evil which it cannot escape by means of its own forces. There are other arguments which cannot be submitted to attention here due to lack of space.

[3] PL 44, *Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum,* I, 5, col. [0552]; "But in defending free will they hasten to confide rather in it for doing righteousness than in God's aid, and to glory every one in himself, and not in the Lord. But who of us will say that by the sin of the first man free will perished from the human race? Through sin freedom indeed perished, but it was that freedom which was in Paradise, to have a full righteousness with immortality; and it is on this account that human nature needs divine grace, since the Lord says, 'If the Son shall make you free, then shall ye be free indeed' – free of course to live well and righteously. For free will in the sinner up to this extent did not perish, – that by it all sin, especially they who sin with delight and with love of sin; what they are pleased to do gives them pleasure." Augustine, *A Treatise Against Two Letters of The Pelagians,* in *St. Augustin Anti-Pelagian Writings*, trans. Peter Holmes and Robert Ernest Wallis (NPNF[1] 5: 279).

[4] See Nico W. den Bok, "Freedom of the will…,", Note 45, 251.

perspective determined Augustine to link *arbitrium* with *bona voluntas* and *mala voluntas,* as they relate to *arbitrium* as to that which God addressed, both before and after the Fall. As in Luther's theology, *arbitrium* cannot be taken out of the equation.

We return now to the relational structure between consent and *voluntas*. Augustine replies to the questions asked by Julian of Eclanum – *Interrogo, ad quem modum liberatur? Ut bonum semper velle cogatur, et malum velle non possit? An ut utrumque possit appetere?* – in the matter of the compulsion of the will: *Si enim cogitur, non vult; et quid absurdius, quam ut dicatur nolens velle quod bonum est?*[1] There is no free will through compulsion, although it is possible to reach the stage of desiring that which one is forced, by external factors, to do through compulsion.

> What we should call psychological compulsions are not compulsions for Augustine. They are simply the individual working out his own nature. Thus in Augustine's view all action is done willingly or unwillingly, and all unwilling action is done after a conscious struggle in which the individual is overborne by external pressure.[2]

In *voluntas*, there are accumulated, like some sort of residue, our past wants, which, one way or another, with consent or without (generally), we have willed. They are like a latent potential of our tendencies. As for sins, it can be said that we will (desire) that what they offer us; they are part of our will. The consent and the choice do not precede our inclinations, but rather follow them. An inclination can oblige *arbitrium* to consent by coming across as a desire or a personal need. Thus it makes that element to appear as if it came from within our "own" will. The inclinations predispose us but our habits compel us.

Repeated consent for good or evil lead us to "enslavement" or "freedom". *Aut enim a iustitia libera est, quando servit peccato, et tunc est mala; aut a peccato libera est, quando servit iustitiae, et tunc est bona.*[3] The nature of *consuetudo* (custom, habit) is determined by repeated choices, which feed the inner (mental) habits, and thus a person becomes predisposed to follow one of the two directions. When an act of will is repeated, it becomes an inclination. The acts of *arbitrium* are qualitatively different from the acquired inclinations of *voluntas*, which results in an asymmetry. This asymmetry does not result from the intrinsic character of the inclinations, which is a creational characteristic of man, but from something outside of the person.

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[1] PL 45, *Contra Julianum opus imperfectum,* I, 101, colls. [1116–1117]; "Jul.: I ask: To what extent is it set free? So that it is always forced to will the good and cannot to will evil? Or so that it can desire both? Aug.: After all, if one is forced, one does not will, and what is more absurd than to say that, while not willing, one wills the good?" St. Augustine, *Answer to Pelagians III: Unfinished Work in Answer to Julian*, Trans., introd., and notes by Roland J. Teske (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press,1999), 123.

[2] John Rist, "Augustine on Free Will and Predestination," *The Journal of Theological Studies* 2 (1969), 422.

