

THE PRESUPPOSITION OF TRUTH AND ITS SENSE

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1. The thesis of logical prejudice
2. The phenomenological truth
3. The co-originality of truths and the meaning of presupposition

Preliminaries

In the famous paragraph 44 of *Sein und Zeit* Heidegger mentions among the theses which characterise the traditional understanding of truth also the one which asserts that "the 'locus' of truth is assertion (judgement)".¹ This thesis has been correlated in the history of philosophy with another one, interpreted in various ways in function of the philosophical view in question: that of the *correspondance* between assertion and reality. According to Heidegger, these theses characterise logical prejudice or the prejudice of logic which must be deconstructed in favour of the idea of the original truth as an essential kind of being of the *Dasein*. Logical prejudice must make room for the prejudice of truth, the presupposition that it exists. " 'We' presuppose truth because 'we', being in the kind of Being which *Dasein* possesses, are 'in truth' ".² Thus "It is not we who presuppose 'truth'; but it is 'truth' that makes it at all possible ontologically for us to be able to be such that we 'presuppose' anything at all. Only *truth makes possible* something of the sort of prejudice."³ According to Heidegger, "presupposing" is "to understand something as the ground for the Being of some other entity."⁴

Does this Heideggerian "presupposition" have, in spite of the thesis of the originality of revelation, the "liberty" of which it assumes about the truth of assertion? Does this "prejudice" not presuppose another one, necessary for making consistent and completely intelligible the Heideggerian construction? Must the two "levels" of truth (original truth and truth of the assertion) not be seen in their co-originality?

¹ M. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, 5. Aufl., Halle, 1941, p.214 (SuZ in the following).

² *Idem*, p.227.

³ *Idem*, p.228.

⁴ *Idem*, p.228.

(Our investigation tries to answer these questions.

1. The thesis of logical prejudice

Contrary to Gadamer's attempts to recover legitimate prejudices⁵ we shall call prejudice those presuppositions which direct our thinking in an undesirable, hardly recognizable way which is difficult to de-construct. A prejudice in itself is not a judgement, nor a presupposition "within a theoretic context of foundation"⁶, but rather a fatal horizon of life. Logical prejudice is the presupposition after which truth must be understood as the truth of the assertion (judgement), more exactly, as the presence of an object which confirms that the assertion is true. Or, in Heidegger's words, "the thesis according to which the original 'locus' of truth is judgement."⁷

Let us analyse this thesis.

What is the relationship between logic and truth? If the assertion is true and the assertion is a logical "form", can we conclude that the truth of the assertion is a logical truth? What is logical truth?

This question has many answers. Some logicians say that logic and truth have nothing to do with each other: "Logic can be constructed without even mentioning truth."⁸ Others consider that logic presupposes the concept of truth, but "what 'true' means after all is not an issue of logic but an issue of the theory of knowledge. 'Truth' is a basically undefined concept in logic."⁹ Seebohm considers that "it is decisive in logic if there is a concept of objective truth..., first of all for singular sentences. What presuppositions make up an opinion about the state of things which comes to be expressed, is a second-rate epistemological question."¹⁰ M. Schlick holds the same opinion when he asserts that logic in general is only possible through the concept of truth.¹¹

The thesis regarding the "place" of truth is a consequence of the shared option of principle. Traditional logic up to Kant and even afterwards considers that the judgement is true. "Every practical reflection on aims and means is formulated in judgements; any knowledge is contained in judgements; any conviction is enclosed in judgements."¹² According to Frege, truth and falsity as the sense of the

⁵ H. G. Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode*, 2 erw. Aufl., Tübingen, 1965, p.255, 260.

⁶ M. Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretation zu Aristoteles*, hg. W. Bröcker, K. Bröcker-Oltmans, Frankfurt, 1985, p.158 (PIA, in the following)

⁷ SuZ, p.226.

⁸ Bruno Baron von Freytag-Löringhoff, *Logik. Ihr System und ihr Verhältnis zur Logistik*, 2 Aufl, Stuttgart, 1957, p.89. and the following.

⁹ Albert Menne, *Einführung in die Logik*, 2. Aufl., München, 1973, p.32 and the following. G. Frege holds the same opinion (*Schriften zur Logik und Sprachphilosophie. Aus dem Nachlaß*, ed. G. Gabriel, Hamburg, 1971, p.23: "What truth is, cannot be explained."

¹⁰ Th. M. Seebohm, *Philosophie der Logik*, Frankfurt, 1984, p.91, 26-28, 142.

¹¹ M. Schlick, *das Wesen der Wahrheit*, p.33.

¹² Chr. Sigwart, *Logik*, Erstes Buch 5. Aufl., Tübingen, 1924, p.313-341, *Die Wahrheit der unmittelbaren Urteile*, p.9.

sentence belong to the thought. Therefore the thought differs not only from the assertion but also from the act of judging or the assertion of a judgement. Other logicians say that the proposition is the bearer of truth.¹³ In Quine's opinion the "eternal assertion" is the bearer of truth¹⁴ whereas Austin and Strawson consider that it is not the assertion which is true but those statements and assertions which view the concrete context of the use of the assertion.¹⁵

What is therefore the relation between logic and truth? What is logical truth? Let us begin with the second question.

The issue of logical truth, central to the analytic program, plays today an important role in the rehabilitation of some logistic theses and the devising of a concept of logic without which it is not clear what do we have in mind when speaking about logic.

With Frege, definitions and the general laws of logic are those which determine the special class of analytic truths to which the truths of arithmetic are reduced: "It is requirement now to discover the demonstration, reducing it, step by step, to primitive truths. If we reach only general laws of logic and definitions, truth has an analytical nature."¹⁶ Russell's paradox questioned the Fregean program, as the sentences about quantities do not have the universality and apodictic nature demanded by logic. Gödel's research proved that the *Principia Mathematica* type systems are insufficient in the complete analysis of arithmetic.

