

**Textual Criticism, Edition History, Interpretation:
Philological and Hermeneutical Problems of Historical-Critical
and Life-Work Editions^{*}**

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Abstract: In the case of text editions, or critical editions of texts handed down by classical authors, philology seems to precede, and thus to have a priority over, hermeneutics. In the traditional (positivistic) view, first comes the reconstruction of texts through critical examination of the sources and the different text variants in order to establish an authentic, reliable, possibly canonical version; then follows, in a second step, the interpretation of the texts thus established. Interpretation is supposed to need something as a solid „Textgrundlage“ so as to set itself into motion; it is thus seen to be parasitic upon pre-given philological work. Although this description of the way scholarly work is usually done in the humanities may be not wholly untrue, more often than not it does not hold, for the establishing and editing of texts is itself not something performed in a space entirely exempt from, and free of, pre-understanding and interpretation. The following paper illustrates this thesis through reference to, and case studies of, the edition history of such eminent authors as Hegel, Kant, Aristotle and Heidegger.

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According to the traditional (positivist) approach, any work in the humanities is articulated in two steps, one preceding the other. In the first step we establish the text, that is, we critically compare the preserved or discovered textual variants for the purpose of creating or reconstructing a possibly final, canonical variant, and this is supposed to be the task of philology. The second step is interpretation (hermeneutics), that is, the interpretation from various perspectives of the textual variant established as a result of philological work.¹ In this approach philology precedes hermeneutics and is ostensibly

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¹ Cf. Hans-Georg Gadamer, „Philosophie und Philologie. Über von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf,“ in Idem, *Griechische Philosophie II, Gesammelte Werke*, vol. 6 (Tübingen: Mohr, 1985), 271–277, 276. He says that during his university years, the following was customary on philology seminars: „Da hatte man erst den Text herzustellen (und sogar zu übersetzen), und dann hatte man

separated from it; and interpretation is built upon the results of philology. This fair (ideal-typical) scheme might work indeed in some – fortunate – cases; however, during the redaction process of (historical-critical) life-work editions of important thinkers it is often doomed to failure. For, more often than not, the establishment of the ultimate text version is itself not something happening in a laboratory environment, in a space exempt from interpretation. In Hegel's case, for instance, it seems that the situation was exactly the opposite: according to the main streamline of present-day Hegel-research Hegel's disciples edited and published Hegel's texts on the basis of their image (interpretation) of Hegel. In what follows, I wish to analyze the relation of textual criticism, interpretation, and editing history by way of case studies, starting from the conclusions drawn from, of all the important life-work editions, primarily Hegel's and Heidegger's, but with an eye also to Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Gadamer.

I.

I.1. As the new life-work editions of the prominent figures of German idealism began to gain ever more definite shape as a research project after WWII, the discussions regarding the necessity of the new editions obviously appeared embedded into the critical reflections on edition history. In Hegel's case, this critical view on his edition history offered approximately the following summary picture.¹

Hegel published only a small number of works in his lifetime. Apart from some lesser writings, reviews published in magazines, he only had two substantial, elaborated works published in his lifetime, which could be regarded as books in an appropriate sense: the *Phenomenology* and the *Logic*. The *Encyclopedia* and the *Philosophy of Right* are only “grounding lines”, “sketches”, which he annexed to his lectures for his students; however, he published not even similar abstracts for his other lectures (philosophy of

ihn zu interpretieren.” From his own hermeneutical viewpoint, Gadamer does not hesitate to add how naïve, how doubtful this description is: “Wie man einen Text herstellen und gar übersetzen soll, bevor alle Künste der Interpretation das Ihre getan haben, wurde dabei nicht gefragt. Das war natürlich eine didaktische Vereinfachung, die den wahren Prozeß des Verstehens nicht abbildet. Daß man einen Text erst herstellen kann, wenn man ihn verstanden hat, ist offenkundig. So lernten wir [...], wie sehr Interpretation nicht nur der zentrale Form des Weltzugangs, sondern auch die des Zugangs zu den Texten der Überlieferung ist. Wir befinden uns nie auf einem Punkte der bloßen Aufnahme des fraglos gegebenen Textes [...]. [...] Es ist nicht so, als ob der Text für uns eine fraglose Vorgegebenheit wäre und die Interpretation eine nachträglich engestellte Prozedur, die man an dem Texte vornimmt.” Gadamer's such complementary remarks, and especially the two quoted sentences, are the fundamental formulations of exactly the thesis of this present study.

¹ For what follows, see: Lothar Wigger, “75 Jahre kritische Hegel-Ausgaben: Zu Geschichte und Stand der Hegel-Edition,” *Pädagogische Rundschau* 1 (1987): 101–116, and also: Christoph Hefnerich, *G. W. Fr. Hegel* (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1979), 217–228. I have dealt in more detail with the philological and hermeneutic problems of the Hegel-edition (primarily with reference to his *Aesthetics*) in the philological attachment of my study “»Az eszme érzéki ragyogása«: Esztétika, metafizika, hermeneutika (Gadamer és Hegel)” (»The perceptual brightness of the idea«: Aesthetics, metaphysics, hermeneutics [Gadamer and Hegel]), in *Hermeneutika, esztétika, irodalomelmélet* (Hermeneutics, aesthetics, literary theory), eds. István Fehér M. and Ernő Kulcsár Szabó (Budapest: Osiris, 2004), 264–332. The quoted place on pages 294–326. In the followings I shall make use of certain ideas used in this attachment.

history, aesthetics, history of religion, history of philosophy). His works were prepared for publication in twenty-one volumes with the hard work of a group of his students between 1832 and 1845. (*Vollständige Ausgabe durch einen Verein von Freunden des Verewigten* [Complete edition published by the Association of the Friends of the Deceased], an edition usually referred to in scholarship as *Freundesvereinsausgabe*, hence the abbreviation I shall use hereinafter: FVA). Even today, this continues to appear like a remarkable accomplishment, which has decisively determined the Hegel-image of subsequent ages; however, in the words of the eminent Hegel-scholar, Friedhelm Nicolin, the first head of the Hegel Archives founded in 1958, this edition contained neither the “complete”, nor the “real” Hegel.¹ In the words of a researcher thirty years later, “the *reception history* of Hegelian philosophy has been influenced by the *edition policy* of the editors of his works to a greater extent than that of almost every other philosopher.”² The disciples totally neglected Hegel’s evolution; they swept aside the early sketches and manuscripts preserved by the philosopher himself (part of them has been lost indeed ever since); by contrast, they published the *Encyclopedia* and the *Philosophy of Right*, representative for the Berlin period, in a considerably extended version. They compiled supplements taken from the most various places with the works published by Hegel himself, and composed the Berlin lectures preserved in his legacy as compact works, based on compilations of lecture manuscripts from various years, and of author’s and students’ notes –reference to the sources appeared only in the introduction of the individual volumes, with no further remarks made in the body of the text. By this edition technique, highly questionable from a contemporary scholarly viewpoint, which had made the differences in Hegel’s development almost unrecognizable, they wished to suggest a well-defined Hegel-image: they defended and perpetuated Hegel, in harmony with their scientific and cultural political views, as the philosopher of the system, and the system itself as a closed and undefeatable fortress.³ It is thus becoming increasingly difficult to avoid the conclusion: what we know as the Hegelian system is in fact the work not of Hegel himself but of his *disciples*; “a document of Hegelianism, of the Hegel-school.”⁴

After many decades of forgetting and rejection, the interest in Hegel only gained new impetus around the turn of the century; Wilhelm Dilthey formulated then the need for an *entwicklungsgeschichtlich* study of Hegelian philosophy, and Hermann Nohl published the preserved writings of the young Hegel in 1907 on Dilthey’s advice. The so-called anniversary edition published by Hermann Glockner in the 1930s contained emendations compared to the original, however, it did not eliminate its fundamental shortcomings. The new critical edition started by Georg Lasson and continued through the 1930s by Johannes Hoffmeister, after several decades of hard work and repeated changes in its conception, remained unfinished in the mid-1950s.

¹ Friedhelm Nicolin, “Probleme und Stand der Hegel-Edition,” *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* 1 (1957): 117–129, 118.

² Lothar Wigger, “75 Jahre kritische Hegel-Ausgaben: Zu Geschichte und Stand der Hegel-Edition,” *Pädagogische Rundschau* 1 (1987): 102. (My emphasis, I. F. M.)

³ Friedhelm Nicolin, “Probleme und Stand der Hegel-Edition,” *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* 1 (1957): 116–129, 118.

⁴ Nicolin, “Probleme und Stand der Hegel-Edition,” 118. (“Dokument des Hegelianismus, der Hegelschule”)

It had thus become clear that even the most respectful efforts of individual researchers were not sufficient to cope with the task of editing Hegel's works. The German Research Foundation (DFG) established a committee in 1957 for the historical critical edition of Hegel's works, and in 1958 the Hegel Archives were founded in Bonn for this purpose, moving to Bochum a decade later, where it has been functioning ever since as an independent institution of the Ruhr University in Bochum, under the patronage of the North Rhine–Westphalia Academy of Sciences. The new, major Hegel-edition, designed for around forty volumes started at the end of the 1960s. The first series, consisting of twenty-two volumes, containing the works published in Hegel's lifetime and his legacy, manuscripts and sketches, approaches its end after forty years of editorial work (only three more volumes awaiting publication), but the publication of the second series, presenting Hegel's university lectures, is repeatedly delayed; the first volume of this series was only published in 2008. (*Gesammelte Werke*, vol. 25, 1. *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie des subjektiven Geistes*. Teilband 1; vol. 25,2 follows in 2012.)

The new academic edition understands itself as a historical-critical edition, but its title is more modest: *Gesammelte Werke* (taking this into account, it will not be referred to with the abbreviation HKA [*Historisch-kritische Ausgabe*], but GW); its purpose is to present Hegel's development on the basis of the available sources, continuously collected by the Archives, and it is intended to be done using the original sources, preceding the disciples' edition. At any rate, the condition of the textual basis of Hegel's lectures and the theoretical difficulties related to an adequate scholarly edition led to the decision that these lectures must be published first as a "test-edition", in a series entitled *Vorlesungen*, outside of the critical edition (indeed, more than fifteen volumes were published in this series during the last twenty-five years). Then, only following the experiences gained during the preparation of this "test-edition", and its echoes in the scholarship, would these texts be published in approximately ten volumes in the framework of the second series of the critical edition. The devious way of the "test-edition" explains the fact that the first volume of the second series was published only as late as 2008.¹

Reaching behind the disciples' Hegel edition means that the manuscripts, notes, lecture notes, etc. which stood at the basis of the compilations, as far as they can still be found, will be processed and edited independently. However, many of these sources have since been lost. The notes which the Hegel-students used to compile the volumes of the lectures not prepared for print by Hegel are no longer extant for their most part, therefore it is impossible to supervise these editions from a textual-critical point of view, or to come up with a new, alternative textual-critical edition. It is, of course, legitimate to criticize the principle of the edition – the fact of compilation –, and indeed, contemporary philology is consistently reluctant to follow it.

¹ Although the summaries written in the 1970s and 1980s expected the forty-volume series to be ended shortly after the turn of the millennium. See Wolfhart Henckmann, "Fichte – Schelling – Hegel," *Buchstabe und Geist. Zur Überlieferung und Edition philosophischer Texte*, eds. Walter Jaeschke, Wilhelm G. Jacobs und Hermann Krings (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1987), 83–115: 109, and Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert, "Hegel Archiv und Hegel Ausgabe," *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* 4 (1976): 609–618, 610.

The mentioned scarcity of the original Hegelian manuscripts which once were at the basis of the FVA, and the rejection of the method of compilation resulted in a new, individual interest in the lectures of different years, the preserved Hegelian manuscripts and the students' notes about the lectures (*Mitschriften, Nachschriften*). The Hegel Archives have been collecting all these documents systematically: both the Hegel-manuscripts and the lecture notes. As for these latter ones, around 130 *Nachschriften* were discovered in various sources before the 1990s, and the Archives managed to acquire ninety of these.¹

I.2. This short summary naturally communicates the self-image, the retrospective self-interpretation of the Hegel Archives. At a distance of four decades, and considering the evolution of the Hegeledition ever since, the following remarks may be appropriate. It may indeed be true that the disciples' Hegel-edition "contained neither the »complete« Hegel, nor the »real« Hegel", however, it is highly doubtful whether either of the two could be a real goal to achieve at all. Apart from the "complete" Hegel, what would a "real" Hegel consist of? "What we know today as the Hegelian system" may well be "the work of the disciples [...], a »document of the Hegel-school«"; still, it is questionable, after forty years of work in the Archives, whether this present age could come up with anything better, whether it could present an alternative Hegeledition. This recognition is gradually becoming conscious in the Hegel Archives, and it may not be merely incidental that the optimistic and self-assured remarks about the »complete« or the »real« Hegel no longer tend to appear these days. And as for the criticism of the disciples' Hegel-edition: it is one thing to criticize a compilation because it is one, and it is quite another to claim to be able to put it aside and go back to the original sources; and it is again another thing to formulate the suspicion that the editors inserted their own ideas not pertaining to the compiled parts, that the preparation for printing is a highly biased transcription.

The history, difficulties, and present state of the edition of Hegel's life-work could be detailed and deepened in several other respects – to some of them I shall return later on – but from the perspective of this study the above considerations are a sufficient basis for some conclusions. Our initial thesis was the following: the philological work of preparation for print, the establishment of the text is not a work done in a laboratory environment as a space void of interpretation, and hopefully the summary presented above was an adequate illustration of this fact. The very expression of "*edition policy*" – sounding even quite astounding, or at least unusual in Hungarian – refers to preliminary interpretations, well determined preconceptions. One may conclude: it was not only the Hegel-edition that formed the Hegel-image, but also the other way round: the Hegel-edition itself was made on the basis of a particular image of Hegel; what is more, this image not only reclined on preconceptions, but it implied definite cultural political goals and expectations connected to the future. It was not only a space not at all void of interpretation where the philological work of the disciples took place, but also one not at all void of "cultural policy" either.

¹ See Wolfgang Bonsiepen, "Berichten über Nachschriften zu Hegels Vorlesungen. Einleitung," *Hegel-Studien* 26/1 (1991): 11–15, 11. Cf. also Otto Pöggeler, "Nachschriften von Hegels Vorlesungen," *Hegel-Studien* 26/2 (1991): 122f.

I. 3. The review of the historical circumstances and the particular constellation of these circumstances – still not completely revealed – would not only exceed the scope of this paper (and the competence and field of research of its author), but it would not be outstandingly relevant from the point of view of the theoretical question discussed here. However, it will not be superfluous to summarize these at least as an enumeration. Besides the disciples' sense of mission almost reaching the level of salvation history that the sudden end of Hegel's life should be linked with the beginning of his immortality in the realm of thoughts in order to secure (in a different, more down-to-earth formulation) Hegel's fame and influence amongst the cultural political battles of Berlin¹ – in his funeral speech uttered at the University of Berlin the Hegel-disciple Rector Marheineke compared Hegel to Christ the Saviour, who returns as a spirit to his community after his death and who gained eternal life and resurrection by his death, while Friedrich Förster said in his speech at the grave: "To safekeep, promote, and consolidate his teachings: let this be our mission from now on"² – in addition to this, the ambition of the family and mainly Hegel's widow, Marie Hegel, to perpetuate and secure – in an expressly conservative spirit – the fame of her deceased husband as well as (last but not least) to strengthen the family's financial situation and support her sister-in-law, played an equally important role. Hegel's widow took in her hands the issue of the edition without any further delay; only a few days after Hegel's death the "Association of the Friends" was created, and less than a week later the Berlin-based Duncker Publishing House already presented a favourable offer to the widow for the publication of Hegel's works (the contract stipulated that the royalties were all to go to the family, the disciples

¹ On the Prussian cultural political ambitions of the 1810s and 1820s, and on the background of Hegel's appointment in Berlin, see *Kunsterfahrung und Kulturpolitik im Berlin Hegels. Hegel-Studien*, vol. XXII. (here in particular H. Lübke, "Deutscher Idealismus als Philosophie preussischer Kulturpolitik," 3–27 and W. Jaeschke, "Politik, Kultur und Philosophie in Preußen," 28–48), as well as *Hegel in Berlin. Preußische Kulturpolitik und idealistische Ästhetik*, ed. O. Pöggeler et al. (Wiesbaden: Reichert, 1981), in particular W. Jaeschke and K. R. Meist, "Von Humboldt zu Altenstein," 29–39.

² Philipp Konrad Marheineke, "Trauerrede. Worte der Liebe und Ehre, vor der Leichenbegleitung des Herrn Professor Hegel, im großen Hörsaal der Universität, am 16. November [1831] gesprochen," *Hegel in Berichten seiner Zeitgenossen*, ed. Günter Nicolini, Philosophische Bibliothek 245 (Hamburg: Meiner, 1970), 474f; Friedrich Förster, "Grabrede. An dem Grabe unseres Freundes und Lehrers, des in Gott ruhenden Königlichen Professors und Doktors der Philosophie Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel am 16. November [1831] im Namen seiner Schüler und Freunde," *ibid.*, 475–478: 477. "He was our helper, our savior, and our liberator [...] To safekeep, promote, and consolidate his teachings: let this be our mission from now on. Although no Petrus will raise in our circle who might dare call himself his place-holder, but his realm, the realm of thought, although amongst attacks, but without opposition will always and eternally be spreading." [Ja, er war uns ein Helfer, Erretter und Befreier aus jeder Not und Bedrängnis [...] Seine Lehre zu bewahren, zu verkündigen, zu befestigen, sei fortan unser Beruf. Zwar wird kein Petrus aufstehen, welcher die Anmaßung hätte, sich seinen Statthalter zu nennen, aber sein Reich, das Reich des Gedankens, wird sich fort und fort nicht ohne Anfechtung, aber ohne Widerstand ausbreiten.]

³ Christoph Jamme, "Editionspolitik. Zur 'Freundesvereinsausgabe' der Werke G.W.F. Hegels," *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* 1 (1984): 83–99, 85f. For the followings, *ibid.*

preparing the volumes for print did their work as an honorary duty.)³ The family or the widow appointed the students for the preparation and edition of the individual volumes, and lent them the manuscripts from the family archives. At the same time, the widow carefully selected these manuscripts; especially in the case of miscellaneous writings, it was necessary – she wrote to her sister-in-law in those days – for her to help choose which of these writings should reach the world in Hegel’s spirit, and which not. To quickly satisfy the existing interest was said to be a primary task; the first work to appear was – not incidentally – the philosophy of religion, already the following year, in 1832, in two volumes, nearly one thousand pages; Marheineke, who edited the volume, was Rector of Berlin University at that time, he may scarcely have had appropriate leisure for a very thorough work.

That the FVA itself was edited on the basis of a well-defined Hegel-image is apparent already from the fact that the lectures making up the greatest part of the edition were edited as composing a closed system – or rather parts of a system. The manuscripts of the young Hegel were almost entirely left out, the only writings included in the edition were those which counted as parts of the way leading to the system. In contrast to these, the Berlin lectures, and especially the encyclopaedic system appeared in a strongly extended form, pumped up with various completions and amendments. The timelessness of the closed – and final – system dominated the image, but this system itself was not elaborated and published by Hegel – it was in fact the work or “document” of the Hegel-school. In any case, it was this edition which laid the basis of Hegel’s fame and the centuries-long influence of his philosophy.

In addition to the variety of editorial intentions, the various Hegel-editions also mirror the historically changing self-understanding of philosophy, Lothar Wigger writes.¹ It may hardly be too risky or daring a statement that the self-understanding of Hegel’s philosophy must have been a standard in Hegel’s time and especially in the circle of his disciples. At any rate, there is an interesting example – to the best of my knowledge, previously unexploited – which shows that the disciples might have followed themselves the spirit of Hegelian philosophy when editing the FVA. In the chapter on Schelling of Hegel’s history of philosophy there are some significant judgments–opinions which are not the least unknown, but much quoted and commented on in different contexts. “Schelling made his philosophical development in front of the public. The row of his philosophical writings is also the history of his own philosophical development. [...] [This row] does not contain a sequence of the elaborated partial fields of philosophy in their succession, but a sequence of its own degrees of development. If one asked for an ultimate writing which would contain the most definitive elaboration of his philosophy, there would be none to point to. [...] In his later works he always started from the beginning (he never created a fully elaborated whole) [...] Therefore it is not advisable to go into details about that which is called Schellingian *philosophy* [...] Because this philosophy is not yet an organically articulated scientific whole [...] This philosophy is still developing, it has not yet offered any ripe fruit [...].”²

¹ Lothar Wigger, “75 Jahre kritische Hegel-Ausgaben: Zu Geschichte und Stand der Hegel-Edition,” *Pädagogische Rundschau* 1 (1987): 101.

² G. W. F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie III*. In Hegel, *Werke in zwanzig Bänden*, Theorie Werkausgabe. Auf der Grundlage der Werke von 1832–1845 neu

The various interpretations usually comment on this fragment from the point of view of the Hegel–Schelling relationship, formulate questions as to whether Hegel's statement is true and valid for Schelling or not – and if it is, then is there any argument against this accusation. These issues – whether Hegel's description is accurate, whether Schelling can or cannot be defended¹ – are completely irrelevant for us now. No less irrelevant is the fact that these lines were formulated about Schelling. What is essential from our point of view is that Hegel presents here his own views about what a philosophy should be like. According to this requirement, a philosophy must be conclusive, definitive in its character should contain a closed system –, conversely formulated: a developing, changing philosophy is not a philosophy at all. Hegel's own philosophical preferences are formulated here, and these prevent him from being susceptible to the values of a philosophy in change, in becoming. Such a philosophy – one that always starts from the very beginning – is none other than imperfect philosophy. One should only come out in public when this previous process of development and change has been finished, and the final system has been created. In the works to be published from now on – works which in fact should only be published at this point and not earlier – this final philosophy unfolds, spreads out, as it were, the individual elements of its organic totality are successively or simultaneously elaborated; however, the succession of elaborations, the degree of elaborateness and the increasing size of the sections to be explained no longer means an internal change of the structure itself.

Now, at a closer look, the FVA edited by Hegel's disciples is articulated precisely along the lines of this concept. Hegel's lecture sketches and outlines, the student notes, and various kinds of other notes, seen from here, are composed into uniform works not merely because of external or subjective reasons – for instance, cultural or political –, but because the editors are influenced by the spirit of a philosophy

edierte Ausgabe, eds. E. Moldenhauer und K. M. Michel, vol. 20 (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1970), 421–423. Schelling hat seine philosophische Ausbildung vor dem Publikum gemacht. Die Reihe seiner philosophischen Schriften ist zugleich Geschichte seiner philosophischen Bildung [...] sie enthält nicht eine Folge der ausgearbeiteten Teile der Philosophie nacheinander, sondern eine Folge seiner Bildungsstufen. Wenn nach einer letzten Schrift gefragt wird, worin seine Philosophie am bestimmtesten durchgeführt darstellte, so kann man keine solche nennen. [...] In späteren Darstellungen fing er in jeder Schrift nur immer wieder von vorne an (stellte nie ein vollendet durchgeführtes Ganzes auf), weil man sieht, daß das Vorhergehende ihm nicht Genüge getan; und so hat er sich in verschiedenen Formen und Terminologien herumgeworfen. [...] Es ist daher auch nicht tunlich, da in ein Detail eingegangen werde über das, was Schellingsche *Philosophie* genannt wird, wenn es auch die Zeit erlaubte. Denn sie ist noch nicht ein in seine Glieder organisiertes Ganzes, sondern besteht mehr in einigen allgemeinen Momenten, die allein das sich gleich Bleibende sind. Diese Philosophie ist noch in der Arbeit ihrer Evolution begriffen, noch nicht zur reifen Frucht gezeitigt."

¹ Hegel's characterization of Schelling is of course true in a trivial sense; so much so that one of the most important works of 20th-century Schelling scholarship, Xavier Tilliette's two-volume, 1200 pages long monograph formulates the very same idea on Schelling's thought already in its title. See: Xavier Tilliette, *Schelling. Une philosophie en devenir* (Paris: Vrin, 1970). However, both for Tilliette and other researchers – such as, e.g., Heidegger (see: *Schellings Abhandlung über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit*, ed. H. Feick [Tübingen: M. Niemeyer, 1971], p. 7.) – this statement establishes a fact and has no disapproving character.

which claims that *it is only the final, the ultimate, the closed whole that is valuable*.¹ The disciples – if standing indeed on the ground of the above cited Hegelian idea – must surely have been convinced that Hegel did possess this system, only his premature death prevented him from lending it ultimate and detailed elaboration. Therefore they must have felt it to be their duty, task and responsibility – indeed, a mission in the most pregnant sense of the word – to finish, according to the best of their knowledge and conscience, what the master was not able to complete himself. On Hegelian grounds,

¹ It should also be added: the creation of a (closed, final) system in Hegel's sense is a fundamental ambition and distinguishing mark of German idealism starting with Kant, formulated on the ground of the initiatives of modern philosophy. Heidegger in his 1936 Schelling-lectures developed this idea with great force, embedded into a broad context of the history of philosophy. As he explains, the specific requirement of the construction of a philosophical *system* was only formulated in modernity. Before Descartes, the philosophers never claimed the need to elaborate a system in the modern sense; instead, they only offered the organization and articulation most suitable for appropriation and study in schools of an inherited and traditional mass of knowledge. The medieval *summa* itself was not a "system" in this sense either – only our modern perception makes them be viewed as such – but much rather as "handbooks" (e.g. Thomas Aquinas's famous *Summa theologiae*, which is clearly offered as a "textbook" in the prologue). An organic philosophical system as a need to construct the conceptual system of knowledge only came into being in modernity. The particular image of modern philosophy is defined by the fact that, freeing itself from the authority of traditional knowledge – or with the demand of its critical revision – it tries to form a new, autonomous realm within knowledge: it is on this ground that the requirement of a "system" can be born. Kant particularly emphasized the architectonic nature of reason, distinguished from intellect, oriented primarily to unity, to the *system*, articulated according to various ideas. In his words, "Die Einheit aller möglichen empirischen Verstandeshandlungen systematisch zu machen, ist ein Geschäft der Vernunft," Immanuel Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, eds. Georg Mohr and Marcus Willaschek (Berlin: Akademie 1998), A664, B692; cf. Martin Heidegger, *Schellings Abhandlung über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit*, 42ff. The fundamental requirement of reason for Kant is thus the system itself, but the Kantian philosophy failed to lead to a system, the "idea" forming the basis of criticism was left in shade: it is a dilemma which offers a nuanced explanation of how, in what specific sense has the requirement of a system in idealism become a basic problem of the development or – what is the same for Kant – professionalization of philosophy. "Das System allein verbürgt ja die innere Einheit des Wissens, seine Wissenschaftlichkeit und Wahrheit," writes Heidegger in this interpretation. "Deshalb muß in Absicht auf die Wahrheit und das Wissen zuerst und vor allem immer wieder das System selbst in Frage gestellt, in seinem Wesen begründet und in seinem Begriff ausgebildet werden. So ist es zu verstehen, daß für den deutschen Idealismus *das System* der Leitruf wird und daß er nichts anderes bedeutet als wahrhafte Selbstbegründung des Ganzen des wesentlichen Wissens, *der Wissenschaft schlechthin, der Philosophie*." (Heidegger, *Schellings Abhandlung*, 50). Of the extended literature on the subject, I only mention the study of Robert C. Solomon, "Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*," in *The Age of German Idealism*, eds. Robert C. Solomon and Kathleen M. Higgins, Routledge History of Philosophy, vol. 6 (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), 181–215: "The idea of a 'system' of philosophy comes from Kant, who aspired to provide a unified and all-encompassing 'science' of philosophy." (182). I have treated this issue in somewhat more detail in one of my earlier writings; see István Fehér M., "Rendszer, szabadság, intellektuális szemlélet. Kant és a német idealizmus néhány alapproblémája" (System, freedom, intellectual concept. Kant and some fundamental problems of German idealism) *Magyar Filozófiai Szemle* 3 (1982): 401–414.

they may rightly have been convinced that one must not come out in front of the audience with works still changing, with nothing more than a plurality of text variants – the manuscripts and lecture notes had thus to be composed into an organic whole. Seen from here, the concept underlying the edition may legitimately be claimed to have largely been penetrated by the spirit of the philosophy to be edited: the basic principles of the edition (the philological establishment and elaboration of the texts) and the spirit of the philosophy to be edited (its preliminary understanding–interpretation, its pre-understanding, that is, hermeneutics) are connected by far-reaching *Wahlverwandschaft*, a sort of common spirit. From our point of view this means that the philological work – the selection of the manuscripts and their working into a body of texts to be printed – was preceded and guided by a (perhaps not conscious) philosophical and hermeneutical awareness. In other words, if it is true that the image of Hegel (gradually developed after the philosopher's death) was shaped, to a considerable extent, by the first edition of his printed works, it is not less true that the specific way of editing the printed works was in its turn largely motivated by the image of Hegel–i.e., the disciples' image of Hegel, their preliminary understanding of Hegelian philosophy no less than of philosophy itself in general.