[3] PL 44, *De gratia et libero arbitrio,* 15.31, col. [0899]; "The will is always free in us, but it is not always good. For it is either (*a*) free from justice, when it is the servant of sin, and then it is evil; or (*b*) free from sin, when it is the servant of justice, and then it is good. But God's grace is always good." Augustine, *On the Free Choice of the Will, On Grace and Free Choice, and Other Writings*, ed. and trans., Peter King, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 167.

> Liberaliter enim servit qui sui domini voluntatem libenter facit, ac per hoc ad peccandum liber est qui peccati servus est. Unde ad iuste faciendum liber non erit nisi a peccato liberatus esse iustitiae coeperit servus. Ipsa est vera libertas propter recte facti laetitiam, simul et pia servitus propter praecepti obedientiam.[1]

Therefore, Augustine contends that grace is that which makes the difference in this qualitative asymmetry: grace frees, whereas sin enslaves.

Another observation which completes the picture of the relation between *arbitrium* and *voluntas* is that God, in fact, becomes the true mediator between the two. God created all good things, therefore *arbitrium* and *voluntas*, as the manifestation of creational grace, are good. There is however a difference between what was created as a basis for the nature of the person (eg. *arbitrium*, *voluntas*) and that which can be added on top of it. A considerable part of *voluntas* is to be shaped in the course of life, and enters the person's mental existence through the grace of God who reveals that what He created.

However, the importance of *liberum arbitrium* is evidenced through the fact that God cannot overlook it: it is present in all three stages of development of a person – creation, redemption, glorification. This is why *voluntas* is edified by grace only when *arbitrium* consents to a positive action. The dispositions which God develops within man depend on the desires to which man regularly succumbs, and on the inclinations which have become stronger. It is the *arbitrium* that allows the disposition to actualize. But the connection between *arbitrium* and *voluntas* operates through God. Bok[2] contends that there are many dispositions sown within us which come across as our own good inclinations, of which we might be less aware. *Misericordia igitur et iudicium in ipsis voluntatibus facta sunt.*[3] Moreover, he distinguishes between the two types of inclinations, both of which are created by God, and are apportioned to us using different methods. Some of them are given through grace, *before*, and without the consent of *arbitrium*, and others are given *after*, and with the consent of *arbitrium*. The latter are more 'of our own' than the former.

4. *Servum arbitrium* in Martin Luther

If Augustine is renowned for developing the doctrine of the free will, doctrine which he upholds all the way to the end of his life, Martin Luther is evidenced through his doctrine of enslavement of the will. In his theses against Julian of Eclanum, Augustine states: "Sed vos festinatis, et praesumptionem vestram festinando praecipitatis. Hic enim vultis hominem perfici, atque utinam Dei dono, et non libero, vel potius *servo* propriae

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[1] PL 40, *Enchiridion. De fide spe et caritate*, IX, 30, col. [0247]; "He serves freely who freely does the will of his master. Accordingly he who is slave to sin is free to sin. But thereafter he will not be free to do right unless he is delivered from the bondage of sin and begins to be the servant of righteousness. This, then, is true liberty: the joy that comes in doing what is right. At the same time, it is also devoted service in obedience to righteous precept." Augustine, "Enchiridion," in *Confessions and Enchiridion*, 357.

[2] Nico W. den Bok, "Freedom of the will…," 254.

[3] PL 44, *De praedestinatione sanctorum,* 6.11, col. [969] ; Therefore mercy and judgment were manifested in the very wills themselves. Certainly such an election is of grace, not at all of merits. Augustine, "On the Predestination of the Saints" (NPNF[1] 5:504).

voluntatis arbitrio (italics ours R.B.)".[1] Prompted by, and relying on this quote, Luther felt vindicated in terms of his radical understanding of free will as *servum arbitrium.*[2]