Nevertheless, the idea of the *universality of classical logic* and of the viability of *analyticity* remains valid. They also correlate with each other; some recent attempts to define logic draw upon analyticity. "Without the idea of analyticity, says J. Hacking¹⁷, who cares exactly what logic is?" Others reject analyticity but accept the thesis according to which logic is classical logic. (Quine). Let us thoroughly analyse these theses so that we can answer the above question.

At different levels of reflection on logic we often come across ideas such as 'logic studies logical truth'. But what is logical truth? Quine¹⁸ asserts that logical truth is a truth in which there are only logical constants. But what is a logical constant? A. Tarski¹⁹ pointed out that we cannot classify logical constants according to an explicit criterion. We can enumerate them, but they do not have a "common denominator" which can be expressed by a non-circular definition.

¹³ W. Kneale, *Proposition and Truth in Natural Languages*, in: *Mind*, nr.81, 1972, p.238 and the following.

¹⁴ W.V. O. Quine, *Pursuit of Truth*, Cambridge-Massachusetts, 1992

¹⁵ J. L. Austin, *Truth*, in: *Philosophical Papers*, 3rd ed, Oxford, 1979, p.119-121.

¹⁶ G. Frege, *Scrieri logico-filosofice (Logical-Philosophical Writings)*, București, 1977, p.41.

¹⁷ J. Hacking, *What is Logic?*, in: *A Philosophical Companion to First-Order Logic*, R.I.G. Hughes, Hackett P.C., Indianapolis/Cambridge, 1993, p.244.

¹⁸ W. V. O. Quine, *Truth by Convention*, in: *The Ways of Paradox*, p.70-99.

¹⁹ A. Tarski, *On the Concept of Logical Consequence*, in: *Logic, Semantics, Mathematics*, Oxford, 1956.

Wittgenstein has a similar thesis. Logical truth is that which results from the introduction of logical constants in a language formed by elementary sentences²⁰ only. The distinction between logical truth and empirical truth in the *Tractatus* has as its equivalent the distinction between the *conditions of truth* for compound sentences, that is, for logical truths as meanings introduced by rules (4.431, 4.442, 4.45, 4.46, 4.461, 4.463) and *possibilities of truth* for elementary sentences (4.3, 4.31, 4.4, 4.41, 4.42, 4.43, 4.431, 4.44, 4.442, 4.45, 4.46, 5.101). Starting from this point, generalising for all kinds of constants, logical truth can be defined: it is that which results from introducing a constant with the help of certain rules; as *sequence calculus* is the best symbolic representation of what is called deduction in natural language, the rules of this calculus are also the “model” of defining logical truth and logic, implicitly²¹. How does logical truth and logic “define” deducibility?

The classical relation of deducibility (\vdash) is a relation between formulæ verifying three conditions:

1. Reflexivity: $A \vdash A$
2. Attenuation: If $\Gamma \vdash \theta$, then $\Gamma, A \vdash \theta$ and $\Gamma \vdash A, \theta$
3. Transitivity (the rule of cutting): If $\Gamma \vdash A, \theta$

and $\Gamma, A \vdash \theta$, then $\Gamma \vdash \theta$.

These three conditions can be considered *structural rules* at the same time. For example, from $\Gamma \vdash \theta$ we deduce $\Gamma \vdash A, \theta$ (therefore $\frac{\Gamma \quad \theta}{\Gamma \quad A, \theta}$). They

do not depend on the existence of logical constants.

Another class is formed by *operational rules* by which logical constants are introduced. For example, the rule of introducing the conjunction in the succedaneum is:

$$\frac{\Gamma \quad A, \theta \quad \Gamma \quad B, \theta}{\Gamma \quad A \quad B, \theta},$$

²⁰ “Ob ein Satz der logik angehört, kann man berechnen, indem man die logischen Eigenschaften des *Symbols* berechnet. Und dies tun wir, wenn wir einen logischen satz ‘beweisen’. Denn, ohne uns um einen Sinn und eine Bedeutung zu kümmern bilden wir den logischen Satz aus anderen nach bloßen *Zeichenregeln*.” (6.126, *Tractatus*).

²¹ The formulation of a concept of logic shifts between the thesis according to which logic is the *science of truths* (Quine, *Introduction*, in: *A Philosophical Companion*, p.1-6) and the thesis that logic is the science of deduction (M. Dummett considers that logic does not deal with a characteristic of the assertion (truth), but with the deduction of some assertions from other assertions; Frege, *Philosophy of Language*, p.432-3). The calculus of sequences is mentioned in this second sense. Although the two opinions regarding logic are correlated, they are not identical. Logic “conserves” the truth of assertions by the relation of deducibility, but logic does not deal with truth as such. What about logical truth?

where A and B are formulas, whereas Γ and θ are quantities of formulas.

The formulas from the “numerator” are *components* of the *principle* formulas (from the “denominator”). In case of binary connectives the components are subformulas of the principle formula (this is the *property of the subformula*).

The calculus of sequences has an important logical-philosophical consequence: operational rules can be considered definitions which introduce the meanings of logical constants in a language. The only requirement is that these definitions be conservative, that is, they must not alter the three conditions of the classical relation of deducibility.

Are operational rules, similar to syntactic rules, independent of truth? If not, what role does truth play here?

P. Horwich²² offers a possible answer to this question. There are two reasons why truth is considered so closely linked to logic; these are possible sources of error.

a) Logic deals with a certain type of generalisation and truth - defined as a scheme of equivalence (“The sentence *that p* is true $\leftrightarrow p$ ”) - helps us to formulate these generalisations²³. For example, the law of noncontradiction can be formulated this way: Nothing is odd and even, colourful and colourless, live and dead at the same time. As we need a single sentence to express this infinite series, on account of the above scheme of equivalence we can formulate it this way: “The sentence ‘*nothing is colourful and colourless at the same time*’ is true.” We can deal similarly with the other conjunctions. The word “truth” attributed to the conjunctions similar to the forementioned ones allows for such a generalisation. Any sentence of the type ‘Nothing is F and non-F at the same time’ is true. The author concludes: “In this very role truth appears so general in logic. We also remark that the notion of truth in the formulation of classical logic is the same as that in other logics such as intuitional logic and quantum logic: it is the notion expressed by the scheme of equivalence.” (p.71.)

b) The second source of error which interconnects truth and logic is the thesis according to which logical connectives are best explained in terms of truth and falsity. Disjunction, for example, has the following truth chart:

p	t	t	f	f
q	t	f	t	f
$p \vee q$	t	t	t	f

²² P. Horwich, *Theories of Truth*, in: *A Philos. Comp...*, p.71.