Meanwhile, it is worth noting: the new, modern Hegel-edition – the declaredly evolutionary conception (*entwicklungsgeschichtlich*) of this edition – does not lack the spirit of the age, or in other words, the trace of the philosophical spirit or worldview of this age either. Since we live in a fragmentary, pluralistic age, which perceives itself in no way as some kind of an ultimate age like Hegel and his contemporaries may have perceived themselves – and not even as a new age, a new epoch as a time of birth and a transition to a new period – and since in such ages there is no kind of generally accepted, final philosophy, and even a requirement of the sort tends to sound quite improbable, inauthentic, therefore the question regarding a philosopher's *ultimate* system – or the edition of such an *ultimate* system – cannot even be meaningfully formulated. The job of an edition *in such an age* can only be to prepare for print and edit in a chronological order, with adequate critical apparatus, the printed or manuscript works, sketches, fragments of an author. The question concerning which of these texts contains the ultimate system of thought of an author, or whether the idea of a final system of thought is plausible or not – a system that resists any further change and evolution – a modern edition has just to give up answering such questions. All it can do is to present or publish the development of a philosopher's thinking in its various stages without conceiving of this development or rather change in a teleological way, as some kind of a movement towards perfection or completion.

I. 4. Going back to the problems around the FVA edition: the above interpretation about the “complementarity” or “concordance” of the ideas permeating the edition and the philosopher being edited can be made problematic at one point. Its discussion leads us to one of the most serious dilemmas of the new, modern Hegel-edition, so it will not be useless to briefly speak about it.

The objection that can be formulated is that the interpretation presented above takes at its basis Hegel's judgment on Schelling, as Hegel formulated it in his lectures on the history of philosophy. It is, however, one may argue, in the text edition of the FVA that Hegel's lectures on the history of philosophy are presently available, their critical edition is still yet to come. Since doubts were raised in the past about the authenticity of

several parts of the FVA, it may well be the case that the quotation lying at the basis of the above interpretation will also be among these. In this case the above interpretation – the claim concerning the common spirit between the basic principles of the edition (the philological establishment of the texts) and the spirit of the philosophy to be edited – will cease to hold. And it will not because the supposed common spirit can be shown not to exist, but because the very possibility of the comparison will be eliminated. The principles of the edition will not be comparable to the spirit of this philosophy because the spirit of this philosophy itself can only be reconstructed from the texts made available by the basic principles of edition. *Horribile dictu*, it can even be imagined – pushing the objection to its extreme – that, in order to justify their editorial principles with Hegel's philosophy, the disciples attributed to Hegel words and phrases that he never uttered. This objection means that the textual basis of the comparison is rendered questionable, an issue I analyzed elsewhere in the context of another Hegelian locus.¹

This objection, as long as it is formulated in a general, theoretical way, cannot be countered: it can be formulated in connection with any Hegelian text which was not submitted for print by Hegel himself, or the authenticity of which cannot be undoubtedly proved from some other source. The only problem is that this objection is too relevant to hold, as it were, it reaches – so-to-say – beyond its target, and, as I shall return to it soon, one must pay a high price for it. At any rate, in the *concrete* situation here two kinds of considerations are possible.

The first is that it is hardly possible to *conclusively disprove* the originality of a text under suspicion as to its authorial authenticity.² Suspicion is one thing and disproof is another, just as difference should be made between a free-floating (unmotivated) suspicion and a seriously founded one. As long as the suspicion is not founded by a thorough justification, we have no reason to doubt the authenticity of a text. This consideration seems to be valid not only for our concrete case, but it can be generalized within certain limits.

The other consideration, referring only to the *concrete* case and thus much stronger, claims that the thesis at the basis of the mentioned common spirit – philosophy is only real as a closed system, it is only in this form that it is philosophy at all – appears

¹ See the philological appendix of my study entitled “»Az eszme érzéki ragyogása«: Esztétika, metafizika, hermeneutika (Gadamer és Hegel)” (»Das sinnliche Scheinen der Idee«: Aesthetics, Metaphysics, Hermeneutics [Gadamer and Hegel]), in *Hermeneutika, esztétika, irodalomelmélet* (Hermeneutics, Aesthetics, Literary Theory), eds. István Fehér M. and Ernő Kulcsár Szabó (Budapest: Osiris, 2004), 264–332. Here: 294–326. I should add to this that rendering a textual fragment questionable as an *original text* (coming directly from its author) does not necessarily mean its rendering questionable as an *interpretive text* (although it is usually perceived to be questionable as such, too). An intelligent, clarifying *interpretive text* can be worth just as much – or even more – as an undoubtedly *original, authorial text*. One may have no expectations or requirements from an original, authorial text – that is, if its authenticity is proved, it must be accepted as it is, as it has come down to us; however, we may be entitled to raise requirements about an interpretive text, for instance, trivially speaking, the requirement to meaningfully clarify some original text.

² The argument that a textual locus cannot be regarded authentic unless it can be found in preserved manuscripts or other sources is not conclusive because most of the sources available when editing the FVA are no longer extant today.

in, and what is more, completely pervades, *also* the texts prepared and submitted for print by Hegel himself, texts therefore standing beyond doubt as to their authenticity. The following four characteristic quotes, outlining in a certain sense the entire programme of Hegelian philosophy, taken from the Preface of the *Phenomenology* adequately illustrate this claim:

1. “The true shape in which the truth exists can only be its scientific *system*.” To help to bring philosophy nearer to the form of science – that goal where it can lay aside the name of *love* of knowledge and be actual knowledge – that is what I have set before me.” (§ 5.)
2. “The truth is the whole. The whole, however, is merely the essential nature reaching its completeness through the process of its own development. Of the Absolute it must be said that it is essentially a result, that only at the end is it what it is in very truth; and just in that consists its nature, which is to be actual, subject, or self-becoming, self-development.” (§ 20)
3. “The living substance, further, is that being which is truly subject [...] As subject it is [...] a process of splitting up what is simple and undifferentiated, a process of duplicating and setting factors in opposition [...] True reality is merely this process of reinstating self-identity [...] It is the process of its own becoming, the *circle* which *presupposes its end as its purpose, and has its end for its beginning*; it becomes concrete and actual only by being carried out, and by the end it involves.” (§ 18)
4. “Among the many consequences that follow from what has been said, it is of importance to emphasise this, that knowledge is only real and can only be set forth fully in the form of science, in the form of system” (§ 24)¹

Philosophy, according to the first quote, is only real as a system; the second quote describes this system as a whole, as a result arrived to its end, while the third describes it as a circle, which has a presupposed purpose and beginning, and during its becoming reaches its end, that is, it closes in as a circle and forms a closed whole. This is, according to the fourth quote, the scientific form of philosophy. Making philosophy a science and constructing it as a system closed (in itself) is thus one and the same thing. For this reason, a philosophy which has not constructed itself as a system cannot lay claim to the status of science and – as we have seen – this is precisely what Hegel disapproved of Schelling. These are central theses of the self-understanding of Hegel’s philosophy, which leave no doubt about how Hegel looked at philosophy and his own philosophy as well. Hegel had this text printed himself, so we have no reason to doubt its authenticity.²

¹ Hegel, *Phenomenology of Mind*, trans. J. B. Baillie (London: Harper & Row, 1967). Online edition: <http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/ph/phprefac.htm> (Accessed: 25.01.2012) (Emphasis in quotes 1. and 3.: I. F. M)

² Moreover, a particular – negative – philological situation can further enforce the authenticity of the quoted texts. In 1831, a few weeks before his death, Hegel started to rewrite the Preface in preparation for a second edition that he had been planning for some time. He reached with the revision approximately half-way through the Preface, more precisely to the paragraph beginning with *Analysis of an idea* (§ 32), but all the fragments I quoted precede this paragraph in the text.

I. 5. The fundamental dilemma following from the articulation of this objection, and concerning the new historical-critical edition and capable in a sense to bring it to crisis, can be reconstructed as follows. Our presentation of the history of the Hegel-editions started from the simple and almost trivial statement that the arguments on the necessity of new editions all grew out of the critical reflections on edition history. This – as we have seen – is completely and, indeed, primarily valid for the Hegel-editions. Since the old editions do not meet modern scholarly requirements and are full of deficiencies, *therefore* there is a need for new, reliable editions. This conclusion seems unobjectionable. However, is this argument exhaustive? Is it indeed the reason – the only reason – for the necessity of the new edition?

If we turn, in a somewhat pedantic way, to the traditional logic of syllogisms, we see that in order to draw a conclusion we need at least two premises. One single premise is never enough to correctly draw a conclusion from. So there must be an implicit, second premise in the background, which does not come to the forefront because it seems so trivial, so self-evident. It may of course be *so* – let us not doubt it –, but it still *is*, it still *exists* nonetheless, and thus it deserves being made heard and explicit. So: the new Hegel-edition is necessary because: 1. the old one has many shortcomings, and 2. (to put it in one of several possible ways) Hegel is admittedly a great philosopher, whose work deserves being made available in a new, scientifically reliable source, or – to put it differently – it is the duty of the present age to make his work available in a new, scientifically reliable source.

Let us stay with formal logic a bit longer. It is a requirement that the two premises of the conclusion must come from different sources of knowledge, that is, they cannot be related to each other in any way. If this is not the case, if they are somehow related, then we no longer have to do with two premises, but only one. Let us take the classic example: 1. All man is mortal, 2. Socrates is a man, so 3. Socrates is mortal. The first two premises cannot be deduced from each other. We know from different sources of knowledge that all men are mortal, and that Socrates is a man. From the enunciation “all man is mortal” cannot be deduced that “Socrates is a man”. (If we think that Socrates belongs to “all men”, since he is a man too, then we beg the question, i.e., presume exactly what should be proved; Socrates belongs to “all men” if I already *know* – and this of course means: from some other source – that he is also a man, but this is precisely the question here).

Let us return to the Hegel-editions. Where, from what source do we know that Hegel is a great philosopher? Is it indeed the case here that the second premise is independent from the first? In the light of what was argued above, it is quite obvious: the

The revision did not affect any of the quoted fragments, Hegel left all of them unchanged for the second edition planned. (English translation of the paragraph *Analysis of an idea* in Hegel, *Phenomenology of Mind*, § 32. Original: Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, eds. Wolfgang Bonsiepen and Reinhard Heede, *Gesammelte Werke*, vol. 9 (Hamburg: Meiner, 1980), 27. New edition: *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, eds. H.-F. Wessels and H. Clairmont, introd. W. Bonsiepen, PhB 414 (Hamburg: Meiner, 1988), 25. See also W. Bonsiepen’s notes on the issue (new edition, 551), who refers to the report of the editor of the *Phenomenology* published in the FVA (*Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe durch einen Verein von Freunden des Verewigten*, vol. 2, ed. J. Schulze (Berlin: Duncker, 1832), V.

FVA, which the first premise declares to be deficient, is not only not independent of the second premise's source of knowledge, but is mostly identical with it. The reception history of Hegelian philosophy, which founded Hegel's fame as a philosopher and presented Hegel as a great philosopher, was determined to the full by the FVA. Therefore if the FVA is rendered questionable, then implicitly the philosophical greatness of Hegel – a greatness handed down by the reception history starting from the FVA edition – is also rendered questionable. However, if this latter (Hegels gretness as a philosopher) is put under suspicion, it also renders then questionable the necessity of a new edition, needing decades of work and a considerable material and intellectual input. That the new edition will make available and mediate a more accurate image of Hegel – may well be possible; but whether this Hegel *should be worth* being presented in a new edition, is an issue that cannot be anticipated.

From all those said before it results that one should be careful about criticizing the FVA. Now, this point of view appears indeed – although instinctively rather than consciously – in the writings of the academic edition's editors. While illustrating the deficiencies of the FVA, they remember over and over again the indisputable merits of this edition. Firstly, about its having grounded Hegel's fame and transmitted it to posterity. Friedhelm Nicolin, the initiator and mentor of the GW, emphasized it from the very beginning: "Hegel's thinking had exercised a worldwide influence due to the FVA. Followers and antagonists in the 19th and 20th century read Hegel in this edition. The translations to foreign languages of his individual works were based on these text editions. Last but not least, the indirect effect of Hegel's image in the history of philosophy was also determined by this edition. [...] Finally, as regards the original documents which were still available for Hegel's disciples, but have since been lost, this edition makes up the permanent part of the sources of Hegel's work."¹ It should be added that here at the turn of the 1950s and 1960s Nicolin tried to argue for the necessity of the new edition not merely by reference to philological reasons: first of all, he referred to a particular modern necessity, a renewing interest worldwide in Hegel's philosophy.² Then, following Nicolin, the idea of the *actualization* of Hegelian thought for present thinking did continue appearing in the writings of other co-operators and editors of the Hegel Archives.³

As for the merits of the FVA, Walter Jaeschke still continues to emphasize in our times – after the turn of the millennium, almost fifty years following Nicolin's quoted words and connected to them – that "The 'Friends of the Deceased' created the Corpus Hegelianum and the image of Hegelian philosophy which [...] defined its direct influence and which has lasted until these days."⁴ From the period between these two seminal opinions, I shall quote Christoph Jamme, who wrote in the first half of the

¹ Friedhelm Nicolin, "Die neue Hegel-Gesamtausgabe. Voraussetzungen und Ziele," *Hegel-Studien* 1 (1961): 295–313, 296.

² *Ibid.*, 308.

³ Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert, "Hegel Archiv und Hegel Ausgabe," *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* 4 (1976): 609–618, 617: "A second, just as essential precondition of the work of the Hegel Archive is the philosophical actualization of Hegel. A successful attempt must be made to reveal the relevance of facing Hegel for the horizon of present-day philosophy."

⁴ Walter Jaeschke, *Hegel-Handbuch: Leben – Werk – Schule* (Stuttgart: Metzler, 2003), 503.

1980s: “Despite all of its editorial questionability, the FVA is outstandingly important.” Since – by the more recent 20th century editions based on the FVA, such as Glockner’s so-called anniversary edition or the *Theorie Werkausgabe* – “it has fundamentally influenced the reception history of Hegelian philosophy up to the middle of the 20th century and beyond; it has formed the basis of Hegel-interpretations from Marx and Kierkegaard to Adorno.”¹ The significance of reception history can of course hardly be overestimated from a hermeneutical perspective: no matter what the edition policy of the FVA was like, and no matter how we think about it now in the light of today’s philological standards, it is a fact that this edition created the dominant Hegel-image. The young Marx – whose thinking was determined all his life by the struggle with Hegel as mediated by the FVA – wrote in his doctoral thesis, debating the question of the ontological proof of the existence of God that the essential thing is not whether or not there were gods, but that people believed in them in the course of history, and “in this sense all gods, both pagan and Christian, possessed a real existence. [...] Kant’s criticism [of the ontological proof of God – I.F.M] means nothing here. If someone imagines to have a hundred Thalers [...], if he believes in it, then the hundred imagined Thalers have the same value for him as a hundred real ones. E.g. he will run into debt over his imagination, the imagination will have effect, just like the whole humanity ran into debt on their gods’ account.”² Similarly, it can be said: irrespective of how the “real” Hegel, Hegel “in himself” may be construed to have been – provided this question is meaningful at all,³ and provided there is any empirical evidence extant to reconstruct it,⁴ to finalize this (still not entirely clearly meaningful) enterprise –, his reception history

¹ Christoph Jamme, “Editionspolitik. Zur ‘Freundesvereinsausgabe’ der Werke G.W.F. Hegels,” *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* 1 (1984): 83–99, 84.

² Karl Marx, *Differenz der demokritischen und epikureischen Naturphilosophie nebst einem Anhang*. In: *Marx-Engels-Gesamtausgabe*. Ergänzungsband, T. 1. Berlin: Dietz 1975, pp. 257–373, here p. 371: “in diesem Sinn [...] *alle Götter*, sowohl die heidnischen als christlichen, eine reelle Existenz besessen haben. [...] Hier heißt auch Kants Kritik [of the ontological proof for the existence of God] nichts. Wenn jemand sich vorstellt, hundert Taler zu besitzen, [...] wenn er an sie glaubt, so haben ihm die hundert eingebildeten Taler denselben Wert wie hundert wirkliche. Er wird z. B. Schulden auf seine Einbildung machen, sie wird *wirken*, wie die ganze Menschheit Schulden auf ihre Götter gemacht hat.” (In English: Karl Marx, *The Difference between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature*, Marx-Engels Collected Works vol. 1. [Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975]).

³ “Ein Kant an sich [...] ist ein Grundmißverständnis” (A Kant in himself [...] is a fundamental misunderstanding”). Heidegger GA 3, 301.

⁴ No kind of empiric knowledge can be used to reconstruct something like a “real x” – even if the sources are abundant, or even if (or rather especially if) they are endless – since this “real x” always presupposes the primacy of the *a priori* unity of a concept or an idea. “The desire either to prove or to refute ideas on the basis of facts is nonsense – according to the quotation Kant used: *ex pumice aquam*.” – wrote Husserl. Edmund Husserl, “Philosophy as Rigorous Science,” in *Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy*, translated by Quentin Lauer (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), pp. 71–147. The quotation in Kant’s *The Critique of Practical Reason*, trans. and ed. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); on ideas see also: *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. and ed. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). See also: Jean-Paul Sartre, *The Emotions: Outline of a Theory*, trans. Bernard Frechtman (New York: Carol Publishing Group, 1993), pp. 4–5. “[T]he idea of man [...] will be

could not still be ignored or eliminated even in that case. Should we still expect a new, significant, more authentic image of Hegel on the basis of the GW, the almost two centuries-long effective history of the reception of Hegelian philosophy cannot be undone.

I. 6. Thus the FVA serves the GW in a double, ambivalent way: both negatively and positively. Indeed, the GW is very much dependent on this ambivalence in order to justify itself. It must feed on the FVA – both negatively and positively – as a parasite. The thorough criticism of the editorial principles and practice, as well as editorial policy of the FVA is just as much a decisive part of the necessity and self-justification of the GW as the assumption of Hegel's greatness and importance as a philosopher constructed and handed down due to the same FVA. However, this ambivalence brings about several incompatibilities and results in a number of "non sequitur". In any case, taking back or moderating the criticism of the FVA, or counter-balancing it by accentuating its merits creates a dubious obscurity. It seems advisable to veil or conceal the common root of this double – positive and negative – reference.

I have previously cited Nicolin, who claimed it was a merit of the FVA, amongst other things, that "Hegel's thinking has gained its worldwide influence due to the FVA." But – let us not postpone the question any further – did Hegel deserve indeed this "worldwide influence"? For precisely by taking seriously the criticism concerning the FVA the traditional image of Hegel – or: the traditional image of Hegel's greatness as a philosopher – should be shattered, as a result of, and in parallel with, this criticism. As a matter of fact, if one ventures to consistently think over this issue, one should become absolutely sceptical about the nature and calibre of Hegelian thinking. One cannot make the pretension – although, of course, one does, and by doing so makes the ambivalent, tacit impression – as if Hegel's importance as a philosopher were a widely

only a conjecture aiming to establish connections between disparate materials"; if "some psychologists were to use a certain conception of man *before* this ultimate synthesis were possible, it would be [...] like an idea in the Kantian sense, and their first duty would be never to lose sight of the fact that it was a regulating concept. [...] To expect the *fact* is, by definition, to expect the isolated, to prefer, because of positivism, the accidental to the essential, the contingent to the necessary, disorder to order; it is, on principle, to case what is essential into the future: 'That will do for later, when we shall have assembled enough facts.' [...] it is just as impossible to get to essence by accumulating accidents as to reach 1 by adding figures to the right of 0.99." Jean-Paul Sartre: *Esquisse d'une théorie des émotions*. Paris: Hermann & Cie 1939, p. 5: "C'est dire que l'idée d'homme, si jamais elle prend un sens positif, ne sera qu'une conjecture visant à établir des connexions entre des matériaux disparates et qui ne tirera sa vraisemblance que de sa réussite. [...] Si pourtant certains psychologues usaient d'une certaine conception de l'homme *avant* que cette synthèse ultime ne fût possible, ce ne pourrait être qu'à titre rigoureusement personnel et comme fil conducteur ou mieux comme idée au sens kantien et leur premier devoir serait de ne jamais perdre de vue qu'il s'agit d'un concept régulateur. [...] Attendre le *fait*, c'est, par définition, attendre l'isolé, c'est préférer, par positivisme, l'accident à l'essentiel, le contingent au nécessaire, le désordre à l'ordre; c'est rejeter, par principe, l'essentiel dans l'avenir: »c'est pour plus tard, quand nous aurons réuni assez de faits.« [...] Les psychologues ne se rendent pas compte, en effet, qu'il est tout aussi impossible d'attendre l'essence en entassant les accidents que d'aboutir à l'unité en ajoutant indéfiniment des chiffres à la droite de 0,99."

known, acquitted, concluded fact, whereby the disciples editing the FVA deserved to be praised and patted on the back for recognizing it,—in other words, as if it were a fact which we already know and take for granted as something beyond dispute and beyond doubt. The criticism of the FVA – if taken seriously – must throw into crisis or pull down with it the Hegel that it “constructed” or “built up” (to return to this political-like expression). The ambivalent reference to the FVA or the FVA’s use or exploitation – both in a negative, and a positive sense – for the advantage and justification of the GW is a phenomenon which precedes and accompanies the initiative and development of the GW. It is articulated differently depending on the audience it addresses or the interests of its particular context, while the reference is usually very careful not to “bring together” its thoughts; therefore it “conducts a household of its own,” “weighs and measures by a twofold standard,” to use Hegelian expressions.¹

The argument that the FVA does not meet contemporary scholarly standards is a direct basis for the necessity of the new edition. The second, tacit premise, which should accompany the first and come in its completion, and must sometimes be expressed nonetheless, says that: a “Kulturvolk” or “Kulturnation” (such as the Germans) – or in a more emphatic formulation: a “Kulturvolk” or “Kulturnation” of the

¹ Hegel, *Phenomenology of Mind*, trans. J. B. Baillie (London: Harper & Row, 1967), § 205. Online edition: <http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/ph/phprefac.htm> (Accessed: 01.02.2012) “This [sceptical] form of consciousness is, therefore, the aimless fickleness and instability of going to and fro, hither and thither, from one extreme of self-same self-consciousness, to the other contingent, confused and confusing consciousness. It *does not itself bring these two thoughts of itself together*. It finds its freedom, at one time, in the form of elevation above all the whirling complexity and all the contingency of mere existence, and again, at another time, likewise confesses to falling back upon what is unessential, and to being taken up with that.” And also: *ibid.*, § 572. “The believing mood *weighs and measures by a twofold standard*, it has two sorts of eyes and ears, uses two voices to express its meaning, it duplicates all ideas, *without comparing and relating the sense and meaning in the two forms used*. Or we may say belief lives its life amidst two sorts of perceptions, the one the perceptions of thought which is asleep, purely uncritical and uncomprehending, the other those of waking consciousness living solely and simply in the world of sense; and in each of them it manages to *conduct a household of its own*.” (Italics mine – I.M.F.). See Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*. In: Hegel: *Werke in zwanzig Bänden. Theorie Werkausgabe*. Auf der Grundlage der Werke v. 1832-1845 neu edierte Ausgabe. Redaktion Eva Moldenhauer und Karl Markus Michel. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp 1970, Bd. 3, p. 162: “Dies [skeptische] Bewußtsein ist also diese bewußtlose Faselei, von dem einen Extreme des sichselbstgleichen Selbstbewußtseins zum andern des zufälligen, verworrenen und verwirrenden Bewußtseins hinüber- und herüberzugehen. Es selbst *bringt* diese beiden Gedanken seiner selbst *nicht zusammen* [Italics mine – I.M.F.]; es erkennt seine Freiheit *einmal* als Erhebung über alle Verwirrung und alle Zufälligkeit des Daseins und bekennt sich ebenso *das andere Mal* wieder als ein Zurückfallen in die *Unwesentlichkeit* und als ein Herumtreiben in ihr.“ Cf. also p. 423: “Das glaubende Bewußtsein *führt doppeltes Maß und Gewicht* [Italics mine – I.M.F.], es hat zweierlei Augen, zweierlei Ohren, zweierlei Zunge und Sprache, es hat alle Vorstellungen verdoppelt, *ohne diese Doppelsinnigkeit zu vergleichen* [Italics mine – I.M.F.]. Oder der Glaube lebt in zweierlei Wahrnehmungen, der einen, der Wahrnehmung des *schlafenden*, rein in begrifflosen Gedanken, der anderen des wachen, rein in der sinnlichen Wirklichkeit lebenden Bewußtseins, und in jeder führt er eine *eigene Haushaltung* [Italics mine – I.M.F.].“

sort of the Germans – have the elementary obligation both towards themselves and towards the educated, scholarly world to make available the works of the outstanding thinkers of their past in scientifically reliable editions, meeting contemporary exigencies. The essential part of this double reference is that “it does not itself bring these two thoughts of itself together”: the second premise – as it should in a syllogism – appears as a distinct source of knowledge although in fact it is not. This second premise is needed nonetheless, it cannot be done without: if the edition project wants to avoid turning against itself and undermine the scientific and institutional foundations of its own enterprise, then it can be by no means of interest to the GW to overthrow or revise the image of Hegel’s greatness as a philosopher. On the contrary: it must make use of it as a justification for its own enterprise and its importance, for its purported national-cultural mission. The reference therefore – here, in this context – remains silent about the connection of the two premises: namely, the fact that Hegel’s philosophical greatness is a product of the scientifically condemned FVA. Were it not silent about it, the second premise would be overthrown, and the justification of the necessity of a new edition would seriously lose its weight.