The enslavement of the will is included in the doctrine of justification and is connected to other adjacent themes, such as the fallen state of humanity and the inheritance of sin, the goodness of God in his approach to sinners, the covenant of faith and the reconciliation with God. The treatise *De servo arbitrio* (1525) is, in fact, a point by point diatribe in response to Erasmus' optimistic treaties, *De libero arbitrio* (1524), on the state of humanity. Embracing the humanist tradition, Erasmus eulogizes human dignity, defends the ethics of reward and punishment, and defends God when he condemns or rewards the decisions and the actions of which man is responsible. Having reached his theological maturity (after 1519), regarding the issue "freedom of the will", Luther categorically asserts:

> Homo antequam renouetur in nouam creaturam regni spiritus, nihil facit, nihil conatur, quo paretur ad eam renouationem (et) regnum. Deinde recreatus, nihil facit, nihil conatur, quo perseuerut in eo regno, Sed utrunq(ue) facit solus spiritus in nobis, nos sine nobis recreans (et) conseruans recreators ut (et) Iacobus dicit Voluntarie genuit nos uerbo uirtutis suae, ut essemus initium creatura eius (Jak. 1, 18).[3]

4.1. *Servum arbitrium* as the inability to alter the aversion to God

In *De servo arbitrio*, Wicks[4] has identified a number of doctrinal affirmations which address the arbiter of human enslavement, and which we examine in this section. Whilst Erasmus contends that the will is positioned as a possibility of choosing between God

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[1] PL 44, *Contra Iulianum,* II, 8.23, col. [0688]; "But you are in a hurry, and in your hurry you desert your presumption. For you wish man to be perfected here, and would have that indeed by the gift of God not a free gift, but one dependent on the decision of man's own will." Saint Augustine, *Against Julian*, Trans. Matthew A. Schumacher, The Father of The Church, A New Translation vol. 35 (New York: Father of The Church, 1957), 83.

[2] Alister E. McGrath, *Iustitia Dei: A History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification*, Third Edition revised, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 40.

[3] Martin Luther, "De servo arbitrio,"," in *Weimar Ausgabe, D. Martin Luthers Werke,* Kritische Gesamtausgabe, Band 18, Weimar, 1908, [754], 10–15; hereafter *WA= Weimar Ausgabe,* "[2] In just the same way (our answer continues), before man is changed into a new creature of the Kingdom of the Spirit, he does nothing and attempts nothing to prepare himself for this renewal and this Kingdom, and when he has been recreated he does nothing and attempts nothing toward remaining in this Kingdom, but the Spirit alone does both of these things in us, recreating us without us and preserving us without our help in our recreated state, as also James says: "Of his own will he brought us forth by the word of his power, that we might be a beginning of his creature" [James 1, 18]". Martin Luther: General editors Jaroslav Jan Pelikan, Hilton C. Oswald, and Helmut T. Lehmann, *Luther's Works on CD-Rom*, 55 Volume American Edition, copyright 2002. *Luther's Works, Vol. 33: Career of the Reformer III*. The text of Luther's *The Bondage of the Will* is from *Luther and Erasmus: Free Will and Salvation*, Translated and edited by E. Gordon Rupp, Philip S. Watson, A. N. Marlow, and B. Drewery, (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1999) c1972 (Luther's Works 33), S. 33:242–243. Hereafter cited as *LW*.

[4] Jared Wicks, "Justification and Faith in Luther's Theology," *Theological Studies*, Volume 44(1), 1983: 18–20.

and Satan, Luther asserts that the enslaved will is captive to evil and it, in fact, happily chooses to do evil. Man's will manifests a perverse ontological movement, which God tolerates, but He does this only in conformity with this condition of the will, which is one of aversion to God and His law. The inability to dissociate from this aversion to God is a type of enslavement of the will, the captivity of a fallen will, irresistibly overpowered by the lordship of evil. Subject to this immutable state, the will cannot escape except through God working in man.