²³ See also P. Horwich, *Truth*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1990.

where “p” and “q” are propositional variables, “v” the symbol of disjunction, “t” true and “f” false.

However, on account of the scheme of equivalence, this chart has the same meaning as the following rules of inference:

$$\frac{p, q}{p \vee q}; \frac{p, \sim q}{p \vee q}; \frac{\sim p, q}{p \vee q}; \frac{\sim p, \sim q}{\sim (p \vee q)};$$

“Then the set of rules of deductive inference implicitly helps to define logical particles. The concept of truth and falsity do not contribute to this, save that they make formulation easier.” (Idem)

Let us analyse the two theses of P. Horwich, first the thesis which asserts that truth facilitates the generalisations logic deals with.

We must state at the very beginning that the scheme of equivalence “The proposition *that p* is true if p” is not a logical truth but an epistemological one. It is nothing else but a metalinguistic assertion about a component of the object language. The application of this scheme to the functions of truth does nothing else than makes explicit an already existing content. The difference between the formulation “ $p \ \& \ \bar{p}$ ” or “ $(\forall p) (p \ \& \ \bar{p})$ ” and “‘ $p \ \& \ \bar{p}$ ’ is true” is that the last formulation makes *linguistically* explicit that which is implicitly contained in the first and second formulation. It does not follow that *truth* is *reduced* to the easiness of formulation. Is the truth “contained” in the formulation “ $p \ \& \ \bar{p}$ ”? Unlike Horwich, we think that it is. For the notion of truth used in different logics (intuitionist and quantum logic) has, contrary to Horwich’s view, different connotations. The author’s assertion that different logics are based on the same notion of truth, namely, the one “articulated by the scheme of equivalence”, is not valid unconditionally. Horwich’s thesis has similar partial results but completely different consequences. The assertion according to which the scheme of equivalence (*mutatis mutandis*, Tarski’s criterion) is valid in other logics can be found in the writings of Putnam, Dummett and Hacking.²⁴ Putnam, for example, considers that the rules according to which we define connectives in a trivalent logic are consistent with all rules used in relation with the “true” and “false” values. (Op. cit. p.172). As the sense of these concepts is not linked to bivalence, Tarski’s criterion, formulated for a bivalent system, is applicable for a trivalent system. The famous Tarskian equivalence “‘Snow is white’ is true \leftrightarrow Snow is white” is a true sentence in a trivalent logic. This is due to the fact that these words

²⁴ N. Putnam, *Philosophical Papers*, vol.I, Cambridge U.F., 1975

M. Dummett, *Truth and Other Enigmas*, Cambridge, 1978

J. Hacking, *op. cit.*

have a nucleus meaning which can be preserved even if *tertium non datur* is abandoned in a nonstandard logic. Putnam and Horwich agree on this point. Can we conclude then that *truth* means the same in different logics? We think we cannot. Putnam himself offers an argument in his cited paper. When the truth value of a compound sentence is known, the behaviour of a logician who uses bivalent logic and that of another one who uses trivalent logic coincides. If we know that snow is white, the sentence "Snow is white or \bar{A} Snow is white" will be accepted by both logicians. However, if the truth value of a sentence is not known, disjunction will be accepted in a bivalent logic and rejected in a trivalent one by the introduction of the third value.

Contrary to Horwich's assertion, *truth* in the Tarskian formulation (and *truth* in Putnam's example when the truth value of a sentence (assertion) is known) and the *conception of truth* and the *truth* which *founds* the reading of a logical formula are not the same. What happens to the classical equivalence $(\bar{p} \& \bar{\bar{p}}) \leftrightarrow (p \vee \bar{p})$ in a nonstandard logic?

In a *trivalent* logic when the truth value of p is unknown, the excluded third is suppressed. Classical functions can be translated in case of *intuitional* logic:

classical \wedge is identical with intuitional \wedge (conjunction)

classical \vee becomes $\bar{\bar{}}(\bar{p} \wedge \bar{q})$ (disjunction)

classical $p \rightarrow q$ becomes $\bar{\bar{}}(p \wedge q)$ (implication)

classical \neg is identical with intuitional $\bar{\bar{}}$ (" \neg " classical negation, " $\bar{\bar{}}$ " intuitional negation).

On account of this interpretation the theorems of the classical calculus of expressions become theorems of the intuitional calculus of expressions.²⁵ However, the sense of functions changes. The central concept is that of *provability*, not that of truth and /or falsity (to assert p means to assert *p is provable*, as " $p \wedge q$ is not provable" is a contradiction in intuitional logic). Then, " $p \vee p$ " in classical logic means that every sentence is true or false. According to the above translation, $p \vee p$ is equivalent with $\bar{\bar{}}(\bar{p} \wedge \bar{p})$ which means that it is absurd that a sentence and its negation are both absurd - a relation which says nothing about truth and falsity.

Therefore we can conclude that Horwich's thesis according to which "the notion of truth used in the formulation of classical logic is the same as truth used by other logics such as intuitional and quantum logic..." is *stricto sensu* false.