However, in a *different* context this fact does not have to be dismissed in silence. Once the self-justification of the GW has been successful, it can well be formulated: it happens with the purpose both of generously recognizing the merits of the FVA, and the accentuation of the importance of its task – further enhanced by the fame of the praised predecessors – as well as the raising of scholarly requirements. Since it is the merit of the FVA to have perpetuated Hegel’s philosophical greatness in its own – debatable – way, then a contemporary, scientifically more reliable edition could even more raise the hope and expectation to reformulate and present this greatness in an undistorted, modern, scientific form. In *this* context the theoretical emphasis of the fact elsewhere kept silent of how significantly a textual and life-work edition can transform consciousness and shape the reception history is expressly an advantage and not at all a drawback. It formulates the expectation that the new edition will be a great accomplishment similar to the old one. By the two premises according to which: 1. the FVA performed a culturally significant act, and 2. the FVA used scientifically questionable methods, results the promise that: if 2. is corrected, that is, a scientifically reliable edition is made, it would bring along with it also premise 1, that is, it would be a culturally equally significant act.

I.7. However, the GW is the prisoner of FVA also in another sense: in a sense which could also exemplify the “conducting of a household of one’s own,” therefore it is not uninteresting to enter into some detail. The basic objection against the FVA is that it focused on the Berlin Hegel, that is, the Berlin lectures, the texts of which did not come directly from Hegel and which were compiled together to form unitary works. These volumes, which were not prepared and submitted for print by Hegel, take up more than half of the edition; in their case, much more textual criticism is needed than for those works which Hegel himself had published. The GW wanted to compete with the FVA primarily about the second series of the edition, the preparation of the lectures, since it was this part of the FVA which was most criticised and condemned, also firstly by the GW, therefore it seemed desirable and necessary to offer an alternative in this field.

To compete with the FVA means however, that the GW in this respect is subject to the previous edition. Had the FVA not attributed such an outstanding role to the lectures, perhaps the GW would not have placed them in the forefront either. However, the GW also tried to justify the importance of editing the lectures, this time not on the basis of compilations, with a circumstance partly connected to the previous one, and partly independent of it. It argued that Hegel's great influence, because of the relative scarcity of published works, was primarily grounded by the orally delivered lectures, his fame is due to those, therefore it is highly justified to pay extra editorial attention to them and, following a thorough critical textual analysis, make them available to the audience in a form which satisfies contemporary scholarly standards.

This argument appears as essential because it (is practically the only one which) tries to validate Hegel's fame and influence not on the basis of the FVA edition, but in a way evading it, independently from it. The new edition is claimed to have to pay special attention to the lectures because Hegel gained his fame primarily *by these* and not by his printed works. This creates the impression that, besides and beyond the imperfection of the FVA, we have gained one further argument to justify the outstanding editorial interest in the lectures. The edition of the lectures therefore is especially significant because, 1. the way the FVA edited them is highly imperfect, unacceptable for modern standards, and 2. Hegel's fame as a philosopher was primarily established by his oral lectures. Or, to put it more impressively: the edition of the lectures is especially significant because 1. Hegel's fame as a philosopher was primarily established by his oral lectures, and 2. these were highly imperfectly edited by the FVA.

However, a closer analysis of the argument reveals once more its ambivalences. It can be questioned indeed whether these two arguments are truly independent of each other – and enforce each other – or rather there is one single argument in fact, that is, the existence of two arguments is only an *appearance*. Indeed, in the previous formulation the expression “by them” [the lectures] can be understood in two ways: first, as *directly by them* (so, directly by the oral delivery, and not by (or not only by) the FVA), then as *indirectly by them*, insofar as the FVA, focusing on the lectures, made them available in print, and this was the basis of their later broad influence. Of course, this statement cannot be refuted. Whether directly, through their oral delivery, or by their later edition, it is a fact: the lectures did have indeed a major influence. The ambivalence of this latter formulation also creates a dubious – though from an editorial viewpoint beneficial – obscurity; at any rate, it is obvious that at a closer look this argument (namely, the reference to the great influence of the lectures) for establishing Hegel's fame apart from the FVA can hardly be tenable. Any attempt to account for Hegel's fame and reception history by overlooking the FVA is necessarily doomed to end up in failure.

But let us see some characteristic formulations. The starting point is in almost all cases a kind of specific negativity, which then is turned into positivity. The negativity lies in the fact that Hegel – unlike his idealist predecessors and Kant – published very little in his lifetime. His fame, unlike his predecessors', had not been established by the little number of his printed works (most of which had already been hardly accessible by that time). But since Hegel was a great philosopher (as we of course already know), therefore – if we wish to know his thinking –, we must concentrate on the reconstruction of his university lectures, which are much more significant in the process of the

publication of his works than in the case of his forebears.¹ And since Hegel's lecture manuscripts have been handed down in very fragmentary forms, one must heavily draw on the student notes still available, the publication of which exceeds in significance the importance of lecture editions of other philosophers. If for no other reason, then because the FVA also published first of all the lecture notes. "Simply by presenting Hegel's work in a closed form, by introducing the lecture volumes as complements, what is more, higher-level complements of Hegel's unpublished works, and only thus could this edition exert a decisive influence lasting to this day" – writes Walter Jaeschke.²

"First of all, Hegel's influence was established by his lectures; there he gathered his students around him and founded his school," wrote Otto Pöggeler at the beginning of the 1990s. "Distinctly from Kant and Fichte, the decisive part of Hegel's works was formed indeed by his lectures."³ The claim that Kant was primarily influential by his printed works, while this was not the case for Hegel, was already formulated by Christoph Jamme in the 1980s,⁴ and Lothar Wigger also stressed: "As opposed to Kant, Hegel was primarily influential due to his lectures, in which he concretely elaborated important parts of his system."⁵ Then after the turn of the millennium Walter Jaeschke

¹ This reference is almost completely valid, although both Fichte and Schelling have a considerable amount of unpublished writings, and especially in Fichte's case the various drafts of "science knowledge" (*Wissenschaftslehre*) which formed the core of his thinking were largely remained unpublished in the philosopher's lifetime, and were only made available by the new, forty-volume historical-critical edition initiated some years before the Hegel-edition, in the beginning of the 1960s, and now at its termination (while the first series of the complete edition, containing the works published in the philosopher's lifetime, consisted of ten volumes, the second series containing the works from his legacy consisted of fourteen volumes). In any case, it is valid for both of them that they published enough writings during their lifetime to establish their fame (in Fichte's case the unpublished manuscripts of the *Wissenschaftslehre* were adequately compensated by the popular writings meant for the audience at large, such as the *Speeches to the German Nation*). For Kant the influence of his three critiques evidently eclipsed the aura of his university lectures; furthermore, Kant consciously considered his works as an organon "by which he intended to influence the audience." Eckart Förster, "Die Vorreden," in *Immanuel Kant: Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. Klassiker Auslegen, vol. 17, eds. G. Mohr, M. Willaschek (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1998), 37–55, 37.

² Walter Jaeschke, "Probleme der Edition der Nachschriften von Hegels Vorlesungen," *Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 3 (1980): 51–63, 57: "Allein indem sie Hegels Werk in dieser geschlossenen Form darbot, indem die Vorlesungsbände sich als Surrogat und sogar als überlegenes Surrogat von Hegel nicht publizierter Werke präsentierten, konnte diese Ausgabe ihre bis heute bestimmende Wirkung entfalten."

³ Otto Pöggeler, "Nachschriften von Hegels Vorlesungen," *Hegel-Studien* 26 (1991): 121–175, 128: "[Es waren] vor allem die Vorlesungen, auf denen Hegels Wirkung beruhte: dort gewann er zumeist seine Schüler und bildete seine Schule. In diesen Vorlesungen lag – anders als bei Kant oder bei Fichte – in der Tat ein entscheidender Teil des Hegelschen Werkes".

⁴ Christoph Jamme, "Editionspolitik. Zur 'Freundesvereinsausgabe' der Werke G.W.F. Hegels," *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* 1 (1984): 83–99, 89; see also *ibid.*, 95.

⁵ Lothar Wigger, "75 Jahre kritische Hegel-Ausgaben: Zu Geschichte und Stand der Hegel-Edition," *Pädagogische Rundschau* 1 (1987): 101–116, 102: "Gewirkt hat Hegel – im Unterschied z. B. zu Kant – vor allem durch seine Vorlesungen, in denen er die konkrete Umsetzung und Ausführung wichtiger Teile seines Systems vornahm."

continued to emphasize: “Unlike the works of Kant, Fichte, and Schelling, Hegel’s philosophy received little public attention and discussion in his lifetime.”¹ In one of his writings two decades earlier Jaeschke expressed this same thesis in more detail as well. “Distinctly from the cases of Leibniz, Kant, Fichte, or Schelling, the major influence of Hegel’s works starting from the edition of his lectures. [...] From the perspective of the reception history of his philosophy, Hegel’s activity as a lecturer at Berlin University proved to be decisive, and it proved to be so *both* from the point of view of its broad influence, *and* the foundation of the Hegelian school, which was of course only established by his educational activity in Berlin.”²

Our investigation could naturally ask the question whether this *both-and* denotes two distinct things indeed. The question is answered in a sense by Jaeschke himself in his previously cited work from 2003, which is worth being cited at some length: “Hegel’s philosophy received little public attention and discussion in his lifetime. His actual reception history [...] started only posthumously. [...] Contrary to widespread legends which saw him as the emperor of philosophy of his age, Hegel’s influence in his lifetime was limited to the classroom, his aura only reached Halle, and remained only partial even in Berlin.”³

This qualification seems to heavily contradict any statement that stresses the significant influence of the lectures – formulated by others as well as Jaeschke himself in his earlier writings cited before – and seems to be difficult to reconcile with the first part of the *both-and* construction of the above mentioned sentence. In this respect in fact it does answer – albeit in a negative sense – the question whether the *both-and* denotes indeed two things. The contradiction can be explained (or dissolved) by the difference in knowledge interests or – as I have mentioned above – the difference in contexts, which in this particular case means the targeted audience. The last cited fragment comes from a handbook, while the former from a scholarly journal. Now, evidently a handbook is written not so much for the experts of a discipline, but for the audience at large. The need for a new edition must be justified towards the experts of the discipline (and not less towards cultural policy and science financing); however, such a justification loses its relevance or at least remains in the background in presentations written for the wide

¹ Walter Jaeschke, *Hegel-Handbuch: Leben – Werk – Schule* (Stuttgart: Metzler, 2003), 503: “anders als das Werk Kants, Fichtes und Schellings [...] Hegels Philosophie zu seinen Lebzeiten nur geringe öffentliche Aufmerksamkeit und Auseinandersetzung erfahren [hat]”

² Walter Jaeschke, “Probleme der Edition der Nachschriften von Hegels Vorlesungen,” *Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 3 (1980): 51–63, 57: “Denn anders als etwa bei Leibniz, Kant, Fichte und Schelling ging die Hauptwirkung des Hegelschen Werkes von der Edition der Vorlesungen aus. [...] Hegels Vorlesungstätigkeit an der Berliner Universität [ist] für die Wirkungsgeschichte seiner Philosophie entscheidend geworden [...]: sowohl für ihre Breitenwirkung als auch für die Gründung der Hegelschen Schule, die sich ja erst auf Grund der Berliner Lehrtätigkeit gebildet hat [...]” (Italics I.M.F.)

³ Walter Jaeschke: *Hegel-Handbuch*, 503: “Hegels Philosophie [hat] zu seinen Lebzeiten nur geringe öffentliche Aufmerksamkeit und Auseinandersetzung erfahren. Ihre eigentliche Wirkungsgeschichte setzt erst postum ein [...]. [...] Entgegen den verbreiteten Legenden, die Hegel zum philosophischen Imperator seines Zeitalters stilisieren, hat sich seine Wirkung zu seinen Lebzeiten auf seinen Hörsaal beschränkt, mit Ausstrahlung lediglich auf Halle – und selbst in Berlin ist sie nur partiell gewesen”.

audience. Nevertheless, the interest of the wide audience can very well be raised by curiosities such as the discovery that the world-famous philosopher was practically unknown in his own age. Moreover, this latter representation is probably closer to reality, while the former is prone to project this wide influence back to Hegel's time, to his Berlin period. (It should deserve a little digression to call attention to this particular anomaly of the profession, this kind of "transcendental appearance or illusion" in a Kantian sense, which Kant describes in opposition to empirical or logical appearance as follows: "This illusion it is impossible to avoid, just as we cannot avoid perceiving that the sea appears to be higher at a distance than it is near the shore"¹ – namely, to the fact that the present is prone to date the influence of a work it considers outstanding to as early as possible, preferably to the very age when it was written.)

Therefore the references to Hegel's "widely influential" lectures are ambivalent, and capable of creating appropriate obscurity; the meaning may be either the effect of the orally delivered lectures, or that of the printed version published by the slightly more than half a dozen disciples in the FVA edition, and this shift in meaning can alternate, in accordance with the all-time necessities and contexts. The two meanings are indefinitely – and, let us add, beneficially – intertwined. Christoph Jamme in his already cited work spoke about the "inglorious fame" ("unrühmliche Berümtheit") that Hegel's works had to deal with firstly due to the methods used in editing the lectures. This is a fortunate expression – but not only in the meaning intended by the author, but also in that further sense that the researchers editing the GW in their statements about the FVA can alternately stress the positive connotations of the noun or the negative connotations of the adjective, in accordance with the context and the all-time needs of the GW.² However, that much should be added by all means: without this "inglorious fame" Hegel could hardly have become who he was later to be, and the GW could also hardly have come into being.

I.8. It has been repeatedly mentioned above that the edition of the lectures is the most controversial point of the FVA, and that the GW considers its fundamental task to offer an alternative to the FVA precisely in this matter. However, the elaboration of adequate editorial principles has been a problem from the very beginning. There was agreement only about the fact that it cannot be pursued as the FVA did. In the mid-1970s Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert complained about there being no philological standards for the edition of the lectures.³ A few years later, Walter Jaeschke – editor of the FVA, today the director of the Archives – already summarized as follows: "we have been dealing with it for years to proceed with the planning and preparation of the second

¹ See Kant, *The Critique of Pure Reason*, B353f. [Transcendental logic. Second Division. I. Of Transcendental Illusory Appearance]

<http://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/4280/pg4280.html>

("... so wenig als wir es vermeiden können, daß uns das Meer in der Mitte nicht höher scheine, wie an dem Ufer").

² Christoph Jamme, "Editionspolitik. Zur 'Freundesvereinsausgabe' der Werke G.W.F. Hegels," *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* 1 (1984): 83–99, 83.

³ Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert, "Hegel Archiv und Hegel Ausgabe," *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* 4 (1976): 609–618, 610.

series, the edition of the lecture notes as well, in parallel with the first series of the complete edition.”¹ The elaboration of the concept is evidently a time-consuming activity, and it should by no means be hastened, we could say, since twenty-eight years have passed since the publication of the above lines. The edition started in the 1960s and was planned for forty volumes; it should have been finished by the turn of the millennium, in forty year’s time² – whereas the editorial brochure planned the publication of the opening volume of the second series only for 2008, evidently on the basis of a well-designed concept, but definitely – as mentioned above – following a decade of test-edition series.

The editorial announcement of this initial volume of the second series makes use to the full of the above displayed ambivalence. Hegel’s fame, the editorial reads, was established by his Berlin lectures, and his great influence on his contemporaries was due less to his earlier published writings than to his lectures held at Berlin University.³ Nonetheless, the text goes on, the FVA’s procedure to compile a sovereign main text out of various source texts is not an acceptable way to go for the GW. Instead, the second series of the GW will contain “the authentic wording of all extant lecture notes” (“der authentische Wortlaut aller erhaltenen Nachschriften”).⁴

¹ Walter Jaeschke, “Probleme der Edition der Nachschriften von Hegels Vorlesungen,” *Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 3 (1980): 51–63, 51 (“Wir sind ... seit mehreren Jahren damit beschäftigt, parallel zur Arbeit an der ersten Abteilung auch die Planung und Vorarbeiten für die zweite Abteilung, also für die Edition der Nachschriften, voranzutreiben [...]”). Friedhelm Nicolin noted already in the second half of the 1950s that “the publication of the lectures has begun” (Friedhelm Nicolin, “Probleme und Stand der Hegel-Edition,” *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* 1 (1957): 117–129, 128.) He also mentioned that there was great anticipation for the long heralded early writings of Hegel (although the first of the planned two volumes of these latter writings only appeared in 1989 [GW 1], while the second [GW 2], which should comprise the Frankfurt writings, possibly the most acclaimed of this period, is still unpublished).

² See the summary of Otto Pöggeler, “Die historisch-kritische Edition in der Wissenschaftsorganisation,” *Buchstabe und Geist. Zur Überlieferung und Edition philosophischer Texte*, eds. Walter Jaeschke, Wilhelm G. Jacobs und Hermann Krings (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1987), 27–37, 33. “According to the plan designed in the 1960s, Hegel’s works are to appear over a period of forty years in forty volumes.” One of the primary motivating factors of the new edition was that – as I have previously mentioned – even the ever so honourable efforts of individual researchers will not be enough to complete a new Hegel edition within one generation’s time. However, the present state of the Hegel-edition sets forth the perspective that the editorial work of a whole generation of researchers and philologists of Hegel will not suffice to do so either.

³ http://www.meiner.de/product_info.php?products_id=2962: “Hegels Ruhm gründet sich auf seine Berliner Vorlesungen, die in der zweiten Abteilung der ‘Gesammelten Werke’ nun erstmals in textkritischer Edition vorgelegt werden. [...] Hegels große Wirkung auf seine Zeitgenossen beruhte nicht so sehr auf der Rezeption seiner zuvor publizierten Schriften, sondern vor allem auf seinen Vorlesungen an der Berliner Universität, an die er 1818 berufen wurde und an der bis zu seinem Tod im Jahr 1831 den Ton angab.”

⁴ “Für die Edition der Vorlesungen in der historisch-kritischen Ausgabe der ‘Gesammelten Werke’ kann das Prinzip der ‘freihändigen’ Kompilation eines Haupttextes aus diversen Quellentexten, das [...] von den Herausgebern der ‘Freundesausgabe’ befolgt wurde, allerdings keine Geltung mehr haben. Geboten wird daher in der zweiten Abteilung der ‘GW’, die die Bände 23 bis

Although it is advisable to evaluate the opening volume only after its appearance and the ensuing scholarly echo, and a thorough value-judgment can obviously be made only perspectively, after several volumes have been published, a remark can be made nonetheless: the expression within the quotation marks is very difficult to understand. Since the “test edition” of the lectures and the subsequent debates clearly show that, while the FVA’s way is not a pursuable one, the opposite extreme, the publication of all student notes extant, is nothing more effective or executable either.¹ Firstly because of the material-intellectual-physical overwork, since – as it has been mentioned before – the Hegel Archives possesses approximately ninety lecture notes, and this would entail the publication of almost as many or only a little fewer volumes, while there is hardly enough capacity for such an endeavour. Secondly, this method is also counter-productive, since by this edition it would, so-to-say, “dead edit” its author (“tot edieren”; I shall return to it further on). On the other hand, not all lecture notes extant deserve to be published, that is, not all of them are in a condition to be worth publication. The previously repeatedly considered proposition to edit the notes according to academic years, including the lecture notes of a particular series into one volume (“Jahrgangstexte”) would be too mechanical and inexpedient. Hegel’s teaching activity in Berlin extended to twenty-six semesters, with an average of two lectures per semester, therefore – as far as the sources are improved – we would still be speaking about the edition of sixty or seventy volumes, which is not only too much, but also not justified, since the notes of various years are unevenly documented; some better, others less, yet others very poorly. Moreover, Hegel’s lectures in some years were quite similar. The solution apparently chosen by the second series (deducing from the planned amount of ten volumes) was already formulated by Walter Jaeschke. According to him, the lecture notes referring to one discipline or subject (e.g. metaphysics, philosophy of religion, aesthetics, history of philosophy), coming from subsequent years – and different students – should not be published individually, but compiled into one single – or, if justified (if there are significant conceptual differences between the years), two or three – volume(s) in such a way that the best lecture note is chosen as the “lead text” (“Leittext”), while the other notes – from the same year but different author, or adjacent years but on similar subject – will serve as control or complementary texts (“Kontrolltext”, “Ergänzungstext”), and will appear in footnotes or attachments, or in the textual critical apparatus. The edition of the lectures is organized thus around “year’s texts” (“Jahrgangstexte”), where one volume integrates several years’ texts. This edition technique will make possible the publication of the thirteen preserved notes in logic in three or four volumes.

The sketched proposition is felicitous, but its success depends on the fortunate encounter of too many contingent circumstances. It is a question, first of all, whether the preserved lecture notes will fall in line with the concept. What happens if several lectures notes can rightfully claim to be “lead texts”, or the opposite: none seems worthy

31 umfassen wird, *der authentische Wortlaut aller erhaltenen Nachschriften* zu den von Hegel gehaltenen Vorlesungen, um der Forschung ein sicheres Fundament zu geben.” (Emphasis by I.F.M.)

¹ For the followings, see: Walter Jaeschke, “Probleme der Edition der Nachschriften von Hegels Vorlesungen,” *Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 3 (1980): 51–63, 53–59.

of it? Then: the criteria for establishing the “lead text” are not clear or clearly identifiable. Otto Pöggeler was apparently right to claim that various notetakers (“Nachschreiber”) could work together, exchange their notes, or copy from each other.¹ Thus, if for example three of a lecture’s five extant notes are highly consistent with each other, it is still no evidence for their authenticity. Be it as it may, the publisher’s assurance that the second series of the GW will yield the “authentic wording of all extant lecture notes” is quite obscure and unfounded; one can hardly explain what an “authentic wording” would mean here, and especially, how this latter would refer to “all” lecture notes.

At any rate, the integrated (combined) edition of the lectures by years, although maintaining the critical attitude towards compilation, seems to make steps in the direction of the FVA’s concept of Hegel’s “system”. In addition to this, the ambition of competing with the FVA also seems to remain in the background, and this way the role of the lectures in the integrated edition (dramatically stressed before) diminishes or loses its importance as well. While the lectures were contained in more than half of the FVA’s volumes, the second series of the GW, in contrast to the twenty-two volumes of the first series, will publish the lectures in only ten volumes.

Despite the grouping into thematic units, the edition based on combined years’ texts is still highly reclining on the principle of evolution history, stresses Jaeschke.² Ever since Dilthey, the perspective of evolution history is a recurrent keyword of Hegel-editions. I have been arguing earlier (section I.3.) that the new, modern Hegel-edition, the GW does not lack the traces of the philosophical spirit and worldview of the age either, only that it expresses it differently than the FVA, and that it is precisely the evolutionary perspective which is the leading motif of expressing the spirit of the age. Since the main subject of this paper is the relationship of philology and philosophy or philology and hermeneutics – the thesis that the establishment of the text and the edition of the text, or the critical and lifework-editions in general, do not happen in a space void of interpretation or above history – it will not be superfluous to return to this question in the concluding part of this summary of the history of Hegel’s edition (which has hopefully illustrated this relationship in several different ways).

I.9. The critical reflections about the “complete” and the “real” Hegel have constituted the overture of the GW – as discussed in part I.1. – in the sense that the FVA contained neither the one, nor the other.³ Which Hegel is the “real” Hegel – that is, the tacit assumption that the “real” Hegel will be contained in the lifework edition drawn up on the basis of the evolutionary Hegel-image, and not in the disciples’ edition – is not at all a trivial, self-evident question: and to its greatest part is dependent on *philosophical* considerations on *truth*. At any rate, the *real/true* Hegel for the disciples may well have been the systematic Hegel, the Hegel of the FVA. They could argue this on the basis of the philosophical concepts and authority of their master. For – we have heard it – “the

¹ Otto Pöggeler, “Nachschriften von Hegels Vorlesungen,” *Hegel-Studien* 26 (1991): 121–175, 158.

² Walter Jaeschke, “Probleme der Edition der Nachschriften von Hegels Vorlesungen,” *Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 5 (1980): 58.

³ See Friedhelm Nicolin, “Probleme und Stand der Hegel-Edition,” 118. Part of the researchers took then over this characterization. See e.g. Wigger, “75 Jahre kritische Hegel-Ausgaben,” 103.

truth is the whole.” “The true shape in which the truth exists can only be its scientific *system*.” Obviously, it is possible to come out with other kinds of philosophical concepts on truth, but these will be just as debatable as all philosophical concepts in general. It is a naivety to believe that the rhetoric on the “real” Hegel could find itself a stable ground outside philosophy, and thus could feel exempted (as some kind of ultimate truth) from philosophical discussion. It can be claimed of course that (the meaning of) truth is different for us today than it was for Hegel or his disciples. Today we understand something else as the “real” Hegel. But this only means that we live in a different age. Still, we do not live in an absolute age either.

The situation is the same with reference to the “complete” Hegel. Similarly to the “real”, Hegel also had his own clear opinion about the “complete”, as apparent from the quoted passages of the *Phenomenology* and his remarks on Schelling. The legitimacy of the modern complaint that the FVA does not contain the “complete” Hegel because it only very selectively draws on the early manuscripts – it consciously puts aside and eliminates the writings which are documents of Hegel’s evolution, while it publishes the Berlin lectures in a highly overestimating manner –, so because its editorial method is highly selective, depends on what we mean by “complete”. The disciples could rightfully believe that they published indeed the “complete” Hegel (“complete” in the sense shown by the quotes), and to this purpose they resorted, wherever necessary, to the method that they are blamed about today: the compilation of manuscripts and lecture notes. Hegel reprehended Schelling for putting forth his developing, shaping thoughts for the wide public instead of waiting until his thoughts had gained their final shape, crystallized, and formed a system. The disciples could have answered: they did not wish to burden or confuse the reader with unnecessary and irrelevant things – as Hegel seems to have thought Schelling did. For them, the missed things: the manuscripts representing the various, consecutive stages of the evolution history of Hegelian thought were definitely not part of the “complete” works (based on the understanding of “complete” mediated to them by the Hegelian system).