> Alterum paradoxon, Quicquid fit a nobis, non arbitrio libero sed mera necessitate fieri, breuiter uideamus, ne perniciosissimum dici patiamur. Hic sic dico, Vbi id probatum fueri, extra uires et consilia nostra, in solius opere Dei pendere salutatem nostram, quod infra in corpore disputationis spero me euicturum, nonne clare sequitur, dum Deus opere suo in nobis non adest, omnia esse mala quae facimus (et) nos necessario operari, quae nihil ad salutem ualent? Si enim non nos, sed solus Deus operatur salutem in nobis, nihil ante opus eius operamur salutare, uelimus, nolimus. Necessario uero dico, non *coacte* (italics ours R.B.) sed ut illi dicunt, necessitate immutabilitatis, *non coactionis* (italics ours R.B.) hoc est, homo cum uacat spiritu Dei, non quidem uiolentia, uelut raptus obtorto collo, nolens facit malum quemadmodum fur aut latro nolens ad paenam ducitur, sed *sponte* (et) *libeti uoluntatem* (italics ours R.B.) facit, Verum hanc libentiam seu uoluntatem faciendi, non potest suis uiribus omittere, cohercere aut mutare, sed pergit uolendo (et) lubendo, etiam si ad extra cogatur aliud facere per uim, tamen uoluntas intus manet auersa, (et) indignatur cogenti aut resistenti, Non autem indignaretur, si mutaretur, ac uolens uim sequeretur. Hoc uocamus modo necessitatem immutabilitatis, id est, quod uoluntas sese mutare (et) uertere alio non possit, sed potius irritetur magis ad uolendum, dum ei resistitur, Quod probat eiud indignatio, Hoc non fieret, si esset libera uel haberet liberum arbitrium. […].[1]

[1] *WA* 18, [634], 3–27; "As for the second paradox, that whatever is done by us is done not by free choice but of sheer necessity, let us look briefly at this and not permit it to be labeled most pernicious. What I say here is this: When it has been proved that salvation is beyond our own powers and devices, and depends on the work of God alone (as I hope to prove conclusively below in the main body of this disputation), does it not follow that when God is not present and at work in us everything we do is evil and we necessarily do what is of no avail for salvation? For if it is not we, but only God, who works salvation in us, then before he works we can do nothing of saving significance, whether we wish to or not. Now, by 'necessarily' I do not mean *compulsorily* (italics ours R.B.), but by the necessity of immutability (as they say) and not *of compulsion* (italics ours R.B.). That is to say, when a man is without the Spirit of God he does not do evil against his will, as if he were taken by the scruff of the neck and forced to it, like a thief or robber carried off against his will to punishment, but he does it of his own accord and with a ready will. And this readiness or will to act he cannot by his own powers omit, restrain, or change, but he keeps on willing and being ready; and even if he is compelled by external force to do something different, yet the will within him remains averse and he is resentful at whatever compels or resists it. He would not be resentful, however, if it were changed and he willingly submitted to the compulsion. This is what we call the necessity of immutability: It means that the will cannot change itself and turn in a different direction, but is rather the more provoked into willing by being resisted, as its resentment shows. This would not happen if it were free or had free choice." *LW* 33, S. 33:64.

4.2. *Servum arbitrium* reluctant to receive the grace of God

The stress that Luther places on the enslavement of the will is augmented by the acknowledgement of its residual incapacity of acceding to the grace of God. The will does not have a positive "ontological status", hence its response to grace is an obstinate opposition of exclusion by consent. Thus, there is a need for an externally sourced regenerate will, which is based on such dynamics that do not allow for synergism: there is no cooperation between man's will and the Spirit of God. The irresistible nature of the Spirit is so powerful that it overwhelms the determination of the will.

In his dispute with Erasmus, Luther reproaches him, saying that he persistently avoids the main problem – the evidence of the enslavement of the will – and that he attempts to demonstrate the freedom of the will using scriptures which, correctly interpreted, that is, through the necessity of immutability, prove the opposite – the enslavement of the will. Such is the case with *Proverbs* 21, 1: *Ipsi uidetur urgere, Cor regis in manu Domini, cuocunq(ue) uoluerit, inclinat illud*[1]. Erasmus' argument is that when God *directs* the heart, He does not constrain it. On the other hand, Luther argues that it is not about *coactione*, but rather about the necessity of immutability, which he had previously explained.