Let us analyse now Horwich's second thesis which brings us even closer to answering the question regarding the nature of logical truth. Horwich translates

²⁵ V.K. Gödel, *Zur intuitionistischen Arithmetik und Zahlentheorie*, in: *Ergebnisse eines mathematischen Kolloquiums* 4, 1933, p.34-38.

the chart of functions of truth into rules of deduction in which the sense of truth does not appear any more. It is easy to see that this idea converges with that of Hacking (via Gentzen) according to which operational rules (which introduce the meaning of logical operators) can be considered definitions without containing truth as such. However, these ideas differ considerably. Horwich concludes that "truth"/ "falsity" in these definitions of logical operators only make formulation easier, whereas Hacking says that operational rules only "fix the meaning of logical connectives" meaning that it offers them a semantics "only if the classical notions of truth and falsity are already assumed."²⁶ Putnam has an apparently contrary opinion: "...rules of derivation such as $p \wedge q \therefore p$; $p \wedge q \therefore q$; $p \therefore p \vee q$; $q \therefore p \vee q$; $\neg p, \neg q \therefore \neg(p \vee q)$, do not fix the 'meaning' of logical connectives, as a number of philosophers, including recently Hacking, have asserted. Someone could accept all of those rules (and all classical tautologies, as well) and still be using the logical connectors in the nonclassical sense just described - a sense which does not belong to the theory of functions of truth."²⁷

Let us consider this "difference". It is an *apparent* opposition, because both logicians link *truth* to *logic*. "Difference" resides, and this is fundamental, in the way of presupposing truth. Different views on logic represent the consequence of this assumption. J. Hacking for example presupposes a *classical* concept of truth and of the relation of logical consequence. Together with the requirement of preserving the three features of the relation of deducibility, they form logic proper, that is, first rate logic (the branching theory of logical types, without the axiom of reducibility). The feature of the subformula and the requirement of conservation strictly delimits, in Hacking's opinion, the class of logical constants, a delimitation which is in perfect harmony with logistic theses. Then, it offers a semantics of the constants in question because demarcation is done by the way logical constants are characterised. Thirdly, and which is most important in Hacking's view, demarcation explains why logic is important for the analytic program. "How can we account for logic without the idea of analicity?"²⁸ Besides, a treatment of branching quantifiers is impossible in first rate logic.²⁹ Other results throw light on the quasi-formal nature of the demarcation, by excommunicating some very elaborate constructions from logic. A Gentzen rule, as we have already mentioned,

²⁶ J. Hacking, *op. cit.* p. 240.

²⁷ H. Putnam, *Was ist 'Realismus'?*, in: *Von einem realistischen Standpunkt*, Rowohlt Taschenbuch V, p.87.

²⁸ R. Montague builds the categorial grammar of English on this type of logic. See *Formal Philosophy*, Yale UP, 1974. Montague also contests the ontological-formal argument which "protects" first rate logic (according to which first rate logic is the strongest complete and compact theory endowed with the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem). He asks why compactness must be absolutely defining for logic itself?

²⁹ L. Henkin, *Some Remarks on Infinitely Long Formulas*, in: *Infinitistic Methods*, New York, 1961, p.167-83.

has the feature of subformula. Some authors devised Gentzen versions of the \in calculus of Hilbert where the rule of cutting is not valid.³⁰ We ask ourselves if Hilbert's \in constant is a logical constant? According to Hacking, it does not belong to the class of logical constants because logic is understood in a logicist sense. The whole of modal logic is subject to such an excommunication.

The pre-supposition of truth has another nature with Putnam.³¹ The choice between different logics means different ways of pre-supposing truth. The same rule can appear in different logics, its meaning depending on the way of pre-supposing truth. Conceived this way, logical rules cannot fix by themselves the meaning of connectives. However, to invoke the assumption of truth is to go beyond logic. Where? Where is the place of these presuppositions? Are they something natural and obvious, the acceptance of which is without problems? Then why are they pre-supposed and not simply taken from the "place" where they are?

If the assumption of truth mentioned by Hacking, Putnam, Dummett, etc. is not something of the nature of *logic*, but something on which logic is based, then it must be in the language in which was agreed the sense of a connective before introducing it by a rule, in a fragment of language. Is natural language a language the structure of which is expressed by classical logic? No serious logician after Russell shares this opinion. Is it then trivalent or intuitionist? All these logics and many others can be "found" in it, however, natural language cannot be characterised exclusively from the perspective of a logic, whatever this would be. The pre-suppositions³² we deal with are abstractions (conventions) created by logicians. They are not of the nature of language, nor of the nature of logic. They are not completely outside language, for every understanding of the sense of a word is the understanding of a "thing" brought into language. They are neither absolutely outside logic, as they are its pre-suppositions.

What is logical truth, then? We could say: the union of two meanings, "truth" and "logic", something that belongs to logic (a constant for example) linked to something which founds its meaning (the pre-supposition of truth). If we assign truth (in the classical sense) an absolute nature, we come to Frege's thesis according to which logical laws are laws of thinking, that is, "the most general laws, which prescribe universally the way in which one ought to think if one is to think at all" and which he calls "boundary stones set in an eternal foundation

³⁰ L. Wessells devised such a calculus for \in -Hilbert. See *Cut-Elimination in a Gentzen-style Calculus without Identity*, in: *Zeitschrift für math. Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik*, 23/1977, p.527-38.

³¹ M. Dummett presents a similar view in *Elements of Intuitionism*, Oxford, 1977.

³² J. Hacking speaks about semantic frames of a fragment of language. In order to introduce a greater "distance" from natural language we will avoid this syntagm, even if semantics is, strictly speaking, that which allows the "reading" of any logical symbol.

which our thought can overflow but never displace.”³³ If logical truth becomes relative, the *sense* of our presupposition must be searched for elsewhere.

If the same rule can have different meanings in function of the presupposition, then logical truth is presupposition as such. This abstraction, not to be found anywhere but interconnected with language and logic and which “mediates” the generic dialogue of the self with the world, bears the mark of transcendentalism. If so, then its *universality* must be proved.

The forementioned ideas allow us to answer some questions. As the relation between truth and logic is explicit now, we can say about the status of the assertion that logic does not deal with the *way* of proving it but with the *pre*-supposition of truth and the nature of this presupposition. Is the assertion the “place” of truth? The answer is: no. Is the “place” of truth outside the assertion? Again, no.