Every selection has its criteria – however, this statement is not less valid for the (apparent) lack of any selection. The disciples could have argued against the modern, evolution-historical Hegel-edition by saying that it wants to employ no kind of selection, only taking into consideration the one single, *external* (!) criterion of what Hegel himself (incidentally) submitted for publication and what he had no time to publish, or what manuscripts and notes were preserved – by this, a lifework-edition only betrays (and/or conceals) its own perplexity. Its perplexity regarding the question: what does Hegel’s philosophy consist of? And through this, also the fact is revealed that Hegel’s philosophy does not concern the editors any longer, it does not affect them, it has no live relationship with them any more. (And indeed: the editors of the GW are Hegel-researchers, but they are hardly Hegelians). The “complete” they wished to edit may be said to be nothing else than the accidental empirical set of completely heterogeneous and disparate things,¹ and the obtained result hardly assists the reader in familiarizing

¹ See Friedhelm Nicolin, “Die neue Hegel-Gesamtausgabe,” 310. As to its content, “the fundamental principle of completeness is valid” for the new complete edition. “The edition must contain everything that Hegel ever published in print, or everything that was preserved in his legacy in manuscripts or posthumous editions.” The objective is to “make visible, as much as

him/herself with Hegel, but rather overwhelms and confuses him or her. The editorial uncertainty causes the reader's disorientation. While an edition (seen from the perspective of the disciples) would have the task to undertake a fundamental role in the dispersion of the system – whether or not as an unconquerable fortress –, or at least, as a minimal condition, in raising the interest and sympathy towards it.

At the same time, this reasoning, as it had been mentioned before, is very much present in the attempt to avert the risk of "tot edieren". "There can easily be found basic editorial principles for the edition of the students' notes which so-to-say overwhelm the author by his edition [einen Autor tot zu edieren]," highlighted Jaeschke. "A supposed philological accuracy and thoughtlessness – at least with reference to this problem – are not very far from each other."¹ This latter thesis – as the theoretical formulation of the relationship and inner connections of philology and hermeneutics – can be accepted indeed to the fullest with a pure heart. However, it is worth noting meanwhile: there can be various kinds of reactions to the supposed or real danger outlined; the complete edition of Heidegger, started in 1975 with its over one hundred planned volumes – precisely one hundred and two – and seventy-seven actually published volumes until October 2008, seems to have remained indifferent to it, or wanted to defiantly challenge it.

The need for the evolution-historical image and edition of Hegel, propagated by the spirit of the age and undertaken by the GW together with all other editions following

possible, the thinker's path that Hegel had walked." As Nicolin relates it elsewhere, after reviewing more than one thousand auction catalogues, the number of documents (letters and manuscripts) in Hegel's handwriting has raised to approximately one hundred items; at the same time, not much is known about their state of preservation (see Friedhelm Nicolin, "Philologische Aufgaben der Hegel-Forschung," *Heidelberger Hegel-Tage, Hegel-Studien*, Supplement 1, eds. Friedhelm Nicolin and Otto Pöggeler, (1962): 327–337, 331.)

¹ Walter Jaeschke, "Probleme der Edition der Nachschriften von Hegels Vorlesungen," *Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 3 (1980): 56 ("...sich unschwer Prinzipien finden [lassen], um einen Autor tot zu edieren. Vermeintliche editorische Akribie und Gedankenlosigkeit sind – zumindest im Blick auf dieses Problem – eng benachbart"). See also Otto Pöggeler, "Nachschriften von Hegels Vorlesungen," *Hegel-Studien* 26 (1991): 123. "It has been repeatedly claimed that an author can be edited to death [Es ist vielfach darauf hingewiesen worden, daß man einen Autor auch totedieren kann]. With the above mentioned quantity [several dozens of lecture volumes] the loading of the statics and finances of institutions and libraries would become unmanageable. And which doctoral student would then not be right to turn around and run away if he were taken to the inestimable number of volumes with the warning: 'Well, you should read these first.' ("Es ist vielfach darauf hingewiesen worden, daß man einen Autor auch totedieren kann. Mit der genannten Quantität an Büchern würde die Belastung der Statik und die Finanzen der Institute und Bibliotheken untragbar. Und welcher Doktorand würde nicht mit guten Gründen fortlaufen, wenn man ihn vor die unübersichtliche Zahl der Bände führte mit der Mahnung: »Lesen Sie das erst einmal.«") See also Otto Pöggeler, "Die historisch-kritische Edition in der Wissenschaftsorganisation," *Buchstabe und Geist. Zur Überlieferung und Edition philosophischer Texte*, eds. Walter Jaeschke, Wilhelm G. Jacobs and Hermann Krings (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1987), 27–37. Here, 33.: "Is it not possible to edit an author to his death? To close it up by the edition within his coffin in such a way that no doctoral student can access it any longer?" ("Kann man einen Autor aber nicht auch tot edieren, ihn durch eine Edition so einsargen, daß kein Doktorand sich mehr an ihn heranwagt?")

the FVA, reaches back to Dilthey.¹ It is from him that the nearly programmatic famous words derive: “The time of struggling with Hegel has come to an end, the time of his historical knowledge has arrived. Only this historical perspective will be able to separate the transient and the permanent in Hegel.”² These lines were written in conclusion of the review which Dilthey wrote on the appearance of the two-volume edition, published in 1887 by Karl Hegel, of Hegel’s correspondence as a late supplement of the FVA.³ This publication and its review by Dilthey marks a kind of time limit: the change of a philosophical worldview and spirit of the age which determines and separates two editions. Seen from here, the edition of Hegel’s correspondence is itself a kind of shift: a bridge from the systematic Hegel of the FVA to the historical Hegel. Highly welcoming this latter kind of edition, Dilthey intended to radicalize it; his conclusion projects forth the necessity of accomplishing this task. “We have received these two volumes with great gratitude,” he wrote immediately before the quoted words: “But these make us realize even more the necessity to create, on the basis of the completely new apparatus, the evolution history of Hegel [Entwicklungsgeschichte] by the publication of the more complete abstracts of the manuscripts of his early years, and that this way the nice work once started by Haym – before the opening of the legacy of the romantics and Schelling, and in addition precisely in the time of the struggles with speculative systems – would adequately come to its end.” („Mit lebhaftem Danke haben wir diese beiden Bände aufgenommen. Aber sie können nur unser Bedürfniss um so lebhafter erregen, dass auf

¹ This is also valid for the new, academic edition of the lifeworks of Fichte and Schelling. “Dilthey’s concept on the academic edition of Kant’s Collected writings is the pattern for the basic editorial principles of the historical-critical edition of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel half a century later. The complete processing of the author’s intellectual legacy, the edition within the framework of four series (works, letters, manuscripts, lectures), the chronological organization of the material which makes possible to reconstruct the author’s evolution history, the preservation of historical language use, the documentation of the creation of individual texts, the list of all textual variants, reference to cited places, and objective explanations – these are the most important characteristics taken over from the Kant-edition” (Wolfhart Henckmann, “Fichte – Schelling – Hegel,” *Buchstabe und Geist. Zur Überlieferung und Edition philosophischer Texte*, eds. Walter Jaeschke, Wilhelm G. Jacobs and Hermann Krings [Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1987], 83–115; 83: “Dilthey’s Konzeption der Akademie-Ausgabe von Kants *Gesammelten Schriften* ist das Modell, nach dem noch ein halbes Jahrhundert später die Grundzüge der historisch-kritischen Ausgaben der Werke von Fichte, Schelling und Hegel entworfen worden sind. Vollständige Erfassung der geistigen Hinterlassenschaft des Autors, Einteilung in die vier Reihen der Werke, Briefe, des handschriftlichen Nachlasses und der Vorlesungen, chronologische Anordnung der Materialien, aus der die Entwicklungsgeschichte des Autors abgelesen werden kann, Wahrung der historischen Sprachform, Dokumentation der Entstehung der einzelnen Texte, Verzeichnis aller Textvarianten, Zitatnachweise und Sacherklärungen – dies sind die wichtigsten Standards, die von der Kant-Ausgabe übernommen worden sind”)

² Wilhelm Dilthey, “Briefe von und an Hegel,” in Idem, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 15. *Zur Geistesgeschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts. Portraits und biographische Skizzen. Quellenstudien und Literaturberichte zur Theologie und Philosophie im 19. Jahrhundert*, ed. Ulrich Herrmann, 3rd edition (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1991), 310–316; 316.: “Die Zeit des Kampfes mit Hegel ist vorüber, die seiner historischen Erkenntnis ist gekommen. Diese historische Betrachtung wird erst das Vergängliche in ihm von dem Bleibenden sondern.”

³ *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* I (1888): 289–299.

Grund des neuen vollständigen Apparates eine Entwicklungsgeschichte Hegel's unter Mittheilung ganz ausreichender Auszüge aus den Manuscripten seiner früheren Jahre uns geschenkt werde und so das eins von Haym vor der völligen Eröffnung der Nachlasse der Romantiker und Schelling's, dazu noch in der Zeit des Kampfes mit den speculativen Systemen so schon Begonnene entsprechend vollendet werde.”)

I shall return to Haym soon, but in order to illustrate the differences between the two kinds of age climates, it is worthwhile to return to and dwell on Hegel's age for a while. The description of the age is offered first of all by the plastic summary of Richard Kroner's work.¹ The age of German idealism, dating it from the year of publication of the *Critique of Pure Reason* to the year of publication of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*, wrote Kroner at the beginning of his outstanding work, comprises in fact the four decades between 1781 and 1821. This age is penetrated by a spirit which “is comparable to the eschatological hopes of the forming Christianity; the day of the truth must dawn now or never again; it is at hand, it is our calling to accomplish it.”² In order to illustrate the intellectual climate, Kroner cites Hegel's letter written to Schelling in January 1795: “Let the kingdom of God come, and let us not sit idle.”³ This spirit is similarly represented already in the final lines of Kant's main critical work: “only the way of criticism remains open,” Kant retrospectively summarizes his seminal work. “The readers, if they had enough good will and patience to accompany me on this road, can now judge whether it is possible, if they are willing to contribute, to widen this path into a highway, and turn into reality before the end of our century that what so many centuries could not accomplish, namely to answer those question, to the full satisfaction of the human mind, which have always raised – although to no avail up to now – their desire of knowledge.”⁴ Reading these lines, one may remark: it is evident in this approach that for the representatives of German idealism – and especially for Hegel – these words of Kant sounded as summons. They were extremely willing to widen the path of criticism into a highway, and they tried to give final answers to the questions raising the humans' desire of knowledge. Kroner then illustrates this spirit and the corresponding tone on the basis of various writings of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, but we shall not follow his summarizing any further.

¹ For the followings, see Richard Kroner, *Von Kant bis Hegel*, 2 vols. (Tübingen: Mohr, 1921 and 1924; 2nd edition: 1961), 1 ff.

² “...etwas von dem Hauche der eschatologischen Hoffnungen aus der Zeit des Christentums“ hat; “jetzt oder niemals muß der Tag der Wahrheit anbrechen, er ist nahe, wir sind berufen, ihn herbeizuführen“. We have seen before (in part I.3.) that the tone of the funeral orations delivered at Hegel's death are very much similar to this.

³ Brief Hegels an Schelling v. Ende Januar 1795. In: *Briefe von und an Hegel*, ed. Johannes Hoffmeister, vol. 1 (Hamburg: Meiner 1969), p. 18. “Das Reich Gottes komme, und unsere Hände seien nicht müßig im Schoße!“

⁴ Kant: Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B884: “Der *kritische* Weg ist allein noch offen. Wenn der Leser diesen in meiner Gesellschaft durchzuwandern Gefälligkeit und Geduld gehabt hat, so mag er jetzt urteilen, ob nicht, wenn es ihm beliebt, das Seinige dazu beizutragen, um diesen Fußsteig zur *Heeresstraße* [Italics mine – I.M.F.] zu machen, dasjenige, was *viele Jahrhunderte nicht leisten konnten* [Italics mine – I.M.F.], noch vor Ablauf des gegenwärtigen *erreicht werden* [Italics mine – I.M.F.] möge: nämlich die menschliche Vernunft in dem, was ihre Wißbegierde jederzeit, bisher aber vergeblich, beschäftigt hat, zur völligen Befriedigung zu bringen.

It should be noted at any rate that the period of fifteen years after Hegel's death – the very period while the disciples were editing the FVA – was still reigned by the intellectual climate signalled by Kroner, to such an extent that even Schelling's Berlin lectures in the 1840s unfolded against its background. The way how Hegelians reacted to Schelling's occupation of the Berlin cathedra was reminiscent of the tone of the funeral speeches delivered upon Hegel's death. In his account of Schelling's inaugural speech in Berlin in November 1841, the young – and at that time still very Hegelian – Engels wrote the following: "Our job will be [...] to protect the grave of the great master from vituperations. We shall not refrain from struggle. Nothing can be more desirable for us than to temporarily become *ecclesia pressa* [repressed church]. Here the souls part. That which is true, will resist to the ordeal of fire, that which is false, we shall gladly miss it from among ourselves. [...] the youth has never poured in such a great number under our flags, the thought that reigns over us has never unfolded with such richness, the courage, sensibility, talent has never been on our side as much as it is now. Therefore we shall boldly confront the new enemy [...]"¹ In his brochure published one year later, Engels also wrote lines which mirrored the contemporary influence of the FVA and which are worth cited here because, according to my knowledge, they have not been put to use yet from the point of view of FVA's philology and reception history, although possibly so from other points of view. "When Hegel died in 1831 and left his system as heritage to his students, their number was relatively small. [...] His writings taken in public [...] could only count on the small number and biased audience of scientists. [...] But it was when Hegel died, that his philosophy started its true life. The edition of his complete works, and especially his lectures had an immense influence. New gates were opened to that hidden, wonderful treasure that lay in the silent cave of the mount [...] At the same time the teaching gained a more human, more approachable form on the lips of Hegel's disciples."²

¹ Friedrich Engels, "Schelling über Hegel," *Telegraph für Deutschland*, no. 107, December 1841 (signed Friedrich Oswald); also see in: Karl Marx – Friedrich Engels, *Werke*, supplementary volume: *Schriften, Manuskripte, Briefe bis 1844*, second part (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1982), 163–170; 169. ("Unsere Sache wird es sein, [...] des großen Meisters Grab vor Beschimpfungen zu schützen. Wir scheuen den Kampf nicht. Uns konnte nichts Wünschenswerteres geschehen, als für eine Zeitlang *ecclesia pressa* [unterdrückte Kirche] zu sein. Da scheiden sich die Gemüter. Was echt ist, bleibt im Feuer bewährt, was unecht ist, vermissen wir gern in unseren Reihen. Die Gegner müssen uns zugestehen, daß niemals die Jugend so zahlreich zu unsern Fahnen strömte, niemals der Gedanke, der uns beherrscht, sich so reich entfaltete, Mut, Gesinnung, Talent so sehr auf unserer Seite war als jetzt. So wollen wir denn getrost aufstehen gegen den neuen Feind [...].")

² Friedrich Engels, "Schelling und die Offenbarung. Kritik des neuesten Reaktionsversuchs gegen die freie Philosophie," in Karl Marx – Friedrich Engels, *Werke*, Ergänzungsband: *Schriften, Manuskripte, Briefe bis 1844*, Zweiter Teil, Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1982, 171–221; 175. ("Als Hegel im Jahre 1831 sterbend seinen Jüngern das Vermächtnis seines Systems hinterließ, war ihre Zahl noch verhältnismäßig gering. [...] Die Schriften, die er veröffentlicht hatte, [...] konnten [...] nur auf ein geringes, noch dazu präokkupiertes Publikum von Gelehrten rechnen. [...] Als aber Hegel gestorben war, begann seine Philosophie erst recht zu leben. *Die Herausgabe seiner sämtlichen Werke, besonders der Vorlesungen, machte eine unermessliche Wirkung*. Neue Pforten taten sich auf zu dem verborgenen, wundervollen Schatze, der im verschwiegenen Bergesschoße

These lines hardly need any commentary: not only do they stand evidence for the great influence of the FVA through the eyes of a contemporary, but they also show that the effort of this edition, as formulated by Walter Jaeschke in his quoted note, “to present the lecture volumes as a supplement, and directly as a higher-level supplement, to Hegel’s unpublished works”¹ was not at all unsuccessful. In addition, it is not merely incidental that Engels’s writing contains the objection to Schelling quoted above – objection born in an utterly Hegelian spirit – that “in the history of recent philosophy [Schelling] played an important role, but despite any of his initiatives he never offered a finished system, and always postponed coming to grips with science.”²

Schelling’s lecture in Berlin was in Karl Jaspers’s formulation the last occasion for the university to play a decisive role for the public at large, and for philosophy to count as a world-shaping power and event.³ Schelling’s inauguration address was delivered in front of several hundreds of people – the largest auditorium was not large enough, the students threatened to climb in through the windows if they could not get in through the doors (they needed entrance tickets for this)⁴ – among whom there were “university notabilities and the coryphaei of science” and the representatives of “all social statuses, nations, and religions,” “old physicians and priests,” “white-bearded field officers” and “young volunteers.”⁵ The audience comprised contemporary or future intellectual or political personalities such as Alexander von Humboldt, Savigny, Kierkegaard, Bakunin, Lasalle, Leopold von Ranke, Jacob Burkhardt, Droysen, Trendelenburg. Many notabilities sat among the listeners: high ranking state officials, functionaries, officers and high priests. The lecture, so it seemed, caused no disappointment, but lived up to the expectations. As Xavier Tilletie wrote as a summary: “Notabilities and unknown people, admirers and adversaries all declared with little dissent: they had witnessed a great event.”⁶

The increased attention and the eschatological anticipation surrounding philosophy in the age of idealism which preceded and accompanied Schelling’s lecture in Berlin can also be very well perceived in Engels’s description. The militant young Hegelian painted the following picture about the atmosphere preceding Schelling’s occupation of the Berlin cathedra: “If anyone who has the slightest knowledge about the

lag [...]. Zugleich nahm die Lehre im Munde der Schüler Hegels eine menschlichere, anschaulichere Gestalt an [...]”. – *Italics I.M.F.*)

¹ Walter Jaeschke, “Probleme der Edition der Nachschriften von Hegels Vorlesungen,” 57. See note 2 on page 133 above.

² Friedrich Engels, “Schelling und die Offenbarung,” 166. See note 2 on page 120 above on the objection towards Schelling.

³ See Karl Jaspers, “Vom lebendigen Geist der Universität,” in Idem, *Rechenschaft und Ausblick. Reden und Aufsätze* (München: Piper, 1958), 174–217; 197. See also Xavier Tilletie, *Schelling. Biographie* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2004), 400 f. Arsenyij Gulüga: *Schelling* (Budapest: Gondolat, 1987), 292 f.

⁴ Kuno Fischer, *Schellings Leben, Werke und Lehre. Geschichte der neuern Philosophie*, vol. 7, 2nd edition (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1899), 244.; Xavier Tilletie, *Schelling. Biographie*, 402.

⁵ Friedrich Engels, “Schelling über Hegel,” 162 f. For the followings see also: Gulüga, *Schelling*, 292; Kuno Fischer, *Schellings Leben, Werke und Lehre*, 244; Xavier Tilletie: *Schelling. Biographie*, 402.

⁶ Xavier Tilletie, *Schelling. Biographie*, 401.

power of the intellect over the world was asked now in Berlin which is the battlefield where the fight for the reign over Germany's political and religious public opinion, that is, over Germany itself is going on, then he would answer: this battlefield is on the university, and precisely in lecture room 6, where Schelling holds his lectures on the philosophy of revelation."¹ Schelling of course, writes Jaspers, similarly to his contemporaries, lived with the awareness of the turn of the age, moreover, "together with all those intellects whom he had met in Jena, his thinking was penetrated not merely by the awareness of a new age, but outright of a turning point in world history."² The awareness of the turning point, the eschatological expectation of the coming of a new age is very much present in Schelling as well – this awareness will then survive in a modified form in Marx's thinking as well.

This short panorama shows how the spirit of idealism permeated not only the thinking of the idealists and Hegel, but – more importantly in the current context – also the disciples' self-interpretation of their task – perceived as a mission – to edit and publish Hegel's works. Compared to this, the age characterized by the collapse of German idealism – to borrow the title of Paul Ernst's influential book published after the first World War³ – which marked the second half of the 19th century, only found its way to Hegel – if at all – in a historical approach. This approach is best signalled by the title of the first significant work of the literature on Hegel, Rudolf Haym's book published in 1857: *Hegel und seine Zeit*.⁴ Hegel's work is represented in the context of *its own* age and evolution – that is: not *our* age, but the age of Haym. Hegel must be understood starting from his own age – in the background of this harmless and benevolent, and seemingly natural requirement lies the recognition: if we start out from our own age, we find no ways to him. Dilthey also stressed in his cited review: "Haym newly processed the manuscripts of the legacy, and was the first to present the inner evolution history [Entwicklungsgeschichte] of his system."⁵ And indeed: as Haym wrote in the introduction, his purpose was not dogmatic, his work "wishes to offer the objective

¹ Friedrich Engels, "Schelling über Hegel," 162 f.: "Wenn ihr jetzt hier in Berlin irgendeinen Menschen, der auch nur eine Ahnung von der Macht des Geistes über die Welt hat, nach dem Kampfplatze fraget, auf dem um die Herrschaft über die öffentliche Meinung Deutschlands in Politik und Religion, also über Deutschland selbst, gestritten wird, so wird er auch antworten, dieser Kampfplatz sei in der Universität, und zwar das Auditorium Nr. 6, wo Schelling seine Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Offenbarung hält."

² Karl Jaspers, *Schelling. Größe und Verhängnis* (Munich und Zürich: Pieper, 1986; unchanged reprint of the 1955 edition), 253: "[Schelling lebte] mit all den Geistern, die sich in Jena trafen, im Bewußtsein nicht nur der Heraufkunft einer neuen Zeit, sondern einer weltgeschichtlichen Wende. Sie denken und dichten in dem Sinne, diese Wende zu sein und sie zu prägen."

³ Paul Ernst, *Der Zusammenbruch des deutschen Idealismus* (München: Georg Müller, 1918; 2nd edition 1931). See also: Gadamer, *Neuere Philosophie I: Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger*, in GW, Vol. 3, (Tübingen: Mohr, 1987), 249; Heidegger, EM, 34 f, GA, 32: 57; SA, 7.

⁴ Rudolph Haym, *Hegel und seine Zeit. Vorlesungen über Entstehung und Entwicklung, Wesen und Werth der hegel'schen Philosophie* (Berlin: Verlag von Rudolf Gaertner, 1857), 2.; (expanded edition: Leipzig: Wilhelm Heims, 1927).

⁵ Wilhelm Dilthey, "Briefe von und an Hegel," in Idem, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 15, 310: "Haym [...] hat von neuem die nachgelassenen Manuskripte Hegels durchgearbeitet und zuerst eine innere Entwicklungsgeschichte des Systems gegeben."

history” of Hegelian philosophy rather than a presentation of its parts or a criticism or polemics in the usual meaning of the word; and although presentation and criticism are also part of his intentions, he still strives to prepare the ground for both “in a historical way”, “by discussing the origins and evolution” of this philosophy. “Nobody would dare state today – unless he was completely anachronistic or blind – that this system would still rule over life and science as it once used to.”¹ However, a philosophical system can only be overthrown by another system, writes Haym (of course this idea shows very much the influence of the Hegelian concept of system), a mental edifice cannot be demolished by mental fragments. There is no shortage of course of pretenders for the vacant throne. On the other hand, “the truth is [...] that the realm of philosophy has remained today altogether without a leading philosophy, it is now in a state of disintegration and chaos.”²

The state of disintegration and chaos favours the unfolding and flourishing of historical interest, which is born in fact with the decline of system philosophy, gradually taking its place. As Haym clearly claims, the interests of the modern age no longer favour spirit: whether poetry or philosophy. “The fall of Hegelian philosophy is in connection with a general fatigue of philosophy.” Our age is no longer an age of philosophical systems, but much rather one of technical discoveries: “the emotional and mental world of the previous decade is separated from ours by a sharply traced division line.”³

As long as the spirit of the age has fallen out of the range of the reception history of Hegelian philosophy, it can only approach Hegel in a historical way. This is the confrontation of reception history and historicism. If something no longer stands in the reception history of something previous, than this something can only be accessed in a historical way – this is the age of the flourishing of historicism. Because historicism, as Gadamer argues, tears the threads connecting the present to the past; and it tries to find its way historically in the second run to something that it has ceased all living relations

¹ Haym, *Hegel und seine Zeit*, p. 3: “Niemand, es müßte denn ein ganz Zurückgebliebener oder ein ganz Blinder sein, wagt zu behaupten, daß dieses System noch heute Leben und Wissenschaft beherrsche, wie es sie beherrscht hat.”

² Rudolph Haym, *Hegel und seine Zeit*, 2. (expanded ed.: 2–4.) (“An Prätendenten, es ist wahr, auf den leer gewordenen Thron ist kein Mangel. [...] Die Wahrheit ist [...], daß sich das Reich der Philosophie im Zustande *vollkommener Herrenlosigkeit*, im Zustande der Auflösung und Zerrüttung befindet”).

³ Ibid., 5 f. (“Der Verfall der Hegel’schen Philosophie steht im Zusammenhang mit der *Ermattung der Philosophie überhaupt*. [...] Wie durch einen scharfgezogenen Strich ist die Empfindungs- und Ansichtswelt des vorigen Jahrzehnts von unserer gegenwärtigen getrennt.”) “It can be said, and it was said indeed,” writes a contemporary writer, “that a humanist education [...] had become anachronistic by the second half of the 19th century [...], since that was the period of the technical revolution, of industrialization – an unprecedented event which transformed Europe within a very short time more profoundly than anything that had been accomplished as the works of humans in the course of the preceding three millennia.” (Manfred Fuhrmann, *Bildung. Europas kulturelle Identität* [Stuttgart: Reclam, 2002], 32: “Man kann sagen und hat gesagt, dass die humanistische Bildung schon im 19. Jahrhundert [...] ein Anachronismus gewesen sei, fand doch damals die technische Revolution, die Industrialisierung statt, ein beispielloser Vorgang, der Europa in kürzester Zeit mehr veränderte als alles Menschenwerk in den drei Jahrtausenden, die vorausgegangen waren.”)

with in the first run. The connection to tradition – the creative furthering of tradition – will be replaced by the ambition of its objective (historical) knowledge. This latter means, even in its starting point and objective, the elimination of any connection. Historical consciousness, as Gadamer writes, dissolves the living relation of life, it creates a distance towards history,¹ it places within brackets “the primary role of that life reference that tradition means for the present age,”² “reflects itself out of the life reference connected to tradition.”³ By this, historical consciousness enforces tradition, but only “historically”, that is, in its own otherness, and not as something that has an effect over us and continues in us.

It is worth following Gadamer’s representation a little longer, since his description is fully appropriate to picture the change of the spirit of the age in which the relating to Hegel went through a basic transformation; – it is so appropriate that one might think that it may have been particularly this change that he had in view when formulating his assessment of historicism. In addition, it is also not incidental that, when describing this change, the reference to Dilthey is repeatedly uttered in an authoritative way. “Just like the *strangeness* which the mechanical age felt against nature as natural world, was epistemologically expressed in the concept of self-consciousness and its? clear and well articulated [...] rules,” he writes, “the same way 19th-century intellectual sciences felt a similar strangeness towards the historical world. The intellectual creations of the past [...] no longer belong to the self-evident content of the present, but they are objects which must be researched, givennesses by which the past can be represented. Thus Dilthey is also guided by the concept of givenness when he forms the concept of experience.”⁴ In his obituary written on Wilhelm Scherer, Dilthey stresses that Scherer’s method was guided by the spirit of natural sciences. He tried to explain why Scherer submitted so much to the influence of English empiricism: ‘He was a modern man, and the world of our ancestors has no longer been a home for his spirit and heart, but a historical object.’”⁵ Dilthey’s last statement could be regarded more or less as a self-characterization or self-interpretation as well.