> Ea significatur per inclinationem Dei, quae non est res tam stertens (et) pigra, ut fingit Diatribe, Sed este auctosissima illa operatio Dei, quam uitare (et) mutare non possit, sed qua talle uele habet necessario, quale illi Deus dedit (et) quale *rapit suo motu* (italics ours R.B.), ut dixi supra.[2]

This enslavement which is involved in the submission to God is to be understood as the passivity of the will, which is utterly enchanted and pulled by the rapturous force of the Spirit of God, who, to this end, uses the power of delight. *The necessity of immutability* which operates through the power of God nevertheless does not constrain but engages the will in a spontaneous search for good. The end result of this is the desire and action of the will out of its own consent.

> Rursus et extera parte. Si Deus in nobis operatur, mutata (et) blande assibilata per spiritum Dei uouluntas, iterum mera lube(n)tia et pronitate ac sponte sua uult (et) facit, non coacte, ut nullis contrarijs mutare in alliud possit ne portis quide(m) inferi uinci aut cogi, sed pergit uolendo et lubendo (et) amando bonum, sicut antea uoluuit (et) lubuit (et) amauit malum. […] ut nec hic sit ulla libertas uet liberum arbitrium, alio sese uertendi, aut aliud uolendi, donec durat spiritus (et) gratia Dei in homine.[3]

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[1] The version used by Luther is slightly different from *The Vulgate* which renders *Proverbs* 21,1: *sicut divisiones aquarum ita cor regis in manu Domini quocumque voluerit inclinabit illud;* "The king's heart is a stream of water in the hand of the LORD; he turns it wherever he will." (Revised Standard Version, 1952).

[2] *WA* 18, [747], 23-27; "[...] It is the latter (i.e. the necessity of immutability) that is signified by God's 'turning', which is not such a snoring, indolent thing as Diatribe imagines, but is that most active working of God which a man cannot avoid or alter, but under which he necessarily has the sort of will that God has given him, and that God carries along *by his own momentum* (italics ours R.B.), as I have said above." *LW* 33, S. 33:233

[3] *WA* 18, [634], 25–635, 33; "By contrast, if God works in us, the will is changed, and being gently breathed upon by the Spirit of God, it again wills and acts from pure willingness and

4.3. *Servum arbitrium* and the governing of the universe

The most obvious and inevitably acute form of enslavement of the will is the cosmic one, which derives from the free will of God's sovereignty over the whole universe. God has an infallible, eternal and immutable will, and this is utterly consonant with His foreknowledge of all things and with the fulfilment of His plan. Luther agrees with Erasmus in that the will of God must be understood as immutable, but disagrees with him when he excludes the possibility that the foreknowledge of God may be understood as immutable. On the contrary, Luther argues that there is an intrinsic and inherent relation between the foreknowledge, the will and the immutability of God:

> Scilicet uoluntatem immutabilitem Dei praedicas esse discendam, immutabilitem eius uero praescientiam nosse uetas, An tu credis, quod nolens praesciat, aut ignarus uelit? Si uolens praescit, aeterna est (et) immobilis ‹quia natura› uoluntas, si praesciens uult, aeterna est (et) immobilis ‹quia natura› scientia.[1]

The sovereignty of God is an efficient cause which, in terms of the fulfilment of His eternal purposes, cannot be hindered. Everything that happens does so according to His plan.