What is pre-supposition outside that which is based upon it? Is there *pre*-supposition in itself? Do we not move along a presupposition-grounded connection by presupposing truth? What is true if the assertion is not?

Thus we pass beyond logic in another way than by presupposing the truth. This is a passage into phenomenology.

2. Phenomenological truth

If the “logical prejudice” according to which the “place” of truth is the assertion could be deconstructed, then the “phenomenological prejudice” (or the prejudice of phenomenology), according to which original truth does not have the nature of an assertion and has nothing to do with logic, can also be deconstructed.

Let us see the state of affairs.

Which is the way of presupposing truth in phenomenology? Is Heidegger’s “original” truth free of every presupposition? Is Heidegger’s separation from “logical prejudice” a complete one? We can answer these questions by systematically following the stages of the Heideggerian deconstruction of logical prejudice. We have in mind his lectures in Marburg (summer 1925) entitled *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffes* and those from winter 1925/26, *Logik. Die Frage nach der Wahrheit, Sein und Zeit, Vom Wesen des Grundes, Vom Wesen der Wahrheit*. However, as to the extent the author’s ideas changed in relation to this subject of investigation, this will be dealt by indicating the work in question.

The Heideggerian inquiry about the sense of being must not be placed at the antipode of logic and it must not be considered eluding logicity which is a feature of the discursive horizon. Nevertheless Heidegger’s *logic* does not contain

³³ G. Frege, *Grundgesetze der Arithmetik*, apud. *the basic Laws of Arithmetic*, Berkeley, Univ. of California Press, p.13.

anything which is usual in manuals of logic. Its aim is to work out a “philosophische Logik” or “philosophierende Logik”, one which has in view the original sense of “logos”. The science of logos is the science of uttering (Reden); if language is the subject of linguistics, utterance, on the contrary, is a dialogue (Miteinanderbereden) in which revealing him about whom we speak has primacy over the act of communication. Therefore uttering is discovering. And “We call this discovery, that is, the non-hiding of being, truth.” (*Logik*, 7). In Heidegger’s view, truth in this sense should be the object of such a philosophical logic. We can remark here one of Husserl’s influences: in his 1917 lecture in Freiburg he deals with working out a “phenomenological/genetic logic” being “the universal and pure science about the logos as logos and therefore... about truth as truth” and which excludes “every knowledge of the type of judgements”.³⁴ In perfect harmony with the master, “the question about what-is-true in an authentic and original way, that is, the question about the primary sense of truth” becomes the fundamental issue of logic. (*Logik*, 12).

According to Heidegger, Husserl’s *Logische Untersuchungen* does not only represent the most elaborate form of a “philosophierende Logik” from the beginning of the century but also shows that Husserl “reflected on the great tradition of Western logic” in this work. (*Logik*, 14). What does this assertion mean?

It is not by chance that Heidegger insists on the three great discoveries of phenomenology: *intentionality, categorial intuition and the original sense of truth*³⁵ (PGZ, 34-103). Let us dwell on the latter.

There are four concepts of truth in Husserl’s work. The first has a double formulation: “As an equivalent of an identifying act” truth is a “state of things” (ein Sachverhalt), while as an equivalent of a covering identification it is an “identity: the whole correspondence between what is referred to and the given as such” (L.U II/2, 122; PGZ, 66-70). With Husserl, the first concept of truth has two determinations: “Sachverhalt” and “Identität”. In Heidegger’s view we find here the nucleus of phenomenological explanation: experiences in Husserl’s view are in dynamic connections in the sense that what is only referred to (gemeint) in an experience is linked to intuitivity (Anschaulichkeit), that is, the filling (Erfüllung) of its sense; the perceptive filling (Wahrnehmungsmäßige Erfüllung) of the intention of meaning, that is, the legitimisation of what-is-referred-to (Gemeinte) in what-is-inferred (Angeschaute) is the decisive argument for rejecting the Cartesian image of cognition (*Logik*, 99-107).³⁶

³⁴ See *Analysen zur passiven Synthesis (Ap S)*

³⁵ *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffes (PGZ)*.

³⁶ E. Tugendhat asserts: “It is only because we have the remarkable possibility to refer to something that is not given “directly” and because, on the other hand, this something can be given directly, that the discussion about truth and false has sense.” (*Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger*, 2 Aufl, Berlin, 1970, p.30).

The intended void (*Leervermeinte*) and what-is-inferred become identical (*Zur-Deckung-kommen*) in the legitimising filling (*ausweisende Erfüllung*). Husserl calls this identification “evidence” or “act of identification”. “Evidence” is a key concept because it leads to the thematisation of truth. “As any identification, it (evidence) is an objectifying act; its objective equivalent meaning *being in the sense of truth* or even *truth*.” (L.U. II/2,122). In evidence truth is “lived” as a filling which must be distinguished from simple perception. Heidegger stresses the difference between the “experience” of truth (in evidence) and the perception of truth. In experience identity itself is not sensed thematically: “We possess the characteristic connection according to which *something is experimented, but not sensed* and that this is experimented only in the sensing of the object (*Objekterfassen*) as such, that is, in not sensing identity.” (PGZ, 70) The distinction experience - sensing/perceiving acquires the aspect of the thematic - non-thematic polarity, which is central in the Heideggerian doctrine of truth.

Husserl’s second concept of truth is asserted as follows: truth is “the ideal relation within the unity of coincidence, defined as evidence, between the cognitive essences of the acts which coincide” (PGZ, 71) (“*das ideale Verhältnis, welches in der als Evidenz definierten Deckungseinheit zwischen der erkenntnismäßigen Wesen der sich deckenden Akte obwaltet*” (PGZ, 71)).

The third concept of truth refers to the object (*Gegenstand*) given in “erfüllender Akt”. In this sense, the object itself is “the true” (*Wahren*) (L.U. II/2, 123).