¹ Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Hermeneutik I. Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik. Gesammelte Werke* Bd. 1, Tübingen: Mohr 1999, p. 12f.

² Ibid., 201.: “Vorgängigkeit des geschichtlichen Lebensbezugs, den die Überlieferung für die Gegenwart darstellt”.

³ Ibid., 366.

⁴ Ibid., 70f.: “Hatte die Fremdheit, die das Zeitalter der Mechanik gegen die Natur als natürliche Welt empfinden mußte, ihren erkenntnistheoretischen Ausdruck in dem Begriff des Selbstbewußtseins und der [...] Gewißheitsregel der klaren und distinkten Perzeption, so empfanden die Geisteswissenschaften des 19. Jahrhunderts eine ähnliche *Fremdheit* gegenüber der geschichtlichen Welt. *Die geistigen Schöpfungen der Vergangenheit [...] gehören nicht mehr zu dem selbstverständlichen Inhalt der Gegenwart, sondern sind der Erforschung aufgegebenen Gegenstände, Gegebenheiten, aus denen sich eine Vergangenheit vergegenwärtigen läßt.* So ist es der Begriff des Gegebenen, der auch Diltheys Prägung des Erlebnisbegriffes leitet.”⁴ [Italics I.M.F.]

⁵ Ibid., 12. See Wilhelm Dilthey, Vom Anfang des geschichtlichen Bewußtseins. Jugendaufsätze und Erinnerungen, in Idem, *Gesammelte Schriften*, ed. Erich Weniger, vol. 11 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1988), 244: “Er war ein moderner Mensch, und die Welt unserer Vorfahren war nicht mehr die Heimat seines Geistes und seines Herzens, sondern sein geschichtliches Objekt.”

Now it is hardly a mistake to say: the statement that “*The intellectual creations of the past [...] no longer belong to the self-evident content of the present*” is perfectly valid for Hegel, or rather, it is primarily valid precisely for Hegel. Hegel’s “intellectual creation no longer belongs to the self-evident content of the present,” Hegel’s world – “is no longer a *home*, but as *historical object* for the spirit and heart” of his descendants – the second half of the 19th century and the new editions starting from Dilthey’s directive. The strangeness towards it is a new and living experience; therefore one should not primarily fight for it – stand up for it or turn against it and confront it –, but *get to know* it first. Get to know – this means: we do not actually know it, it is strange for us. Strangeness means: the living life connection has broken. If we struggle with something – whether for it or against it – then we know it. Therefore Dilthey’s directive is more painful for a Hegelian (as for instance Lukács and the majority of 20th-century Hegelian Marxism) than any attack of Hegel’s adversaries against the master. Who is attacked, is alive and living. What they want to get to know, becomes (already only) a *historical object*. Gadamer’s formulation characterizes with utmost precision that intellectual climate the comprehensive horizon of which has outlined, starting from the second half of the 19th century, the new coordinates of relating to Hegel: “The intellectual creations of the past [...] no longer belong to the self-evident content of the present, but they are objects which must be researched, givennesses by which the past can be represented.” („Die geistigen Schöpfungen der Vergangenheit [...] gehören nicht mehr zu dem selbstverständlichen Inhalt der Gegenwart, sondern sind der Erforschung aufgegebenen Gegenstände, Gegebenheiten, aus denen sich eine Vergangenheit vergegenwärtigen läßt.“)

It is this spirit which creates and pervades the background and – explicit or implicit, conscious or unconscious – precondition for the need for new, “evolution historical” Hegel-editions. For Dilthey, writes the modern Hegel-researcher, “Hegel’s system became historical; the sketches of the young Hegel must not be regarded as half-finished pre-stages of the system but as independent concepts. This maxim is valid for any later evolution historical [entwicklungsgeschichtlich] interpretation of the young Hegel.”¹ From this point on it is evident what Theodor Haering clearly claimed at the end of the 1930s: to be a Hegel-researcher and a Hegelian researcher are two different things. Haering settled it from the very beginning: “he shares Hegel’s basic point of view under no circumstances,” he is “not a Hegelian in any sense”; his purpose is “a step-by-step representation of Hegel’s evolution.” Hegel’s philosophy is for contemporary people like that of the Egyptians or Babylonians: they are the crucial sources of every future philosophy, but they are “an unknown and unapproachable realm” for the modern age.²

¹ Klaus Düsing, “Jugendschriften,” in *Hegel. Einführung in seine Philosophie*, ed. Otto Pöggeler (Freiburg/München: Alber, 1977), 28–42; 28: “Hegels System ist historisch geworden; die Entwürfe des jungen Hegel dürfen daher nicht nur als unfertige Vorstufen des Systems, sondern müssen als eigenständige Konzeptionen betrachtet werden. Diese Maxime gilt auch für alle späteren entwicklungsgeschichtlichen Interpretationen des jungen Hegel”.

² Theodor Haering, *Hegel. Sein Wollen und sein Werk. Eine chronologische Entwicklungsgeschichte der Gedanken und der Sprache Hegels* (2 vols., Leipzig and Berlin: B.G. Teubner, 1929 and 1938; reprinted: Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1979), vol. 1, VII, 1.

At the same time, reversely, Dilthey also characterized with similar precision the difference between the Hegel-disciples' relation to Hegel and his own age's changed relation to the philosopher. As he wrote at the beginning of his cited review, "Since these disciples were completely permeated by the historical influence of the [Hegelian] system, they could attain, without any kind of a schoolmaster's pedantry, such an influence of his legacy which equalled that of books."¹ The statement of the first part of the sentence is very likely highly pertinent and true. The disciples "were completely permeated by the historical potency of the system": the FVA was fully born in the swirl of the reception history of Hegelian thinking.² Posterity however only sought its way to Hegel in a "historical" way, the fascination stopped: the new text editions, the collection and edition of extant manuscripts and lecture notes are nothing else than the products of this search, of the access via the "historical" way.³

This part can be concluded with the following remark. It had become clear by the 1950s that even the ever so honourable efforts of individual researchers would not suffice to complete the tasks of a new Hegel-edition, as claimed in the introduction; there is a need for an institutional background and synchronized teamwork. We may now add to this: it seems that one generation is not enough even for a whole team, several are needed.

¹ Wilhelm Dilthey, "Briefe von und an Hegel," in Idem, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 15, 310. ("Wie diese Schüler von dem Gefühl der geschichtlichen Wirkungskraft des Systems noch ganz erfüllt waren, haben sie ohne schulmeisterische Pedanterie dem Nachlass eine Wirkung, die der von Büchern gleich käme, zu geben gewusst ...")

² Dilthey's formulation here is melancholic and distanced. The disciples "were completely pervaded by the historical potency of the system": whoever uses this formulation, hardly stands himself any more in the catchment area of this potency. The one who does would hardly say: "I am pervaded by this or that potency". He would rather feel – just as Hegel's students might have felt – that they are touched by the truth (and not by the potency of one or another philosophical system).

³ Of course, the chances of this access are hardly any better than the success of the research of Jesus's life (*Leben-Jesu-Forschung*) with the historical-critical method – that is, quite low. Seen from here, the differentiation between Jesus of the faith and the historical Jesus approximately corresponds – *mutatis mutandis* – to the differentiation between Hegel of the system and the historical Hegel. Jesus is just as difficult to be found in a merely historical way as Hegel. Moreover, so it seems, Hegel himself was also aware of the drawbacks of the historical-critical research of Jesus's life. "If faith wishes to draw from history the mode of founding or at least justifying its content of which the Enlightenment speaks," wrote Hegel in his *Phenomenology*, "and seriously believes at and behaves as if the whole matter depended on it, then it had already had himself be seduced by the Enlightenment; and his efforts to found or enforce himself in such a way only prove his contamination" (*The Phenomenology of Spirit*, 286.) Otto Pöggeler referred to the negative effect of the historical, or rather evolution-historical life-work editions when he remarked that "No matter how important the edition of the classics may be – they ruin our relationship to philosophy: they refer the thoughts of a "great" philosopher from an evolution-historical point of view only to the complete life-work, and not primarily to the thing itself." (Otto Pöggeler, "Die historisch-kritische Edition in der Wissenschaftsorganisation," *Buchstabe und Geist. Zur Überlieferung und Edition philosophischer Texte*, eds. Walter Jaeschke, Wilhelm G. Jacobs and Hermann Krings [Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1987], 27–37, 37.)

II.

At first, we started out from the thesis that establishing the text is a first step in the traditional (philological-positivist) conception, then as a second steps follows the interpretation of the textual variant established and put forth as a result of philological work. One of the basic theses of this present work is that the establishment of the text does not happen under laboratory conditions, as if in a space void of interpretation, and that thus philology and hermeneutics are multiply intertwined.

A traditional difficulty in establishing the text is itself of a philological origin, insofar as – in order to establish the text – the philological-textual critical work going back to the edition history of a particular text must often face the fact that some texts were published by their authors in several editions, and thus in several variants which may more or less differ from one another. What is there to do in such cases? Which should then be the canonical text? How can this be established, by restoring [setting-in-place] or producing [setting-forth]?¹

¹ By the above formulation I try to represent (albeit necessarily imperfectly) the German dichotomy of *Feststellen*–*Herstellen*. On their differences see, e.g. Paul Ziche, “Editionswissenschaft: Historisch-kritisches Edieren. Beispiele aus der Akademie-Ausgabe von Schellings Werken,” *Akademie Aktuell. Zeitschrift der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* vol. 20, 1 (2007), 27–31; 27.: “Das ‘Herstellen’ oder ‘Feststellen’ eines Textes bildet einen unverzichtbaren Arbeitsschritt einer kritischen Edition. Das setzt voraus, dass vor einer solchen editorischen Feststellung ein Text nicht wirklich feststeht, sondern erst im Prozess des Edierens entsteht. Eine Edition bewahrt oder reproduziert nicht nur etwas bereits Vorliegendes [...]” (“The producing [setting-forth] or establishing [setting-in-place] of a text is an indispensable working stage of a critical edition. This implies the precondition that before such an editorial production the text does not really exist, but it comes into being in the very process of edition. A certain edition does not merely preserve or reproduce something that already exists.”) – The following explanation may be needed for understanding the relationship between “establishment”, “restoration [setting-in-place]” and “production [setting-forth]”. The “establishment” of the text means its determination, fixing, its “setting-in-place”, and in this sense it cannot be clearly separated from “production”, “setting-forth”, which ultimately also leads to some kind of fixation in place: this is a process in which the text is *set* so-to-say from the back to the front, to a certain place, to its own (canonical) place, and as a result it is there now, it stands steady, still, fixed [steht fest] before us. “Setting-forth” as a process should be understood about the same way as a manufacturer *sets forth* a product or the police *sets forth* a suspect: the product did not exist before its production, the suspect existed but had been hiding before, or at least had not been previously found, but now – as he was found and stopped, held back (and probably also arrested) – he is (steadily) held, therefore he can be disposed of, for instance, he can be interrogated (or the product can be sold or used). As a result of setting-forth, setting-in-place they can be localized, they have their *place*: the location of the text set forth is a paper-based manuscript or a printed book, preserved in a library (archive, manuscript collection), the location of the suspect is the prison guarded by the police, the product’s location is the warehouse: the object (or subject) set forth can be adequately delivered, requested and given back. The identity of the person set forth is verified just like that of a product or an established text (textual identity, *Wortlaut*), after which the identity of both is ensured and unchanged. The set-forth is the one who (or which) was sought and, following its identification, it is set in its own place – it is set-in-place (to print or library, to prison or police, to warehouse or store). Incidentally, the German verbs “festhalten” and “festsetzen”, similar to “feststellen” in their meaning of “fixing”, also possess the sense of “capture”, “detain”, “lay down”. The selected example tries to visualize how the “setting-forth” can be at the same time (a sort of) setting-in-

There are several far-reaching questions emerging in relation to this, but within the confines of this paper I shall only present one single example in some detail. Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* is one of the classical works of the history of philosophy, and quite likely one of the most outstanding works of modern philosophy. This work was published in 1781, and a second, revised edition appeared in 1787. Kant wrote an utterly new preface to this second edition, he kept the introduction, but significantly extended it, and reworked the text itself as well in some of its parts – among others, in the section on transcendental aesthetics –, and almost completely rewrote the chapter on transcendental deduction; except for two introductory parts, the thirty-five pages long part of the first edition was now replaced by forty new pages of text, and he also made other essential changes to the text of the first edition.¹

During the time elapsed since Kant's death, each and every edition or translation of Kant's work has necessarily had to face the problem of which edition's text to reproduce (or which to take as the basis for translation), or simply how to deal with the problem of the two editions. The path taken by the edition of the Prussian Royal Academy of Sciences in 1911, that they published the texts of both editions in separate volumes (as volumes three and four of the academic edition) is evidently only open for an academic edition; however, not even this is perfect, since – as attention has been drawn to it, arguably quite legitimately – this edition makes it highly difficult to

place as well; however, there is a difference in this process between the production of a product (*Herstellen*) and the “detainment” (*Feststellen, festsetzen*) of the suspect, inasmuch as the former comes into being in the course of its production, while the latter already existed before it, while still it comes into being in the real sense through its “production”, its “setting-forth”, that is, it changes its mode of being, it changes its legal status, the same as the text of a critical edition also becomes “canonical” only after its establishment.

¹ On the differences of the two editions, see for example part V. of the thorough introduction of the translators in the new English edition (Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. and ed. Paul Guyer and Allan Wood [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998], 66–73, mainly 70ff.) See also Wolfgang Carl, “Die transzendente Deduktion in der zweiten Auflage,” in *Immanuel Kant: Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. Klassiker Auslegen vols. 17–18, eds. G. Mohr and M. Willaschek (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1998), 189–216; 189: “For the second edition of the *Critique*, Kant completely rewrote the section on the transcendental deduction of pure rational concepts. Although Kant himself only spoke about corrections made only in the “representation”, the two formulations clearly differ from each other in their content as well.” See also: Wolfgang Carl, *Die transzendente Deduktion in der ersten Auflage der Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Ein Kommentar* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1992) and Hansgeorg Hoppe, “Die transzendente Deduktion in der ersten Auflage,” in *Immanuel Kant: Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, 159–188. Furthermore, see also: Dieter Sturma, “Die Paralogismen der reinen Vernunft in der zweiten Auflage,” in *ibid.*, 391–411; 392: “Kant called the reworked parts of the second edition only ‘the change of the way of representation’. [...] This reference suggests that the A- and B-paralogisms differ just in stylistic issues. This setting is not satisfactory if only for the reason that despite any emphatic formulations, B-paralogisms are still not exempt from redundancies and obscurities, which attests that the ‘change of the way of representation’ could have had other motifs as well. However, if we look at the entirety of B-paralogisms, we shall have the impression that the way of argumentation has also changed here.”

compare the individual text fragments in the two editions.¹ Apart from this, the academic edition is not even unbiased, since the editorial method still betrays some kind of tacit preference. Seemingly, the publication in two separate volumes does not take sides as to which of the two editions has a better (canonical? final?) text. However, the problem of the succession of the texts, that the third volume of the academic edition contains the full text of the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, while the fourth volume contains the text of the first edition, in a reverse chronological order; and that the text of the first edition printed in volume four is not complete and lasts only until Kant had no longer altered the text (namely, it contains nearly half of the complete text, so in comparison with the 552 pages of the second edition printed in the third volume, the fourth volume only counts 252 pages): this double editorial decision tacitly yet clearly commits itself to the second edition, while considering the first interesting only in a philological and historical respect. This editorial method clearly suggests: the canonical text is the text of the second edition, the first is only auxiliary in relation to the second for the sake of completeness (which a critical edition must always bear in mind) as a textual variant, and it can be of interest as such – as a historical or philological addition.

We cannot discuss in detail all the solutions attempted by various Kant-editions in the past more than two hundred years. It is enough to say that – although there have been attempts to avoid the forced either–or choice (the decision to rely mainly on the text of either the first, or the second edition), that is, attempts at the associated typographical reproduction of both editions in some form,² which, besides its advantages, also has its drawbacks or even pitfalls – the most common or typical solution is, these days as well, to take the second edition as the main text and to reproduce the first edition's differences either in the notes or (in case of lengthier differences) elsewhere, mostly in appendices or following the corresponding text or the second edition (this method was followed by both Hungarian editions, too.)³

There are two considerations worth taking into account about this solution. Firstly, Kant himself wrote at the end of the preface to the second edition that he made no changes concerning the essence, that is, matters of content, compared to the first

¹ Paul Guyer and Allan Wood, "Introduction to the *Critique of Pure Reason*," in Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 74.

² See for instance the 1877 Kehrback edition's revised 1924 version by Raymund Schmidt, and its unaltered reprint in 1979 (Leipzig: Reclam). This edition uses the alternation of Gothic and Latin letters according to well-defined criteria, in combination with a two-columned typesetting in an attempt to simultaneously reproduce the texts of both editions and this way, as can be read in the preliminary note, "it can be used as an original textual variant for both the first and the second editions" (p. VI.)

³ Wilhelm Weischedel, the editor of the currently most used twelve-volume *Werkausgabe*, repeatedly reprinted since 1968, summarized the main guidelines of the Kant-interpretations of just the past two hundred years when he wrote in his editorial afterword: "The second edition mostly revised and altered by Kant himself is preferred in the establishment of the text; the differences in the first edition [...] will be indicated in the notes [...]. Where Kant had modified lengthier fragments, [...] there both formulations will be printed successively." (Kant, *Werke in zwölf Bänden, Theorie-Werkausgabe*, ed. Wilhelm Weischedel [Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1974], vol. 4, 716 f.)

edition, but he improved the mode of presentation, he changed the formulation in several misleading places, and hopefully made thus his ideas intelligible. However, were these indications not there, it could still be intuitively acknowledged and accepted: if an author publishes his work anew years after its first edition in a revised version, then he must evidently think that its text is an improved, corrected variant, therefore it should be considered as the final version to be reproduced in the future. So – beyond Kant's concrete case – it has become, in a sense, a rule of edition technique that the last text version published in an author's lifetime should be considered the authentic text. Editors thus, writes Wilhelm G. Jacobs in comment to this thesis, so to speak fulfil the deceased's last will: if a work was published in several editions in its author's lifetime then the editors take the last edition as a basis, as the last word of the deceased with respect to the matter.¹

Obviously, the textual variant eventually chosen for printing significantly determines the subsequent interpretation, including the reception history. Conversely, it is also valid: the interpretation – insofar as it must decide which text to publish, which variant it considers worthy of print – anticipates the textual edition, precedes it. At any rate, textual edition and interpretation go hand in hand. Those who take as a basis the text of the second edition – this group is more numerous in the reception history of Kant's work – naturally accept the interpretation that the second edition is better and clearer than the first: the new text created by reformulations – on the basis of the reception of the first edition and also in reaction to the judgments and often also misunderstandings published in the reviews written in the meantime – offers a more forceful and consistent presentation of the basic idea of the *Critique*; in other words, it is indeed a "corrected edition".

Nevertheless, it is essential that we must also refer to the exceptions, among whom most important are Schopenhauer and Heidegger. Schopenhauer wrote that he could only understand Kant's main work and he was only able to dissolve the contradictions previously sensed only when he read the work in the first edition already difficult to find at that time. Pages 348–392 of the first edition, which, according to Schopenhauer, contained a brilliant representation of Kant's idealism, disappeared in the second edition, and were replaced by a set of contradictory statements. "By this, the text of the Critique of Pure Reason widely used between 1787 and 1838 became a distorted and spoiled text, and the work itself a self-contradictory book the meaning of which could no longer be clear and comprehensible for anyone."² – said Schopenhauer. For this reason, he felt directly entitled to turn to the reader: "No one should imagine that they know the Critique of Pure Reason and that they are able to create a clear picture of Kant's teaching if they only read the work in the second edition or another edition

¹ Wilhelm G. Jacobs, "Textüberlieferung und historisch-kritische Edition. Typen von Editionen," *Buchstabe und Geist. Zur Überlieferung und Edition philosophischer Texte*, 21–26; 21.

² Arthur Schopenhauer, *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, vol. 1, "Anhang: Kritik der kantischen Philosophie", Idem, *Sämtliche Werke*, ed. Wolfgang Frhr. von Löhneysen (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986), 586 f. ("Dadurch ist denn der Text der »Kritik der reinen Vernunft«, wie er vom Jahr 1787 an bis zum Jahr 1838 cirkulirt hat, ein *verunstalteter und verdorbener* geworden, und dieselbe ein sich selbst widersprechendes Buch geworden, dessen Sinn eben deshalb Niemanden ganz klar und verständlich seyn konnte." [Emphasis mine, I. M. F.]

reproducing the second one; this is completely impossible, since then they only read a mutilated, spoiled, in a sense inauthentic (!) text. It is my duty to determinately say it for everybody's warning."¹ In 1837 Schopenhauer turned to Karl Rosenkranz, Hegel's disciple who edited the complete works of Kant, in a letter asking him to publish Kant's critical main work in its original form, that is, in the first edition. Rosenkranz completed the request in 1838, and by this, according to Schopenhauer, he "gained unsurpassable merits": "he saved the most important work of German literature perhaps from destruction".²

According to Heidegger's interpretation of Kant one of the central parts of the work, the chapter on the deduction of pure rational concepts, in the first edition version reveals the difficulties deriving from the main problematization of the work in a more open and manifest way than the heavily reformulated text of the second edition. What is more: the reason of changing the formulation could have been precisely the fact that Kant recoiled from the difficulties arising around the concept of transcendental imagination and the troubling risks causing the instability of the construct of pure reason; in the second edition he radically reinterpreted the concept of transcendental imagination and strove to reduce its role to a minimum.³ Attention should not be paid to what Kant says but to what happens, what is going on in the course of the new foundation of metaphysics attempted by him. And this happening reveals shrinking back, retreating or recoiling.⁴

Kant searched the connection of the two branches of human cognizance, sensibility as receptivity and passivity, and thinking as activity and spontaneity, in the synthesis of imagination, which he was inclined to interpret in the first edition of the

¹ Ibid., 587. ("Keiner bilde sich ein, die »Kritik der reinen Vernunft« zu kennen und einen deutlichen Begriff von Kants Lehre zu haben, wenn er jene nur in der zweiten, oder einer der folgenden Auflagen gelesen hat; das ist schlechterdings unmöglich: denn er hat nur einen *verstümmelten, verdorbenen*, gewissermaßen *unechten* Text gelesen. Es ist meine Pflicht, Dies hier entschieden und zu Jedermanns Warnung auszusprechen.") [Emphasis mine, I.F.M.]

² Ibid., 587. ("In Folge meiner Vorstellungen [...] hat im Jahre 1838 Herr Professor Rosenkranz sich bewegen gefunden, die »Kritik der reinen Vernunft« in ihrer ursprünglichen Gestalt wieder herzustellen, indem er sie [...] nach der ersten Auflage von 1781 abdrucken ließ, wodurch er sich um die Philosophie ein unschätzbares Verdienst erworben, ja das wichtigste Werk der Deutschen Litteratur vielleicht vom Untergange gerettet hat; und dies soll man ihm nie vergessen.") See also Karl Rosenkranz, *Geschichte der Kant'schen Philosophie*, ed. S. Dietzsch [Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1987; 1st ed. Leipzig: Leopold Voss, 1840], 160.)

³ Cf. Heidegger GA 3, 160ff, 164, 168, 214f; GA 25, 279. Transcendental imagination "is only nominally present" in the second edition, which loses its function of "an individual fundamental ability, which mediates in an original way between sensibility and reason in their possible unity", "its function is taken over by reason" (GA 3, 164 [Die transzendente Einbildungskraft wäre "in der zweiten Auflage nur noch dem Namen nach da"; sie fungiere "nicht mehr als eigenständiges Grundvermögen, das Sinnlichkeit und Verstand in ihrer möglichen Einheit ursprünglich vermittelt", "sein Amt ist dem Verstand übertragen."]; cf. also GA 25, 412).

⁴ The term "recoiling" (Zurückweichen) appears in GA 3, 160, 165, 168, 215, but it also appears already in § 6 of *Time and Being*. (*Sein und Zeit* [Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1979], 23: "Wovor Kant hier gleichsam zurückweicht, das muß thematisch und grundsätzlich ans Licht gebracht werden [...]"). The 1929 Kant-book can be regarded as a detailed exposition of this concise interpretation of Kant raised in a few sentences in Heidegger's capital work.

Critique as an independent spiritual ability, the common root of the two branches.¹ But since imagination was considered to refer to sense perception and time, but this Kant's entire enterprise, the preservation of the "purity" of pure reason, was endangered. This way Kant stopped to follow the path he started, and in the second edition of his work presented a serious reconsideration of the issue of imagination. Led by the ambition to find a new, steady foundation for metaphysics, to base it on the subjectivity of the subject, on "pure reason," what Kant does in fact – writes Heidegger – is precisely to undermine the foundation he has just wanted to lay; he, so-to-say, digs out the earth from underneath it [den Boden weggräbt].² Recoiling is a result of this. Beneath the earth dug out from there an abyss was revealed. Seeing the abyss opening up in front of him while he tried to lay the foundations of metaphysics, Kant recoiled and hurried to cover it over. The reformulated text of the second edition's chapter on deduction is a result of this cover-up attempt.

The traditional – neo-Kantian – claim, that Kant cleared the text of the second edition from the "psychologistic" reminiscences still there in the first one is – according to Heidegger – false from its very beginning. The first is just as little "psychologistic" as the second is "logical".³ Since however neo-Kantianism saw Kant's foremost work and its philosophical accomplishment in the (anti-psychologistic) epistemology founding positive sciences, although in Heidegger's view it is primarily an attempt for the foundation of metaphysics,⁴ it is understandable that the primacy of logic, seen from this perspective, might have seemed an advantage, and therefore the text of the second edition counted as a standard. "That seemingly external question" – writes Heidegger – "whether the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* deserves to be preferred to the first one in its interpretation or it is the other way round, is but a pale reflection of the question decisive for the Kantian foundation of metaphysics and its interpretation: is the transcendental imagination as a foundation strong enough to define in an original way – in its unity and entirety – the finite essence of human subjectivity [...]?"⁵

As an in-depth analysis of the various edition-technical attempts of Kant-editions during the past two hundred years is not our task here, neither is the discussion of two hundred years' interpretations of Kant, nor, in connection with this, the polemical examination of Heidegger's interpretation of Kant, in effect truly suggestive and conceptual indeed. For the purposes of the problem discussed here, a very weak formulation will perfectly suffice. Namely, that Heidegger's interpretation must not be "true" from the point of view of the problem discussed, it is enough that it *may as well* be true in principle – moreover, Kant also knew this strategy, and called it the polemical use of reason.⁶ If it fulfils this condition – and I think it does, what's more, it overfulfils

¹ Cf. Heidegger GA 3, 137ff especially 140; GA 25, 276ff.