> Ex quo sequitur irrefragabiliter, omnia quae facimus, Omina quae fiunt, (et) si nobis uidentur mutabiliter (et) contingenter fieri, reuera tamen, fiunt necessario (et) immutabiliter, si Dei uoluntatem spectes. Voluntas enim Dei efficax est, quae impediri non potest, cum sit naturalis potentia Dei, Deinde sapiens, ut falli non possit (...).[2]

These assertions, corroborated with the passivity of the will of man, under the influence of God's will, lead, as far as the elect are concerned, to the impossibility of participating in any way in God's enterprise of governing the world. This interpretation of reality leads to a position of passivity regarding not only the "things above" (that which regards the relationship with God), as Luther labels them, but also regarding the "earthly things". According to Luther, faith in God's providence, trusting that God's promises will be fulfilled, means to allow God to be God.

> Cum enim promittit, certum oportet te esse, quod sciat, possit (et) uelit praestare, quod promittit, Aliuoqui eum non ueracem, nec fidelem aestimabis, quae est

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inclination and of its own accord, not from compulsion, so that it cannot be turned another way by any opposition, nor be overcome or compelled even by the gates of hell, but it goes on willing and delighting in and loving the good, just as before it willed and delighted in and loved evil. […] So not even here is there any free choice, or freedom to turn oneself in another direction or will something different, so long as the Spirit and grace of God remain in a man." *LW* 33, S. 33:65

[1] *WA* 18, [615], 35; "Do you, then, believe that he foreknows without willing or wills without knowing? If he foreknows as he wills, then his will is eternal and unchanging (because his nature is so), and if he wills as he foreknows, then his knowledge is eternal and unchanging (because his nature is so)." *LW* 33, S. 33:37

[2] *WA* 18, [616], 2–7; "From this it follows irrefutably that everything we do, everything that happens, even if it seems to us to happen mutably and contingently, happens in fact nonetheless necessarily and immutably, if you have regard to the will of God. For the will of God is effectual and cannot be hindered, since it is the power of the divine nature itself; moreover it is wise, so that it cannot be deceived." *LW* 33, S. 33:37–38.

> incredulitas (et) summa impietas (et) negatio Dei altissimi. At quo mod certus (et) securus eris? nisi scieri illum, certo (et) infallibiliter (et) immutabiliter, ac necessario scire (et) uelle (et) facturum esse, quod promittit. Neq(ue) solum certos oportet nos esse, Deum necessario (et) immutabiliter uelle (et) facturum sed etiam gloriari in hoc ipso, ut Paulus Rom. 3. Esto autem Deus uerax, omnis homo mendax.[1]

Related to this theory of the enslavement of the will is the adjacent argument that all things are subject to God's "hidden" foreordained plans, according to which all that He had planned He will accomplish. Furthermore, God's plans and reasons are too high for us to understand, and therefore we ought not to investigate them. Particularly, we are not to assume the right to question the reasons why God's transforming grace leans towards some but not towards others. The 'solution' to this mystery is illustrated through the metaphor of the three lights:

> Tria mihi lumina pone, lumen naturae, lumen gratiae, lumen gloriae, ut habet uulgata (et) bona distinctio. In lumine naturae est insolubile, hoc esse iustum, quod bonus affiligatur (et) malus bene habeat, At hoc dissoluit lumen gratiae. In lumine gratiae est insolubile, quomodo Deus damnet eum, qui non potest uliis suis uiribus aliud facere, quam peccare (et) reus esse, Hic tam lumen naturae quam lumen gratiae dictant, culpam esse, non miseri hominis, sed iniqui Dei, nec enim aliud iudicare possunt de Deo, qui hominem impium gratis sine meritis coronat, (et) alium non coronat, sed damnat, forte minus ule saltem, non magis impium. At lumen gloriae aliud dictat, (et) Deum, cuius modo est iudicium incomprehensibilis iustitiae, tunc ostendet esse iustissimae (et) manifestissimae iustitiae tantum, ut interim id credamus, moniti (et) confirmati exemplo luminis gratiae, quod simile miraculum in naturali lumine implet.[2]