Finally, the fourth sense considers truth as being the “correctness of intention” (the certainty of judgement), as the act of its adequation to the object of truth”.

Heidegger’s main objections to Husserl’s view are:

1. The concept of truth in *Logische Untersuchungen* (the 6th research) belongs to the tradition of logical prejudice.
2. There is no asking of the being of the intentional.

The first is interesting for this discussion. It appears strange because Heidegger himself, speaking about truth in Husserl’s work, says: “The assertion is valid because there is truth in the sense of identity.” (*Logik*, 110-12). Therefore, the “original” truth (that of identity between what has been referred to and the given as such) counterpoints the truth of the assertion. The real assertion is a member of the relation which defines truth in an authentic sense (as identity *Gemeinte* \equiv *Angeschaute*). The logician treats the assertion as the place of truth because the assertion represents in void that which is identifiable in intuition.

If the above relation of identity is designated as *Sachverhalt*, then “it is moving... along the same line as the state-of-things (*Sachverhalt*) S is P, the

See also R. Sokolowski, *Husserlian Meditations*, 22: “Only when we are able to experience the object in its presence and in its absence do we encounter its identity.”

blackboard is black, the same as the relation between black and blackboard" (*Logik*, 112). In Heidegger's view Husserl confounds "Wahrheit" (truth) with "Sachverhalt" and does not stay in the dynamics of that "Zur-Deckung-kommen von Ab-und Anwesenden" (the occurrence of absence and presence in identity).

True, Husserl oscillates between a dynamic and static concept of truth³⁷, between the identification (renamed by Heidegger as *Wahrverhalt*) and the remaining identity between "referred to" and "given". This oscillation is also transmitted to the understanding of the being of truth (*Wahrhaftsein*), since in LU it is understood as a permanent presence of the state-of-things and which is identifiable with what is referred to, in a true judgement. This permanent presence is that of the ideal being of the true assertion.

On account of this fact Heidegger concludes that Husserl remains prisoner of the logical prejudice. We must also consider the sense of Heidegger's ambiguous assertion that "he (Husserl) thought over the great tradition of Western philosophy" (Op. cit.)

How does Heidegger withdraw from logical prejudice? Aristotle's *Metaphysics* is the second "source" of the Heideggerian thesis of original truth. In *De interpretazione* 17, paragraph 3 we find out that the assertion (*logos apophantikos*) differs from other modes of the discourse (wishes, requests, etc.) in that truth and falsity belongs only to it. "Every logos means something, says Heidegger, referring to Aristotle, but not every logos is apophantikos, only that in which the fact of being-true (*Wahrsein*) or being-false (*Falschsein*) is present." (*Logik*, 129). The enunciation is defined here in a univocal way regarding truth, not vice versa. Heidegger concludes that in Aristotle's work "Truth is the place of assertion, not the assertion the place of truth." (*Logik*, 135; S2, 226). In order to elucidate the relation between truth and assertion, we must resort, says Heidegger, to the evident nature of any assertion: every assertion is about something (*Worüber*). Assertions cannot be true or false without this "about something". As the assertions assert something about "something", we have already access to this something. This "accessibility" (*Zugänglichkeit*) is the basis of the original phenomenon. The preliminary knowledge of that which the assertion speaks of is not of the nature of predication but rather it comes from an un-thematic connection of "preoccupation" (*Besorgen*). The object of the assertion is understood from its nature of utensil ("what" (*Wozu*) it is used for), its use *as...* (*Als-Was*). The utensil

³⁷ Heidegger's criticism is not completely justified, as the concept of "Sachverhalt" is used by Husserl in a completely general way, without excluding simply intuited objects and the nonreferential (nominal) intentions corresponding to them, a fact avoided by Heidegger. The second objection is not completely grounded either: when Heidegger delivered his lectures on logic at Marburg (*Logik...*), in which he criticised the Husserlian theses about truth, Husserl delivered a lecture at Freiburg entitled *Grundzüge der Logik*, appeared in 1966 under the title *Analysen zur passiven Synthesis* in which he develops the idea of a genetic analysis of intentionality, without identifying the being of the intentional with the subsistence of objects given to pure consciousness.

gains its meaning (*as...*) only in a totality of finalities (Bewandtnisganzheit) which form in their unity the “world of meanings” (SZ, 108). Therefore the understanding of something *as* something, that is, in its original meaning, presupposes the phenomenon of the world³⁸. Heidegger calls this primary though un-thematic understanding “attitude with a meaning” (bedeutendes Verhalten). This “as” expresses therefore the structure of understanding, an understanding which must be understood as a fundamental mode of being of our Dasein” (*Logik*, 150). Heidegger also calls it the “fundamental hermeneutic structure” or the “as-structure... of primary understanding”, or “as-hermeneutics” and which is essentially ante-predicative.

We can explain at this point the relation between *apophantic* and *hermeneutic*. Let us do this on the basis of an excerpt from *Sein und Zeit*: “We call the original “as” of the comprehensive explanation in the foreseeing (ερμηνεῖν) mode the existential-hermeneutic as, compared to the apophantic “as” of the assertion” (SZ, 158). This hermeneutic “as” structure with Heidegger is an “original fundamental structure”, a syntagm which shows the Husserlian subject of intentionality as well as the “existentials” in *Sein und Zeit*.

Heidegger takes again the literal sense of the term *apophantikos* in order to clear up the relation between primary understanding and assertion. The essence of an assertion consists of “allowing a being from itself to be seen”. That-which-we-deal-with” in the assertion becomes the “about-which” of the indication so that the already discovered can be “further discovered” (*Logik*, 154, 133). Whatever the form of the assertion, says Heidegger, it depends on the original “as” structure.