² Cf. Heidegger GA 3, 160ff, 214, 217; GA 25, 276ff.

³ Heidegger, GA 3, 170.

⁴ Heidegger seriously contested already in his early lectures, for example in 1921–22, that Kant's accomplishment would have unfolded primarily in the field of epistemology (cf. GA 61, 97).

⁵ Heidegger GA 3, 171.

⁶ "By the polemical use of reason I mean that reason defends its theses against their dogmatic negation. This is not to say that its statements may not be false, only that nobody can state its opposite with apodictic certainty (or even with higher probability)." In extreme cases "we could contrast the pompousness of one party with the – equally legitimate – pompousness of the other, so

it – then it will be able to destabilize the opposing view, its self-evident, complacent self-confidence that it has no alternative. In this case Heidegger's interpretation can destabilize the self-evidence of the thesis which says: "later edition = better edition" or "the text of the later edition = the better (canonical) text", "the later textual variant = the better textual variant". No matter what stance we take in the matter, it is obvious: the choice of one edition to prefer over the other is very much a matter of interpretation. However, this preference depending on interpretation precedes the decision on the choice of the textual variant to be printed, seemingly pertaining only to the competence of philology. That is to say, interpretation, hermeneutics precedes philology.

Heidegger had expounded his preference for the earlier text on other occasions as well, approximately one decade before the appearance of his book on Kant. He premised his first university lecture on the interpretation of the main work of his former professor, the neo-Kantian Rickert, with a short edition-historical survey. He minutely exposed that the first edition of 1892 the *Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis* as a habilitation writing consisted of 91 small-sized pages, but by the third edition in 1915 "a whole new book was born, which already shows on the outside by the fact that it numbers 456 large-sized pages." In the followings, Heidegger turns against Rickert's self-interpretation – just like against Kant's later on: "Rickert says in the foreword of this edition that 'the earlier editions must not be used any more.' The basic idea, as it was formulated in the first edition, should nevertheless be retained, therefore in presenting its short characterization and problem-historical connections I shall primarily refer to the first edition, mainly because Rickert's decisive ideas are expressed in even simpler ways here and they are not burdened immeasurably by several far-flung, lengthy and often over-elaborate critical discussions with unnamed opponents, as it so often happens in the third edition."¹

Somewhat later he stresses again: "[The problem] must be understood in its main tendency, and in such a way as it arises from historical motivation. Therefore [I shall take into consideration] the first edition, despite Rickert's observation."²

that the mind this way would at least be shocked by the attack of the opponent, start to be suspicious about the excessive needs and listen to the voice of criticism" (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A739 f, A757 = B767 f, B785: "Unter dem polemischen Gebrauche der reinen Vernunft verstehe ich nun die Verteidigung ihrer Sätze gegen die dogmatischen Verneinungen derselben. Hier kommt es nun nicht darauf an, ob ihre Behauptungen nicht vielleicht auch falsch sein möchten, sondern nur, daß niemand das Gegenteil jemals mit apodiktischer Gewißheit (ja auch nur mit größerem Scheine) behaupten möchte."). The polemical use of pure reason serves to destabilize the claims pretending to possess the apodictic truth (saying that what I state may have no less right to claim that it is true than what you state), and not to be a true statement itself. This use serves as a defence.

¹ Heidegger, GA 56/57, 178. (Emphasis mine, I.F.M.) "Rickert sagt im Vorwort zu dieser Ausgabe selbst, "die früheren Auflagen sollten nicht mehr benutzt werden". Allerdings ist auch hier der Grundgedanke, wie er in der ersten Auflage gewonnen wurde, festgehalten, und ich werde daher zu seiner kurzen Charakteristik und zur Kennzeichnung des problemgeschichtlichen Zusammenhangs mich zunächst an die 1. Auflage halten, zumal auch deshalb, weil hier die entscheidenden Gedanken Rickerts noch einfacher zum Ausdruck kommen und noch nicht so übermäßig belastet sind mit breit ausladenden, oft umständlichen kritischen Auseinandersetzungen mit ungenannten Gegnern, wie das besonders ausgiebig in der 3. Auflage der Fall ist."

² Ibid., 181. "[Das problem] gilt es in seiner Haupttendenz zu verstehen, und zwar so wie es aus der historischen Motivation sich ergibt. Daher die 1. Auflage, trotz Rickerts Bemerkung."

Heidegger's preference for the first editions in the case of Kant and Rickert is possibly connected with the wider dimensions of his philosophy, namely with the disposition to return to the original, and is prone to regard tradition – the derivative, the subsequent, as a movement which obscures the origin, and distances from it – as decadence, emptiness, decline. According to Heidegger, tradition is characterized precisely by being emptied, levelled, by the fact that it exhausts and the veils over the meaning of the original insights of tradition. "Tradition as it becomes dominant makes that what it 'transmits' primarily and mostly so inaccessible that it much rather obscures it."¹ The Husserlian principle of "back to the things" is transformed at Heidegger into "back to the origins", or "back to the historical beginnings," back to history. Seen from this perspective, the initial, most "original" return to the origins, the new enforcement of the radiating power of the origin is the true beginning of philosophy or philosophizing, it is philosophy itself. Accordingly, philosophers are in fact eternal starters – or rather restarters – whose questions, not accidentally and precisely because of this, are typically directed to the beginnings, to the beginnings of things. No surprise thus that in his second period, Heidegger's intellectual efforts increasingly revolved around a new, "different beginning", "another beginning" ("anderer Anfang") of European philosophy and history. From Heidegger's point of view, of all great things beginning is the greatest, since, as something that cannot be traced back to anything and cannot be deduced from anything, is a mystery utterly resisting understanding, and conceals within itself an inexhaustable richness; one that in all its unfolding or derivation may necessarily mean retrogression, impoverishment, decline.² The *Being and Time* begins with the statement: the question referring to being which stood in the foreground of the thinking of Plato and Aristotle, has fallen into oblivion, became trivial and was reduced to silence. "What they once succeeded, with the greatest effort of thinking and albeit only fragmentarily and as a first attempt, to grasp of phenomena, has long before become trivial."³ Philosophers are thus in fact beginners, who possess "eternal youth".⁴ Reference must also be made to

¹ SZ 21.: "Die hierbei zur Herrschaft kommende Tradition macht zunächst und zumeist das, was sie »übergibt«, so wenig zugänglich, daß sie es vielmehr verdeckt." The product of this approach is the following statement: we are with Kant against Kantianism. (GA 25, 279.)

² Cf. e.g. GA 45, 110, 114, and also the second next note below.

³ SZ 1§. "Und was ehemals in der höchsten Anstrengung des Denkens den Phänomenen abgerungen wurde, wenngleich bruchstückhaft und in ersten Anläufen, ist längst trivialisiert."

⁴ See GA 56/57, 214: [ewige Jugend]. See also Theodore Kisiel's term "incessant beginners" at the end of his study "The Genesis of *Being and Time*," *Man and World* 25 (1992): 35. Heidegger wrote in a letter in 1928: "Philosophizing in fact means nothing else than being a beginner" [Philosophieren heißt am Ende nichts anderes als Anfänger sein] (Rüdiger Safranski: *Ein Meister aus Deutschland. Heidegger und seine Zeit* [Munich and Vienna: Carl Hanser], 1994, 15). Completion: 17. 07. 2010.: a letter dated 30. 05. 1928 to the former rector of the Konradhaus, Matthäus Lang, cited by Hugo Ott, *Martin Heidegger. Unterwegs zu seiner Biographie* (Frankfurt and New York: Campus Verlag, 1988), 53 f. The preceding sentence reads: "Vielleicht zeigt die Philosophie am eindringlichsten, wie anfängerhaft der Mensch ist. Philosophieren heißt am Ende nichts anderes als Anfänger sein." This is only seemingly in contradiction with the claim: "Nun können wir Menschen freilich nie mit dem Anfang anfangen – das kann nur ein Gott –, sondern müssen beginnen, d.h. mit etwas anheben, das erst in den Ursprung führt oder ihn anzeigt." (GA 39, 3f.). Such beginners are characterized by a strong

Heidegger's master, Husserl, who thinks that philosophy "is in its essence a science of the true beginnings",¹ and who, accordingly, established his own philosophical attitude on the level of a "beginner", and considered that "at least at his old age he reached perfect certainty at least for himself about the fact that he could finally call himself a *real* beginner."²

Now, supposedly it may *also* be regarded as a kind of philological ramification or increment of this philosophical approach – phenomenological-hermeneutical, directed to the beginnings – that in the course of his historical interpretations of philosophy, Heidegger sometimes prefers the first edition of the works of certain thinkers. The fact that the philological preference may be connected with philosophical considerations, is embedded into a philosophical background: this may only seem condemnable or detrimental for a positivist conception feeding the illusion of a philology devoid of philosophy. In fact, it is mostly an advantage since the philosophical embeddedness makes itself *visible*, and therefore it makes *possible* its own rational discussion: from a different point of view, for instance from a Hegelian one – for which, as we have seen, "truth is the whole", and the absolute "is only *at the end* what it is" – becomes debatable, polemical. The Hegelian stance as a philosophical stance at the same time, as we have seen, may suggest completely different philological and edition technical consequences, and the edition of the disciples quite accurately accomplished with reference to Hegel's works.

However, it is not necessary to share Heidegger's philosophical point of view – the outlined philosophical background which is supposedly connected to his preference for first editions – in order to take its philological consequences as acceptable or plausible. These consequences are valid in themselves. That is to say, if we do not exclude the supposition that it is theoretically possible that an earlier text may formulate

preference to inquire about the beginnings – i.e. the beginnings of all things, the *arkhai* – since they are reluctant to simply accept that which has been handed down as self-evident (*selbstverständlich*) and lives on in the present. That the particular subject of philosophy is exactly that what appears as self-evident in everyday life, and that philosophy must be able to sight directly a kind of mystery in this alleged self-evidence: these insights had already played a central role for Husserl; see e.g. *Die Idee der Phänomenologie, Husserliana*, vol. 2. ed. W. Biemel (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1973), 19. ("Die Erkenntnis, im natürlichen Denken die allerselbstverständlichste Sache, steht mit einem Mal als Mysterium da"); *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentalen Phänomenologie, Husserliana*, vol. 6. ed. W. Biemel (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1976), 183 ff. ("Von vornherein lebt der Phänomenologe in der Paradoxie, das Selbstverständliche als fraglich, als rätselhaft ansehen zu müssen und hinfort kein anderes wissenschaftliches Thema haben zu können als dieses") etc. Therefore such beginners are sometimes prone to consider the beginning as the greatest, perhaps the greatest of all (future) things. (see e.g. *Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universität. Das Rektorat 1933/34*, ed. H. Heidegger [Frankfurt/Main: Klostermann, 1983], 12; *Einführung in die Metaphysik* [Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1976], 12, 145; GA 5, 64, 327.; GA 34, 15.; GA 45, 110, 114; GA 65, 57.; GA 51, 15). I use the term "beginning" here in the meaning of "Anfang" and not "Beginn" (about this differentiation see GA 39, 1 f; GA 54, 9f).

¹ Edmund Husserl, *Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft*, ed. Wilhelm Szilasi. Frankfurt/M.: Klostermann 1965, p. 71 ("Wissenschaft von den wahren Anfängen").

² Edmund Husserl, "Nachwort zu den Ideen" (1930). *Husserliana* vol. 5, 161. Husserl also added here: his efforts can only be understood and appreciated, his work can only be adequately approached by he "who struggles for the beginning of philosophy" (*ibid.*, 162.).

in a more open and unveiled manner – as if *in statu nascendi* – the thoughts of its author, while it may happen that in a later version the original thought becomes obscured, it is concealed, palled, becomes unrecognizable, or at least it will not remain as directly accessible as it was at its first formulation, then Heidegger's interpretation of Kant would make plausible the *possibility* that in certain cases the earlier version is to be preferred to the subsequent ones. However, in this case it can be said: the statement that the later text is the final, authentic version is thus unfounded and by no means can be generalized. More accurately, it is itself dependent on the acceptance of various philosophical conceptions (e.g. mirroring the Hegelian approach); conceptions which – as philosophical suppositions – are themselves debatable, that is to say, they are not absolute statements beyond any doubt and without any alternative. Whatever may be the case, the historical-critical edition in process of the other two outstanding philosophers of German idealism, Fichte and Schelling, always uses the first edition (Erstdruck) of the writings published in the authors' lifetime, and marks the incidental variations in the notes or the critical apparatus.¹

¹ On Fichte, see: Wolfhart Henckmann, "Fichte – Schelling – Hegel," In *Buchstabe und Geist. Zur Überlieferung und Edition philosophischer Texte*, eds. Walter Jaeschke, Wilhelm G. Jacobs und Hermann Krings (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1987), 83–115, 90. (Henckmann refers to the fact that the Fichte-edition differs in this respect from the complete works of the philosopher edited by his son in eleven volumes. On Schelling, see: Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, *Historisch-kritische Ausgabe der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, eds. Hans Michael Baumgartner, Wilhelm G. Jacobs, Jörg Jantzen, Hermann Krings und Hermann Zeltner, 1st series: *Werke* (Stuttgart – Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog), vol. 1, 1976, 15. On the history of Schelling-editions and the new historical-critical edition see the detailed study of Luigi Pareyson, "La nuova edizione storico-critica di Schelling," *Filosofia*, Nuova Serie XXX/1 (1979), 45–90. Due to the influence of certain observations of Pareyson and some other reviews written in the meantime, the edition technical principles of the Schelling-edition went through some changes between the first and second volumes. These deserve to be presented in some more detail since they offer insight into the concrete concepts as well as difficulties or dilemmas regarding the bibliographical structure or text formation of the individual volumes of the critical edition. For the sake of a better, easier readability the diacritical marks referring to the critical apparatus were removed starting with the second volume of the complete edition, and the critical and explanatory notes were not formatted as footnotes but as continuous endnotes at the very end of the volume, before the indexes, and the references to the adequate text fragments were made by marking the page- and line numbers of the primary texts. Thus the footnotes only contained the indications of the textual variants, and this was evidently justified by the need to more determinedly distinguish the differences between the two textual levels. This was supposed to suggest the modifications or variants of the primary text itself (changes between the versions published in Schelling's lifetime, or in certain cases in various copies of the same edition, or even in the first complete edition published by Schelling's son), which must have primacy over the apparatus clarifying and explaining the text, containing further references, completions, commentaries, quotations – that is, let's say, over the level of the articulation of the secondary text. At the same time, the very useful, so-called "Editorischer Bericht" has been preserved in an unchanged form in front of each text, the structure of which always contains a threefold division. As a first step, the editor of the specific text reports, under the title "Zur Edition des Textes", on the first edition of the text, the extant or accessible copies, the condition of the text, on possible second or subsequent reprints, offers a – primarily bibliographical – description or information, summarizes the transmission of the text, attempts a comparison of various editions, and tries to recover the text or manuscript

Attention should not be paid to what Kant says, but to what happens in the course of the new foundation of metaphysics he attempted – I summarized above a cardinal thesis of Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant. Variants A and B of the chapter on deduction of Kant’s main work, according to Heidegger, contains a happening (recoiling or shrinking back, which is a back-and-forth movement – that is, the “forth” must be preceded by a “back”, but this is not so important at this time). It is worth noting that this *concept* of various *textual variants* as *occurrence* – as we could call this kind of interpretation – has its representatives also in the contemporary literature on Kant. For example, the interpretation of Hansgeorg Hoppe, although much less conceptual than Heidegger’s, shares the latter’s concept on the *inner happening* of the text.¹ In his approach deduction B attempts at taking a step further in order to solve some of the problems left open in deduction A, but precisely because of this knowledge of deduction A is indispensable for the understanding of the problem as a whole. Seen from here, one may legitimately speak of the *happening of the text*; that is to say, the question of which

lying at the basis of that particular text edition. In the second run, under the title “Zur Entstehungsgeschichte des Textes”, the editor reconstructs the circumstances of the creation of the text, the reasons for its being written, its background in terms of biography, the history of ideas and of the age, the time of writing (its beginning and end), and places the text within these coordinates. Finally – for texts where this can be the case at all – under the title “Zur Wirkungsgeschichte des Textes” (or some other similar title, such as “Hinweise auf die frühe Rezeption”) the reader gains insight into the history of effect or reception history of the writing in question. This uniquely structured “Editorische Berichte” is one of the most valuable elements of the historical-critical edition. The volumes are concluded by a bibliography of cited works – either by Schelling or by the editors in the apparatus –, various indexes (of places, of persons, of subjects), and a “Seiten-konkordanz”, an index of correspondences of the page numbers of various editions. It should also be mentioned that the Schelling-edition was the last to be published of all the critical editions of the thinkers of German idealism. The new, major edition was initiated by the celebrations of the 200 years anniversary of the philosopher’s birth, the first volume of the planned eighty was published one year later, in 1976. The enterprise – as the last edition of the three, planned for more volumes than the other two together, therefore most ambitious and monumental of all – could draw on the experiences of the two previous editions; it is an extraordinarily accurate and exhaustive edition, with a lengthy critical apparatus: when one takes in hand the volumes of the Schelling-edition, one has the impression that he has to do with the most exhaustive and accurate edition of the three thinkers’ works. At the same time – and possibly in relation to the difficulties about the institutional-financial background of the long-term accomplishment of these critical editions, mentioned above – the planned number of volumes of the Schelling-edition has seemed to be decreasing in the last years. While the webpage of the publishing institution, the Schelling Committee of the Bavarian Academy of Sciences, the edition still appears planned for eighty volumes, a new webpage contains fifty-five volumes, and the webpage and catalogue of the publishing house which publishes the edition, the Frommann–Holzboog, the number is only forty. In more details about individual volumes of the Schelling-edition, see István Fehér M., “A történeti-kritikai Schelling-kiadás újabb kötetei a német idealizmus- és a Schelling-kutatás kontextusában” (New volumes of the historical-critical Schelling-edition in the context of German idealism and Schelling-research), *Existentia* 6–7 (1996–97), 383–391.

¹ Hansgeorg Hoppe, “Die transzendente Deduktion in der ersten Auflage,” In *Immanuel Kant: Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. Klassiker Auslegen, vols. 17–18, eds. G. Mohr, M. Willaschek (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1998), 159–188: 187 ff.

comes first of the two textual variants of deduction is simply eliminated. Should we think that the later variant must be preferred, we still cannot disregard the earlier one, since only on the basis of this – the earlier – can we understand, and appreciate accordingly, the later. The question of either–or is an incorrect and false question. This question can only be formulated in a meaningful way in the event of perceiving the text as a formation (Das Gebilde) – torn out from its possible evolution history – frozen at a certain moment and thus made timeless. It would suffice to make a short reference to the fact that one of the classical cases of text happening is the relationship of the Old and the New Testament, where the latter writes further and thus reinterprets or completes the text of the former.¹ The traditional dilemma of Hegel-research, namely that the researcher cannot be certain, from a philological point of view, even about the title of the *Phenomenology*, also belongs to the same circle of problems: some bound copies still bear the original title given by Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Erfahrung des Bewußtseins*,

¹ Tradition has had an important role in the formation – and also the further evolution – of the texts of the Old and New Testaments. See for this more recently: Karl Kardinal Lehmann, “Norma normans non normata? Bibel im Begründungszusammenhang von Theologie und Lehramt,” *zur Debatte. Themen der Katholischen Akademie Bayern* 38/5 (2008): 1–4, mainly 2: the Bible itself “has been created through a long process of tradition. This tradition has in important share in the collection of the writings in the so-called obligatory “canon”. In the course of this we recognize the actual participation of the Bible in this collection and delimitation.” In the end, we arrive to the functional connection that “there is no writing without tradition, and there is no tradition without the Church, and no Church without the former two.” (p. 3). It is also worth mentioning that the historical-critical exegesis strongly connected to the historical-critical edition from a hermeneutic perspective – seen from the point of view of application – is a highly committed genre. As Martin Ebner writes: “Ever since its beginnings, the historical-critical exegesis has had a church-historical orientation. It independently and completely consciously turns against the ecclesiastical educational institution, and reads the founding documents of the church against the background of contemporary praxis and preaching as a counter-control. Inasmuch as it is the meaning of the writings that interests the ecclesiastical educational institutions, then historical criticism primarily inquires one-sidedly about the original meaning of the writings [...] In this respect historical criticism feels itself to be the advocate of the *strangeness* [Fremdheit] of our fundamental writings. However, by no means does it happen out of pure historical interest. The true concern lies in the fact that it *confronts* today’s readers [...] with the beginnings of the movement. That it reveals precisely that what makes questionable our ideas about the beginning and our reading habits. [...] The programme says: placing the text back to its age and leaving it to make its effect – however, not for the reason of archiving, but for enforcing an early Christian text in its confrontation with contemporary praxis, in such a way that contemporary theological thinking and contemporary ecclesiastical structures should be able to stand responsibly in front of the witnesses of the early times. By its insistence on the original meaning, historical criticism tries to enforce the individual right of fundamental writings, and wishes to induce a salutary shock in the contemporary readers of these texts: there were many other things at the beginning. This is accompanied by the impulse: it can be different again in the future. – In order to reach this shock induced by the strangeness of texts, historical criticism operates in two interconnected ways: it situates the text historically, and reveals the historical stratification of the texts.” In Antiquity, authoritative texts carried their creation history within themselves. The authenticity of a text increased by feeding on a previous preliminary text. M. Ebner, “Grundoperationen der historisch-kritischen Exegese,” *zur Debatte. Themen der Katholischen Akademie Bayern* 38/5 (2008), 7 f.

changed only in the course of printing, and it is not at all a mere philological, but an utterly hermeneutical problem, implying the meaning of the entire work, the *happening of the text*, how the “science of the experience of consciousness” became, in the course of the work’s intellectual-bibliographic production, “The phenomenology of spirit”.

The first paragraph of the commentaries over the problem of application of Gadamer’s major work, that I have examined in more detail elsewhere, can be mentioned as a special case of the inner happening of the text. In my interpretation what happens here is the connection between the disappearance in all subsequent editions of a footnote appearing in the first two editions of the work, and the textual deterioration of the following footnote¹ – however, we shall only find it out if we compare the texts of the various editions and we are able to conceive the text lying in front of us as if in a frozen state as a station of the happening of the text (we can trace down mainly eliminated or erased texts this way). Since the Collected Works edition of Gadamer’s major opus is in fact the fifth edition of the work, which takes as its basis the text of the fourth edition, this happening of the text remains thus hidden for the readers of the final, ten-volume edition of Gadamer’s work, and could only become accessible in case of its comparison with the texts of the first two editions.

Similarly, in Kant’s case as well – this is the minimal requirement of Heidegger’s interpretation – one must be familiar with both versions of the chapter on deduction in order to be able to judge the nature of the modifications. Text deterioration is itself a happening of the text – a special case of it – one that *eo ipso* questions the conviction that the text of the last or later edition is (more) authentic in comparison with the earlier ones.

Some further cases are also worth listing, in which the thesis that the last or latest textual variant published in the author’s lifetime can be regarded as the authentic – or more authentic – text also cannot be maintained. I have in mind the various textual modifications made from one edition to the next in certain works of Heidegger, that I have discussed in more detail elsewhere, therefore I shall only briefly refer to them here. In § 44 c. of *Being and Time* there are certain interesting remarks on the sceptic, scepticism, and the refutation of scepticism. In the seventh edition of the work, Heidegger made modifications in a key sentence of this section, and this new text was published in all subsequent editions of the work, which witnessed fourteen editions in Heidegger’s lifetime. By this modification, the former “nie” (never) was replaced by “je” (once), and this is of course not an insignificant change. The question of which of the two versions can be regarded as *the* authentic version (a question which in a traditional sense, that is, in the sense of “Textherstellung”, can be regarded as philological) leads to no significant results unless completing it with hermeneutical effort. Apparently, the textual modification lends a completely new meaning to the text,

¹ Cf. István Fehér M., “Hermeneutika és filológia – pietizmus és felvilágosodás” (Hermeneutics and philology – pietism and Enlightenment), *Irodalomtörténeti Közlemények* 1 (2004): 56–109, mainly 70 ff.; rewritten and extended version: “Hermeneutika és filológia – pietizmus és felvilágosodás. A humán tudományok diskurzusának összefüggései egy esettanulmány tükrében” (Hermeneutics and philology – pietism and Enlightenment. Connections of the discourses of humanities in the mirror of a case study), *Hermeneutika, esztétika, irodalomelmélet*, eds. István Fehér M. and Ernő Kulcsár Szabó (Budapest: Osiris, 2004), 368–447; here: 388.

but a more careful analysis rather shows a shift of emphasis.¹ Just like in the case of the other two textual modifications usually discussed in the literature on Heidegger, where the problem also appears primarily as a philological question. However, at a first sight the modification in these cases (at least philologically) is even more radical: it reverses the meaning of the text. In paragraph 4 of § 3 of *Being and Time*, the term “durchsichtig” was changed in the complete edition into “nicht durchsichtig”² on the one hand, and one sentence of the afterword of “What is Metaphysics?” went through a radical change on the other hand: the sentence fragment which prior to the fourth edition

¹ Cf. István Fehér M., *Heidegger és a szkepticizmus. A szkeptikus kételyen át a hermeneutikai kérdésig* (Heidegger and scepticism. From sceptical doubt to hermeneutic question) (Budapest: Korona Nova, 1998.), 23.: “The key sentence in question of the Heideggerian text [...] can be meaningful in the case of both textual variants – that is to say, the either–or alternative of meaningfulness can be avoided, or it does not exist –, at most the emphasis lies elsewhere in the two variants.” See also 45.: “It can be epitomized that the two textual variants created by the modification lying at the centre of our analysis delineates two meanings, distinct in their emphases, within the analyzed text: various, equally sensible formations of meaning are delineated in the analyzed text depending on our interpretation along one or the other version, depending on which variant we include in the chain of thought.”