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[1] *WA* 18, [618], 14–21; "For when he promises anything, you ought to be certain that he knows and is able and willing to perform what he promises; otherwise, you will regard him as neither truthful nor faithful, and that is impiety and a denial of the Most High God. But how will you be certain and sure unless you know that he knows and wills and will do what he promises, certainly, infallibly, immutably, and necessarily? And we ought not only to be certain that God wills and will act necessarily and immutably, but also to glory in this fact; as Paul says in Romans 3[:4]: 'Let God be true though every man be false' ..." *LW* 33, S. 33:42

[2] *WA* 18, [785], 27–38; "Let us take it that there are three lights – the light of nature, the light of grace, and the light of glory, to use the common and valid distinction. By the light of nature it is an insoluble problem how it can be just that a good man should suffer and a bad man prosper; but this problem is solved by the light of grace. By the light of grace it is an insoluble problem how God can damn one who is unable by any power of his own to do anything but sin and be guilty. Here both the light of nature and the light of grace tell us that it is not the fault of the unhappy man, but of an unjust God; for they cannot judge otherwise of a God who crowns one ungodly man freely and apart from merits, yet damns another who may well be less, or at least not more, ungodly. But the light of glory tells us differently, and it will show us hereafter that the God whose judgment here is one of incomprehensible righteousness is a God of most perfect and manifest righteousness. In the meantime, we can only *believe* this, being admonished and confirmed by the example of the light of grace, which performs a similar miracle in relation to the light of nature." *LW* 33, S. 33:292-293

5. Augustine and Martin Luther on the issue of *arbitrium*

If Augustine was preoccupied with the question of will from both philosophical and theological perspectives, in Luther, *arbitrium* is mainly circumscribed to the theological grounds, particularly the concept of justification. Indeed, there are similitudes between Luther and Saint Augustine, but, because they start off from different anthropological presuppositions, they differ in terms of their understanding of faith and sin.

One of the major implications is that in Luther the doctrine of justification is based on *servum arbitrium* (an enslaved will), whilst in Augustine, the basis is *liberum arbitrium captivatum*, but which, through the action of *gratia sanas*, becomes a *liberum arbitrium liberatum*. This leads to another adjacent implication, namely that, after justification, Luther does not seem to depict the liberation of *servum arbitrium*.[1] "At one significant point he went beyond Augustine, whom he most often correctly cited against Erasmus: the bondage of the will is no longer as for Augustine and the entire tradition merely a result of the fall. It results from human creatureliness."[2] This is perhaps the fundamental difference from which one could start and to where one could possibly return. And if the *servum* originates from nature, according to Luther, then God is the author of sin. This is the opposite of Augustine's correct assertion[3] that man is the author of sin. Furthermore, Luther's formulation of the doctrine of double predestination is the inevitable consequence of his theological system-construct. Augustine was reluctant to plainly admit this point of view; however this assertion is a logical and implicit conclusion of the analysis of his works.

We said at the beginning that Augustine and Luther are positioned within the theological theory of will. As far as Luther is concerned, this is evidenced through his doctrines of the sovereignty of God's grace, the double predestination, and especially the concept of a re-created will of the believer, through which it is in fact God that wills inside the person. Augustine's theological orientation is firstly found in his explanation of the

[1] Alister McGrath, *Iustitia Dei,* 232.

[2] Bernhard Lohse, *Martin Luther's Theology. Its Historical and Systematic Development,* trans. Roy A. Harrisville (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1999), 167.

[3] Either we talk about the Eastern tradition, dominated by the Capadocians, in which the anthropology starts from Christology (named *iconic anthropology*) and where sin is an "accident" that has only "weakened" the image of man made in resemblance to God, or we talk about the Augustinian tradition, in which sin is seen as radically separating from God, the responsibility for sin is identified in man in both traditions. Augustine succeeds in articulating a theology on the relationship sin – free will – grace which will be taken over to a great extent by the Council of Orange (529), theology whose decisive theses enjoyed the official acceptance of the Western tradition in the form of a "moderate" Augustinianism. In fact, Augustine institutes a tradition in Paulinic line in the way sin is seen, which will be continued by Anselm of Canterbury (1033–1109), Bernard of Clairvaux (1091–1153), Peter the Lombard (1096–1164), Bonaventure (1217–1274), Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), Reformers, and will be reaffirmed by the Council of Trident (1545–1563). Most of the time Luther generally integrates himself in this tradition, but the promotion of a necesitarian view on *servum arbitrium* with shades of *hard determinism* causes sideslips from the correct line, with consequences in the sin – free will relationship. For more detailes see Harry J. McSorley, *Luther: Right or Wrong? An Ecumenical-Theological Study of Luther's Major Work The Bondage of the Will* (New York, NY: Newman Press / Augsburg Publishing House, 1969), 111–128, 329–353.