This existential-hermeneutic “as” is established “as understanding and rendering explicit in general in the ecstatic-horizontal unity of temporality.” (SZ, 360). Therefore, the understanding of something *as* an available being or *as* subsistent being has at its basis the temporal horizon in which existence is projected as a concrete historical possibility. We deduce therefore that logical prejudice is also based on a certain understanding of time. Heidegger thinks that the tradition of logic until the 20th century, a tradition which presupposes that truth and being can be deduced from something subsistent (*Vorhandene*) or something present (*Gegenwärtige*), has this understanding. Heidegger’s “complete” withdrawal from logical prejudice is carried out by making explicit the relation between temporality and the vulgar understanding of time, a relation based on the following theses:

1. Temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*) founded on the original phenomenon of the future is that which allows for authentic unrest.
2. The unauthentic, “derived” temporality is at the basis of logical prejudice.

³⁸ “However, if the Dasein must deal with a context of the utensil, then it must understand, although un-thematically, something like finality: *a world has to be revealed to it.*” (SZ:364).

3. Logical prejudice considers true only that which corresponds to *presence* as subsistence; however, the “non-striking” presence of the world has another feature, that of “not announcing itself”. And this type of presence is that which founds the discovery of the available being and subsistence.

4. The possibility of logical prejudice is founded in a non-authentic way of co-existence (talkativeness and public opinion), the impersonal “it”, in which the common world has primacy and which levels all the differences regarding being and time. This is how “the most handy” ontology is formed, for which being means subsistent being and truth is the truth of the assertion. “Traditional logic” has its foundation here. (SZ, 129).

5. Authenticity can be gained by the self-projection of the Dasein on its most authentic possibility (death). Through the decision (*Entschlossenheit*) of projecting itself on this possibility it already advanced (*Vorlaufen*) in the possibility itself.

6. “*Die vorlaufende Entschlossenheit*” is the *confirmation* of the state of revelation (Erschlossenheit). It is the original truth of existence which is the basis of the truth of assertion.

7. The everyday understanding of time as a succession of subsisting moments is the basis of logical prejudice. However, the “Characteristic determinations of time understood in a vulgar way must themselves become intelligible from the original time.” (SZ, 362).

Consequently, the separation from logical prejudice means, in Heidegger’s view, separation from its truth and the concept of being on which it is based.

How conclusive is this separation? What are its consequences?

What type of presupposition is this? The truth of the assertion presupposes truth in its original sense. Does this Heideggerian presupposition have the univocal sense claimed by his philosophy?

E. Tugendhat raises an objection to this thesis. True, he has in mind two Heideggerian studies appeared after *Kehre: Vom Wesen des Grundes* and *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit*. However, what is essential about the issue of truth, thinks the German critic, can be found in *Sein und Zeit*.

Tugendhat considers that “Heidegger’s equalising ‘truth’ with ‘revelation’ (non-hiding) is not justified and even leads to the occultation of the issue of truth.” (WHH, 260). “The issue of truth” presupposes that distinction can be made between the way something is shown artificially and the way it exists. (WHH, 267, 331-336). Outside this “criterion” the discussion about truth loses its sense.”³⁹

Tugendhat’s objection is only partially justified, because he considers that the distinction “Gegebensein” - “Selbstgegebensein” misses, as the syntagm “wie es

³⁹ “daß in der Erschlossenheit, in der das Zuhandere genuin als Zuhandenes begegnet, überhaupt kein Bezug auf Wahrheit enthalten wäre” (WHH, 297).

an ihm selbst ist”(how he in himself is) is missing. Indeed, such a syntagm is omitted, but its sense is presupposed in different contexts of using the word “true”. “The fact of being indicating-itself as it is” and “the fact of being-in-the-mode-of-discovery” (SZ, 218) have the same sense. The “criterion” of truth disappears only with reference to the horizon of revelation (Lichtung) of the original sense (an existential-hermeneutic sense which founds the existential-hermeneutic and the apophantic). *Stricto sensu*, the revelation of this original horizon cannot be called “truth” for want of this criterion.⁴⁰

The sense in which the criterion of truth and, implicitly, the presupposition of truth is kept is the following: the Heideggerian intention is to *thematise* revelation as original truth, as truth on which the discovery of being and therefore the true assertions are based, by *true assertions*. Heidegger defines philosophy as “the objectivation of being as temporal, respectively, transcendental science, as ontology.”⁴¹ If something can be objectivated, must it not be subsistent or present in a way? How can then ontic determinations be differentiated from ontological ones? How do we differentiate between an apophantic truth and an existential-hermeneutic one if both can be “translated” discursively with the same exigencies? Does Heidegger not reach an aporia by claiming the setting up of a transcendental science while the “object” of research belongs to subsistence? In other words, if all theoretical-thematic assertions distort the original sense of the being of truth, does the thematisation of the sense of being not do the same in a fundamental ontology? Especially as the possibility and necessity of an analytical-existential theme of the Dasein would eventually be “existentially, that is, ontically rooted” (SZ, 12,150,153,310), and the ontologic truth of existential analysis “is established on the basis of the original existential truth.” (SZ, 316).

Facing these issues, Heidegger abandons the idea of philosophy as “science about the being” after *Kehre* in favour of the idea of non-objectifying philosophical thematisation. Then, philosophical concepts, unlike any scientific construction, have a formal-indicative structure. Does this thesis save the aporetic Heideggerian construction in *Sein und Zeit*? We think it does not.

Philosophy is trapped in a “*Mißdeutung*” to the extent it has access to the word, for everything that gains the nature of expression also gains the nature of subsistence. How can this “mistaken translation” be attenuated?

Unlike the object “presentified” by the assertion, the one indicated (*Angezeigt*) by the philosophical concept⁴² is in fact not “given in a complete and

⁴⁰ However, there is still a “salvation”: “originality” designates the fact that it is presupposed by any other truth; as it is original truth, it must not have the characteristics of apophantic truth. Revelation is revealed to itself, as it is in itself, and thus the criterion of truth is kept.

⁴¹ *Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*, 466; *Sein und Zeit*, 37.