² “Die eigentliche »Bewegung« der Wissenschaften spielt sich ab in der mehr oder minder radikalen und ihr selbst [nicht]durchsichtigen Revision der Grundbegriffe” (SZ 9.) This modification appears in the *Gesamtausgabe*-edition of *Being and Time* – and in the individual editions following the GA, that is, beginning with the 15th edition of the series of individual editions –; this is an editorial modification made on the basis of Heidegger’s note in his own copy. See: Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, *Hermeneutische Phänomenologie des Daseins. Eine Erläuterung von Sein und Zeit*, vol. 1. »Einleitung: Die Exposition der Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein« (Frankfurt/Main: Klostermann, 1987), 86 f. Tibor Schwendtner discusses in detail Von Herrmann’s editorial interference in his book *Heidegger tudományfelfogása (Az 1919–1929-es időszak írásainak tükrében)* (Heidegger’s concept of science [In the mirror of his writings from the 1919–1929 period]) (Budapest: Osiris, 2000), 118 ff. – In my view, it is about the grammatical–syntactic question whether the scope of the expression “mehr oder minder” (“more-or-less”) extends to only one or both of the two adjectives – or in fact an adjective and an adjectival structure – following, and connected to it. If it does, then the modification is superfluous and it rather causes textual deterioration. If it does not, then the textual modification is justified. I have as yet tried to discuss this problem with several German university colleagues, among whom also Germanists, but I received no definitive, certain answer, which may lead to the conclusion that this is a stylistically ambiguous structure.– Heidegger’s note in his own copy is also difficult to interpret. Should we see it as an intention of text emendation, or a subsequent commentary, rethinking or completing the original text? (“A revision more-or-less transparent for itself: well, at a deeper thought, rather less than more, so one could also say: a more-or-less *not* transparent revision...”). Finally, it cannot be disregarded that the “more-or-less” – inasmuch as its scope also includes “revision” – somehow tempers the significance of the counterpoint; what can “more-or-less” be stated to be “x”, that can (“more-or-less”) be stated to be “not-x” as well. What is “partly” transparent, that is also “partly” non-transparent – and this is not a contradiction to such an extent that it can even be attached to the text, too (“partly transparent, partly non-transparent”), but even if it is not attached, and the text transforms from “partly transparent” to “partly non-transparent”, what happens is not the reversion of meaning, but rather the shift of emphasis, of the weights. In a certain sense the case is similar to the replacement of “ever”–“never”, which also covers a shift of emphasis.

appeared as “[...] daß das Sein wohl west ohne das Seiende, daß niemals aber ein Seiendes ist ohne das Sein”, changed, from the fifth edition onwards, to “[...] daß das Sein nie west ohne das Seiende, daß niemals ein Seiendes ist ohne das Sein” (in an approximate translation: “although there is being without beings, but there are no beings without being”, and: “there never is being without beings, there never are beings without being.”)¹ Just like the classic philological question referring to the authentic variant in the case of Kant’s major work – is it the first or the second edition of *The Critique of Pure Reason* that can be regarded as authentic variant? – cannot be unequivocally answered, similarly, it seems like an unproductive or mistaken problematization to investigate whether, with regard to the Heideggerian modification, it is the earlier or later textual variant that should be preferred.

The above mentioned modification of the afterword of *What is metaphysics?* yields an opportunity for a short attempt of explanation. It can be equally said that – with certain simplification and extrapolation – there is being without beings, and there is no being without beings, insofar as both statements are, in their own way – seen from a certain (restricted) perspective – valid, while they are imperfect from different perspectives: the imperfectness and onesidedness of the one is counterbalanced or “equalled” by the imperfectness and onesidedness of the other. Every philosophy which is characterized by the rejection of the subject-object dualism, must fight with its linguistic predicament – Hegel had already complained about it as well.² As I have tried

¹ See GA 9, 306. In relation to the philological-hermeneutical debates about the textual modifications, having the ambition to critically assess or dissolve the difficulties or contradictions caused by these modifications, see Max Müller, *Existenzphilosophie im geistigen Leben der Gegenwart* (Heidelberg: Kerle, 1949), 50, 75 f. (M. Müller: *Existenzphilosophie. Von der Metaphysik zur Metahistorik*, 4th, extended edition, ed. A. Halder [Freiburg/München: Alber, 1986], 55 f, 84 f.); Walter Schulz, “Über den philosophiegeschichtlichen Ort Martin Heideggers,” *Philosophische Rundschau* 1953/54, 65–93., 211–232; 212 f. Reprint edition: *Heidegger. Perspektiven zur Deutung seines Werks*, ed. O. Pöggeler (Köln/Berlin: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1969) (2nd edition: Königstein/Ts.: Athenäum, 1984), 95–139; 118 f.; Karl Löwith, *Heidegger. Denker in dürftiger Zeit*, In Löwith, *Sämtliche Schriften*, 8 vols. (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1984; 1st ed. 1953), 160 ff. György Lukács, *Az ész trónfosztása* (The dethronement of the mind) (Budapest: Magvető, 1978), 742.

² See Hegel: *A szellem fenomenológiája*, 19.: “They take the subject as a constant point, to which the predicates are attached as to their support.” In addition, see primarily the thoughts concerning the “speculative theorem”, in particular, the following fragment: “The philosophical theorem, because it is a theorem, triggers the impression that we are dealing with the ordinary relation of subject and predicate and the common behaviour of knowledge” (ibid., 41.). Also see the following specific place of the young Hegel’s Frankfurt fragment of a system: “if I say that it [being] is the connectedness of opposition and relation, then this connectedness itself can also be isolated and disapproved its opposition to non-connectedness; thus I would have to say: being is the connectedness of connectedness and non-connectedness. Every single term is a product of reflexion [...]” (Hegel, “Rendszertörődék” (Fragment of a System), in *Ifjúkori írások. Válogatás* (Works from the age of youth. A collection), trans. Gábor Révai (Budapest: Gondolat, 1982), 140.) The identicalness and non-identicalness of being and consciousness, respectively the disclosure of negative dialectics struggles with the same shortness of language; about this, see footnote 56. of my article with the title “Lukács és Sartre. Két gondolati út metszéspontjai és elá-

to show elsewhere, philosophy has, in a particular sense, no “language” of its own.¹ In Heidegger’s case the relation of being and beings can only be “one-sidedly”, that is, imperfectly expressed by any kind of statement, and here lies the explanation of the “equalling” of one one-sidedness with another – contrary – one-sidedness. The question of an authentic or preferable textual variant, here as well as elsewhere, is highly dependent on interpretive operations: it happens in a space dependent of interpretation just as much as the questioning of the meaning of the question itself. This operation brings to light in the question itself some kind of pre-supposed meaning, or, if you want, bias.

III.

Insofar as the concept of text happening means being opposed to the concept of a text frozen into timelessness, and implies a kind of destruction–deconstruction of the concept of text, and if this thesis has been founded above primarily by the references to the two editions of Kant’s *Critique*, then in any case the self-identity of the text seemed to have been preserved in an unchanged form at least with respect to individual editions. It cannot be superfluous to make one step further and say that in certain cases even the self-identity of the *texts* of the “first edition”, “second edition” may as well become very volatile, that is, questionable. And on top of it, this happens not so much in the – according to some interpreters – ideal-idealistic, volatile interpretive space of hermeneutics, but rather in its roughly material mediality. In this sense the following part should be titled: “Textual criticism and radar technology”.

Paul Ziche, one of the editors of the historical-critical edition of Schelling’s lifework, wrote not long ago: the “setting-forth” or “establishment” of the text is an indispensable work stage of a critical edition. This presupposes of course that prior to such an editorial establishment there is no text – it only comes into being in the course of preparation for print. Then he continued: “The idea of an unequivocal, abstractly existing text, materially accomplished in different copies cannot be maintained from the point of view of 18th century printed works.”² This is not only to say that the text of the first editions contains many printing errors: the history of printing had its contacts with criminality much more often than an unsuspecting reader – a “non-critical text user” or “the user of non-critical texts” – would kindly presume. Pirate editions published without permission, claiming to imitate a legitimate edition, were quite frequent; and although they were not criminal in nature, the resetting or reprint of certain texts or parts

gazásai” (Luke and Sartre. The intersections and junctions of two conceptual roads) (*Magyar Filozófiai Szemle* XXVIII, 1984/3–4: 379–413, here: 396f.).

¹ See István M. Fehér.: “Irodalom és filozófia – irodalmi szöveg és filozófiai szöveg” (Literature and philosophy – literary text and philosophical text), *Irodalomtörténet* LXXXIX / XXXIX., 2008/2, 155–187. Primarily see the text passages around footnote 58. (page 167.).

² Paul Ziche, “Editionswissenschaft: Historisch-kritisches Edieren. Beispiele aus der Akademie-Ausgabe von Schellings Werken”, *Akademie Aktuell. Zeitschrift der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, Heft 20, 2007/1, 27–31, here: 27.: “Das ’Herstellen’ oder ’Feststellen’ eines Textes bildet einen unverzichtbaren Arbeitsschritt einer kritischen Edition. Das setzt voraus, dass vor einer solchen editorischen Feststellung ein Text nicht wirklich feststeht, sondern erst im Prozess des Edierens entsteht. [...] Die Idee eines eindeutigen, abstrakt existierenden, in den Exemplaren bloß noch material realisierten Textes ist für Druckwerke des 18. Jahrhunderts nicht haltbar.”

of texts was a frequent complicating factor for orientation between the various editions. With just a bit of exaggeration, it can be said – claims Ziche – that the first edition of a work published around 1800 hardly had any copy completely identical with another one.¹

It has been mentioned before: in the course of the edition of individual authorial works, a historical-critical edition must take into account all the editions of the work in question published in the author's lifetime, and, regardless of what edition technique it would apply in the end – whether the text of the first, second, or some later edition, or the very last edition published in the author's lifetime – some way it must reproduce the minor or major textual alterations of various editions. Now we must ask the question how, through which operations the *establishment* of the text of various editions may actually happen. The answer seems simple: copies of the different editions must be acquired and read simultaneously (collated, "kollationieren"). But if we want to operate really thoroughly, then we obviously recognize: it is not only the copies of various editions that must be collated, but several copies of the same edition must also be acquired, and the comparison of these must result in the text (textual identity, or the *establishment* of the text or textual identity) of the edition in question (first, second, etc.) This is exactly the procedure followed by the Schelling-edition; several copies were acquired of each edition, and their comparison resulted in the surprising recognition: the texts of Schelling's various works showed differences of various degrees even in the several copies analyzed.

Interestingly, this result was born with the use of the instruments of radar technology, astronomy, and military technology. English Shakespeare-philologist Charlton Hinman, who set out to compare more than eighty copies of first editions of Shakespeare's works, made use of his experiences gained in WWII, when he had to uncover and identify suspicious establishments using radar images. For this, an earlier procedure was used, developed for the astronomic researches of the 1920s and 1930s for discovering moving objects, which also served to discover the planet Pluto. During this procedure two snapshots taken at different times and placed precisely over each other are compared by alternately illuminating them, while the essential differences – in astronomy and military technology the movements – become directly apparent. Hinman constructed a machinery, which was later called "Hinman-Kollator", for making this technology also applicable to civil, that is, scientific, purposes. The two copies to compare are projected over each other in such a way that the two copies are lit in a rapid sequence one after the other, and this makes clearly visible as a moving object even the slightest difference – such as a missing comma – between them. The textual differences between the individual editions of Schelling's works were discovered and analyzed with

¹ Paul Ziche, "Editionswissenschaft: Historisch-kritisches Edieren. Beispiele aus der Akademie-Ausgabe von Schellings Werken", 27.: "Nicht nur enthält der tradierte Text der Erstdrucke Fehler, die zu berichten und, nach kritischer Abwägung, zu berichtigen sind; die Druckgeschichte tendiert, wie Robert Darnton gezeigt hat, weit öfter, als dem unkritischen Textnutzer oder dem Nutzer unkritischer Texte lieb sein kann, ins Kriminelle. Unerlaubte Raubdrucke, die eine legitime Ausgabe zu imitieren suchen, waren gängig; nicht kriminell, aber üblich und das Edieren komplizierend war ein Neusatz und Neudruck einzelner Texte oder Textstücke im ganz normalen Herstellungsprozess. *Mit nur geringer Zuspitzung kann man sagen, dass kaum ein Exemplar des Erstdrucks eines um 1800 verlegten Buches einem anderen gleicht.*" (My emphasis, I. F. M.)

the help of this technique. Ziche mentioned a characteristic example about an essential textual variant discovered in an 1800 edition of Schelling's work *The System of Transcendental Idealism*, which he illustrated with a facsimile image. Thus, the expression "freyen Handeln" of one copy was replaced in the other one by "Anschauen" (this change can hardly be regarded as the correction of a printing error), and only the latter makes a meaningful text. Now, the historical-critical edition has the task, states Ziche, to reconstruct the textual "movements" in a way similar to the "Hinman-Kollator".¹

The text was repeatedly modified during printing, if for no other than technical reasons. The lead types used for typesetting were not enough, therefore the individual printing sheets were typeset, paginated, and printed separately, and corrected during printing. After printing, the paginated sheets were taken apart, the types were used for printing the next sheet, and the printed sheets were heaped up. This way the work was never printed as a whole, and therefore the proof of the whole work was never produced as a whole either. In the next phase, the sheets of the many heaps were bound together randomly to form the individual copies (randomly choosing from the corrected or modified sheets and the original sheets alike). This also meant that the textual identity of the copies coming from the very same printing press was not ensured.

This is to say that the identity of the text in the mentioned case is uncertain even on the level of individual editions,² and the assessment of the textual alteration within the same editions needs further interpretation. So the question which is the preferable variant – and in this case not even for the purpose of establishing the final text of the work itself (its authentic text), but only that of one of its editions – can hardly be answered again without a hermeneutic effort.

¹ Paul Ziche, "Editionswissenschaft: Historisch-kritisches Edieren. Beispiele aus der Akademie-Ausgabe von Schellings Werken," *ibid.*, 27f. It will not be useless to quote the Schellingian fragment in question: "So wie man also sagen kann, daß ich, indem ich anzuschauen glaubte, eigentlich handelnd war, so kann man sagen, daß ich hier, indem ich auf die Außenwelt zu handeln glaube, eigentlich anschauend bin, und alles, was außer dem Anschauen im Handeln vorkommt, gehört eigentlich nur zur Erscheinung des einzig Objektiven, des *Anschauens/freyen Handelns*, und umgekehrt, vom Handeln alles abgesondert, was nur zur Erscheinung gehört, bleibt nichts zurück als das Anschauen" (Schelling, *System des transzendentalen Idealismus*, *Schellings sämtliche Werke*, ed. K.F.A. Schelling (Stuttgart/Augsburg: J. G. Cotta, 1856–61), Vol. 3, 566. = Schelling, *Historisch-kritische Ausgabe*. Reihe I, *Werke*. Vol. 9, 1–2: *System des transscendentalen Idealismus*, eds. Harald Korten and Paul Ziche, 2005, 9, 1, 264.).

² We are wondering what results an examination with a Hinman collator would have regarding the two editions of Kant's *Critique*. After all, the edition of the Royal Prussian Academy of Science is from the 1910s, when the Hinman collator had not been known, consequently, a similar comparison could not be done, and as far as I know, it has not been done posteriorly either. Is it possible that an examination of this type would attenuate the tacit assumption regarding the identicalness of the first and the second edition of the *Critique*?



Teodora Cosman, *Over-exposures*, acrylic on synthetic tissue, 40 x 40 cm, 2009

IV.

A paper entitled “Textual Criticism, Edition History, Interpretation” should indeed deal with, if only within the range of certain remarks, Heidegger’s philological–hermeneutic observations on the edition of Aristotle. At the beginning of the 1920s Heidegger started working on a phenomenological (phenomenological–hermeneutic) interpretation of Aristotle; although the number of the manuscripts grew, and after the while the work reached an advanced stage – so much so that in a letter written to Roman Ingarden on 14 December 1922 Husserl reported that in volume VII of the *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung* edited by him “appears Heidegger’s fundamental [...] work on Aristotle”,¹ and it seems that the work was ready for print in the summer

¹ Edmund Husserl, *Briefe an Roman Ingarden. Mit Erläuterungen und Erinnerungen an Husserl*, ed. Roman Ingarden (Den Haag: M. Nijhoff, 1968), 25.

of 1925¹ – the promised interpretation of Aristotle has never been published in print, either then, in the 1920s, or ever after. What is available for us today of this work, is the famous “Natorp-account”, an approximately forty typewritten pages long abstract bearing the title *Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles (Anzeige der hermeneutischen Situation)*,² and the university lectures of the 1920s.³ Although Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle has never been published, it is not unimportant that his major work, the *Being and Time* published in 1927, grew out of this intellectual endeavour after various modifications. This way there is a direct relationship between the planned interpretation of Aristotle and the *Being and Time*. In a retrospective summary of this work, Gadamer wrote about Heidegger’s approach and the structure of the planned work that “Heidegger has found indeed a new and unusual access to Aristotle. He approached it, so-to-say, from below, from actual life. His first lectures did not treat Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* or *Physics*, but his *Rhetoric*. The subject of these lectures on Aristotle was a major aspect of all rhetoric, described first by Plato in *Phaedrus*, namely that in order to persuade the audience, we must first know it. Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* became for Heidegger an introduction to philosophical anthropology. In the second book of *Rhetoric*, Heidegger’s attention was primarily drawn to the discussion of the affects, the *pathe*. These affects signal the audience’s inclination towards, or reaction against, the rhetor’s speech. It was with regard to this Aristotelian pattern, completed with his own life experience, that Heidegger gained insight into what he later termed, in *Being and Time*, ‘*Befindlichkeit*’.”⁴ Indeed, there are some laconic references to this in Heidegger’s major work. In § 29, dealing with “*Befindlichkeit*”, Heidegger notes: “Aristotle discusses *pathe* in the second book of his *Rhetoric*. This work – in opposition to the traditional orientation of the notion of rhetoric to some kind of ‘discipline’ – must be perceived as the first systematic hermeneutics of everyday being-together.”⁵ Now, with the newly published text of the 1924 university lectures as volume 18 of the complete works, there is a chance to study this meaningful, yet enigmatically concise reference against a much wider textual basis. The broader context of Heidegger’s ideas is formed by the critical reconsideration of the historical shaping of philosophical disciplines that Heidegger calls destruction. This is about the reconsideration, guided by phenomenological-hermeneutical inquiries, of the set map of philosophical disciplines,

¹ See Thomas J. Sheehan, “«Time and Being»; 1925–27”, in *Thinking About Being. Aspects of Heidegger's Thought*, eds. R. W. Shahan, J. N. Mohanty, Norman (Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1984), 180.

² See now as the appendix of GA 62. In Hungarian: *Fenomenológiai Aristotelész-interpretációk (A hermeneutikai szituáció jelzése)* (Phenomenological Aristotle-interpretations [The indication of the hermeneutical situation]), *Existentia* VI–VII, 1996–1997, *Supplementa*, vol. 2; for more on the manuscript, see István Fehér M., *Martin Heidegger. Egy XX. századi gondolkodó életútja* (Martin Heidegger. The life of a thinker from the 20th century), 2nd extended edition (Budapest: Göncöl, 1992), 55–58.

³ Primarily GA 61: *Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles. Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung*; GA 62: *Phänomenologische Interpretationen ausgewählter Abhandlungen des Aristoteles zur Ontologie und Logik* and GA 18: *Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie*.

⁴ Gadamer: *Gesammelte Werke*, Vol. 3, 399.

⁵ *Sein und Zeit*, 29. §. 138. See the quoted Hungarian translation, 167.

the loosening of the conceptuality of tradition, with the purpose of a positive appropriation of tradition (neither its servile acceptance, nor its unthoughtful rejection). This reconsideration neither leaves untouched the foundations of the historically created philosophical disciplines as well. In this case we are speaking about rhetoric. Heidegger formulates the provocative thesis – which may also shed light on the cited reference of the *Being and Time* – that the traditional disciplinary approach to rhetoric is not helpful at all in understanding Aristotelian rhetoric, on the contrary, it directly hinders its understanding. In Heidegger's view the confusion around rhetoric – and this is the point where the *philological* notes that interest us follow – was apparent already at the time of the edition of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, inasmuch as it was placed at the very end of the Berlin academic edition of Aristotle, prepared by Bekker in the 1830s, a time when the understanding and appreciation of rhetoric was at its lowest. "They didn't know where to place it, so they put it at the end! A brilliant proof of perfect helplessness!" – complains Heidegger.¹ Tradition has long lost its understanding of rhetoric, he continues; it was degraded into a school discipline already in the time of Hellenism and in the early Middle Ages. The original meaning of rhetoric has long fallen into oblivion. In contrast, rhetoric is nothing else, Heidegger claims, "than the discipline in which the self-interpretation of the concrete human being-here explicitly happens. Rhetoric is none other than the interpretation of the concrete human being-here, the hermeneutics of being-here."² Consequently there is an inner relationship between rhetoric and hermeneutics for Heidegger, and besides the rehabilitation of rhetoric it also becomes visible how organically the planned, but never published interpretation of Aristotle (or more accurately the dialogue with Aristotle, since the Greek philosopher was not so much an *object* of interpretation for Heidegger, than a *partner* in a dialogue) was embedded into the approach of his major work, how deeply it influenced Heidegger's hermeneutic perspective and with it, the basic structure of the *Being and Time*. It is understandable thus that Heidegger was disappointed about the *Rhetoric*'s placement at the very end of the *corpus*, and considered it a sign of philosophy's loss of orientation in the 19th century. At the same time, the fact that Heidegger preferred the "life-philosophical" Aristotle – his aesthetic, rhetorical, and ethical writings – to the "scientific" Aristotle – his writings in logic, metaphysics, and natural philosophy, and tried, if at all, to approach, or bridge the gap between, the latter by means of the former, or, as Gadamer formulated, "from below, from actual life", from practical philosophy: well, this sheds particular light precisely over Heidegger's own philosophical stance. This approach had, of course, not been ready from the beginnings, but was shaping, as if in its way to itself, in the course of years precisely through the theoretical reconsiderations of, among others, Aristotle, and eventually found itself in the philosopher's major work.³ It highlighted that particular approach which led to the

¹ *Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie*, GA 18, 109f.

² *Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie*, GA 18, 110. Additionally, see Heidegger, *Sein und Wahrheit*, GA 36/37, 158.: "the science that is concerned with the capacity of speaking, namely rhetorics is the basic science of man, the political science."

³ Regarding this, see Franco Volpi's basic monograph: *Heidegger e Aristotele* (Padova: Daphne, 1984); mainly the pages 90–116., and id.: "Dasein comme praxis: L'assimilation et la radicalisation heideggerienne de la philosophie pratique d'Aristote", *Heidegger et l'idée de la phénomé-*

breakup with, and radical turning away from, the usual ways of philosophizing of the age, eminently with the epistemological and scientific orientation of neo-Kantianism, and to an opening towards “the actual life”. Seen from here, we have good reason to assume a similarity between the ruling philosophical spirit of the 19th century and the Aristotle-edition published in this period reminiscent of the one claimed to exist between the Hegelianism of Hegel’s disciples and the principles governing the edition of the FVA. (The difference might only be grasped in some shift of emphasis: there, the similarity was lying in-between the editorial principles – the philological establishment of the texts – and the *spirit of the philosophy edited*, and here, between the editorial principles – the establishment of the sequence of the texts – and the *spirit pervading the age, and the age’s scientific thinking*.) If Heidegger opposed the ruling philosophical spirit of the age, then he must have opposed the Aristotle-edition pervaded by this spirit as well as the interpretation of Aristotle, defined by both of these aspects. However, just like in the case of his interpretation of Kant, it is unnecessary for us to discuss in more depth Heidegger’s interpretations with regard to the “correctness” of his understanding of Aristotle and its connections with his own system of thinking. It is a historical fact that rhetoric has lost its importance during modernity.¹ If Heidegger’s complaint is accurate, then his remark may highlight the *philological* fact that Bekker’s Berlin edition of Aristotle’s works, the standard edition to this day, and the sequence of the manuscripts in the printed version was significantly pervaded by the philosophical and science theory climate of its own age, the modernity. The climate defined by the victorious breakthrough of the method of mathematical natural sciences, the formation of the paradigm of scientific methodology, and the related devaluation of the humanities, stretching back to Bacon and Descartes, one result of which was the playing down and discrediting of rhetoric. (Descartes turned the verisimilar, which has to do with rhetoric, almost into a synonym of falseness).² So, the fact that the Berlin edition placed the *Rhetoric* to the very end of the *corpus*, must have had its effects on several generations of the late 19th – early 20th-century readers, pervaded in other respects as well by the spirit of the age; the decision about the sequence of texts meant just as much a tacit stance influencing interpretation in the case of the importance of certain writings as the publication of the two editions of Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* as part of the academic edition of Kant – as we have seen above – which tacitly preferred the second edition. Gadamer’s cited remark that Heidegger’s first lectures – in an “unusual approach” [ungewöhnlicher Zugang] – did not treat Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* or *Physics*, negatively imply that the *usual approaches* of the standard interpretations of the age (and of the 19th century) did exactly that, and the philological organization of Aristotle’s

nologie, eds. Franco Volpi et al. (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988), 2–41.; in English: “*Being and Time: A 'Translation' of the Nicomachean Ethics?*”, in *Reading Heidegger from the Start. Essays in His Earliest Thought*, eds. Th. Kisiel and J. van Buren (Albany/New York: State University of New York Press, 1994), 195–212.

¹ See for example: Jean Grondin, “Die Hermeneutik und die rhetorische Tradition”, in id., *Von Heidegger zu Gadamer. Unterwegs zur Hermeneutik* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2001), 17–45, here: 19., with other references.

² Related to the topic, see Samuel IJsseling: *Rhetorik und Philosophie. Eine historisch-systematische Einführung* (Stuttgart – Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1988), 92ff.

texts in the Bekker-edition – over and above its character defined by the spirit of the age – might have also had a role in it. This state of affairs may be meaningful for a paper with the title “Textual Criticism, Edition History, Interpretation” insofar as in the light of Heidegger’s remarks, and reconsidering these remarks – similarly to the FVA edition of Hegel – the thesis that edition history and interpretation mutually define each other can also be valid for Aristotle’s work as well: on the one hand, edition history is itself an operation guided by preliminary understanding, interpretation (in our case by a worldview and understanding pervaded by the spirit of the age), which, on the other hand, significantly influences the future history of effect and interpretation of the edited author. At any rate, the establishment of the text – in this case: the organization and sequence of writings in the textual corpus preserved – did not happen here either under laboratory conditions, in a space void of interpretation.

Heidegger confronted the standard interpretation of Aristotle in another point as well, and since this confrontation also contained philological elements – and since the spirit of the age also had a considerable role here, too – it is worth discussing it in somewhat more detail. The issue here is the relationship of being and time, of a paramount importance for Heidegger’s entire path as a thinker, the fundamental reference point for which was the final chapter (10) of book IX (1=theta) of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*. This chapter is found at the end of a book – Heidegger noted in 1925/26 – which is one of the most difficult books of the treatises collected under the title *Metaphysics*. “The understanding of Greek ontology and thus the problem of truth depends on the possibility of access to this chapter”,¹ formulates Heidegger in his important addition. Heidegger as a thinker had repeatedly returned to the detailed interpretation of this chapter, and developed his own interpretation in a theoretical-critical dialogue with the standard traditional interpretations of Aristotle.