cause of the existence of evil and sin right inside of man's will (e.g. *De libero arbitrio*), in spite of its liberty to choose. This is why the will must be renewed and redirected towards the search for Good. Then man's will becomes the stage on which the drama of God's grace must be played (e.g. *Confessiones*). In the case of Augustine, it can also be argued that salvation is initiated by the sovereignty of God's grace, as the works of both Luther and Augustine generally assert that God's will precedes the will of man.

Conclusions

This study focused on the concept of will in Saint Augustine and Martin Luther. In Augustine's case, we concentrated on the relation between *arbitrium* and *voluntas*, in which *arbitrium* is the faculty of reasoning and free consent, and *voluntas* is portrayed as a complex of inclinations and dispositions.

We have established that both authors belong to the theological theory of will, according to which it is God's will that initiates and moulds the analytical process of the will of man. In both cases, the theory was validated particularly through the concept of sovereignty of grace. We have critically analyzed the discontinuity-continuity controversy in Augustine, and have accepted the outcome of 'continuous???? discontinuity', which means that we have agreed that the Hipponite developed and evolved. In particular, with regard to the freedom of the will and grace, Augustine's reflections have been conditioned by his own inner struggles as well as the fight against the heretics, which led to new perspectives and approaches, and a continuous adaptation of the theological language and grammar.

As for the relation between *arbitrium* and *voluntas*, we dipped into the period before Augustine and have found that *voluntas* is associated with ο `ρμη, which means *impulse*, *desire* to perform an action. In general we have observed that there are three types of connotations: the dispositional connotation, the inclinational connotation and the volitional connotation. Augustine combines the significance of the mental attitude, a practical inclination (disposition), a profound desire, with the significance of volition. Thus, in his works, *voluntas* usually has a philosophical meaning, but can also have a practical meaning, which is associated with *liberum arbitrium*.

The first observation is that, due to the element *bona voluntas*, *arbitrium* had been capable of accepting the primordial gift from God. The persistence of *arbitrium* after the Fall leads to the conclusion that the three *non posse*, as well as the two *adjutorium*, must not necessarily be understood strictly, but dispositionally.

The second observation is that the habits that develop in a person can make that person a slave of grace or a slave of sin. The consent and the choice do not precede the acquired dispositions, but follow them. A disposition can force the *arbitrium* to consent through the fact that, assuming the desire or a need of a person, makes that element look as if it was coming from one's "own" will.

The third observation asserts that the connection between *arbitrium* and *voluntas* operates through God. The dispositions which God creates in man depend on the volitions toward which man turns more often, thus making the inclinations stronger.

As far as Luther is concerned, we have found in his treatise, *De servo arbitrio*, three types of enslavement of the will, which are progressively linked to each other: firstly, an enslavement through the impossibility of renouncing rebellion against God,

then an enslavement through the impossibility of responding to the grace of God, and lastly, a will subject to the sovereignty of God's government of the universe. These are linked to the sovereignty of double predestination, in which grace is bestowed only upon those who are chosen.

The most significant difference between Luther and Augustine is on matters of anthropology. In Luther's thought the enslavement of the will is no longer simply the consequence of the Fall as in Augustine and the tradition,[1] but rather the result of the state of human creation (being).

[1] See Note 4, page 424.