⁴² “Dazu ist eine Besinnung auf den durchgängigen Charakter der philosophischen Begriffe notwendig, daß sie alle formal anzeigend sind” (*Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik*, Frankfurt, 1983, p.422.)

authentic way”, but previously given “in principle”.⁴³ On account of the fact that it refers to the mode⁴⁴ in which the “object” (the sense of being) could have originally “had”, the philosophical concept is a formal indication. “Formal” means “void”, not “formal thematisch” or “formal logisch”. The one indicated formally is not something subsistent but a way which is not of the type of presence because it has to be created first. Categorical expressions cannot elude the presupposition of their truth. In Heidegger’s work they have a double nature: when they are expressed they acquire the structure of apophantic assertions and therefore, they mean something subsistent first; at the same time, they have an indicative nature, that is, “all assertions need a change in understanding, an orientation towards that which is indicated, which is essentially never a subsistent being.” (*Logik*, p.410). This means that philosophy has a “concrete task of its own”: the deconstruction of the evidences of the impersonal “it” and of logical prejudice.

Heidegger tries to solve the aporia of thematisation: he emphasizes the indicating-transforming nature of philosophical concepts. The philosophical concept, unlike all other concepts, is not situated outside that which must be understood. Philosophising is a mode of being of the Dasein (as in-der Welt-Sein) which aims at defining the “in-der-Welt-Sein” regarding its being.⁴⁵ The “task” (Sache) of philosophy is the sense of the Dasein’s being. However, that which reflection refers to is already unsuppressably “present” (da); reflection is therefore a “bringing back” (Wiederholen), a re-creation (Nach-vollziehen) of the sense of being from oblivion.

3. The co-originality of truths and the sense of presupposition

However, the method of formal indication and the objectivation of being... as ontology” cannot be brought together. If we keep the idea of formal indication and reject the idea of a transcendental science as a science of the being, is the aporia of thematisation elucidated? We think not, because thematisation (be it objectifying or not) correlates with the presupposition of truth of assertions about the subject (the sense of being). Presupposition and its sense are constituents of any reflexive situation.

On the other hand, any thematisation (be it objectifying or not) requires the presence of its subject in a sense. Thus, the presupposition of truth indicates the

⁴³ Philosophy is therefore not a “Sache”, but a “principielles Haben” and therefore it must be “anzeigend”: “Sie ist, ‘formal’ anzeigend, der ‘Weg’, im ‘Ansatz’. Es ist gehaltig unbestimmte, vollzugschaft bestimmte Bindung vorgegeben” (PIA, p.20.)

⁴⁴ The object of interpretation must be interpellated so that the definition of what it is (Was) is authentically obtained from the mode (Wie) in which it exists: “wie der Gegenstand ursprünglich zugänglich wird” (PIA 20,23; SZ 27).

⁴⁵ *Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik*, Frankfurt, 1983, p.13.

being in the sense of presence (Anwesenheit) and therefore the fact that Heidegger remains in a sense within the frame of "logical prejudice".

The presupposition of truth is a legitimising supposition and the transcendental condition of any reflexive relation (scientific, philosophical or other.)

Does *What Is Metaphysics?* not show such a situation? Why does Heidegger need the reification of this syncategorematic "nichts" by substantivation in "das Nichts"? Does this attempt serve the purpose of the author?

His answer to the first question is: "Does Nothing exist only because there is the 'no', that is, negation? Or rather vice versa... We assert: The nothing is more original than the 'no' and the negation. If this thesis is justified, then the possibility of negation as the activity of the intellect and the intellect itself somehow depend on the nothing."⁴⁶

In his opinion the experience of the nothing is something else than logical negation: it is a dynamic negation by which we experience the "slip" of being as a whole. In comparison, the negation of a sentence is secondary, thinks the author. False! The presupposition of the truth of the assertion is obvious (implicitly; otherwise it will not be presupposition) when Heidegger wants to bring the intellect in its own place. The negation of the primacy of the intellect is strictly speaking a negation and therefore a structural component of language as well as a "house of being". Can the aspects linked to the formal dimension be excommunicated from language? Does language not originally have this "impure" structure? Is the assertive moment (along with all the categories of logic) not present when we reveal something? Are these solitary moments not simultaneously present in the Heideggerian explication of truth? Original truth (the revelation of the sense of being) is the horizon of the discovery of being and of the truth of the assertion therefore, whereas the truth of the assertion circumscribes this horizon which comes to be sensed only by the explication of original truth by indicative-formal assertions.

In conclusion, the issue of thematisation must take into consideration the co-originality of truths: original truth and the truth of the assertion. The presupposition of the truth of assertion requires therefore a de-construction of the Heideggerian analytics of the Dasein and a rethinking of the relation between being and existence, ontic and ontological, temporal and intratemporal. The fact that existential analysis is based on existential possibilities proves that Heidegger himself came close to these relations. "There is no understanding of Being which is not rooted in an ontic attitude towards existence."⁴⁷ The nature of this grounding

⁴⁶ *Was ist Metaphysik?*, Siebte Aufl. v. Kostermann, Frankfurt, 1955, p.28-29.

⁴⁷ *Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*, p.466 and *Sein und Zeit*, p.310: "Aber liegt der durchgeführten ontologischen Interpretation der Existenz des Daseins nicht eine bestimmte ontische Auffassung von eigentlicher Existenz, ein faktisches Ideal des Daseins zugrunde? Das ist der Tat so."

remains completely obscure in Heidegger's work. The issue of transcendental grounding cannot be elucidated without the presupposition of truth in the sense presented above.

Is this a return to the classical solution of the universality of (classical!) logic? Not at all! What we have theorised is merely the *type* (sense) of the presupposition of truth, not its criteria. What we have presupposed is not the truth of a logic, but the truth which grounds an infinity of logical-hermeneutic constructions. Be it in an explicit way or not, the truth of our presupposition takes on the necessary feature of the presupposition of truth, even in the cases in which it appears to be completely excommunicated. The reason for this is that originally the being of the Dasein has an *onto-logical* structure, one which compels us to rethink the sense of understanding in terms of the co-originality of truths.