Now, tradition has had a hard time interpreting this final chapter; not once, the opinion that this manuscript appears in the wrong place has also been formulated. The well-known researcher of Aristotle, Werner Jaeger, in his 1912 work entitled *Studien zur Entstehungsgeschichte der Metaphysik des Aristoteles*, in conclusion of the preliminary works of H. Bonitz and others, stated that this edition juxtaposed individual treatises, lecture manuscripts, and introductions, which all dealt with ontological issues but were not necessarily interconnected either in content or in methodology. Jaeger settled that books Z, H, and I belonged together, and exposed that he considered these books most relevant from an ontological point of view – for this very reason it became questionable for him that I 10 belonged to I. In reference to Schwegler and Christ, who thought that this chapter did not fit into the conceptual context, Jaeger only made a short commentary, saying that “this chapter stands there lacking any connection”, it is nothing else than “a kind of attachment”. W. D. Ross in this fundamental edition published in 1924 commented on this section in a similar manner: this chapter “has little to do with the rest of book” (Oxford, 1924, vol. 2, 274.) In his later major work, the *Aristoteles. Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Entwicklung* published in 1923, Jaeger changed his mind – influenced by Bonitz’s 1849 commentary, who did not dispute the placement of the chapter, but in Heidegger’s view his arguments were just as invalid as Jaeger’s

¹ Martin Heidegger, *Logik. Die Frage nach der Wahrheit*, GA 21, 174. About the following ones, see *ibid.*, 171ff.

counter-arguments –, but he did not justify this change appropriately. For Heidegger, the uncertainty and obscurity in what regards the place and content of this chapter can be explained by the fact that the relationship of being and truth is disregarded; moreover, it is not even observed as at all. “We must understand in advance the inner relation of the interpretation of being and truth [...]”, he said in 1925/26, “that is, we must clarify *philosophically* the subject matter of the texts in question, before we would proceed to make obscure *philological* assumptions about their contentual connections.”¹

Philosophy (hermeneutics, interpretation) must therefore precede philology. The question whether the text of the chapter at issue belongs there or not – a question which refers to editing the texts and manuscripts into a coherent textual corpus, and is thus an eminently textual critical, philological question – can only be answered substantially (and sound assumptions can also be only formulated) if we have *understood* first and *interpreted* in an appropriate way what it is about. It is again unnecessary to go deeper into Heidegger’s more than twenty pages long interpretation following the mentioned introduction – just like in the case of his Kant-interpretation above or that of his interpretation regarding the place of rhetoric –; it is enough to see the strong interconnectedness of philosophy (hermeneutics) and philology. The question of where to include a certain textual fragment when collating several manuscripts, and whether that certain part indeed belongs where it was originally placed, presupposes interpretation, it cannot be decided on merely philological grounds. (The question regarding the text, Heidegger formulates in 1930, is connected to the question regarding the object).²

Preliminary interpretation, however, is also influenced one way or another by the spirit of the age. Now, since in modernity, and primarily in the 19th century, truth has gained an eminently epistemological meaning, that is, it was understood as the truth of proposition, or cognition – and not of being –; well, it was only in this governing spirit of the age that the philological uncertainty regarding the placement of the chapter in question could have occurred at all as a problem. A chapter of logic cannot pertain to metaphysics, thinks Schwegler, and Jaeger even goes one step further, when he claims to enforce the chapter’s strangeness from the book by saying: the main obstruction of the chapter’s pertinence to the book is not only that its subject is the true being, but also that it denotes this being as an “actual” being.³ This, according to Jaeger, would be a highly implausible idea, not typical for Aristotle. This characterization should accordingly be either deleted from the text – as does Ross –, or fundamentally reinterpreted – as does Schwegler. That the discussion of truth and falseness – writes Heidegger in 1925/26 – “forms the highest peak of ontological investigations [...], is meaningless and impossible for traditional philosophy. Because truth [according to the ruling approach of modernity] pertains still to judgment and thinking [...], therefore it is hardly the definition of the being of beings, and by no means its “most authentic” definition; hence

¹ Martin Heidegger, *Logik. Die Frage nach der Wahrheit*, GA 21, 174. (My emphasis, I. F. M.).

² Martin Heidegger, *Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit. Einleitung in die Philosophie*, GA 31, 80. (“Zusammenhang von Textfrage und Sachfrage”).

³ Martin Heidegger, *Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit. Einleitung in die Philosophie*, GA 31, 82.

comes the uncertainty and variation about the pertinence of this chapter [...].”¹ Because, as he returned to the problem in 1930, “every beginner in philosophy knows that the problem of truth pertains to logic, not to metaphysics, and especially not to the treatise which discusses the fundamental problem of metaphysics.”² In consequence, it has yet little significance how the interpreters answer the question referring to its pertinence – whether they think it belongs there or not. Just like in the case of the interpretation of Kant above, we could refer here to the method of the polemic use of the mind used by Kant.³ Heidegger’s influential interpretation on the relationship of being and truth must not necessarily be “true” in order to shatter the traditional interpretation of Aristotle, and highlight their being bound to their age, and thus question their indubitable authority.

The issue discussed here differs from the problem of rhetoric inasmuch as, in the case of rhetoric, it was the science theoretical evaluation of rhetoric in the spirit of the age which included Aristotle’s writing to the end of the corpus, while here the approach of modernity regarding the relationship of metaphysics–ontology and epistemology created a philological (or pseudo-philological) problem: whether a text referring to the definition of truth can be placed next to metaphysical or ontological texts, whether it belongs there or not. This latter dilemma is also a typically modern one. However, it is a common feature of both questions that the philological problem is preceded by some kind of hermeneutical-philosophical operation: in the first case, the contemporary understanding, preliminary interpretation of rhetoric – namely, that it enjoyed no high regard – decides the editorial technique applied, in the second case the approach of the philosophy of the age suggests the philological questions regarding the revision of the Hellenistic disposition of Aristotelian writings. And it does this starting from the naïve presupposition that Aristotle must have thought about the concept of truth the same way as we think today, and if a text fragment contradicts it, then we are entitled to doubt its pertinence to the work in question.⁴

V.

A paper entitled “Textual Criticism, Edition History, Interpretation” cannot afford leaving out (it should indeed be treated as a separate study) one of the major and most authoritative lifework-editions, both in length and in contents, of the past decades: the complete edition of Heidegger’s works begun in the last twenty-five years of the past century. The project of this endeavour started in 1975 has repeatedly changed and been extended compared to the initial plans: the complete edition of Heidegger, which, with its one hundred and two planned volumes according to the present, updated project, and seventy-seven actually published volumes (the decisive majority of which contain previously unpublished writings, several appearing already in the second or third

¹ Martin Heidegger, *Logik. Die Frage nach der Wahrheit*, GA 21, 171.

² Martin Heidegger, *Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit. Einleitung in die Philosophie*, GA 31, 81.

³ See note 6 on page 155.

⁴ For more on the correlations of being and truth in Heidegger’s conception, see István Fehér M., *Martin Heidegger. Egy XX. századi gondolkodó életútja*, 29f, 160–165., and *Heidegger és a szkepticizmus. A szkeptikus kételyen át a hermeneutikai kérdésig* (Heidegger and scepticism. Through sceptical doubt to the hermeneutical question) (Budapest: Korona Nova, 1998), 51–64.

edition), is one of the most remarkable lifework-editions in the contemporary literary panorama. All the more so since the volumes of the complete edition – despite the well-known linguistic difficulties connected to the translations of Heideggerian texts – are also published in English, French, Italian, and Spanish editions following the original ones, and this is a practically singular thing in the academic world (so far twenty-six volumes were published in English, sixteen in French, thirty-six in Italian, and twenty-seven in Spanish, and twenty–twenty-five more are forthcoming).¹

Martin Heidegger, who was born in 1889 and died in 1976, has long been considered one of the most important thinkers of the 20th century; however, it has increasingly become the prevailing opinion that Heidegger is the greatest thinker of the century. This opinion is largely influenced by the writings of the philosopher's legacy, published in the period following his death. Heidegger's lifework is decisive for the philosophical debates in many parts of the world; besides its influence in Germany, let us only think of the fact that contemporary French philosophy would be completely unconceivable without Heidegger's influence and the critical dialogue with him, that outstanding attention has been given to him in Japan ever since the 1930s, that his thoughts have raised great interest in Italy and the neo-Latin countries since the 1950s, and that the confrontation with the Heideggerian ideas has lately increasingly become a decisive part of philosophical consciousness in the USA as well. It is significant from this perspective that in the year of the 100th anniversary of Heidegger's birth, in 1989, conferences and symposia were organized all over the world, approaching one hundred in number.

When Martin Heidegger died in 1976, at eighty-seven years of age, it had already been clear for many that one of the greatest thinkers of the 20th century passed away. However, it could hardly have been predicted that the philosopher's thoughts have not lost their strength even after his death, but maintained, and what is more, even increased their influence. In the last years of his life, Heidegger was organizing his manuscripts with the help of some friends and disciples, and was thinking about the fate of his legacy. Slowly, the project of the complete edition of his works was formed, and Heidegger could still live to see, in 1975, the first published volume of the series. The editorial works started vigorously, and as a result of the hard work, two or three volumes have been published each year for the last over thirty years (which is approximately the opposite of the editions of idealist philosophers treated above, which usually come out with one volume each two or three, or even more, years.) Since most volumes contain unpublished writings, over the last few years the interpretation of Heidegger has been placed upon new foundations across the world.

It is only possible to truly assess how little Heidegger published in his lifetime if we see the dimensions of his unpublished legacy. This notable reticence is the result of several reasons, and therefore the fate of the legacy has not been certain either. In the last decades of his life, Heidegger published so few writings also because he thought that his age could not understand him. This opinion of his did not change then until his death. He considered that it were fatal to publish the manuscripts of his legacy since his age would have deeply misunderstood and misinterpreted them to such an extent that it would have been completely misled the future generations. And it is still better than

¹ See *Heidegger Studien* 24, 252ff.

misunderstanding if the writings remained inaccessible for a while, until the children of a happier age would read them with fresh eyes and without bias. When will this age be mature enough for receiving his writings, is of course impossible to know; one thing is certain: this age will not cease from one day to the next.

When the future fate of his manuscripts came into discussion, Heidegger first expressed his will to block his legacy for one hundred years. This was followed by various debates, considerations, and persuasions with the family and friends. One of the most serious arguments was that in an atomic war – the possibility of which was very plausible in Heidegger's analysis of the age – his writings could be easily destroyed, and therefore it should really be reconsidered whether it is advisable to block them for such a long time. This argument was not really convincing for Heidegger. There are atomic-safe shelters, bunkers, he said, it should only be seen to it that his writings be transported to such places and preserved there. Finally, the decisive argument was that although his writings could survive an atomic war – it is not impossible –, but it could very well happen that there would not be any survivors left to read them. Eventually, Heidegger reluctantly accepted this argument. Characteristically, the only argument to convince him to publish his unpublished legacy was that perhaps there will be no people one hundred years later. That is to say, had he seen any guarantees that people were still living on earth one hundred years from now, he would have not allowed his writings to be accessible in the present.

“Ways – not works”: this was the motto placed by Heidegger in front of his works some days before his death. This is not about publishing an author's opinions, presenting his stance, or organizing these in a historical order – claimed one of the proposed introductions of the complete edition – but about the issue of thinking. The former is of course quite possible in our age, the age of information, but from the point of view of accessing the issue of thinking, it lacks any significance. The task of the complete edition is to assist in asking, understanding, profoundly questioning the question – in facing the issue of thinking.¹

Accordingly, the complete edition of Heidegger's lifework is not a historical-critical edition,² but one corresponding to Heidegger's last will: “Ausgabe letzter Hand”,

¹ GA 1, 438.

² Behind the conception of the historical-critical edition there is a research program, as Hans Gerhard Senger claims, whose history has not been written yet – it also has a historical continuity which exceeds the historicism of the 19th century that has been considered its source medium until now. More precisely, it dates back to the Renaissance humanism, or directly to the age of Alexandrian philology; the term “critique” was first used in the 17th century in the sense of judging and differentiating with the aim of creating historically valid texts and filtering out the unhistorical projections. As far as the philological apparatus is concerned, there already existed registers in the 16th century. (Hans Gerhard Senger, “Die historisch-kritische Edition historisch-kritisch betrachtet”, in *Buchstabe und Geist. Zur Überlieferung und Edition philosophischer Texte*, eds. Walter Jaeschke, Wilhelm G. Jacobs and Hermann Krings (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1987), 1–20.: 2, 5, 7f.). About the humanists' philological interest, also see Ulrich Muhlack, “Zum Verhältnis von Klassischer Philologie und Geschichtswissenschaft im 19. Jahrhundert”, in *Philologie und Hermeneutik im 19. Jahrhundert*. I, ed. H. Flashar et al. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1979), 225–239., here: 225f. – The historical-critical edition, as Wilhelm G. Jacobs says, does not interest them, thus they pay identical attention to

“the last edition according to the author(‘s last will)”¹. This means, explains the editorial announcement of the complete edition, that the individual volumes appear in the form in which the philosopher published his writings in his lifetime: without a critical apparatus and indexes. The philological apparatus of historical-critical editions repelled Heidegger (the deterrant example for him was the Stuttgart edition, *Großoktavausgabe*, of Hölderlin’s works); he thought that the apparatus suppresses the text itself: intruding into the foreground, it always draws attention upon itself, and guides the reader towards previously defined readings and definitive questions (e.g. the comparison of textual variants, historical-philological analysis of connections raised by the commentaries, etc.) And that what is truly essential: the “thing” itself, remains in the background. Similarly (with one single exception) we find no kind of indexes (name, subject, or other) at the end of the complete edition’s volumes; these only assist a superficial reading, and there is a possibility that the reader will approach the text from the indexes.² As a kind of substitute for the missing indexes, and in assistance of the reproduction of the line of thought, he considered useful a detailed table of contents compiled by the editors, of help for a better orientation in the volumes of lectures. Last but not least, his argument against critical editions was that the slowness in time of such endeavours breaks the reception and effect of the ideas, and makes almost impossible to follow up the unfolding of ideas: the edition must be completed within approximately one generation, supposing that the lifework expects an at least somewhat appropriate reception – a consideration which (as we have seen in the case of the Hegel-edition) is hardly unfounded, and can be completely agreed with. (Especially if taken into consideration that, as mentioned above, the elaboration of the editorial principles alone of the

each written manifestation, each data is considered *edendum*; thus the historical-critical edition is a complete edition by principle, a *Gesamtausgabe*. In this respect, the Heidegger-edition is closer to the principle of the historical-critical edition than the new Hegel edition. Jacobs’s opinion that the editor knows that his understanding of the author overshadows the edition, but he tries to make this shadow as clear as possible (Wilhelm G. Jacobs, “Textüberlieferung und historisch-kritische Edition. Typen von Editionen”, in *Buchstabe und Geist. Zur Überlieferung und Edition philosophischer Texte*, 21–26., here: 21f.).

¹ “Ausgabe letzter Hand” lexically means “the last edition edited by the author” (Előd Halász, *German-Hungarian Dictionary* (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1967), Vol. 1., 923.), while according to the *Duden Stilwörterbuch*: “letzte vom Autor selbst besorgte Ausgabe” (*Duden Stilwörterbuch der deutschen Sprache. Die Verwendung der Wörter im Satz*, 6th completely revized and expanded edition, ed. Günther Drosdowski, *Der Duden in 10 Bänden*, Vol. 2 (Mannheim – Wien – Zürich: Dudenverlag, 1970), 334. Both explanations should be understood *cum grano salis* in Heidegger’s case, as only regarding the works published in his lifetime (and, strictly speaking, published in more than one edition) can we say that they are “last editions edited by the author himself”, while this does not hold to the unpublished manuscripts that were left as part of the legacy. These are not edited by the author, but there can be authorial instructions regarding the edition, that is why it seems adequate to replace “the last edition edited by the author” with “the author’s last will” or his “testament”, and translate the German expression accordingly.

² Within certain limits, an index of names could even be useful, but a subject index hardly fits into the nature of the Heideggerian phenomenological-hermeneutical thinking (and its considerations and problems raised related to the philosophy of language); see my restrictive remarks preceding the subject index of my Heidegger volume (István Fehér M., *Martin Heidegger. Egy XX. századi gondolkodó életútja*, 2., 379.).

university lectures series in the new Hegel-edition took up almost three decades.) Besides, a critical edition comes in question primarily in the case of authors who already have a lifework edition (and this criterion is fulfilled for all three discussed authors of the age of idealism). Heidegger's decision is based on his assumption – says the publisher's announcement – that the time is not ripe as yet for a historical-critical edition of his lifework. An additional remark of the 1991 brochure which is missing from later announcements claims that, on account of the nature and scope of his philosophical legacy, the accomplishment of a historical-critical edition of Heidegger's works would not be possible for the next fifty years.¹

The first editorial announcements refer to the structure of the complete edition, but even as late as the beginning of the 1990s, the projected number and content of the volumes of the four planned series was only concretized for the first two series and the first two volumes of the third series (vols. 1–16, 17–63, 64–65.), while for the third and fourth series only the major thematic units were distinguished, without marking the numbers of volumes. At this time, the complete edition was assumed to comprise seventy–eighty volumes; then the project of the 102 volumes gained shape by the mid-1990s.² The most important change or completion – on the influence and for the satisfaction of the international scholarly community³ – happened at the beginning of the 1980s, in the most comprehensive and greatly interesting second series of the complete works, Heidegger's university lectures; namely, the early Freiburg lectures (1919–1923), as long as they were still available, were announced to be published at the end of the second series, “in accordance with the decision of legacy's guardian in 1982, following Heidegger's instructions”.⁴ This way the chronological principle was clearly

¹ It is worth adding that the Heidegger complete edition – similarly to the FVA Hegel edition – is a private undertaking, meaning that it does not belong to an institution. It is supported by the caretaker of the legacy, Hermann Heidegger and the family, co-operating with Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. With one exception, there are no permanent paid functions – contributors or editors. In opposition to this, behind a historical–critical edition usually there is some kind of institution that more or less finances the undertaking, and it makes the scientific–professional decisions from time to time. This is the situation in the case of the edition of the philosophers of idealism, which is institutionally supported by the provincial academies (the Hegel edition is supported by the Rhine-Westphalia Academy, while the Fichte and Schelling edition is supported by the Bavarian Academy of Sciences).

² The structure of the complete edition of four series is as follows: I. Abteilung: Veröffentlichte Schriften (1910–1976), Vols. 1–16; II. Abteilung: Vorlesungen 1919–1944, Vols. 17–63 (Marburger Vorlesungen 1923–1928, Vols. 17–26; Freiburger Vorlesungen 1928–1944, Vols. 27–55; Frühe Freiburger Vorlesungen 1919–1923, Vol. 56/57–63); III. Abteilung: Unveröffentlichte Abhandlungen – Vorträge – Gedachtes, Vols. 64–81; IV. Abteilung: Hinweise und Aufzeichnungen, Vols. 82–102. As we can see, the works published through Heidegger's life – issued in the first series – add up to less than one quarter of the complete edition.

³ See Theodore Kisiel, “Heidegger's Early Lecture Courses”, *A Companion to Martin Heidegger's 'Being and Time'*, ed. Joseph J. Kockelmans (Washington DC: University Press of America, 1986), 22–39., republished: Kisiel, *Heidegger's Way of Thought. Critical and Interpretative Signposts*, eds. A. Denker and M. Heinz (New York – London: Continuum, 2002), 137–148., here: 137.

⁴ See Martin Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe. Ausgabe letzter Hand* (Frankfurt/Main: Klostermann: 1991), 7.

broken. While the lectures between 1923 and 1944 follow chronologically in volumes 17 to 55 of the complete works, the early Freiburg lectures held between 1919 and 1923 are published as an attachment in volumes 56 to 63.¹ The covers and title pages of the second series volumes have also been changed accordingly. Previously, the title was: “II. Abteilung: Vorlesungen 1923–1944”, but now it changed to: “II. Abteilung: Vorlesungen 1919–1944”, or simply: “II. Abteilung: Vorlesungen”.

The first two editorial announcements, instead of a historical-critical edition, mentions a “lesbare Werkausgabe”, following the principle of chronology. The third editorial brochure published in March 1978 contains the designation “Ausgabe letzter Hand”, and in 1982 appears the formula “Edition ohne Interpretation”.

However, it is not so easy to escape interpretation. To mention one single example: the hermeneutic difficulty to interpret the abbreviations cannot be neglected. For example, “ex.” may mean “existentiell” or “existenzial”, “Fkt” may equally mean “Funktion”, “Fiktion”, or “Faktum”. A place of the 20th volume of the complete works is a good example for proving how much of an interpretive operation is the decoding of abbreviations, it says: “in der theoretischen noch unmodifizierten Erfahrung”.² The knowledge of Heidegger’s thought in the 1920s makes this formulation questionable, and the manuscript reveals an abbreviation on the corresponding place: “theor.” Grammatically, it can equally be an adjective or an adverb, and it is the duty of an interpretive reading to decide how to decode it. Consequently, it is obvious that the correct reading is the following: “in der theoretisch noch unmodifizierten Erfahrung”³ (the difference in English: “in the not yet modified theoretical experience” versus “in the theoretically not yet modified experience”).

¹ An edition based on the principle of chronology and development history (more or less like the Heidegger complete edition or the Hegel-edition) stands in opposition to an edition based on thematic categorization like the Husserl complete edition, the *Husserliana*. An edition of this type basically determines the interpretations and the choice of interpretation topics (e.g. time consciousness, intersubjectivity). An edition based on thematic categorization is disputable in this case, because it can level the differences in the development history – see for example *Husserliana*, vol. 10: *Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins (1893–1917)*; the manuscripts of 25 years related to the same topic get published together, or the *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität* (*Husserliana*, vols. 13–15) containing three volumes, which collects the manuscripts of three decades, similarly to the edition of Hegel’s lectures issued by his students, though – we have to mention here that – in the case of the *Husserliana* we are not talking about compilations, and the manuscripts belonging to different periods maintain their independence. In spite of this, an edition of this type is already decisive with respect to the history of interpretation; it only offers a view on the development of thoughts related to some specific topics, and on the development of the philosopher’s thoughts in general, in a chronological order. Of course, the edition of the Husserlian oeuvre (containing approximately forty volumes) has its own specific problems. First of all, – as the director of the Husserl-Archive stated – there is the fact that the legacy in Husserl’s case is voluminous, as well: approximately 40000 pages of manuscript written in shorthand. The edition itself admittedly does not follow a chronological order (see Samuel IJsseling, “Das Husserl-Archiv in Leuven und die Husserl-Ausgabe”, *Buchstabe und Geist. Zur Überlieferung und Edition philosophischer Texte*, 137–146., here: 139, 145.).

² GA 20, 152.

³ Th. Kiesel, “Edition und Übersetzung. Unterwegs von Tatsachen zu Gedanken, von Werken zu Wegen”, 93.

The edition takes as its basis the last textual variant. Nevertheless, it must be added that it does not follow the editorial practice of Hegel's FVA since the editorial afterword at the end of the individual volumes offers a correct philological explanation on the creation and compilation of the text of the published volumes. In addition, the first series of the complete edition systematically publishes the marginal notes found in Heidegger's own copy, through which the reader may follow, if not the creation of the text, but its authorial afterlife as well.

Taking into account the text's stages of evolution corresponds to what I have previously termed the happening of the text. Naturally, it can be absolutely useful to trace it, but we can only find out about the happening of the text if some trace of an earlier text or variant is preserved. Let me enforce this with a further example. Several researchers formulated it as a requirement in the 1980s to publish the famous 1920/21 lectures on the phenomenology of religion, which had not been preserved in manuscript, and was circulating for decades in the form of student notes among the researchers, as a kind of underground, valuable and secret sensation. The lecture was then published in 1995, as volume 60 of the complete works, on the basis of the reconstruction of student notes.¹ The title of the volume is: *Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens*. The editorial afterword reveals that the title of the volume comes from a note on the cover of a school notebook, used by Heidegger to bound his notes on the phenomenology of religion. Another bookcover contains the original title: *Phänomenologie des religiösen Bewußtseins*. Heidegger later crossed out the word *Bewußtsein*, and replaced it with *Leben*. For whoever is familiar with Heidegger's ideatic development after WWI, and within it his profound theoretical reckoning with Husserlian phenomenology, the recognition comes as obvious: this terminological replacement in its laconic form is suitable for describing Heidegger's entire hermeneutic turn and development in the 1920s. In short: the neo-Kantian–Husserlian concept of “consciousness” is replaced by “life”. A word is deleted, and another word takes its place. Now, even if we do not know about this development or happening, the title (*Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens*) remains meaningful nonetheless, but being aware of the deleted variant yields a piece of extra information by which the text can be understood in more detail, more accurately, as a result (or stage) of an inner happening. In this respect it is useful therefore to publish the deleted versions as well. Naturally, the question also rises: what if the deletion was only made in the author's thoughts (and not on paper)? Then of course nothing will be preserved of the changes (just like on a computer, unless the track changes function is on, but then corrected misspellings and other errors are visible as well). But is it not what usually happens? When we formulate something, we are permanently deleting or modifying the text, that is, we reformulate it, most often without leaving any corrected or deleted written notes behind.

¹ When asked about the Hegel-edition, Heidegger reminded us about his previous remark according to which the students' notes on lectures are nothing but “obscure sources” (*Unterwegs zur Sprache* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1959), 91.: “Nachschriften sind freilich trübe Quellen”), and – referring to the publishment of the Hegel-lectures – he gave utterance to his hope that this practice would not apply to him (Hartmut Buchner: “Fragmentarisches”, *Erinnerung an Martin Heidegger*, ed. G. Neske, (Pfullingen: Neske, 1977), 47–51., here: 50f.). However, irrespectively of our judgement on the editions in question, it can be stated: it applied to him.

It has been said that the longest and most interesting part of the complete works of Heidegger is the lectures published in the second series. However, their preparation – in this respect similarly to the Hegel-edition of GW – causes several difficulties and raises several questions. Let us conclude this paper by adding even more questions, inquiring the foundations by directing the question to the object of edition itself.

The lecture series of both the Hegel- and Heidegger-editions has to face the difficulty that the manuscripts of the delivered lectures, although to various degrees, but are only available in very incomplete form, and the use of students' lecture notes gains importance in this context, as a kind of substitute. However, one must ask the question: what is it that we must really publish? What is really a lecture? Is it a written or oral manifestation? Strangely enough, the recurrent complaint about the incompleteness of the lecture notes presupposes that the lecture is not a *performance*, but a written manifestation. This assumption however is not at all obvious. At any rate, only the word can be efficient, the written, but perhaps undelivered manuscript can hardly have any influence. If it is called a “lecture”, then it is perhaps that what the author “lectures” (in speech, how else) that should be published. Even if we have access to the entire manuscript at the basis of the lecture, how do we know, in lack of student notes, that the written text was delivered in that particular form – and completeness – in speech? Evidently, it can be argued what is worthier of being published: a manuscript or the transcript of a tape? The manuscript can of course be published, but possibly in a series entitled “writings from the legacy” of the complete works edition; but a series entitled “Lectures”, if taken literally (and how else should we take it?) should aim at the reconstruction of the oral delivery. Consequently, if Heidegger (whether or not similarly to Hegel) has become known due to his influential lectures held after WWI – while he published nothing in print for around a decade – then the student notes preserved should mirror the effect of the delivered word just as much as a possibly fragmentary manuscript, which cannot be verified to have indeed been delivered in speech. If the main thesis of this paper claims that the establishment of the text does not take place within laboratory conditions, in a space void of interpretation, then we should now ask: whose text should we now establish in preparation for print? The text of the manuscript at the basis of the lecture, or that of the delivered lecture? For the series title of the complete edition announces, after all, “Vorlesungen” (lectures), and not “Vorlesungs-Manuskripte” or “Vorlesungs-Texte” (lecture-manuscripts, lecture-texts).

Translated by Emese Czintos